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Abstract 
The Tsugaru domain in far north eastern Honshu was located at the very northern 
bourtdary of Japan in the Tokugawa period, and its identify~ Q1 independent polify was 
almost~ new ~ the shoguicrte itself. A relative newcomer to the political atd economic 
structures that had taken shape by the end of the sixteenth century, the domain spent 
most of the seventeenth century establishirg itself ~ a viable polify with a sound 
economic base. By the mid eighteenth century, after the productivify of T sugaru had 
increased by a greater margin thal that of orry other domain, outgoi"9 expenditures had 
also increased enonnously and a fiscal crisis occurred. 
This dissertation excunines the program of reforms instituted in the Horeki reforms to 
address the situation, arguirg that the rationalisation of bureaucracy and integration of 
local commercial actors into mancgirg official fiscal affairs showed some promise. Then, 
by closely tracirg the experiences of famine in Tsugaru and two neighbouri"9 domains, 
ald their comparative fates in after the harvest failure that interrupted Tsugaru's 
reform program, I go on to argue that the combirotion of distalce from the central 
markets, a climate unsuited to rice cultivation at the technological level of the period, 
and a late start in establishirg SWld ?roceclures for fiscal mc1m3ernent memt that the 
T sugaru polify was hard put to move out of the precarious situation it was in by the mid 
1700s. 
The succession of a child daimyo had left the administration of the domain in the hands 
of a small group of hereditary elders before the crises. One of them, who favoured 
fl.l1damental cha1'9es to government structures and procedures, was instrumental in the 
appointment of NyGi Mitsugi to le.ad the reforms. Mitsugi stored rice in the domain's 
granaries and was able to save the domain from the famine by arragi"9 the distribution 
of relief food supplies. The elders, religious institutions and established merchants of 
the domain, however, chafed at the radical reform policies with which he followed up 
that triumph, however, aid he was dismissed. 
Through ai examination of some of the writirgs Mitsugi produced duri~ the periods he 
spent under house arrest aid in exile, I argue that although to a large extent the 
domain was captive to its geography, climate and lack of depth in administrative 
experience, the world of the spirit and the intellect had no bol.11daries. 
T aki"9 politics in the broadest sense of political economy and social organisation, the 
dissertation demonstrates that although the id~ ald arguments for more equitable 
access to entitlements to adeqoote food were accessible to, and in fact elaborated by, 
NyGi Mitsugi, the powers of we.alth, status and a centralised political system militated 
cgainst savirg the poorest and most isolated people from starvation when famines 
occurred. 
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Notes to the Reader 
Usage 
•!• NyCii Ichirazaemon Noritomi was given the mine Mitsugi by the Tsugaru daimyo in 
1756. That is the rnme usually used now to refer to him. To avoid confusion, I use 
Mitsugi throughout this study. 
•!• The word "farmer" is used where readers might expect "peasant''. In one of my 
dictiornries, the definition of the latter begins: n(not in GB or US)colJ1tryman 
workinJ on the land, ... 
•!• Australian English spelling is used, except in quotations from other versions of 
English. 
•!• Japanese and Ghinese persoool mines are given in the order in which they are used, 
usually with family mine first. 
•!• Gendered langucge is sometimes used deliberately. 
•!• The word "heaven" is sometimes given a capital letter, out of respect. 
•!• Tokugawa period lunar calendar dates are used where they are comected with the 
mines of events, or when a number of happenings in the same reign era are being 
discussed. 
Translation 
•!• Gharacters and meanings are not routinely given for Japanese or Ghinese words, 
but are added where they might be useful. 
•!• I have deliberately not presented all the material taken directly from Mitsugi's 
works and other eighteenth century sources as IC>nJ, direct quotations, but instead 
paraphrased a fair amount. This is because of the problems of voice and 
readability. 
•!• Unless translations are otherwise attributed, they are mine. 
Abbreviations used in footnotes 
•!• NMZ Nyoi Mitsugizensha 4 Vols. (1935-37) 
•!• SHS Shinpen Hirosaki-shi shi, shiryohen 2. (1996) 
•:• HSS Hirosaki-shi shi. (1963) 
•!• TKD Tsugaru kyUki denrui. (1958) 
•!• TRK Tsugaru rekidai kirui. (1959) 
Units of Measure 
l£r9th and are.a 
1 ri= 36 cha = 3.93 kilometers or 2.44 miles 
1 cho(or chiibu) = .992 hectares= 2.45 acres 
Volume 
2.5hyii=1 koku =approx 180 litres of rice. 
Moret and Weights 
10 rin= 1 bu; and 4 bu= 1 ryiiof gold 
1kan=J()(X)monme=3,750g,and 1 monme=lO fU?of silver 
From the 1740s until 1800, 1ryii=61 monme5 bu7 rin 
The price of rice was usually between 50 and 80 monme per koku. 
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Plates 1 and 2: Gate and moot of Hirosoki castle. and a view of Mount Iwoki from 
the castle grounds 
Photographs by the author unless otherwise acknowledged. 
Prologue 
From where I am standing on the bank of the moat of Hirosaki castle, 
beside the east gatehouse of the second compound, I can see along one side of 
the old earthen wall. A row of craggy cherry trees lines the top; sasa bamboo 
grass covers the slope down to the water. The pent roof of the gatehouse is 
unusually high, so the stronger roof above protects it from heavy snowfalls. 
There are no stone reinforcements beside the gatehouse, and the outer wall is 
low and simple. There has been no fear of attack since the castle site was 
chosen some time before 1608. 
1 
Beneath my feet, little turtles are paddling busily on the surface of the 
moat, and startled minnows and summer insects dart away in all directions. 
Deep down, where the water is still, swim large carp. Their progress is barely 
perceptible. Beyond the wall are what remains of the administrative 
headquarters of the twelve successive Tsugaru daimyos who ruled the domain 
between 1610 and 1868. Briefly during the 1750's an official called Nyui 
Mitsugi held almost unassailable power here, while he worked to stave off the 
domain's financial ruin and a famine. Then he fell from grace. Traces of his 
existence can still be found. 
To the east of the castle runs the bus route linking Hirosaki station to 
the village of Kawaratai, where Mitsugi was once exiled for a time. Passing 
between the moat and the City Off ice, the road heads westward out of town, 
then meanders back and forth across the Iwaki River, along its banks, past the 
weathered traces of old riparian works and a modern dam, to a valley near its 
source in the south-western foothills of Mount Iwaki. This mountain, a 
dormant volcano, is the dominant feature in Hirosaki's landscape: a stunning 
snow-covered "Tsugaru Fuji" for half the year, but now its steep, thickly 
wooded folds and peaks are swathed in summer mist. 
2 
Kawaratai is, literally, the end of the road. By the time we arrive there, 
Mount Iwaki has disappeared behind the closer slopes of the valley, which rise 
almost immediately on either side. By the grassy lot where the bus turns 
around is a little store. When asked for directions, its elderly, kimono-clad 
keeper says that just up the way there is a sign about a memorial for a teacher 
from long ago, but she can't remember who the person was. Sure enough, a 
short walk is rewarded by the appearance of a recently painted signpost that 
reads, "Nyui Mitsugi Memorial Stone", and directs the visitor along a side 
pathway in between houses. It climbs steadily towards the red torii and 
narrow flight of concrete steps leading to the village shrine. In a clearing just 
by the torii stands the stone. Below the heading, "Master Nyui Mitsugi" is a 
lengthy inscription. It is still legible for the most part.1 
The epitaph begins with the assertion: "Nyui Mitsugi was indeed a son 
of Tsugaru, land of steep mountains and long streams". We are then told that 
he became, at a very early age, "an accomplished scholar in the fields of 
Japanese, Chinese and Buddhist studies; and was therefore fully conversant 
with the mysteries of mathematics, the Doctrine of the Mean, and the Book of 
Changes before he turned his attention to economics". On that subject, "he 
wrote copiously, expressing his own impressively wide-ranging and impassioned 
opinions in urgent language, earnestly seeking to transmit ideals and guidance 
to the generations of Tsugaru administrators who would follow him". 
He was appointed twice to serve as kanjo bugyo (IJJE*ff) in Tsugaru.2 
1 Help can be found from the transcript found at the front of the fourth, and final, volume of 
Nyui Mitsugi Zenshu (The Complete Works of Nyui Mitsugi). These four volumes were edited by 
Nakamichi Hitoshi and published privately in Tokyo under the auspices of the NyOi Mitsugi 
Kenshokai (Association to Celebrate the Memory of Nyoi Mitsugi) between 1935 and 1937. for 
this study I have relied on photocopies of the published Zenshu, obtained from the National Diet 
Library and the Hirosaki City Library, with reference to photocopies of some of the original 
handwritten texts. 
2 From two to eight appointees would hold these key administrative posts at any one time in 
Tsugaru; they were in charge of a wide range of domain financial, legal and judicial matters, 
including tax collection. Kanjo bugyois translated variously, fore example, as "superintendents 
of finance" (Hall in the Cambridge History, page 169, Totman in Politics, page 271), "magistrate 
of the exchequer" (Ravina, Land and Lordship, page 227) and "fiscal-judicial commissioner" 
(Nakai in Shogunal Politics, page 2). 
3 
Plote 3: Sign to Nyiii Mitsugi no hi. 
Plote 4: The Nyiii Mitsugi memoriol stone. 
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Both were times when the Tsugaru government was faced with critical financial 
crises. Mitsugi, the account continues: 
dealt with the situation in a far-sighted manner, leaving behind 
a record of strong-minded administrative policy, including the 
recognition of Ainu as human beings. 
This was a "distinctive measure", bestowing official recognition as people of 
Tsugaru upon the Ainu people who lived along the Sotogahama coast. They 
were to be counted in population censuses in the same way as all other subjects 
of the daimyo. During a "subsequent period of exile in Kawaratai, not only did 
he work hard to deliver the unlettered local inhabitants from the shackles of 
their ignorance; he also harnessed water from local mountain streams for 
irrigation, to the benefit of everyone in the vicinity". His life, described as 
"courageous and distinguished", came to an end on the 6th day of the 4th 
month of Kansei 4 (1792). "All things considered", the eulogist sums up, "he was 
a truly outstanding individual of rare ability and intellect." 
Here, Mitsugi's story ends and the inscription turns to explaining why 
the monument was constructed, and who was responsible. I wonder, for a 
moment, why the epitaph has not mentioned the fact that Mitsugi saved the 
people of Tsugaru from starvation during the Horeki famine, then go on 
reading. The explanation given about the erection of the memorial is that a 
local man, Hasegawa Susumu from Meyamura, "wished to make sure that 
Mitsugi's legacy would be handed down to inspire the future inhabitants of 
Tsugaru". In December 1935, the Association to Celebrate the Memory of 
Nyui Mitsugi was formed. Its aims were to collate and publish Mitsugi' s 
written works; and to obtain stone from nearby Meyanosawa for the 
construction of a monument at Kawaratai "in order to record this very account 
for the edification of posterity". The last line of the main inscription ends 
simply with: "Composed and written by Nakamichi and the others." The date is 
the sixth month of Showa 10 (1935). In the far left bottom corner is the 
name of Nyui Tatsuo, one of Mitsugi's descendants, followed by a word 
indicating that the large title characters heading the main inscription are 
modelled on calligraphy he prepared for the purpose. 
Plate 5: Heading, readi119 from right to left, NyOi Mitsugi sensei. 
Plate 6: View from the stone across the village and rice fields to 
the other side of the valley. 
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Turning from the stone and looking back across the valley, I am struck 
by how green it is - especially in comparison with the blanketed white stillness 
of wintertime. The strip of cultivable land is so narrow that a direct walk from 
beside the stone, down past the houses and through the fields, to the foot of 
the wooded hills on the other side takes just around five minutes. Random 
assortments of ripening egg-plants, green beans, cucumbers, pumpkins and pink 
alstroemaria flowers burst out of little plots between the rice fields and the 
houses. Along with the two-stroke fuel cans and blue plastic buckets, they are 
all so much part of our familiar turn-of-the-century world that the idea of 
trying to envisage this place as it might have been 250 years ago seems 
suddenly ridiculous. 
Meanwhile, the kindly driver and storekeeper have kept watch for the 
solitary stranger, and signal that time has run out. The only other bus 
passenger motions me to sit beside her. When she is told in response to a 
sociable enquiry that the purpose of this early-morning visit has been to 
photograph Kawaratai and the memorial in the summer time, her browned face 
wrinkles with puzzled amusement. She is familiar with the stone, remembers 
vaguely that there was a big ceremony when it was put there, but she has 
never actually read the inscription. The name Nyai Mitsugi means nothing to 
her. 
Introduction 
On Being in History 
The historian is just another dim figure trudging along in 
another part of the procession. 
The historian without his facts is rootless and futile; the facts 
without their historian are dead and meaningless. 
History consists of a corpus of ascertained facts ... like fish on 
the fishmonger's slab. The historian collects them, takes them 
home, and cooks and serves them in whatever style appeals to 
him. E. H. Carr3 
... when the mode of differentiation between significative 
factors and textual materiality changes, the same text may 
well be susceptible to an entirely different understanding. 
Naoki Sakai4 
Iterability "structures the mark of writing itself, and does so 
moreover for no matter what type of writing (pictographic, 
hieroglyphic, ideographic, phonetic, alphabetic, to use the old 
categories). A writing that was not structurally legible -
iterable - beyond the death of the addressee would not be 
writing." Jacques Derrida5 
7 
We live in wordy times. They are self-conscious times, too, for those 
who would write history. It seems no longer possible to write with the clarity 
and certainty of E. H. Carr about what we do. Each of us shuffles along for a 
while, a little behind Carr's own cohort, in the endless winding procession of 
humanity and its chroniclers. Different sections of the procession come into 
focus at different times, but only for a moment. We can be startled by a 
glimpse here, and recoil; or be enchanted by a fragment there, and become lost 
in another world. 
How can we pause long enough to coherently problematise the objects 
of our gaze, let alone critique other representations of them? Is it proper for 
us to set out to imagine the bodies, the selves, of others, constructed within 
and by all the complexities and transformations of the social in their place and 
3 E. H. Carr, What is History?, 2nd edition. London: Penguin Books, 1987. Pages 36,30 and 9. 
4 Sakai, Voices of the Past, page 2. 
5 Jacques Derrida, •Signature Event Context," in Margins of Philosophy, page 315. 
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time - in a section of the human procession so comprehensively other than 
ours? How can we, I wonder after reading Naoki Sakai, learn in time to 
differentiate between the verbal signification evoked by patterns of sign, and 
the coded body that includes the materials in which our textual sources are 
inscribed?6 Will we transgress the rules of praxis in our field by not applying 
inverted commas and capital letters to certain common nouns, so as to render 
our meanings clear in the ephemeral discursive space we aspire to re-form by 
our engagement with it? Towards the end of this introductory chapter, I will 
outline some of the ideas that have helped me cope with such disabling 
questions. 
Meanwhile, some other matters need to be made clear. What particular 
fish have been selected from Carr's trope-ical fishmonger's slab, and why 
those? And what, in this age of unstable meanings, isa fish any more? What 
recipes are used for preparing the chosen ones? If they are uncommon 
ingredients, not often chosen by historians cooking up this kind of story, why 
decide now to construct this version of it? Is it a variation on a comfortably 
familiar theme, or are the components combined in new ways? 
While it can be said without equivocation that the domain of Tsugaru, an 
official called Nyui Mitsugi, and the Horeki crisis in Tsugaru are the main 
historical ingredients in what will be served up in the following chapters, and 
that they are not often selected by historian-cooks from the myriad 
phenomena on the slab of the past, I will discuss my approach to the tasks of 
selecting and using my sources in the section on subjects and objects at the 
end of this introduction. Before that, I mention some absences, partial and 
complete, from the kinds of histories of Japan and the Tokugawa period that 
have appeared over the last century. To suggest some reasons why those 
absences are not so surprising, I go on to examine a selection of particular 
parts of some familiar narrative streams in a little more detail. Finally, some 
theoretical ideas are self-consciously set out, so that the premises, intentions 
and the argument of this study might be as clear as possible. 
9 
I On being absent 
E. H. Carr stirs up a hornet's nest with his fishy trope. At first glance, 
he seems to suggest that a cook simply does what he (sic) pleases: that the 
kinds of materials we historians make the objects of our scrutiny, the ways in 
which we interpret them and combine them with other subject matter to draw, 
or hint at, conclusions, are all a matter of uninhibited choice. But, what kind of 
utensils does his cook use? Whose recipe books are on the shelf, and how did 
his mother cook? Does he fear the smell of garlic? Does he respect genres, 
schools or traditions? 
We are not so free at all, really. It is interesting, though, to think 
sometimes about the fish that are left behind on the slab: rejected because 
they do not seem to appropriate for the recipes and cooking methods to which 
the cook has recourse. The particular rejects I consider in this study have 
been left out for various reasons, which are not necessarily connected with 
each other. Famine victims in the pre-modern past, for example, usually walked 
so lightly on the earth and inscribed so little that there are few fish for 
historians to fry; while Tsugaru and Nyui Mitsugi left a rather assorted catch, 
for which recipes have not been so readily available. 
(i) Tsugaru 
In an evocative memoir called Tsugaru, written after a trip home in the 
1940's, Dazai Osamu laments the ignorance he found among contemporaries 
about the region.7 
Most people know little about the history of Tsugaru ... It 
seems some even think Tsugaru is the same thing as Mutsu 
province or Aomori Prefecture. This is hardly surprising. 
In the textbooks on Japanese history that we used at school, 
Tsugaru was mentioned only once, and that was in passing ... 
7 Dazai Osamu, Tsugaru. in Dazai Osamu Zensho: 7, pages 94-95. Translated by James 
Westerhoven as Return to Tsugaru, Tokyo: Kodansha International Ltd 1985. The passages 
quoted appear in the English version on pages 100 - 102. I have altered the translation in places. 
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Based on: "Provinces of Japan in 1808" in Smith, Agrarian Origins, 
opposite page 1; and "Provinces and regions of early modern Japan", in 
Hall (ed.), Cambridge History, pages xxiv-xxvii. The Tsugaru territory 
was the western portion of Mutsu province north of Ugo. 
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Dazai follows up his complaint by quoting the textbook passage that tells how, 
in the year 658 CE, the Empress Saimei dispatched Abe no Hirafu to "pacify 
the regions that are now known as Akita and Tsugaru". He continues expanding 
on his theme, building a crescendo that ends with a set of loud rhetorical 
questions: 
. . . But there was no reference to Tsugaru anywhere else, not 
in our elementary school textbooks, or middle school 
textbooks, or even in lectures at high school ... It fills me 
with sadness to think that our textbooks treated the Age of 
the Gods with great reverence, but only mentioned the name 
of Tsugaru once - in all those years between the Emperor 
Jinmu and the present ... 
What on earth were they doing in Tsugaru all those years? 
Just getting up, rearranging their kimonos and sitting down 
again? For all that time? Did they do nothing but blink like 
owls, and never take a single step outside their own borders? 
More than half a century has passed since Tsugarufirst appeared, but a 
look at the indexes of any number of historical monographs, text books and 
reference works demonstrates that the intervening decades have not changed 
the situation much since Dazai's day. Tsugaru simply does not often attract 
the national historiographer's gaze. In the exciting event that an historian of 
the Tokugawa period, writing in Japanese or another language, refers to 
"Tohoku" in a title, more often than not the locus of enquiry turns out to be 
the Sendai domain, Aizu or Shonai. 
Although it is hoped that this study will patch over some small corners 
of the large hole Dazai so melodramatically conjures up, its purpose is not 
simply to fill selected gaps in familiar histories of Japan by furnishing more 
facts to strengthen their core narratives. At the very least, I want wherever 
possible to reverse the viewpoint, and to write about Tsugaru from a localised 
perspective rather than a central one. It is important, though, to consider why 
the lacuna Dazai bewails still exists. 
One set of reasons for Tsugaru's fleeting appearance in Japanese 
national history is suggested by the series of textbook tales Dazai selects to 
highlight his point. This is a task he tackles with some gusto, working through 
12 
the arcane contents of the kinds of chronologies and narratives still found in 
standard texts, from before Yamato Takeru's legendary campaign against the 
Emishi, through Abe no Hirafu's so-called pacification campaigns and the 
glorious achievements of Sakanoue no Tamuramaro, who "subdued" and 
"subjugated" the Ezo during the ninth, and on and on to what was recorded as 
Minamoto Yoritomo's "subjugation of the whole of the northeast". After 
noting the founding of the Kamakura bakufu by Yoritomo, Dazai then leaps 
seven centuries to complete his dismal catalogue of Tsugaru's absences by 
pointing out that another momentous national historical event, the overthrow 
of the Tokugawa regime, was initiated by a triumvirate of tozama domains from 
the far distant southwest. 
Between the Kamakura and Meiji periods, he might have mentioned the 
last decades of the sixteenth century when regional warlords were fighting 
the epic battles that gave the period its name. Sengoku(~~) literally means 
"countries at war". There was no figure from Tsugaru at this time, either, to 
compare with Takeda Shingen, the legendary daimyo of Kai, or his equally 
celebrated foe, Uesugi Kenshin, of the Yonezawa Uesugi line; nor were there 
battle sites in Tsugaru to mention alongside Kawanakajima or Sekigahara, both 
of which have become vivid elements of popular culture by way of television 
dramas and electronic games. In Tsugaru there was just a rather ordinary 
story about the defection of a vassal. This betrayal, though, in contrast to 
Akechi Mitsuhide's of Oda Nobunaga, had no significant consequences in the 
political centre. 
What Harold Bolitho has observed about the entire province of Echigo 
was even more true of Tsugaru, further north on the Japan Sea coast and even 
more distant from the Pacific coast and the Inland Sea, "where the flow of 
people, gossip, information, and ideas was never-ending." 8 Like Echigo, Tsugaru 
contained no places of historical cultural significance, like Hiraizumi; nor were 
there well-known sites· of religious or scenic significance to attract visitors, 
8 Pages 259-60 in Harold Bolitho, "The Echigo War, 1868", in Monumenta Nipponica, XXXIV:3, 
1979, pages 259-77. 
like the three sacred mountains of Hagurosan, Gasson and Yodonosan in the 
province of Dewa. 
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There is just one context in which Tsugaru is hardly ever absent. It is 
when the major domains of Tokugawa Japan (circa 1600-1867) are listed or 
mapped in textbooks and monographs. For no obvious reason, the domain is 
nearly always among the twenty-five or so included, even when Hirosaki and 
Tsugaru do not appear in the index or text of the given work. The nature of 
"majorness" is rarely defined, though. As we have already noted, the region 
did not spawn major actors or host dramatic events that featured on what was 
to become the national stage. Nor, as Mark Ravina points out, was it among the 
domains whose territory comprised entire ancient provinces, or kuni.9 
One important measure of political status, as well as the amount of 
financial or military support the shogun could demand of the daimyo of a 
domain, was its kokudaka (:P-i%). This was the putative capacity of the domain's 
lands to generate taxable wealth, expressed as a volume of hulled rice of 
equivalent value. Tsugaru rated a kokudakaof only 47,000 kokuthroughout the 
entire seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, when there were some twenty or 
so other domains assessed at 100 ,000 koku or more that are rarely included in 
the lists and maps.10 Tsugaru was rewarded with added omotedaka (formal 
yield) status after despatching troops, on bakufu orders, to Ezo in 1805 and 
then to the islands of Etorofu and Kunashiri in 1808. The rating of the domain 
leapt first from 47,000 kokuto 70,000 koku, and after the second expedition 
to 100,000 koku. Note: One kokuis around 180 litres, or nearly 5 bushells. 
9 Mark Ravina, land and lordship in Early Modern Japan. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1999, pages 19-23, 28-34 and 117-119. I have found Ravina a valuable interlocutor and foil, 
particularly for Chapters 2 and 3. I do not agree with his suggestion that Tsugaru's early daimyo 
took care to ingratiate themselves with Edo because Tsugaru did not have kuni(country) status. 
Their attitudes more likely quite realistic, and derived from habits and practices developed 
around the time of their ancestor's, probably treacherous, secession from Nanbu, when shogunal 
approval was urgently needed. 
10 Those domains include, for example, the shinpan Matsudaira domains at Matsue (186 ,000 
koku), Kawagoe (170,000 koku), and Matsuyama (150,000 koku) and the fudaiYanagisawa domain 
at Koriyama (151,200 koku). Bolitho points out in "Echigo War" (see note 8) that among the 
Echigo domains Takada, with a kokudakaof 150,000 koku, would only narrowly have rated 
inclusion among "Tokugawa Japan's top thirty" domains. 
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Domain Castle town Daimyo family Status Wealth 
1 Hirosaki Tsugaru tozama 47,000 
100,000 
2 Satake Kubota (Akita) Sa take tozama 205,800 
3 Morioka Nan bu tozama 200,000 
4 Shonai Sharri (T St.r'l.glO~) Sakai fudai 140,000 
5 Sendai Date tozama 620,000 
6 Yonezawa Uesugi tozama 150,000 
7 Aizu Aizu-Wakamatsu Hoshina-Matsudaira shinpan 230,000 
8 Mi to Tokugawa shinpan 350,000 
9 Kaqa * Kanazawa Maeda tozama 1,022,700 
10 Owari * Nagoya Tokugawa shin pan 619,000 
11 Echizen* Fukui Matsudaira shin pan 320,000 
12 Hikone Ii fudai 350,000 
13 (Anotsu) Tsu To do tozama 363,000 
14 Kii Wakayama Tokugawa shinpan 555,000 
15 Hime.ii Sakakibara, Sakai fudai 150,000 
16 Bizen* Okayama Ikeda tozama 305,000 
17 Insho * Tottori Ikeda tozama 325,000 
18 Aki* Hiroshima Asano tozama 426,000 
19 Chosho* Hagi Mori tozama 369,000 
20 Awa* Tokushima Hachisuka tozama 257,900 
21 Tosa* Kochi Yamanouchi tozama 242,000 
22 Satsuma* Kagoshima Shimazu tozama 729,800 
23 Kumamoto Hosokawa tozama 545,000 
24 Kurume Ari ma tozama 210,000 
25 Saga Nabeshima tozama 357,000 
26 Fukuoka Kuroda tozama 520,000 
27 Tsushima FuchO So tozama 100,000 
Tobie 1: Some eighteenth-centuy domains. ther castle ft7.vns. daimyo fcm1ies ad ElJ!CitM; weatth 
Based on: Totman, Early Modern Japan, list of ten greatest domains in 1690 on page 
119; Kimura et al. (eds.) Hanshi Jiten, and Half (ed.), Cambridge History, Map 4.1 on 
page 151. 
• Tsugaru's kokudaka is most often given as 100,000 koku. See the last paragraph 
of the previous page for details. 
• * denotes a kuni (domain comprising one or more entire provinces). 
• Income is measured in koku of rice. 
• Numbers refer to domains included in the map on the previous page. 
• For domains not named in the Domain column, either the daimyo family name is 
used, or that of the castle town - or both, as in the Date/Sendai domain. 
• The Tsushima domain (27) was in fact very small, but the daimyo was granted 
extra status in recognition of his role in supervising Korean-Japanese trade. 
27 rJ [/JTsushima 
'Q22,if' 
~@ 
Pacific Ocean 
Map 2: Tokugawa bakufu lands and some domains in the mid Tokugawa period 
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Based on: "Tokugawa domains - 1664", Map 4 in Totman, Politics, page 71, and "Major daimyo domains and capital cities, 
mid-seventeenth century", Map 4.1 in Hall (ed), Cambndge HistoryI, page 151. Numbers refer to domains listed on the table opposite 
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The only other possible reason for Tsugaru's classification as a major domain is 
land area, which is, in fact, the domain's only apparent distinguishing feature. My 
argument in section II of this introduction will therefore suggest that we should 
not expect Tsugaru - or the Horeki famine experience there or Nyui Mitsugi - to 
be included in standard historical narratives of Japan and the Tokugawa period. 
Given the way those narratives are structured, they are irrelevant. That is not to 
say that lives which were lived, and events that occurred, in Tsugaru were not 
connected with what went on in the rest of Japan between the 1580s and the 
1860s: far from it. It is to say, though, that those lives and events were 
peripheral to the ones that form the central core of Japan's national story. Unlike 
the Ina valley, northwest of Nagoya, which once pulsed with the productive, 
commercial and communications activity that emanated from the proto-national 
city hubs, but was later made into a periphery by the crude mechanisms of 
modernity, Tsugaru was always peripheral, and is perhaps even now only 
incompletely articulated with the centre.11 
Lives lived and events occurring in that far-off place have been to the 
national story as akebi canes cut during the Tsugaru summer are to the gnarled 
old vines they are harvested from.12 Were it not for the trunk and branches at 
the centre, no beautiful basket ware would ever be woven from those peripheral 
canes; but, on the other hand, were no canes harvested and no craft items 
produced, the life of the base vine would continue undisturbed, responding as it 
always had to the rhythm of the seasons. 
(ii) Nyui Mitsugi 
After bewailing at some length Tsugaru's diminutive presence in the 
national story, Dazai actually goes on in the same passage to offer himself and his 
11 Karen Wigen has written an engaging and provocative study of the fate of this valley, which is 
located in central Japan on what was a popular alternative route through the mountains between 
Kyoto and Edo: The Making of a Japanese Periphery, 1750-1920. Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1995. 
12 The plant is akebia quinata (five-leaved akebia); its canes are used in such places as Tsugaru and 
nothern Nagano prefecture to produce baskets and other woven items. The craft is called akebi 
zaiku (7 'T ~-~I). 
readers reassurance. He responds to his own proposition that his Tsugaru 
ancestors had just blinked like owls and wriggled to adjust their kimonos while 
centuries of Japan's history had passed by, with: 
No, no - that can't have been the case at all. If you asked the 
people themselves, they would answer: "That's how it might seem, 
but we were pretty busy, you know."13 
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If old documents are anything to go by, one person who certainly does seem 
to have been busy, for a few of those years at least, was Nyui Mitsugi - domain 
bureaucrat, scholar, reformer and tireless activist. According to the records, and 
at this point I am willing to concede that they are not all unproblematic as 
evidence, Mitsugi lived from the 2"d year of Shotoku (1712) until Kansei 3 (1792). 
As the inscription on the stone in Kawaratai says, Mitsugi not only authored a 
substantial number of scholarly texts, but he also served twice as kanjo bugyo(a 
financial magistrate) in the Tsugaru domain government, courageously introducing 
radical reforms while in office. Furthermore, while staying in Kawaratai he 
provided the local folk with welcome and beneficial instruction in literacy, 
numeracy and hydraulics.14 
That "subsequent period of exile" in Kawaratai, mentioned so cryptically in 
the memorial inscription, was, in fact, the official punishment to which he was 
sentenced at the end of his second period in office in An'ei 10 (1780). Both times 
when he occupied the position of kanjo bugyo, his reform policies caused such 
resentment and confusion in the domain that they were abandoned and he was 
dismissed in disgrace. That is the impression to be gained, at any rate, by one 
kind of reading of the records. Mark Ravina, for example, finishes his brief 
section on the Horeki reforms simply by concluding - in what comes across as the 
admonitory tone used by champions of market forces when interference in the 
motions of the invisible hand are mooted - that Mitsugi's attempt to shift control 
of the commercial sector to the government was a complete failure.15 
13 Dazai, Tsugaru, page 102. 
14 Kudo Kieimon H1kki in AKS, pages 276-277. 
15 Ravina, land and lordship, page 128. 
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There is an absence in this kind of reading, which rather surprisingly 
occurs in the account on the stone too, to take adequate account of one strikingly 
positive achievement of Mitsugi's official career: he saved the lives of the people 
of Tsugaru during the Horeki Famine. During his first period in charge of domain 
finances he took such far-sighted and thorough measures to conserve, collect and 
redistribute food supplies throughout the domain that not a single death from 
starvation was registered during 1755 and 1756. Since this was a famine that is 
believed to have been particularly severe in the Tohoku Region, and to have caused 
tens of thousands of deaths in the neighbouring Nanbu, Hachinohe and Akita 
domains, it seemed to me that the circumstances of Mitsugi's Horeki reforms and 
their failure warranted further enquiry. 
Interest in a virtually unknown eighteenth-century person would not 
normally be immediately sparked, though, by a chance encounter with some 
documents or another mossy memorial stone. In my case, the desire to know more 
was first kindled by Kojima Yasunori's article entitled, "The Thought of Nyai 
Mitsugi: Practicality and Reform in Tsugaru Domain". 16 Serendipity delivered me 
to Tokyo and the office of Professor M. William Steele just as he was finishing 
off his translation of this essay. Kojima's work conveys in a particularly engaging 
way the variety and vitality of Mitsugi's writings, highlighting the strong sense of 
vocational commitment they convey. He also notes only in passing the singularity 
of Mitsugi's achievement in keeping the people of Tsugaru alive through the 
dreadful Horeki famine. 
This article is part of a small corpus of work on Mitsugi and the Horeki 
Reforms in Tsugaru that has gradually accumulated since the 1930's, bringing to 
life the legacy of the Association to Celebrate the Memory of Nyui Mitsugi. The 
survival of the Kawaratai monument is one kind of testimony to the effort put in 
by Hasegawa Susumu and the other members of the Association. Despite the 
curious omission of any reference to the famine in its fulsome eulogy, it can truly 
be said to have gone on providing "for the edification of posterity" an enduring 
16 Kojima Yasunori, "The Thought of NyUi Mitsugi: Practicality and Reform in Tsugaru Domain." Asian 
Cultural Studies 19 (March 1993): 35-51. 
19 
record of Mitsugi's life and achievements. More illuminating, though, is the other 
result of their labours: the availability in several Japanese libraries of the four-
volume set, The Complete Works of NytJiMitsug/ 17 Without the more accessible 
contributions, however, of someone like Kojima, as well as local educators and 
publicists from Aomori prefecture, it is difficult to imagine what those of us in 
posterity might have made of that record. 
There has not been, however, so far as I am aware, much other 
consciousness in the national historiographical world of Nyui Mitsugi and his works. 
His short exposition, "Statistical methods for government administration", 
appears in Nihon Keizai Taiten (A Compendium of Japanese Economics); and this 
seems to be the only reason for his name's appearing in the index, but not the 
body, of the much later comprehensive Kokushi Datjiten, an encyclopaedic 
dictionary of Japanese history.18 
Kojima Yasunori has very appropriately worked a brief account of the 
Horeki Reforms and Mitsugi's thought into his discussion of the Sorai tradition, 
political reform, and the social turn in eighteenth-century Confucian studies, 
which appears in the series, Nihon no Kinsei(Pre-Modern Japan).19 Among users of 
English, Mark Ravina, in the monograph already mentioned, chose the Tsugarµ 
domain as one of three comparative case studies in domainal economic management. 
While some aspect of Mitsugi's economic or practical thought, or his attempts at 
administrative reform, is acknowledged in each of these works, none of them 
makes more than a passing reference to his fight against famine, his thinking 
about political economy, his cosmology, or, for that matter, his poetry and his 
mastery of elementary surveying techniques. 
It is not in the trajectories of Japanese economic history, or the 
development of modern or practical thought that I want to place Mitsugi. Rather, 
he will be located amongst the constant struggles that fill images of the Tsugaru 
17 Nakamichi Hitoshi (ed.), Nyui Mitsugi zenshtJ. 4 vols. Tokyo: Nyui Mitsugi kenshokai, 1935-37. 
18 Kokushi daijiten henshu iiankai hen, Kokushi Da1jiten vol. 15b: Index of people's names. Tokyo: 
Yoshikawa kobunkan, 1996. p. 428. 
19 Kojima Yasunori, "Jugaku no shakaika", pages 123-74 in Kiichi Roi, ed., Jugaku, kokugaku, yogaku, 
volume 13 of Mhon no Kinsei. Tokyo: Chuo koronsha, 1993. 
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domain during the eighteenth-century. The thought, practices, and cosmology, as 
read from the texts that have survived to represent the life he lived as an 
individual will also be interpreted as far as possible from that point of view. 
(iii) Famine 
Unlike Tsugaru and Nyui Mitsugi, famine features with some prominence in 
the Japanese historical lexicon, as it does in the histories of most other societies 
that once practiced settled agriculture. Addressing the subject of famine has 
been one of the most challenging parts of this study: imagining the place famine, 
and the fear of it, might have had in the lives of people in a pre-industrial society. 
Disaster and suffering are integral parts of life in that long procession of 
humanity E.H. Carr imagined shuffling through time: chroniclers through the ages 
have noted, among these calamities, terrible experiences of famine. We in our 
time are still appalled by accounts of the loss of life in India after the drought of 
1769, and the famine in northern China a century later. About ten million people 
died each time. 
Scattered survivors of last century's Ukraine famine, Bengal famine, and 
Great Leap famine are still recalling and recording living memories. Histories of 
the globalised, post-industrial, twenty-first century, too, will include accounts of 
the food deprivation, starvation and death, which are not yet past, in Afghanistan, 
Ethiopia and the Sudan. 
Tales of the Great Famine, or Great Hunger (it is never necessary to say 
where, or when), haunt the histories of my own land, which was among those where 
many victims fled to make new lives after their experiences of poverty and dearth. 
In Japan, too, scattered images survive of the awful ways in which famine 
affected the lives of rural people. Given the number of lives that were lost or 
irrevocably changed, though, the coverage of famine in history and literature is 
disproportionately scant, especially when compared with the amount of space 
devoted to records and chronicles and memories of wars. 
Plate 7: Miss Kennedy distributing clothing at Kilrish 
Source: The Illustrated London News, December 22, 1849, page 404. See footnote 19. 
Miss Kennedy is "under ten years old", and is shown distributing clothes to "the 
wretched children" brought to her by "their more wretched parents." The text 
mentions the woman "crouching like a monkey, and drawing around her the only 
rag she had to conceal her nudity." He noted also the very cold weather and 
"the wet and mire in which the naked feet of the crowd were immersed."20 
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It is a commonplace with which one can hardly take issue that the Tokugawa 
suzerainty (1600-1867) delivered Japan's peoples from insecurity and violence 
associated with endemic warfare. This so-called Pax Tokugawa, however, was 
increasingly disturbed as time passed, not only by peasant uprisings and harsh 
penalties; but also by disasters that were regarded at the time as natural. An 
earthquake, volcanic eruption, windstorm, insect plague, fire or flood, or just a wet, 
chilly summer could result in thousands of deaths from starvation or epidemic 
illness. Lives lost due to famine during the Tokugawa period alone must be 
counted in hundreds of thousands, despite the sanguine estimates of some 
economic historians.21 For good reason, the spectre of mass death, illness and 
dislocation haunted much of Japan's population for most of the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries, and well into the nineteenth. 
20 The Illustrated London News, December 22, 1849, page 404, from the website: 
http://www.ppeople.virginia.edu/-eas5e/Irish/Wagon.html 
21 See particularly, "Morioka", pages 126 - 160, in: Hanley, Susan B. and Kozo Yamamura, Economic 
and Demographic change in Preindustrial Japan, 1600-1866. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1977. The way in which population figures are used in this work to revise famine casualties places 
too much confidence in statistics that were routinely fiddled for Bakufu consumption. 
22 
Plate 8: Japanese villagers fleeing from famine. ,. 
Source: Tatebe Seian, Minkan bikoroku. Property of the Naikaku bunko shozo. 
Historical narratives of these centuries are, not surprisingly, punctuated 
by such disasters as the great fire of Edo in 1657, and the eruptions of Mount 
Fuji in 1703 and Mount Asama in 1783. The 1783 eruption was associated with the 
second of the Tokugawa period's so-called three great famines, in the Kyoho, 
Tenmei and Tenpo eras, and in a following section I discuss the role of these 
famines in shaping the historical record. Let us pause here just long enough to 
observe that, although the Horeki famine, which devastated the northeast of 
Honshu, is not recorded as one of the three greats, the Kyoho famine, which 
affected mainly southwestern domains, is. It is, of course, through lack of 
accurate evidence about casualty numbers that this dubious honour must remain 
uncontested. 
Even so, like Peter Laslett, we can not help but marvel at how much we know 
about the history of the empire, the growth of the state bureaucracy, the 
exploits of generals, the work of men of letters or the culture of the Heian court 
aristocracy; but how miserably little we have found out about whether the people 
who lived in pre-industrial Japan had enough to eat.22 What we do know is that 
22 Peter Laslett, The World we have lost, page 127. 
when famine struck, they didn't: thousands of them died. Matsudaira Sadanobu 
has long been credited with taking relief measures to prevent starvation in 
Shirakawa when he was daimyo there during the Tenmei Famine, but there is very 
little else to compare with Mitsugi's success in saving the people of Tsugaru some 
decades earlier. In the expression "the politics of famine", I mean politics in the 
sense that is inherent in an expression used by scholars, thinkers and officials of 
the Tokugawa period to refer to the task of government administration: kei sei 
saimin (~i:!tm.13;;). The whole expression is often translated now as "political 
economy", and has been abbreviated to produce the Japanese expression meaning 
"economics": keizai. A sanguine choice, since the compound originally meant 
something like "bringing order to the social world and saving the people". 
The particular fragments of pre-modern experience in Japan around which 
my study has been generated, then are these: the vulnerability of the Tsugaru 
domain to famine, the man who acted during the Horeki crisis to prevent 
starvation in Tsugaru, his effort to reform the polity, and the ideas expressed in 
his writing. The idea of a fragment is taken from an article by Gyanendra Pandey, 
in which he addresses the problem of representing violence and its victims. His 
concern was that the scars left by historical violence and suffering are 
suppressed in narratives whose themes and contexts do not accommodate them.23 
Just as Pandey found in relation to the suffering of the Muslim and Hindu peoples 
when murderous violence swept northern India, and for many of the same kinds of 
reasons, in Japanese historical narratives actual human experience of dearth, 
starvation, flight and mass death in famines is largely represented by absence, or 
silence. For, as Millman and Kates put it, "The hungry rarely write history, and 
historians are rarely hungry."24 The personal experience of Tsugaru's famine 
victims is almost entirely beyond our reach: there is insufficient evidence to 
determine even their numbers with any certainty. One reason, then, for 
23 Gyanendra Pandey, "In Defense of the Fragment", Representations. 37, 1992, pages 27-55, pages 
27,41. 
24 Sara Millman and Robert W. Kates, "Introduction" in Lucile F. Newman (ed.), Hunger in History, 
Cambridge, Mass., 1990, page 22. 
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undertaking a study like this one is to construct a narrative in which the existence 
of those victims is inscribed. 
II Narrative streams in political history 
(i) Pacification of the east and the emergence of bakufu rule 
Many of the historical episodes listed by Dazai, and summarised in part (i) 
of the section above, are familiar elements in "pacifying the east" narratives. 
These accounts are rarely constructed from a viewpoint within the actual region 
where the events took place; where the bloody battles were fought, the troops 
encamped, the fields trampled, the structures built, the goods - and alliances -
traded. Instead, histories of life in northern Tohoku over two millennia are 
shaped by, and encompassed within, chronicles concentrated upon the purview, 
ambitions and destiny of key figures connected with the imperial state at the 
political centre, whether that was Heiankyo (later Kyoto), Nagaoka, Nara, or one 
of the earlier Yamato Basin capitals. Pacification by the Japanese court of the 
eastern and northern regions of Honshu is a crucial component of modern national 
narratives, intimately intertwined with accounts of state formation and the nature 
of ruling authority. 
It was, for example, from an origin in the Yamato court that Abe no 
Hirafu's expedition in 658 pressed on as far north as Akita and Tsugaru, as noted 
in Dazai's history textbook. The purpose of this campaign, and of the castles built 
at Taga (near Sendai) and Akita to house garrisons of guards during the following 
century, was to keep a frontier secure. This boundary, between lands of the 
Yamato and the not-Yamato seems to have existed principally in the minds of 
court functionaries at the capital. It was reproduced, with considerable 
embellishment, in the plots of warrior chronicles; then transmitted through the 
centuries to generations of Japanese consumers of literature, theatre, cinema, 
television and videotapes. 
Recent research indicates that peoples of both northern and southern 
origin intermingled on either side of that line; but the narrative that unfolds with 
the Yamato peoples moving northward and eastward against recurring Emishi or 
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Ezo resistance has remained the dominant one. It was the destiny of the 
northern peoples, in this epic, to be progressively "pacified" or "subdued" by the 
forces of the civilizing political centre, so that their way of life would "become 
the same as those of the newcomers"25; and they would cease being "a constant 
source of trouble and a hindrance to the opening up of new land".26 The way of life 
in question was, naturally, both settled and devoted to rice cultivation. In the 
light of archaeological evidence that rice cultivation may have been practised in 
the Tsugaru region as early as the fourth century, and certainly occurred during 
the seventh, this civilizing project seems in retrospect a little supererogatory.27 
These are the images that still inform popular plot lines, even though the 
people responsible for pillage, rebellion and general lawlessness in the north were 
just as likely to have been wajin (Yamato people) settlers and warriors from the 
south as emishi.28 The court waged a campaign over twelve years in the middle of 
the eleventh century, for example, against the armies of Abe Yoritoki, the very 
official it had appointed to keep the peace in Mutsu. Yoritoki was killed in 1057; 
but his son, Sadato, soon avenged him by routing the imperial forces. Imperial 
armies returned to the fray with reinforcements in 1062 to claim his head. It was 
the legendary Minamoto Yoshiiye, great-grandfather of Yoritomo and Yoshitsune, 
who finally bore this grisly trophy in triumph back to the (pacified?) capital of 
Kyoto. 
This episode was an early trickle in what became another major narrative 
stream: the emergence of warrior rule. Yoshiiye went on to be appointed 
Governor of Mutsu Province, and fought a second war against insubordinate wajin 
in the north before returning to the capital. for the ensuing half millennium or so, 
power in the northeast was divided between regional chieftains. Yoritomo made 
25 This is part of a 1935 note by Kume Kunitake on the destiny of indigenous peoples, in Kyujiinen 
Kaikoroku, page 38, quoted in Michael Weiner, ·Discourses of race, nation and empire in pre-1945 
Japan". Ethnic and Racial Studies, Volume 18 Number 3, July 1995, page 439. 
26 Sansom, History, page 91. 
27 Kudo Masaki, "Kokogaku kara mita kodai Emishi no bunka". in Michinoku Kodai: Emishi no Sekai, 
pages 1-64. Tokyo: Iwanami, 1991, pages 39-40. 
28 The word emishiis usually taken as meaning Ainu, but, as Mark Hudson points out, it seems in older 
texts to be more like a political category, used to indicate peoples who had not yet been brought 
firmly under central Japanese rule. See pages 198-200 in his Ruins. 
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history in 1185 by having himself appointed Sei-I Taishogun (1if~*~~.m) or, 
barbarian-subduing great general, by the Kyoto court. He was claiming for himself 
the title originally instituted for the court noble under whose command Sakanoue 
Tamuramaro had "pacified" unruly easterners over a millennium before. 
Yoritomo chose Kamakura, far away in the east, as the administrative seat 
of Japan's first bakufu, or warrior government. Even so, his power was usurped by 
his Hojo in-laws, who were drawn back into power struggles at the capital. 
Another eastern warrior lord who was descended from the Minamoto, Ashikaga 
Takauji, led his forces up to Kyoto and tried to settle the dispute between bakufu 
and court. His solution was to install himself in the capital as shogun while 
appointing a royal prince as alternative emperor. Thus, the institutions of warrior 
government were brought to Kyoto, and the Nanbokucho(f¥f,~t'fifJ) period began.29 
The Ashikaga bakufu survived in form until the end of the sengoku j1aa1: This was 
the period when the warrior generals, now called daimyos, or great names, raised 
armies from wherever they could, and gradually established the large independent 
domains from which they drew the resources to keep fighting. Those domains are 
referred to as kuni(~), or countries. De facto military and political power was 
divided between them, and the strongest few continued to vie for supreme 
authority. 
During this new phase of warrior infighting, daimyos from the long-
established Nanbu family continued to control their territory in the extreme 
north of Honshu unopposed, until at the very end they lost the Tsugaru region to 
an ambitious vassal, Oura Tamenobu: he was to become the first Tsugaru daimyo. 
Needless to say, this detail does not figure in the core narrative of warrior power, 
which is taken up with the imperial succession dispute, the weakening shogunate, 
the Onin War, and regional warlords all far to the south of Tsugaru. Viewed from 
a point in the Tsugaru historical imaginary, narrative streams that pass through 
the subjugation of the east and the emergence of warrior rule on the journey to 
Japanese modernity seem largely irrelevant, though shockwaves reached the 
region from time to time and sometimes signalled its future fate. 
29 This means "southern and northern courts". There was a separate emperor in each. 
(ii) The centralisation of state power and the bureaucratic 
tradition 
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If warriors of legendary power emerging from the east feature 
prominently in histories of the Japanese nation state, one key theme that shapes 
those accounts is the evolution of a unified polity, ruled from a stable centre and 
administered by a loyal bureaucracy. One essential element of this evolution was 
the increase in power of successive Sei-I Taishogun (fiE~::ki:cy..W), barbarian-
subduing generals, from the time of Azuma no Tamura Maro through to Ieyasu at 
the apogee of warrior rule. As the successor of Nobunaga and Hideyoshi -two 
very effective military campaigners - Ieyasu was able to establish a bakufu that 
eclipsed all other seats of authority in Japan; and it was at the place he chose for 
his headquarters that the modern nation's capital would later be constructed.30 
Along this narrative stream are such high points as the founding of the 
Kamakura and Ashikaga bakufus, and the emergence of Nobunaga, Hideyoshi and 
Ieyasu from the chaos of the sengoku period. The first two sixteenth century 
unifiers established their central headquarters in the west - Nobunaga at Azuchi 
(now dmi) on Lake Biwa and Hideyoshi in Osaka. With Ieyasu's choice of Edo, the 
centre of centripetal political and military forces shifted from west to east, as it 
had briefly done when Yoritomo made Kamakura his shogunal capital in 1185. 
In Yoritomo's time, the institutions in the imperial capital of Heian (Kyoto) 
in the west still held enough political and spiritual power to cause serious division 
and unrest. When the dawn of Japan's modernity was signalled in 1867, by the 
surrender of the fifteenth Tokugawa shogun to the authority of the imperial 
throne, however, the capital stayed where it was. It was the emperor who moved 
east to occupy the shogun's castle and preside over a new epoch - of government 
run by warriors! Accounts of the Tokugawa suzerainty, therefore, are mostly 
constructed to explicate these three phases: first, the course of events which 
30 Ieyasu's victory at Sekigahara marked the beginning of his pre-eminence; and after the shogun's 
surrender to the emperor in 1867 the bakufu was no longer Japan's government. Other possible 
dates for the beginning of the period are: 1603, when Ieyasu was appointed shogun, or 1615, when 
his forces attacked Osaka castle and killed Hideyoshi's vassals and heirs. 1868, when the Meiji 
emperor issued the Charter Oath, is sometimes taken as the end. 
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led to Ieyasu's supremacy; second, the capacity of the warrior regime he 
established in Edo to keep the peace for so long in spite of periodic calamities; 
and third, how the fall of the bakufu signalled Japan's readiness to become the 
modern world power she was destined to be. 
The dispatch with which the transition between the centralised Tokugawa 
bakufu and the imperial Meiji government was accomplished is explained in this 
his-story in terms of a series of transformations of the warriors' political and 
social roles. In Sakanoue Tamuramaro's time fighting men were mostly members 
of mercenary bands fighting under warrior leaders who rented out their services, 
often to the imperial government for the purpose of "subduing" the emishi on the 
imagined north eastern frontier. Gradually, they became identified with certain 
leaders and districts, to eventually become disciplined ranks of trained retainers 
fighting for the regional daimyos who were vying for absolute military supremacy. 
After the Tokugawa settlement, these bushi(JE\,±) retainers and their daimyos 
found themselves obliged to participate, for the large part as civilians, in an 
elaborately structured and highly regulated hierarchical system of bureaucratic 
government. 31 
Carl Steenstrup succinctly sums up historical relations between the 
Japanese state, its government and bureaucracy with military power in a review of 
a monograph provocatively entitled The Taming of the Samurai. 
In the long sweep, the political history of Japan looks to be the 
history of its soldiers, and, more particularly, of those soldiers 
who held power of command. Over time, their functions changed 
from individualistic fighters on horseback to group fighters on 
horseback; from there to officers leading infantry; and finally, 
during the Tokugawa period, to upholders of peace and order in 
general, with many civilian tasks. After 1868, their privileges 
were diluted, but their influence grew steadily until 1945.32 
31 See the article,"Samurai in Passage: Transformation of the Sixteenth-Century Kanto", by Michael 
Birt, for an account of this process among higher echelons of samurai in the Kanto region. Pages 
369-399, in Journal of Japanese Studies, 11.2, 1985. 
32 Carl Steenstrup, Review of Eiko Ikegami, The Taming of the Samurai: Honorific Individualism and 
the Making of Modern Japan. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995. Pages 426-428, in Journal 
of Japanese Studies, 22.2, 1996. 
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Twentieth century developments notwithstanding, there is no doubt that in the 
early 1600's, with prowess in battle and knowledge of weapons and strategy 
suddenly superfluous, warriors urgently needed to develop administrative and 
managerial skills. Until the middle of the century, though, large numbers of 
masterless and disaffected bushilived in political and social limbo as a result of 
the attainder or transfer of their daimyo leaders. Many of these masterless 
bush1: or ronin U&A), died defending Hideyoshi's heirs in Osaka, or in local 
skirmishes. The prudent majority, in the popular narrative, transformed their 
loyalty and dedication to military duty into a rationale for service as domain and 
bakufu bureaucrats in the Confucian scholar-official mode. This new identity was 
predicated on serious attention being paid to cultural and political skills as well as 
the military arts, the combination popularly styled bunbu (Xli:t). They beavered 
away in administrations with such diligence and efficiency that the transition to a 
centralised national bureaucracy in the nineteenth century was a natural one for 
Japan. 
Like all general historical explanations, this one fits where it touches; and 
it does not fit the Tsugaru experience very closely. The Nanbu had been firmly in 
charge of their lands in the northeast since the twelfth century, well before the 
final scramble of the sixteenth century began. When an argument arose within 
the old daimyo family over a succession issue, Oura Tamenobu took advantage of 
the distraction to realize his personal ambition. He and his retainers overran a 
number of Nanbu fortresses and castles in Tsugaru: he laid claim to the territory, 
and then sought the patronage of Hideyoshi. Later, he was careful to ingratiate 
himself with Ieyasu as well. 
In contrast to this straightforward story, however, the central unifiers 
had difficulty bringing the more powerful daimyos of the south and west under 
their sway, and they used daimyo transfer or attainder as instruments of control. 
Nobunaga, for example, cut the Yamanouchi warrior family off from its roots in 
Owari through a forced transfer to Tosa. Ieyasu confiscated a large portion of 
Mori territory around Hiroshima and confined that daimyo family to the kuni of 
Choshu. He was able to make only an uneasy peace with his erstwhile Shimazu foes. 
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They retained considerable economic and strategic power, based on access to the 
Pacific and the East China Sea from Satsuma. Thus, the relations of these three 
dynasties with the bakufu at the centre were by no means amicable from the very 
beginning. Nearly three centuries later, when the centripetal forces keeping the 
power balance began to weaken, it was those three domains from the 
southwestern periphery that led the coup against the shogunate. 
Tsugaru was never a spawning-ground for that kind of major political or 
military subversion, and produced none of the individuals so celebrated in accounts 
of the Meiji Restoration, or the associated development of nationalist ideology. 
Far away from the shogunal capital of Edo, Tsugaru was at the extremity of the 
networks of highways that criss-crossed most of the land, and far off the 
sanctioned overseas trade routes: geographically, economically and politically 
peripheral. It was on the way to nowhere but Matsumae, that special frontier 
domain separating the known order of Japan from the barbaric otherness of Ezo 
and beyond: a place of ambivalent identity. Tsugaru's warriors submitted very 
tardily, and perhaps even half-heartedly, to the sovereignty of the centre. Even 
then, it was chiefly to serve their own interests.33 
(iii) The not yet of the pre-modern 
Histories of a nation state are, in their very being, projects of modernity. 
It is perhaps therefore inevitable that, being focused on the time immediately 
prior to that which required their invention, histories of the pre-modern take on a 
general air of the incomplete, portraying conditions and peoples poised for their 
transformation or development into something else: instinctively propelling 
themselves into more and more enlightened ways - of producing, selling, buying, 
controlling, learning, protesting - so that modern otherness might emerge from 
the midst of familiar old institutions and habits and transfigure them. Many 
school and university textbooks adopt this pattern, tending to portray static 
traditional societies to contrast with dynamic modern and and post-modern ones. 
33 Ravina explains the attitudes of Tsugaru leaders to the political centre in terms of ·currying 
favour" {page 23) and self-preservation. The latter seems more to the point, from beginning to end, 
as he remarks himself on page 153. Tamenobu established a pattern of relations with Edo and Kyoto 
that appear to have been instrumental or even exploitative rather than forelock-tugging. 
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In the very naming of this period in Japan - as Tokugawa, Edo, or pre-
modern - we hint at one narrative trajectory or another. In "Tokugawa" we have 
echoes of the old, even feudal, order of warrior rule, which in the national story 
was ruptured, overturned and replaced with a parliamentary government under 
imperial rule. Before Tokugawa Ieyasu was installed as shogun in Edo, the right to 
establish a bakufu had only been granted to two other heads of military houses: 
Minamoto Yoritomo and Ashikaga Takauji. But those two family names have not 
been used to name historical periods. The Minamoto grip on power in Kamakura 
waned quickly after Yoritomo's son succeeded him; and, though Takauji and his 
descendants kept the title of Shogun from 1338 until the 1570s, they only ever 
had limited control over the affairs of state: their period of incumbency included 
the war torn sengoku century.34 In contrast, the Tokugawa bakufu and its 
administration held the reigns of power through fifteen generations; until what 
might be called, in a history yet to be written, their betrayal and sudden downfall 
during a succession dispute. 
Because it names directly where central power lay- if not with the 
Tokugawa shogun himself, then with persons who served in the bakufu 
administration or were members of the extended Tokugawa family - the Tokugawa 
appellation will be used in this work. The word bakuhan is not commonly used to 
label the period, even though it suggests the balances and contingencies of a ruling 
structure that was shared between various organs of Tokugawa authority and the 
daimyos governing more than two hundred separate domains.35 Neither the name 
of the predominant lineage, nor that of the city where the shogun's castle was 
situated, gives any hint of that crucial feature of Tokugawa rule. 
The name of Edo, as Carol Gluck recently pointed out in her essay, "The 
Invention of Edo", is now used to evoke innumerable nostalgic images of a timeless 
34 Conflict over the imperial succession, between the Northern and Southern courts, continued from 
the 1330s until the 1390's. The resultant animosities and other rivalries between regional overlords 
continued to intensify, culminating in the Onin Wars of 1467-77. By then, the organs of central 
administration had disintegrated. 1482 is the date commonly associated with the start of the 
sengoku jidai (period of countries at war). 
35 Ravina suggests the term ·compound state", arguing that the term bakuhan is merely an invention 
of modern historians. (See his land and lordship, pages 27-28.) It seems to me to be a very useful 
invention, and has the advantage of being bilingual! 
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and essential Japanese culture.36 The title of Gluck's essay itself acts as a 
deterrent to the use any more of such terms as "Edo period", and some of its 
contents seem to imply that such studies as the one I am engaged in are cock-
eyed tricks with mirrors. The historiography of all but a privileged few, who are 
apparently in possession of context- and theory-free viewpoints, is deemed to be 
invented, or imagined. While claiming the right to be nostalgic, and owning the 
intention of trying to be inventive and imaginative, I want to claim even more - if 
not just for myself, for some older Japanese scholars I admire and respect. 37 I 
can avoid deliberately misrepresenting or otherwise distorting the texts and 
other evidence that are my inspiration; but no-one can ever write anything in a 
cultural, linguistic and ideological vacuum, and few translations of kanbun, sorobun 
and other eighteenth century languages are perfect, least of all those attempted 
on the edge of the scholarly world. Having said that, I recognise and share the 
concern Gluck infers, that some contemporary writing about the Tokugawa period 
implies, or even argues, that Edo was an already-there, modern capital-in-waiting, 
with the apparatus of a bureaucracy and nascent central state; and crowds of 
consuming residents and tourists competing to patronize businesses in already 
thriving commercial and entertainment sectors. 
' 
These images are all compatible with various national narratives. They can 
be employed in the telling, for example, of the Japanese as a uniquely created 
people, possessing a singular culture and exclusive tastes and traits; or of a city, 
once pre-modern castle town, then modern national capital, and now one single, 
gigantic post-modern network, virtually real but with origins in a state whose 
genesis is mysteriously indeterminate, lost in the cosmos somewhere near the sun. 
The partially centralized form of government and the urban culture of Edo are 
elements that are also suggested by the pre-modern label. It is not intended that 
this study engage with any of these narratives: its purpose is neither to reinforce 
nor refute them. 
36 In Stephen Vlastos (ed.), Mirror of Modernity. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998. 
37 Some of the targets of her expolstulations are scholars whose contribution to historical 
scholarship on the eighteenth century I regard as foundational, so perhaps it should suffice to keep 
their company! 
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It is inevitable, though, that the time and place, the events and persons 
that are my subject matter are located also within those narratives: in a Japan 
which was not yet modern, not yet emerged as a nation state, not yet restored to 
its originative, unified sacred imperial state, and not yet fully apprised of the 
virtue of unfettered commercial and financial marketing. The purpose of my work, 
however, is not to illuminate nascent traces of modernity among the feudal 
elements in the Tsugaru domain in general, or in the reform program and thinking 
of NyOi Mitsugi in particular. Nor is it to identify prescient moves toward a 
unified national consciousness, or signs of the emergence of manufacturing 
industry, or class consciousness, or a market economy. The pursuit of such origins 
implies inappropriate states of incompleteness. 
The events of 1866-88 in Japan were not pre-ordained by the gods of the 
market or liberal democracy or any other modernist myth. Where the so-called 
restoration is concerned, it is clear that the currencies of power minted in the 
institutions and discursive spaces of the shogunal capital, and of Tsugaru and 
other cities and domains throughout Japan, were circulated back and forth and 
roundabout in myriad ways and directions for a very long time before the 
overthrow of the shogunate was even thinkable, let alone achievable. At a number 
of points during that time, the evolution of Japan's modernity could have taken a 
turn towards gentler, now forgotten, nascent possibilities. This view is of course 
as transient and of its time as all the others in history.38 
It is always a temptation to nestle historical studies of out-of-the-way 
places comfortably within all-embracing national meta-narratives. But, if recourse 
to telling stories of the transforming imperatives of technological progress, 
national identity, and capitalist expansion were resisted, then the eighteenth 
century could be reconsidered: not as a time when the bakufu in Edo was still 
failing to unify the polity, or when it had not yet been superseded by a more 
enlightened, progressive and modernist regime; but as a time when it was quite 
38 Tsugaru's considerable miliary force and weaponry, for example, prepared for expeditions to Ezo 
and for Russian-repelling, would have been at the disposal of the Northern Alliance had just one 
courier lost his footing on a pass between Kyoto and Hirosaki, and relations between the Alliance and 
the southwestern domains could easily have turned out differently. See Harold Bolitho, "The Echigo 
War, 1868u, Monumenta Nipponica, XXXIV:3, 1979, pages 259-77. 
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rational for administration to be fragmented and localities such as Tsugaru largely 
self-governing. It could be imagined, too, as a time when individuals and groups 
struggled, as people everywhere have always done, to survive in the place where 
they found themselves; and to give their lives what meaning they could in terms of 
the values and ideals espoused by the communities they were part of - whether 
real or imagined. By examining the traces left by particular minds and institutions, 
which worked for a short time in a single location, we might distinguish some 
elements particular to that time and place, but also others that signal a wider 
context - in both chronological and spatial terms. That is inevitable, but the wider 
context of the central narratives is not necessarily the place to start. 
In the out-of-the-way place of Tsugaru, we will certainly find evidence of 
the ideological fragmentation that seems to have characterized intellectual life at 
the time, without causing significant political unrest. We see the effects, too, of 
the enormous variations amongst the 250 or so separate political and 
administrative units of Tokugawa Japan: in land area, population numbers, 
demographic characteristics, climate, topography, agricultural productivity, 
natural resources, industrial output, ideology, religious beliefs and practices, and 
so on. The demands on administrators, and the policies they came up with, were 
correspondingly various, resulting in markedly different social and economic 
relations from domain to domain. These differences were for a long time 
accommodated within the structures set up by the Tokugawa centre. 
There existed at the same time a shared universe of ideas that shaped the 
ways in which both domain and bakufu administrators conceived of the world, the 
problems they confronted, and the parameters within which they had to structure 
their solutions. What interests me is the interplay between the powers of the 
bakufu, the autonomy and particularities of a domain, and the more free-flowing, 
border less world of ideas; for ideas reached beyond Edo, and the boundaries of 
Japan, and the eighteenth century. The projection of political, ideological and 
military power by the Tokugawa regime at the centre, as well as the more and less 
autonomous fields of local power in Tsugaru, are significant features of the 
eighteenth-century terrain that I wish to explore. 
(iv) The waxing, waning and implosion of the Tokugawa regime 
As well as possessing an air of incompleteness, histories of the Tokugawa 
period often portray a series of increasingly serious crises and disasters, which 
less and less competent administrations met with more and more inadequate 
policies and reforms. This pattern could be depicted as an uneven sine curve, 
drawn through time with an overall downward trend. Crises occur at the minimum 
points and recovery is achieved at the maxima. Among the best-known points 
along this particular narrative path are three famines and three bakufu reform 
programs. They are the Kyoho famine (1732-33) and the Kyoho Reforms of 
Tokugawa Yoshimune (1721-28); the Tenmei Famines (1782-87) followed by the 
Kansei Reforms (1789-99) of Matsudaira Sadanobu; the Tenpo famines (1833-37), 
and the Tenpo Reforms of Mizuno Tadakuni (1830-44). 39 
The downward trend is pretty steep after that, because the positive 
outcomes of the Tenpo reforms were mitigated by vacillating leadership in Edo 
under successive shoguns. This exacerbated factional strife among bakufu 
ministers over dealings with foreigners and defence of the coastline. General 
popular unrest ensued. Finally, the more experienced and capable Tokugawa Keiki 
was appointed shogun, but too late to prevent the bakufu's overthrow. Credited 
with hastening the collapse are the strident proto-nationalist ideologies of some 
kokugaku, or nativist, scholars; rapidly expanding rates of popular participation in 
learning, commerce and travel; and the impression, gained from the appearance of 
foreign ships and guns in her ports, that Japan had been permitted to become 
technologically backward compared with Americans and Europeans. 
My chief concern about this narrative pattern is the way in which it invites 
teleological interpretations of evidence from the entire pre-modern period. The 
overall scheme of decline is enlisted to explain events that occurred, and policies 
enacted in response to them, up to a century before what was the quite rapid 
disintegration of a relatively stable structure of government. Whether it is 
informed by a Marxist, Hegelian, liberal economist, or some other determinist 
metanarrative, the conviction that the political system was bound to collapse is 
39 Conrad Totman calls this the 'Heyday of the Kyoho reform', in Early Modern Japan on page 296. 
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not an illuminating one. 40 With regard to reform programs in particular, it tends to 
turn histories into the stories of reactionary officials making futile efforts to 
prop up archaic administrative and legal structures. 
(v) The shape of reforms 
Reforms were instituted throughout the Tokugawa centuries in domains all 
over Japan, often under very different circumstances and in a variety of ways. 
These discrete events tend to disappear in the general narrative, or else are 
lumped together with the ups and downs of the centre. Domain level reforms are 
often portrayed as either precursors or imitators of those introduced in Edo. In 
the newly-established capital and domains alike, the early decades of the 
seventeenth century were taken up with innovation and reorganisation on a scale 
that probably outdid most of the reform programs subsequently labelled as such. 
This was a vital period in the formation of stable, durable polities based on 
adequate economic resources. Daimyos transferred to new fiefs, and those who 
had come only recently to power, like Tsugaru Tamenobu, had to work particularly 
hard to construct institutions that would unite under their authority the local 
bushi, farmers and merchants. Land surveys were undertaken and large-scale 
shinden kaihatsu(~al~;B) programs carried out, literally opening up new fields 
for rice production. In some cases these fields were assigned to retainers for 
development as income-bearing fiefs called jikata chigyo (:l:!BJ5"~rr). In others, 
local village farmers formed units from which the domain directly extracted tax 
payments in kind. Systems were devised for the assessment and collection of tax 
rice. Transport infrastructure was put in place to expedite its journey to the 
markets of Kyoto, Edo and Osaka. 
Adjustments were made to the existing fiefs of many retainers. This 
process was to be repeated many times in subsequent reforms. The overall 
tendency was for older investitures, where retainers managed established land 
holdings independently and exacted their own taxes, were gradually converted to 
40 More sanguine studies of Tokugawa bakufu management do exist. Patricia Sippel's unpublished 
thesis, Financing the Long Peace, is an example. Sippel examines bakufu financial policis over an 
extended period, and shows that there was not a pattern of uninterrupted fiscal decline. 
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stipendiary fiefs. That is retainers who held jikata chigyo (landed fiefs) were 
transferred to kuramaior kirimai(FrlJ.*IWJ*), or treasury rice stipends instead. 
The stipends would then be paid from central treasuries and granaries, in grain or 
cash, or both. Many of the retainers who were allotted stipends were required to 
abandon their warrior personas and take up administrative tasks commensurate 
with their ranks. Furthermore, they were obliged to leave the land and reside 
permanently in castle towns or other urban centres. 
All these changes over the first half-century or so were accommodated 
with varying degrees of compliance. Some retainers resisted or deserted, or 
formed factions and later took sides in succession disputes among their daimyo's 
descendants. Quarrels over succession during the 1650s and 60s, for example, 
resulted in the formation of separate branch houses in the Tohoku domains of 
Tsugaru, Sendai and Nanbu. Many new polities were also confronted with natural 
disasters at this early stage. Yoshinaga points out that Aizu-Wakamatsu, for 
example, was already facing shortages of seed rice, deserted villages and 
uncultivated rice paddies in the wake of a famine very early in the 1600s.41 
As well as having to cope with sudden, unpredicted disasters, which 
continued to occur, from the last decades of the seventeenth century onwards 
many domain treasuries experienced intermittent cash flow problems caused by 
the growth of commercial activity. They made efforts to strictly control or even 
block market expansion into their domains. Depending on the degree to which 
commercial commodity production was developed, and to what extent trade had 
stimulated the growth of a monetised sector in their domestic economies, some 
domains were able to stimulate that production and monetisation further, often in 
tandem with domain monopsonies or monopolies on specified commodities. Aizu 
saw one of the first monopolies in Tohoku when the government took control of 
lacquer sales.42 Because the development of commodity trade was slowed by a 
general shortage of cash money, domains would issue separate currencies for 
41 Yoshinaga Akira, "Tohoku shohan ni okeru hansei kaikaku no tenkai", Aichi kyoiku daigaku kenkyD 
hokoku, Vol 26, 1977, page 232. 
42 Ibid. page 230. 
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domestic use at the same time as encouraging the production of goods for export. 
These were two commonly adopted reform measures. 
Leadership was vital to the successful implementation of any reform 
program, and it is instructive to note that the same configurations of authority 
led reforms at both bakufu and domain levels. In the early decades, setting up 
the institutions and offices of domain government was the responsibility of the 
daimyos themselves; and in Edo it was the new shogun and his successor who 
established the administrative and legal structure there. Well before the shogun 
Yoshimune implemented his Kyoho reforms, able daimyos in Hirosaki, Nanbu and 
Hachinohe were making vigorous efforts to consolidate the bureaucratic and 
economic administration of their domains. 
When ruling dynasties faded, or a daimyo or shogun was very young, elders 
and other senior retainers took the key roles in drawing up and implementing 
reforms. This sometimes led to conflict when factional rivalries and divisions 
within governing elites would come into play to the detriment of the reform and 
the polity. During the crisis period now called bakumatsu (literally, the end of the 
bakufu), it was just such dissension that caused delays in central decision-making 
and left the way open for ambitious younger bushifrom outside to take control. 
During the last eight years of shogunal government, the name of the reign period 
was changed four times, a clear sign that the officials in charge of the calendar at 
least had been willing reform for some time. 
Altogether, some 164 different reform programs are listed in Kokushi 
Da1jiten as having been undertaken in one domain or another during the Tokugawa 
period. for the 150 years before the Horeki period, just fifty-one reforms are 
recorded, while eighty-seven are mentioned for the following 100 years.43 It is 
clear that the frequency with which reforms were undertaken increased markedly 
over the entire period - and, judging from the number of times the word kaikaku 
43 Yoshinaga Akira, "Hansei kaikaku" (domain government reforms) entry in the Kokushi Da1jiten, and 
a short comparative essay, "Tohoku shohan ni okeru hansei kai kaku no tenkai", Aichi kyoiku daigaku 
kenkyu hokoku, Vol 26, 1977, pages 220-224. 
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(~~), meaning reform, appears in press headlines today, the trend has continued 
since. 
III Subjects and objects 
Being self-consciously engaged in history as a creative industry while at the 
same time necessarily living in my own unique segment of history, whose histories 
are drawn from the entire accumulation of past events up until the moment of 
telling, does result, as I mentioned at the start of this introduction, in a certain 
degree of discomfort. Reading, writing, travelling, and living through time change 
a person; change a mind. If you, the reader, find inconsistencies in this work that 
could be because its author has changed, from moment to moment, experience to 
experience, place to place, and, distressingly, computer to computer. The 
following paragraphs comprise a discussion of matters that were on my mind at 
the time when this study was nearing completion: it represents, as well as I can 
make it do, the points of view that shaped my enquiry and my writing. 
(i) Getting a grip on things 
As the author of a piece of historical writing, itself an object in more ways 
than one, I feel obliged to acknowledge the independent existence of things-in-
themselves in the world: rice fields, wooden images of arhats, the skulls of 
famine victims rolling about on the ground. These are real, tangible, things. I 
believe my corporeal self to be one too, though one that is aware of only an 
exceedingly small portion of all the others around me. My experience of living in 
the world, observing and interacting with old things and new, watching with my own 
eyes the processes of birth, decay and death, convinces me that other people in 
the past have had lives and experiences that are in some ways commensurable with 
mine. To some degree, given their traces, I can imagine, or apprehend fragments 
of experience that might be similar to theirs. 
My mind is at times capable of producing thoughts as a result of that 
imaginative exercise. The nature of these thoughts as things is more of a puzzle, 
but I represent them from time to time by typing words on a keyboard attached 
to a computer which projects those words on a screen. All those are clearly 
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things-in-themselves: the words, the keyboard, the computer, the screen and my 
fingers doing the typing. A short distance from my computer is a printer, which, 
on a good day, will transfer my words to paper, thus producing a palpable text. 
And, this text is the means by which the representations of my thoughts will be 
communicated to you, a reading subject. 
The words I choose to type, in this unremittingly logocentric exercise, are 
not necessarily the words of the thoughts themselves; and, they are at the same 
time both mine and not mine. They come to me from a shared stock, but I use 
them in my own way. As readers read, they will not necessarily experience 
thoughts that are the same as mine ever were, either originally or as I reshaped 
them for typing. That is an inevitable condition of the project of writing for 
readers, which is what I believe history writing to be. At the same time, since my 
intention is to communicate a rather large number of connected thoughts, which I 
have been putting together over the past several years, I take care to use 
vocabulary and expressions which I believe not to be peculiar to my own 
understanding and usage, but capable of conveying my thoughts to others who 
read and write and think. That is because I consider myself to be a participant in 
a discussion, and I therefore want to represent my thoughts and intuitions as 
accurately as possible so that my readers' thoughts will connect with those, and 
not with others as a result of miss-representation due to ill-chosen words. 
Like Naoki Sakai, I sometimes experience difficulty connecting myself with 
the words I typed a moment ago - or yesterday, or last year .44 What he cal Is this 
"rupture, distance, and delay" can be usefully dealt with by a suspension of belief 
in a clearly delineated, discernible and constant sovereign "I" in any location at all. 
It must, I feel sure, be the case that this unstable set of relations between my 
idea of myself, my thoughts, the "I" doing the writing, and the words I use and 
the text the printer will produce, is recognizable to a great many of my readers. 
That, too, seems to me to be an inescapable condition of this kind of task. It is 
exacerbated by the use of the technologies that have intruded upon our lives, and 
44 Naoki Sakai, Voices of the Past. pages 1-2. I have had to consider Sakai's monograph particularly 
carefully, since it deals with the texts and voices and languages of eighteenth century Japan. 
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I look with some wistfulness upon such remnants of the world we have lost as Nyui 
Mitsugi's fluid characters, that I imagine being brushed onto handmade pages, 
while the faintly astringent scent of sumiand damp tatamifilled the air. 
(iii) The subject, the facts, the cook and the menu 
Mitsugi is both the writing subject of the texts in the Complete Works, 
and the subject represented in others that portray him and his agency during the 
reform period. He is also the object of derision, admiration and anger expressed 
in those texts. And, he is, along with the Tsugaru domain, an object of my enquiry. 
We are both situated in Carr's metaphorical human procession: and I, trudging 
along in my part of it, was arrested by imagined glimpses of Mitsugi in his. They 
were, of course, glimpses prompted by texts; for, as a deconstructionist might 
observe, there is nothing other than text for us to go by. 
The iterability of written texts is something for which most of us engaged 
in history are grateful. In Mitsugi's case, the result has been the survival of 
enough written material, originating with him and his contemporaries, for a set of 
quite clear images to coalesce. They do not necessarily aggregate to make a 
coherent, cohesive whole; nor are they expected to. The lives, thoughts, actions 
and events these texts were once part of are long gone, and with them also such 
coherence and cohesion as there might once have been. They are, on the other 
hand, consistent enough in places to allow a degree of imaginative reconstruction: 
not of the past as it really was, which is really and truly gone; but of conceptual 
connections, of causes and effects, or problems and solutions. 
The availability of the Complete Works of NytJi Mitsug1: as well as a number 
of other contemporary official and private documents, has offered a rare 
opportunity. Fragments of institutional and private commentary entered in diaries 
and records while Mitsugi held office in the domain can be read alongside a 
substantial collection of his own writings. What I set out to do, then, is to take 
that slice of time in the Horeki period and examine records that were related to 
the reform program and the famine in the light of the region's history, and then 
consider some of the intellectual preoccupations of the key reforming protagonist 
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as they are represented in his written works. It is not intended as a neatly 
consistent "life and times" project, or even as a "thought and action" or "principle 
and practice" study: it is merely a collection of commentary on a set of 
contemporaneous traces, and later representations, organised around the 
experience of famine in Tsugaru, the domain's Horeki reform experience, and the 
historical figure of NyOi Mitsugi.45 
Mitsugi's writings do not often indicate who he thought his readers might 
be, and not knowing is at once a liberation and an imposition. We are free to 
imagine who his interlocutors were, but we must identify them as people whose 
utterances might share discursive spaces with the meanings we glean from his 
writings. This is a particularly interesting exercise, since his writings are, and 
would have been then, structurally legible to different groups of readers because 
he wrote in different languages and sets of symbols. Some texts were written, 
and have been transcribed, in Chinese, some in sorobun (Japanese formal 
documentary style), and others in narrative pre-modern Japanese; yet others are 
expressed in poetic, or mathematical language. for each of them there are, of 
course, cohorts of other contemporary texts, which could be employed in the 
construction of a variety of discursive spaces. The writings left by Mitsugi are so 
various, though, that this task is beyond me. Instead, I hope that by presenting a 
close reading of some texts, and suggesting a possible set of interlocutors, to help 
position Mitsugi in his time and place, as well as conveying something of the range 
of his terms of reference and modes of thought. 
From the myriad offerings on the slab of the past, then, I have chosen 
texts, not facts, and mostly from various written sub-species. To add some 
piquancy, a small quantity of scenic, artistic and architectural flavour has been 
added. What I have concocted will be served in the following order. 
There are four separate, but interrelated courses in the chapters to follow. 
The first involves a discussion, in chapter one, of the kinds of texts that were 
45 Studies that I have found particularly congenial and helpful as models in various ways include: 
Herman Ooms' Charismatic Bureaucrat, Kate Wildman Nakai's Shogunal Politics. Tetsuo Najita's 
Visions of Virtue in Tokugawa Japarr, and Victor Koschman's Mito Ideology. 
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available for my study, the ways in which they can help interpret the processes of 
famine and reform, and how they relate to the person of Mitsugi, his career, and 
some of his intellectual preoccupations. A chronological sketch of his life is put 
together from textual sources collected in one published series of transcribed 
contemporary materials.46 The second course, served as the second chapter, 
comprises a set of historical notes on the development of various fields in which 
power was structured in Tsugaru, to suggest the ways in which multiple forces had 
the potential to combine and counter Mitsugi's attempts to bring about change. 
The implementation and undoing of the Horeki reform program is the focus 
of the third chapter, which is the first part of the rather bulky third course. 
Mitsugi's reforms were conceived in two phases, one before and the other after 
the Horeki 5 harvest failure. The unravelling of the reforms follows very soon 
after the implementation of the second phase. Then, we turn to the experience of 
famine, and the impact of Mitsugi's reform policies on the consequences of the 
Horeki 5 harvest failure in Tsugaru. The basic idea around which I construct my 
argument is, in broad terms, that Mitsugi's capacity to act as an agent of radical 
reform in the Tsugaru domain was both created and constrained within a dynamic 
complex of interwoven fields of power and interest. The forces forming that 
complex were sufficiently disrupted by the threats of financial collapse, and then 
famine, to accommodate the initial phases of the Horeki reforms, but later re-
aligned to eliminate both Mitsugi and the thrust of his policies, with tragic long-
term consequences for the people of Tsugaru. 
The fifth and sixth chapters, presented as the fourth course, are devoted 
to tracing the way in which Mitsugi's writings depict a strong and practical 
vocational consciousness, as well as the capacity to engage in speculative thought. 
Consistent with the notions expressed about the proper role of the retainer-
off icial are texts that reflect hands-on engagement with the practicalities of 
administrative responsibility, land management, and farming. Then there are 
those that present a set of convictions about the workings of the universe or 
46 The series is Michinoku sosho, edited by the Aomori ken bunkazai hogo kyokai. 
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some imaginative allegorical fiction. The positions taken in his works are grounded 
in a very particular cosmology derived from classical Chinese sources. 
The concluding teas and fruits contain reflections on such themes as 
margins and peripheries, markets, and virtuous rule. It is intended that they will 
help in the digestion of what has come before by suggesting how my subject 
matter does, or does not, lend itself to some of the recurring interpretive 
schemes in Tokugawa history. 
Many of the glimpses of Mitsugi's life and career evoked by contemporary 
texts, and some elements in his own writing, locate him firmly in the bureaucracy 
of a remote provincial domain under bakufu authority in the eighteenth-century 
Japan of familiar narratives. There are enough anomalies, though, to make his life, 
thought and practice provocative objects of enquiry: for famine remains to this 
day one of the most persistent yet preventable causes of human suffering and 
untimely death. 
Chapter One 
Tracing Nyui Mitsugi 
His cheekbones were high and sharp, as if pared with a knife; 
and his eyebrows were so bushy and long they grew all the way 
over to his temples. His eyes would pierce people right 
through. He was tall and strong. Once, when he was joking 
around with some people, he hung a sixteen-kan weight on his 
ear and strolled about with it dangling there, just the same as 
ever, without changing the way he walked at all. He also had 
incredibly sharp teeth, and would crunch up and eat the seeds 
of akebi and other stone fruit. 
Kudo Kieimon.47 
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Scholars and thinkers often leave texts as traces, and Mitsugi was no 
exception. Active political and social reformers tend to write less, and their 
policies and activities are more often recorded and commented upon by others; 
who can be neutral about change, its beneficiaries, or its unhappy targets. 
Mitsugi and the Horeki reforms generated all three types of response. The 
victims of famine, meanwhile, usually leave little other than bodily remains, 
though survivors sometimes record their memories and paint their nightmares 
for posterity. All these kinds of traces have accumulated and survived over 
several centuries from the peripheral domain of Tsugaru, where the thinking, 
learning, reforming and starving occurred that are the subjects of this study. 
Through the mediation of the Nyui Mitsugi Appreciation Society, we 
have in the Complete Works, some indication of the kinds of subjects that 
preoccupied Mitsugi at one time or another. The sustained efforts of several 
generations of historically conscious citizens in Aomori prefecture have made 
other texts available, which contain threads we can use in creating a narrative 
outline of Mitsugi's life as it was recorded by known, and unknown, third 
persons. 
47 Kudo Kiemon hikk1; TKD, pages 237-38. One kan (JO weighs 3.75 kilograms. 
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Plate 7: Portrait of Nyai Mitsugi 
Courtesy of the Hirosaki Municipal Museum 
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These texts also enable us to imagine the environments in which he lived 
and worked: from the climate and geography, to political processes, economic 
activity and social life. Such a range of textual material both stimulates and 
disciplines the historical imagination, evoking images, setting parameters and 
posing unanswerable questions. There are collections of extracts from a range 
of diaries, household records and personal memoirs, as well as the official 
records kept by the domain, in Hirosaki and at the daimyo's Edo residence. 
Since these eighteenth century texts have been transcribed, edited and 
reproduced over the last century, there is now a small corpus of historical 
studies that focus on one or more aspects of Mitsugi's writing or his reforms. 
I Imagining the man 
The fragmentary depictions of Mitsugi's person on pages 45 and 46, one 
verbal and one visual, suggest that he was probably regarded as more than 
slightly eccentric by some of his contemporaries. The original brush portrait 
hangs in the local history section of the Hirosaki Municipal Museum, located in 
the castle grounds. The distinctive eyebrows are featured, but, alas, there is 
no sign of an ear ornament! The comment inscribed above the portrait, though, 
appears to have been composed and written by its subject, providing a third 
glimpse of a personality that is lost to us. 48 
What is it that a flock of crows will attack? An owl. 
Who is it that the common crowd will laugh at? Mitsugi. 
Now that I am decrepit and foolish, the old saying that being 
old is like a second childhood is some consolation. How true it 
is! We don't look at all like children, but our words and actions 
are the same. That is why the lijiteaches that old people and 
those who are in mourning should never be punished when they 
do something wrong. Wise men, though, can afford to be kind-
hearted about failings that are cruelly mocked by the common 
crowd. 
Some time ago, a friend of mine painted this portrait, and his 
comment on the finished work was: "It's not a unicorn; and it's 
not a phoenix. It's a stray dog!" At least stray dogs have 
learned enough about the world to bark at thieves! 
I am not living, but neither am I dead; just a babe in the womb. 
48 A reproduction of the text can be found on the page before the beginning of Nyui Tatsuo's 
introductory comments at the beginning of Volume One of the Complete Works. 
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The wry, self-mocking tone of this inscription is tinged with a hint of 
the indefatigability of the person evoked in the poem written by Tsugaru's 
daimyo in Horeki 6. See page 61. In the image of a baby awaiting birth, Mitsugi 
adds a sanguine, or at least slightly defiant, note to counter his earlier 
depiction of what it was like to be old. If he had actually been as strong as 
Kieimon made him, he must have been aware of his physical decline, though he 
would have been saved from the preoccupations that were to develop in later 
centuries with what we now refer to as "the body". 
Yet another picture evokes one more moment in Mitsugi's life as it is 
recorded in the Kudo Kieimon hikk1: It depicts a rice crop ripening along the 
narrow valley floor at Kawaratai. See Plate 6, on page 5. Like many other 
landscapes that have undergone significant change over time, this one can only 
be read for a historical meaning with reference to another, written, text: 
Mitsugi made for himself a very careful examination of the 
slopes on the mountains around the village, and cut a channel 
through one of them so that water flowed through to several 
villages. The villages then established several hectares of 
their own fields, and for the first time they were able to eat 
rice they had grown themselves.49 
The people in those villages would previously have subsisted on such staples as 
barley, millet varieties and soybeans. 
Despite these glimpses, Nyui Mitsugi the man remains in large part an 
enigma. As Kojima has pointed out, very little is known about his life.50 The 
Complete Works, also, contain almost no writing of an autobiographical nature. 
The documented involvement of a Nyui descendant in the 1930's Kawaratai 
memorial stone and Complete Works projects, combined with the fact that 
members of the family have had Mitsugi's gravestone removed from the temple 
in which it was originally located and transported away from Hirosaki, might 
49 Kudo Kieimon h1kk1; in TKD, pages 237-38. 
5° Kojima Yasunori,"The Thought of NyOi Mitsugi - Practicality and Reform in Tsugaru Domain", 
Asian Cultural Studies, 19, March 1993, pages 39-51, page 35. 
indicate that family members might still have some personal papers in their 
private possession.51 
II Traces of the mind 
(i) The Complete works of NyCii Mitsugi 
At the Museum, displayed in the local history cabinet along with the 
portrait are several volumes of Shigaku yoben (A primer for aspiring scholars), 
said to have been written by Mitsugi himself.52 Their presence behind the 
glass offers some comfort to the viewer seeking material evidence of Mitsugi's 
onetime existence as a man who generated meaningful texts. 
Some of the other manuscripts used for the transcriptions that 
comprise the Complete Works, however, are copies made by Mitsugi's students 
and descendants. Among the nine works in Volume Four, for example, is 
Chokenjutsu saimoku zukai (An illustrated guide to surveying methods), which 
originally comprised three satsu, or small bound volumes. The first and third 
of these were transcribed from texts thought to have been copied by Nyui 
Tokumi in the early nineteenth century, since the writing looks like his; while 
the second was based on a text copied by Nyui Tatsuo in Meiji 36 (1903), using 
a copy from someone else's library and fragments from a much older version. 
On the other hand, the transcription of Shogaku sanpo (Beginning 
arithmetic) is from a poorly preserved original thought to have been written in 
1781 by Mitsugi for his pupils in Kawaratai. It contains his name and the 
address where he lived in Mizoguchi after his release from banishment. "Lives 
of eminent Tsugaru retainers" and parts of "A collection of poems to enjoy" 
were also transcribed from texts believed to have been in Mitsugi's hand. 53 
Unfortunately, only few of the manuscripts, either original or copied, 
reveal the dates of their composition. Thus it is difficult, should one desire to 
do so, for a researcher to pinpoint with any certainty precisely when Mitsugi 
51 Personal communication from temple staff. 
52 For a list of contents of the Complete Works, please refer to Appendix One. 
53 NMZ 4, Explanatory notes. 
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might have formed the opinions or been struck by the ideas that are recorded 
in his works. Clearly, though. the very iterability and re-iterability of these 
texts is the inherent property that has brought them to us; and one that 
enables them to be read again and again, and in many ways. One kind of limit to 
the possibilities of interpreting any one of t he Works is the range and nature 
of the contents of all four volumes. A summary follows in t he next section . 
. ' 
Plate 10: Several satsu of the original Shigaku y~ben 
Courtesy of the Hirosaki Municipal Museum 
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(ii) Leafing through the pages 
Over forty separate works are contained in the four volumes: the 
longest takes 407 pages in printed transcription (with 520 characters to a 
page), while the shortest ones take less than ten. Their arrangement seems 
vaguely thematic, and the idea of introducing them in such categories such as 
practical politics, cosmology, literature, thought, history, mathematics and so 
on has some appeal until the attempt is made. Problems arise: Whose thought? 
Whose practice? Whose cosmology? Whose real world? A II those subject-
object issues come to the fore. The discussion that follows, therefore, covers 
works used in the later chapters of this study as well as some others that 
attest to the range of Mitsugi's output. A browse through these volumes is an 
excursion through a surprising variety of fields of engagement. They were not 
necessarily as disconnected from each other in the mind we are attributing to 
our subject-author as they are in ours. See Appendix One for complete list of contents. 
It is no coincidence that the most substantial piece by far was written 
when Mitsugi was under house arrest after the failure of the Horeki reform 
program; and it is no surprise, either, that it contains some very partial and 
strong statements about the principles of good government. It is called, 
rather deceptively, Shigaku yoben (A primer for aspiring scholars) and is dated 
Horeki 13 (1764). Most of the original, which comprises ten maki(scrolls, or 
chapters) written on Mino paper, is thought to be in Mitsugi's own hand. The 
ten parts contain a total of twenty-nine separate sections on such themes as: 
ruler and minister, loyalty and filial piety, public and private, rites and music. 
The language could be described as clear, expository Japanese. Proper nouns 
are set off in the original by dashes, and Mitsugi also provided furigana 
(pronunciation written in kana) for unusual character readings, though the 
concepts and the tone of the discussion are by no means elementary. 
A number of other works are related to matters of government, but are 
written from a very different standpoint. They all take as an authoritative 
model the Zhou/i Three that appear at the beginning of the second volume are 
ShtJrei tstJyo (Applying the Zhouh), Keikoku doryo (Statistics for governing the 
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land), and Doryo bunso(Measurements and apportionment). The last is a longer, 
applied version of the second, written in Japanese instead of classical Chinese. 
The Zhou model is also evoked in several works in the third volume. 
Their subjects include: levying cartage labour in post stations, and calculations 
for allotting fiefs, tax exactions and stipends; methods by which a ruler can 
apportion power and emoluments to people of differing status; and properly 
positioning retainers of various ranks and the rest of the people in relation to 
the daimyo so that greed and dishonesty will not destroy the polity. 
These themes are perhaps given the fullest treatment in two works in 
Volume Two, called Obunshi(A record of appropriate portions), which are also 
heavily informed by the numerical orders of the Ijing. The first is written in 
classical Chinese, and is a long essay about ideal ways of dividing the territory 
and resources of a polity amongst its people, according to their ranks and 
occupations. The whole exercise is based on the principles set out in the 
Zhouh: After a theoretical introduction, Mitsugi illustrates his points in a 
diagram. It has a nine-ri square area at the centre, to represent the capital 
and its surrounds; then a f ifty-ri square around that, and finally, an outer one 
hundred-ri square. He then works through a number of sample calculations for 
dividing up the 10,000 square riof land proportionally between the nine ranks, 
starting with dukes, earls and counts, and taking into account variations in land 
type - flat areas, hills and valleys. The shorter version follows, written in 
simple Japanese and much less technical: it explains ebbs and flows in personal 
and government wealth in terms of the principles of yin and yang. 
Two chapters that take inspiration from the Zhou/ito address 
conditions in a Tokugawa period domain are Setsuyosoku (Economising on the 
use of resources), in which Mitsugi attempts to calculate living allowances for a 
ruler and four different occupationalclasses, and Kokka zaisei(Managing a 
country's wealth), where he discusses ways of circulating wealth so as to avoid 
an extreme gap widening between rich and poor. Another two pieces in the 
same volume also deal with the circulation of goods and wealth: both are called 
Shoka rido (The merchant's way of profit). The longer, more detailed version 
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was written in 1789, just three years before Mitsugi died. In it he posits an 
ideal social world where those who govern follow the Way of Heaven and find 
the middle way: there are therefore no shortages or surpluses to cause 
dissension and disorder. 
rn relation to political administration, Mitsugi also wrote some 
explorations of aspects of the Y,jing, mostly concerned with the kinds of 
numerical schemes linked with principles he found in the Zhou/!: His careful 
explication of Zhou Dun Vi's cosmological scheme, however, is both accessible 
and surprisingly appreciative, since he was not at all enamoured of the kind of 
Sung Confucian worldview with which Zhou is now associated. The vocabulary, 
explanations and diagrams are based on the Y,jing, but the argument is 
straightforward, closely following Zhou. In brief, (and with apologies to Zhou) 
the taikyoku (great ultimate) is the name given to the great formlessness 
whose state was one of constant movement, and which, at the extremes of its 
agitation and quietude formed the yo (yang) and the in (yin), which in turn from 
their myriad combinations formed the five gyo(elements), which were endowed 
with matter. Mitsugi's essay reads as a clear and evocative treatment of what 
is now rather recherche subject matter, but which in his time was a major 
source of ideas about many forms of order: cosmic, aesthetic, political and 
social, to mention several that Mitsugi explored. 
In a completely different vein are the poems, and imaginative prose 
works. There are three hundred poems, gathered under the title, Karaku 
eikasho (A collection of poems to enjoy). The two prose works are Nanashi 
sato (Village with no name) and Miyama Soji(The Zhuangzi of Miyama). Both 
have a rather unearthly tone with Buddhist echoes: Miyama Sojl: the much 
longer of the two, becomes quite mystical in parts. In keeping with the Daoist 
reference, this narrative is built around the experience of a man who retires 
to a cave deep in the mountains, far away from the society and governments of 
men. Each chapter develops around a question asked by the ghostly human 
visitor who drops in regularly and elicits lively discursive responses of the 
hermit. The fifth, for example, comprises an argument over the virtue in some 
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different types of social attitudes and personal convictions of sentient beings, 
in the form of a discussion about insects. 
Insects, Soji declares, are of five kinds: those that are naked and stay 
on the ground, being grubs and worms; those that have scales and like water; 
those with armour, that gather in caves; those with hair, that crawl in trees; 
and those whose wings enable them to soar through the air. The great general 
of the last group is the phoenix. Entomological quibbles aside, in 1762 Mitsugi 
had already written an allegorical story in the form of a confrontation between 
a praying mantis and a dragonfly, presumably both of the soaring kinds. He 
gave it the title Gochoron (Debate among five insects), indicating that he 
might have been considering an extended work that would have included three 
other kinds of insect. As it stands, it is a thinly veiled, scathing criticism of 
the kinds of Tsugaru officials Mitsugi blamed for the failure of his career as 
an administrative reformer. 
Lest Mitsugi be consigned to the ranks of effete literati, idealists and 
dreamers, it should be noted that there are a number of works in the 
collection, some long and detailed, that are entirely practical guides to basic 
arithmetic, and the more advanced mathematics of measurement and surveying. 
He wrote about fractions, place value, squares, cubes and the usefulness of the 
abacus and compasses. His illustrations and calculations to do with surveying 
techniques contain calculations clearly associated with right-angled triangles 
without resort to Pythagoras. Then, in connection with the fields that might 
have been surveyed, there is an essay on the virtues of upland rice as a food 
crop, which is based on findings from Mitsugi's own planting, cultivating and 
harvesting experiments over a number of years. 
Yet another voice adopted by Mitsugi is that of traditional historical 
biographer. Tsugaru meishin den (Lives of eminent Tsugaru retainers) is an 
abridged remake of an older local work of the same name by someone else. It 
is of interest because Mitsugi included stories about people who were not in 
the original collection. One noteworthy addition is the story of a woman. It is 
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about the virtuous widow of a soldier in a Nanbu brigade during the time of the 
Nanbu-Oura split and Tamenobu's ascendancy to power in Tsugaru. 
A Nanbu brigade had been encircled, and its isolated stronghold 
captured by Oura (Tsugaru) troops. Before a messenger from the triumphant 
Tamenobu reached them to let them know he intended to spare them, the 
survivors had all committed suicide. On the 10th day of the 3rd month of Keicho 
5 (1601), now firmly installed as the daimyo of Tsugaru, Tamenobu held a public 
memorial service for the spirits of the dead from both sides at the old Daikoji 
castle site. The widow of one of the brigade members went along, and, having 
placed a suicide note before the altar, she quietly killed herself amongst the 
crowd. Her virtue was admired and praised. The original suicide note was 
written in kana. Mitsugi rewrote it in Chinese, and included her story among 
those of the eminent retainers. 
Probably most directly personal of all the texts collected in the 
Complete Works is the resignation letter reproduced at the end of the final 
volume. It is addressed to the daimyo (~r.1:±.), Hori Goroemon and Munakata 
Joemon. Mitsugi's sense of loneliness and despair at having had his career end 
in such an impasse are poignantly conveyed. For the actual course of that 
career and the matters that caught the attention of some members of the 
literate public at the time, we have to turn to other documents. 
III Texts of his time 
Since Mitsugi's official career, the Horeki reforms and the famine are 
mentioned only briefly in his own works, we must turn to other contemporary 
texts to shape narrative accounts of those experiences in Tsugaru, as well his 
life. Fortunately, an assortment of materials has survived the ravages of time 
and disaster, and many of them have been identified, compiled, transcribed or 
published. 
(i) Records, documents and diaries 
The official Tsugaru domain diaries have been photocopied and bound 
into book form in chronological order for easy reference. These volumes are 
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housed in the Hirosaki city library. They provide a skeletal outline, from the 
point of view of the domain administration and the Edo yashiki, of the domain's 
ritual, ceremonial and administrative life, and any other happenings that 
impinged on the official goings-on. 
The Shinpen Hirosaki-shi shi(New edition of the history of Hirosaki) 
contains separate volumes of sources, and the Kinseivolumes contain a great 
many extracts from the official domain diaries. In the Hirosaki city library's 
collection of documents, the diaries are housed under the title,' Tsugaru 
hancho nikkl' (Tsugaru domain official diary), but the editors of the new 
Hirosaki history have distinguished between the Koku mkki(country/domain 
diary) and the Edo nikki(Edo diary) for the purposes of the new publication. 
These diaries are indispensable sources for legal and administrative documents 
associated with the Horeki reforms. 
The eight Michinoku sosho (Michinoku series) collections that were 
published from 1956 onwards have provided access to a variety of other 
Tsugaru documents. This series is based on a comprehensive collection of 
historical materials undertaken during the first decade of the Meiji period, 
with the co-operation of the last Tsugaru daimyo. A great many of the 
surviving documents were to do with the lives of the successive Tsugaru daimyo, 
their lineages, consorts and children, as well as the lives and careers of the 
domain's retainers. Smaller amounts of mqterial were related to the lives and 
careers of figures active in fields such as formal scholarship, military studies, 
poetry, painting, medicine, and the Shinto or Buddhist priesthood, in addition 
to documents sorted under such headings as rituals, justice, and exhortations 
to farmers. 
The materials compiled for these collections have been extracted from 
a number of household, temple, shrine and personal diaries, as well as the 
official domain records. Each volume is arranged in chronological order, so 
there is, for example, a section devoted to NyOi Mitsugi amongst the 
eighteenth century retainers in the fifth volume, while some entries associated 
with the administration of the Horeki reforms are contained in the chapter 
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covering the incumbency of the seventh daimyo in the first part of the seventh 
collection.54 One drawback of these edited collections is the brevity of many 
of the fragments, though the variety of documentary sources presented on 
each page helps prevent the imposition upon them of any single narrative or 
thematic interpretative scheme. 
The various diaries themselves have had long and often complicated 
histories. Many were kept hidden away for long periods. One, now generally 
called the Eiroku nikki(-lJ<.tffe. Sic.), from which some of the texts quoted in this 
study are taken, has appeared in a number of versions under different names 
since 1558. This was the year in the Eiroku period during which the earliest 
entry was made. The diary is said to be a record kept for generations by the 
Yamazaki family, descended from the Nanbu lord of Namioka castle. It seems, 
though, that the earlier entries were written by someone associated with the 
household called Sato. One version of the work was compiled, copied, and 
presumably edited, by Yamazaki Ryuboku (1747-1805), and this later appeared 
in some places as the Tatekoshi kiroku or Tatekoshi nikki (tt~re~, tt~ S tB), 
using the name of the village where Yamazaki lived.55 
Another related diary, the Satoke ki ( 1£Ei*~), is also based on a 
family record, and some local historians believe that the earliest parts of the 
Eiroku nikki were actually transcribed from this work. Entries from the 
Satoke kithat were related to the history of the domain were compiled and 
transcribed in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries by Sato 
Heihachiro. This diary was a key source for the early Aomori prefectural 
histories and the Michinoku sosho, but the whereabouts of the originals have 
been unknown since 1963.56 
Two of the diaries were kept by successive administrative officers of 
major shrines in Hirosaki: they are the Takaokak1: kept at the Koshogu shrine, 
and the Hirosaki Hachimangu shamu nikki (~L.MJ\.fli'§t±f;J S 're), from the 
54 TKD, pages 225 ff., and TRK, pages 203 ff. respectively. 
55 I have not been able to find the local pronunciation for~~-
56 HSS, Shiryo kaisetsu, llf.tilJ<, pages 1-8. 
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Hachiman shrine. Extracts from the Takaokak1: also sometimes referred to as 
the Takaoka Re1genki(~!Ril~~~), were included in the early Tsugaru rekidai 
kirui(Records of successive generations of Tsugaru) and Tsugaruhan kyiiki 
denrui(Biographies from the old records of Tsugaru han) collections in 
Michinoku sosho. It is regarded as a reliable source for domain history after 
1712, the year when the shrine was founded to honour the spirit of the 
esteemed fourth daimyo, Nobumasa. (The diary's reputation is perhaps 
enhanced by this connection.) At the Hachiman Shrine, records were kept by 
successive heads of the Ono family, and they are now kept in the Hirosaki 
University library store. Extracts to do with the Shrine's experience of the 
Horeki reform policies have recently been published in Shinpen Hirosakishi shi. 
(ii) A public life, as compiled in Tsugaru kyoki denrui 
From all those eighteenth century texts it is possible to gather a set of 
references to Nyui Mitsugi, arrange them in chronological order, and construct 
a kind of life story. This is how the biographical sketches in Chinese dynastic 
histories were usually put together, and those in Tsugaru kyiiki denruiare 
similar. The life story of Mitsugi contained in this volume therefore contains a 
strange mixture of ingredients. There are official notices referring to the ups 
and downs in his career path intermingled with negative comments, random 
observations and even reminiscences taken from diaries kept by individuals. It 
is all focused, however, upon Mitsugi as a publicly observed figure. There is no 
material from his own works and nothing of a private nature about his family 
members, or personal relations, or feelings. 
Table 2 lists known key moments in Mitsugi's life and career. It is 
provided to help clarify the sequence of events in the account that follows. 
Mitsugi's childhood and other names are underlined. In the biographical 
narrative, italics are used to distinguish paraphrases of text in the section on 
Nyai Mitsugi in Tsugaru kyiiki denruifrom my explanations and comments.57 
57 No conscious attempt is made to distinguish the writers' "voices". 
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1712 Nyui Yasazaemon Noritomi (5JJ\.=.ii:wrF~Jl~) born in Hirosaki, eldest 
son of Nyui Gizaemon Norihisa (ff.il\ii:wr~~Jlfi1;1), a Tsugaru retainer on 
Shotoku 1 a 50 koku stipend working as a copy clerk, then attendant to the 
fifth daimyo, Nobuhisa. 
1735 
Kyoho 20 
At age 24, appointed apprentice page (hokominarai $0Yl Vlil) to the 
sixth daimyo, Nobuaki, and ranked in the fifth Temawariguard unit. 
1736 Father, Norihisa, dies. Noritomi succeeds him as family head, 
Genbun 1 inherits the stipend and is renamed Ichirozaemon (rn~~ii:wrM). He 
is promoted to the third Kosho guard unit. 
1744 - 49 Daimyo Nobuaki dies, leaving child heir. At age 33, Ichirozaemon 
Enkyo 1 - joins the Hirosaki castle kitchen staff (zenban !!*ii). The next year, 
Kan'en 2 he is made a personal valet (konandoyaku 1H'fi.F1!i) to the daimyo, 
and four years later, a personal secretary (kinjtJkosho ili:.Vfil 1Mi). 
At age 40, resigns from official posts because of chronic eye 
1751-1752 problems. Recovers and returns to office the following year. 
Reappointed to rank of fifth Temawari guard unit; later promoted to 
Horeki 1-2 yoriai ('ffi1!! ), a higher rank equivalent to that of liege vassal. 
1753 H3 Appointed kanjo bugyowith a 150 koku stipend. 
1755 Horeki famine. Travels to Edo and received by the seventh daimyo, 
Horeki 5 Nobuyasu. Appointed General Overseer (motoshi yaku j[;'iiJi)t) of 
Finance Office, at the rank of steward (yonin fflA.). 
1756 H6 Daimyo Nobuyasu bestows personal name of Mitsugi. 
1757 Mitsugi promoted to rank equivalent to domain elder (karo*-~), 
Horeki 7 with a stipend of 1000 kokuand a new residence. His son, Sa'ichiro, 
granted a separate allowance of 300 hyfJ. 
1758 Mitsugi disinherited, dismissed from off ice, deprived of rank. His 
Horeki 8 residence is confiscated. Sa'ichiro is named head of Nyui household 
and guardian of Mitsugi, who is placed under strict house arrest. 
1768 Receives partial pardon, but still confined in the family residence 
Meiwa 5 under official watch. 
1778 
An'ei 7 At age 67, reappointed kanjo bugyo. Resumes active policy reform. 
1780 Dismissed again. Sentenced to live out his life as an exile in 
An'ei 9 Kawaratai vi I lage. 
1784 Pardoned by the eighth daimyo, Nobuharu. Returns to Hirosaki to 
Tenmei 4 live on a stipend supporting five retainers. 
1792 Nyui Mitsugi Noritomi (now written Jlm;) dies in his eighty-first 
Kansei 4 year. 
Table 2: Chronology of Nylii Mitsugi's life and career. 
Sources: Tsugaru kyuki denrw; pages 225-240; Tsugaru rekidai kirw; pages ??? . 
The section headed Nyui Mitsugi Noritomi, in a chapter devoted to 
domain retainers, in Tsugaru kyoki denruibegins with an extract from the 
60 
papers of a later member of the Nyui family telling us Mitsugi's various given 
names and that he was a ninth - generation descendant of the warrior, Nyui 
Osumi Tatekiyo, who loyally supported Tamenobu in his campaign against the 
Nanbu. In the year Genbun 1 (1736), Mitsugi succeeded his father, Giemon, 
upon his death while serving in a minor official post with a stipend of 150 koku. 
After 1744, Mitsugi was appointed valet, then personal secretary in the 
service of the daimyo. The daimyo was the small boy, Nobuyasu, who was living 
with his adoptive mother far away in Edo at the time. In the first year of the 
Horeki period (1750) he (Mitsugi) left official service on the grounds of 
chronic ill health. A little later he returned, having completely recovered, and 
at the beginning of 1753 was appointedkanjo bugyo.58 
An entry from the Takaokaki shrine records is inserted at this point, to 
flesh out this skeletal chronology.59 As a youth Mitsugi was very clever and 
had an exceptional range of skills. He was working as a valet when he claimed 
to have an eye complaint and withdrew from his duties for some time, which 
gave him a chance to take stock of what was going on in the domain. Some time 
after Lord Nobuyasu became daimyo, a famine occurred, starting in the year 
Kan-en 2 (1749). The administration at the castle was exceedingly distressed, 
and officials tried many different measures. They requested substantial 
donations from wealthy townspeople and halved the stipends of retainers, but 
there was poverty everywhere, and our young daimyo knew nothing at all about 
it. Munakata Saeimon worked so hard that he fell ill and died He was over 
seventy. Tsugaru Mondo succeeded him, whereupon Mitsugi recovered in no 
time at all and returned to work at the castle. 
He (Mitsugi) petitioned Mondo about many important official 
administrative matters: poverty relief, plans for the daimyo's installation and 
wedding ceremonies, and the bad state of repair of shrines and temples, roads 
and bridges and rural housing. Mondo had already consulted his high-ranking 
colleagues about these matters, but no satisfactory conclusions had been 
58 From the papers of a member of the NyOi family, TKD, page 225. 
59 Takaokakiin TKD, pages 225-26 
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reached Mondo had made a general appeal for suggestions from al/ loyal, hard-
working retainers, regardless of rank Mitsugi said he had some ideas but 
suggested that Mondo approach his stewards and magistrates once more 
before he spoke. So, Mondo gathered together the four magistrates and the 
stewards and asked for their opinions. The only person who responded was 
Monai Ariemon, a steward Later, when Ariemon had left, Mitsugi addressed 
Mondo, saying that Ariemon's ideas were quite acceptable, but that if his own 
were put into effect, the domain would be well off again in less than two years. 
Then he outlined his own suggestions for reform. Mondo was so impressed 
that he appointed Mitsugi to a post as kanjo bugyo. 60 Whether it was relations 
with shrines and temples, repairs to roads and bridges or attending to broken-
down houses in the countryside, he (Mitsugi) had an opinion. 
From this passage it is easy to form the impression that its author at 
the Koshogu shrine regarded Mitsugi as something of a parvenu, rather too 
clever from an early age, persistent in putting himself forward when the 
opportunity arose, and scheming to make sure the stewards and magistrates 
were placated before he made the final move to press for a prestigious 
appointment. The text of the official announcement mentioning his promotion 
was recorded in the Kudoke ki. It gives notice of the elevation of Sato 
Gyozaemon to the post of general director of the finance office, Mitsugi's duty 
to assist him, and Monai Ariemon's role as their supervisor. It appears from 
way this particular extract is arranged by the Michinoku sosho compilers, that 
the founding of the Oshirabekata was announced on the same day as Mitsugi's 
appointment, in the first month of Horeki 3. This differs significantly from 
the 15th day of the sth month, recorded in the much longer memorandum 
transcribed from the Koku nikki in Shinpen Hirosakishi sh1:61 
Now follows a charming anecdote, from a work called Hitoki hag1: about 
Mitsugi's first day on the job. The new appointee took one quick look at the 
60 The entry from the Takaokaki, is also reproduced in AKS, with unabbreviated characters, on 
pages 273-74. A more detailed rendition of this passage, which I helped edit, can be found in 
Kojima, •Thought", pages 36-37. 
61 SHS, pages 626-27. 
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kabegaki (~:3), which were the ancient laws pasted around the office walls, 
summoned the kogashira (head clerk) and instructed him to peel them all off 
and burn them. When the older officers arrived at work and were dismayed 
that the hallowed statutes had disappeared, Mitsugi explained that he had 
them removed because they were no longer applicable. But they objected, 
saying that since they were the statutes from ancient times, they wished to 
comply with them. Realizing his mistake, Mitsugi called for the sign writer and 
dictated the statutes one by one for him to write. When they were pasted 
back on the wall not a single character was different. He was extremely clever, 
and his memory was phenomena/," he was brilliant at numbers too. Once he saw 
or heard anything, he never ever forgot if.62 
There are no further entries until, suddenly, Mitsugi's first year in 
office is almost over. The last month of Horeki 3 (1753) seems to have been a 
busy one for diarists, and the reform faction too. One short excerpt from 
Ariemon hikki, and a very long one from the Kudoke kirecord official notices. 
They both appear to be reporting from the very detailed, 22-clause set of 
memorandums issued from the Oshirabekata yakusho announcing the 
administrative and procedural changes planned for the following year. Then, a 
short note taken from both the Takaokaki and the Monai Ariemon hikki is 
added to reveal that Mitsugi took all the papers and forms collected in the 
investigation of the domain's purveyors and burned them. Another entry for 
the twelfth month notes Mitsugi's arrangements for keeping rice in the 
Tsugaru granaries and charging money for promissory notes; and concludes 
with a remark that these days it seems that Nyoi Ichirozaemon is being 
thought of as something of a deity. This is the voice of the Takaokak1: which 
has returned on a more unequivocally positive note after a short, businesslike 
entry from the Kudoke ki about repaying retainers' stipends. Mitsugi is 
reported to have modestly demurred when Ariemon and Mondo expressed 
praise and gratitude for the policies that had brought such abundance to the 
62 Hitoki hagi, TKD, pages 226-27. 
domain. It was such a shining example of ethical conduct, and the entire 
country is united in gratitude'~63 
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In the sd month of Horeki 5, Nyui Ichirozaemon, Tsugaru Mondo and 
Monai Ariemon set off together for Edo. This cheerful line, extracted from. 
the Saito Nagato nikki, is juxtaposed with an account taken from the Satoke ki 
on the famine conditions that overtook the domain later the same year. Grain 
was distributed to the poor from the storehouses of those who had plenty, and 
profiteering on sales forbidden. The final comment in this entry observes that 
Mitsugi and Ariemon worked terribly hard and that they were both most 
admirable.64 
These last remarks are of particular interest as we put together 
contemporary reports and observations in an effort to explain the career 
trajectory of NyOi Mitsugi. Not very much later, the relations between these 
two influential men seem to have been far less congenial and co-operative. At 
the end of the same year, Mitsugi was appointed motoshi(General Overseer). 
He went to Edo and accompanied the newly invested daimyo on his journey from 
the shogun's capital to Hirosaki in the fifth month of Horeki 6.65 
In autumn during harvest time, Tsugaru Nobuyasu was so pleased with 
amount of grain flowing into the domain's granaries that he honoured Mitsugi 
with his celebratory name, which is used throughout this study for the sake of 
consistency. It was presented within a (not terribly felicitous) haiku verse; 
evidence, no doubt, of Nobuyasu's grooming in literary pursuits during his 
boyhood in Edo. 
The poem went: 
v\<&f.t 
v\< (:itt 
ikutosemo 
63 TKD. pages 227-29 
64 Satoke k1; TKD, page 229. 
65 Loe.cit. 
ll9*0)F~9~-"tid. 
l_, 2: 0) * t::. *- (;Q 
shikinoma taenu 
yt;1ptt 
'J;.-:> 'f5' '/J "ft 
mitsugikanc/'6 
66 Nobuyasu plays with the words mitsugi (tribute rice, or support), and shikinoma (the Four 
Seasons Room in Hirosaki castle, or throughout the four seasons). 
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Two possible renditions, depending on how the words are played with are: 
Year upon year, in the four seasons room without limit, 
Ah! Such piles of tax rice! 
Year upon year, all year round but never exhausted, 
Mitsugi, what a man! 
On the 1st day of the 9th month of the same year, Mitsugi set off on an 
official trip within the domain; he was received all the way with great awe, and 
feasting, just as if he were the daimyo. At Sotogahama, old women held their 
prayer beads and worshipped as he passed He crossed from Sotogahama to 
Kodomari by boat, and returned to Hirosaki through the newly developed 
farming areas. During this trip he declared that all the Ainu people of 
Sotogahama should be considered as real people: the men should shave their 
beards and trim their sideburns, and the women could style their hair and 
colour their teeth. Their households should be registered and the members 
counted; and they might choose a temple to belong to as well. The Ainu people 
were so thankful that they too remembered Mitsugi as a god67 
On the JSh day of the gth month, hyofu {ration coupons) were issued in 
exchange for everything {of value in the possession of households in the 
domain}, including money and rice, at about one tenth of the value of what was 
handed over. From the following month, they were to be used in all 
transactions instead of currency.68 The Takaokaki record keeper seems to 
have had a dim view of the new system and its planners. He wrote an imaginary 
account of the way in which it might have been conceived as the result of a 
social encounter between Mitsugi and an acquaintance, Ashibane Chojuro, son 
of the influential merchant Ashibane Jirosaburo. The Ashibane were originally 
a bushifamily from Nanbu. Chojuro had been a student in Kyoto and learned 
the arts of elegant living there. He and his father were in charge of 
implementing the hyofu system. 
67 Kudoke ki and Saito Nagato Kyuki, in TKD, page 230. 
68 Details about the hyofusystem and its implementation are discussed in Chapter Three, and 
are therefore omitted here, except where the recorded comments refer to Mitsugi himself. 
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It was Nyai Ichirozaemon's idea to collect all the wealth and gold and 
s!'lver of the domain and display its abundance all at once. Since he had run out 
of policy ideas, on one occasion when Ashibane Chojuro was visiting, he must 
have said to him ''last year because we helped the people out after the bad 
harvest, an enormous amount of silver and gold flowed to other domains. It is 
already time to start thinking about granary stipend payments. If you have any 
idea about how to deal with the situation, do not hesitate to tell me about it." 
Chojuro went off, and after two or three days returned with his reply. 
His plan was to arrange for the upper classes to have an abundance of 
silver and gold, and for benefits to flow to the lower classes at the same time. 
They should make a big effort and collect all the silver and gold from within 
the domain; then have the lower classes use hyofu (coupons) for money. While 
they were using hyofu~ the gold and s!'lver could be used for Mitusgi's own 
purposes. Nothing could possibly work out better for all the people. It was 
truly an ingenious method for enriching the polity and keeping the people 
content. The imagined encounter between Chojuro and Mitsugi ends here, but 
the diarist goes on to express his displeasure at the new system. 
As for the way they put the hyofu into circulation: every single thing of 
value was collected from every nook and cranny of the entire domain, then this 
great jumble of things mixed up together was handed to the authorities. They 
had the merchants put it all in storage. Hyofu for life's necessaries were given 
out to everyone, and when we needed things that were absolutely essential we 
handed in the coupons to exchange for them. It was then that we realized 
that the hyofu were being used alongside gold and silver. The lower classes 
were to have no money to use, but the upper classes were to become 
unbelievably rich. If you complained that it was a shameful trick, you were told 
that the system was Nyai's idea, and he was in complete charge of everything. 
A second extract from the same diary goes on to lament the situation. 
Nyai Ichirozaemon has brought us all to ruin, it says. He flattered the young 
daimyo, so now he is living in luxury and splendour with indescribably splendid 
attendants. Every day he dines at the height of sumptuousness and has his 
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choice of watching sumo matches or performances of Noh andkyogen. He has 
everything he could possibly wish for, and more, to the extent that there is 
nothing between his circumstances and those of the lord himself.69 
An official notice that was delivered to Mitsugi on the 11th day of the 
10th month of Horeki 6 hints at the kinds of excesses enumerated by the 
Koshogu scribe: 
On the occasion of your being appointed motoshi, you were 
given also the status of steward. Until further notice, 
however, your status has been withdrawn, and from here on, 
you should fulfil the duties of motoshi. You will be notified 
about the matter of status in due course.70 
In the 3rd month of Horeki 7, it was confirmed that Mitsugi's stipend would 
remain at one thousand koku. A week later, the daimyo's sankin kotaiparty set 
off for Edo. Among those who joined Nobuyasu's procession to the capital 
were the karo, Tsugaru Mondo, the motosh1: Nyui Mitsugi, and an official 
purveyor, the merchant Ashibane Chojuro. He, according to the Sato 
household diarist, belonged to Nyiii's cohort and worked with him on the 
official accounts.71 
Back in Tsugaru, as the days went by during this same month complaints 
about the trouble and inconvenience of using hyofu grew more and more 
numerous. At first there was no difference, but as goods became more and 
more scarce and queues longer and longer, anger at the general decline in the 
domain knew no bounds.72 The Umeda nikkireports that at this point, Kakugen, 
who was the chief priest of the Toshun'in Zen temple in Hirosak1: set out for 
Kyoto, to attend a memorial service for his master. As he passed through Edo, 
he reported the turmoil Mitsugi's administration was causing in the domain. 
This skeletal report is fleshed out in colourful detail in the Takaokaki, 
which tells us that before he left, Kakugen first wrote a meticulously detailed 
petition outlining all Mitsugi's policies, and the hardship and chaos that had 
69 Both extracts are taken from the Takaokak1; TKD, pages 230 and 31. 
7° Kudoke ki, loc. cit. 
71 Satoke ki, loc. cit. 
72 TKD., pages 231-32. 
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resulted He addressed it to Matsudaira Kunaisho Tadatsune (t~SJZ.'§P'J:.J;tm,'it1, 
tli), who held the post ofwakadoshiyori in Edo and was in charge of Tokugawa 
hatamoto (bannermen) affairs. Tadatsune had acted as guardian of the boy 
daimyo, Tsugaru Nobuyasu, during his years in the capital and had taken as a 
consort the third daughter of the previous Tsugaru daimyo, Nobuaki. Kakugen 
travelled to Edo with a group of mendicant priests, and delivered his petition 
to Tadatsune, who was deeply shocked and hastily arranged a private meeting 
with the young daimyo. They discussed the letter, and Tadatsune 
recommended Mitsugi's dismissal. After they parted, Nobuyasu immediately 
summoned Mitsug1: and interviewed him at length about the implementation of 
the hyofu exchange system, the engagement of the official distr1bution agents, 
and the distress being caused to the people. Mitsugi respectfully informed him 
that all respons1b1/ity for the handling of money and goods was in the hands of 
the official agents, and agreed to travel back to Tsugaru to restore order in 
the domain by completely dismantling the hyofu exchange system.73 
Mitsugi arrived back in Tsugaru on the 12th day of the 6th month: the 
Kudo and Sato household diaries then record that from the 2sd onwards, a 
number of officers working as distnbution agents were detained and 
questioned on suspicion of misappropriating people's valuables and the improper 
use ofhyofu. In the following week, all hyofuwere withdrawn from circulation; 
and the people were greatly relieved to be using money again. On the first day 
of the following month, retainers' rice allowances were distributed, and on the 
2ft the instruction was given that those who held jikata chigyo fiefs should 
return to extracting their stipend allowances directly from the farmers 
cultivating their lands. The same was to apply to shrines and temples. A loan 
amnesty was also announced, and in due course all the reforms were reversed. 
On the 26th day of the 8th month, a number of distribution agents, with at least 
five members of the Ash1bane household among them, were found gUJlty of 
twenty-three offences and imprisoned74 
73 ibid., page 233. 
74 loc. cit. 
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The Takaokaki, again, contains further detail. The rice, money and 
other assets that the Ashibane had collected for their own corrupt purposes 
were taken out of storage and handed back to their owners in Hirosaki and the 
countryside. Then, Mitsugi set off back to the capital. News of some kind of 
deception by the Ashibane that was causing a commotion among the people in 
Tsugaru gradually reached him, followed by disturbing reports one after the 
other, including one that the entire domain money supply was exhausted 
Mitsugi took a roundabout route to Edo, going by way of Kyoto. There, he paid 
his respects at the Konoe residence and was unexpectedly given an audience. 
Through an employee of the household, he requested that a new Tsugaru 
genealogy be written up by Lord Konoe (who performed this task upon the 
entry of each new daimyo into the castle). His Lordship quickly obliged, and 
Mitsugi set out for Edo, after sending off a letter to the karo {Tsugaru 
Mondo) and Hori Goroemon to let them know that arrangements with the Konoe 
family had gone well, and that the genealogy had already been completed 
The two elders, however, would not take delivery of his message. 
Tadatsune had become quite agitated by the idea that Mitsugi was corrupt, and 
had contacted them privately. He was convinced that it would be a good idea 
to dismiss Mitsugi there and then, as he had already become presumptuous 
enough to begin ingratiating himself with the Konoe household Reports and 
protests about the chaos in Tsugaru had continued to come to Tadatsune's 
notice. He urged the two officials to get rid of Mitsugi and to begin making 
plans for restoring the people's wellbeing. If he were in their place, he would 
send a letter to Kyoto on the spot, ordering Mitsugi back to Tsugaru and 
informing the Lord Konoe of his dismissal. No one in either Kyoto or Edo had 
ever been aware of his scheming plans; they were all completely taken in. At 
that, Tadatsune laughed aloud at them; and the two men could only blush and 
bow deeply before him. Mondo and Goroemon were probably deeply humiliated 
when they realized that Matsudaira Tadatsune believed Mitsugi had made fools 
of them. In spite of his long-standing friendship with Mitsugi, Mondo must 
have made a decision and sent a message from Edo. On that very day, the 
69 
entry concludes triumphantly, Nyoi Ichirozaemon (Mitsugi) was ordered home 
in a letter sent express to Kyoto. 
The Kudoke kitakes up the story in Hirosaki. Mitsugi arrived back from 
Kyoto on the 16th day of the 3rd month of Horeki 8, and was summoned 
immediately to the residence of the karo, Munekata. Before a full assembly of 
retainers of every rank, from the Obangashira (Captain of the great guard) 
down to the Ometsuke (inspectors}, he was formally ordered to retire from 
domain service. Thus, he was made a spectacle before the retainers, and then 
among the local residents for block after block, as he walked away from the 
castle. As he passed by the area around the upper Dotemachi bridge, 
townspeople and retainers crowded around him, making a great commotion, 
shouting abuse and throwing stones and gravel at him. 
An official notice was published the following day, explaining his 
dismissal on the grounds of failing to put his ideas into practice and instead 
causing discord and confusion. Mitsugi's residence was confiscated; he was 
placed under house arrest, and forced to relinqui,sh his position as head of the 
household to his son Sa'ichiro. He was allowed no unnecessary visits, even from 
relatives. Sa'ichiro was transferred from his 300-hyo post as sobazutome 
(fJIJji}JO)J'lb), working as a personal attendant of the daimyo, to the ranks of the 
orusuigumi(1&11Wl!iTJ5-*Jl.) guarding the castle, with an allowance of only JOOhyo. 
The Satoke kirecords one further humiliation: an emissary from the castle 
presented an official notice to Mitsugi ordering him to hand over all his books 
and any gifts he had received from the daimyo. He complied. 
In the Okufuji monogatarithere is a rather unsympathetic summary of 
the situation. Nyui Mitsugi , it begins, was appointed to serve as motoshi in the 
years of Horeki 5 and 6 with the intention that he should take care of 
administration. As the mainstay of the government, he served with great 
power and influence. He discarded the time-honoured rules and regulations of 
the domain and replaced them with new ways. The (miraculous) perspiration of 
the Fudosan, for example, he classed as just another old wooden object 
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absorbing and exuding moisture.75 Since Miyama is such a windy and cloudy 
place, in his opinion it was not in the least surprising to discover moisture there, 
and absolutely no reason for our special services and offerings.76 As a retainer, 
he would say how wrong it is to disregard the commands of one:S- lord:S- and 
then abandon all the oaths he had taken. He would declare that a country with 
an upright ruler never has any reason to resort to using spies (to check that 
retainers are doing their duty), and then shirk his own responsibJ/ities by 
cutting corners. What:S- more, he threw all the old records of the domain and 
castle administrations into the fire. And another thing: in Lord Nobumasa:S-
time, it was ordered that every year several koku of rice would be set aside 
for ml'litary provisions. It was good quality glutinous rice and it would be set up 
around a ceremonial altar to the earth, before being steamed, pounded and 
then mixed with water and eaten. Nyoi Mitsugi just handed all the rice 
straight to the cake shops and had them do it. Narita Sajihe1: the scribe 
added, had said that the way he treated the old documents was the saddest of 
all the dreadful things he did. 
The KudiJke kinotes that when the daimyo granted a general amnesty on 
the 14th day of the 6th month of Meiwa 5 (1768), Mitsugi's sentence was eased· 
but he was only to be permitted to leave the family residence in emergencies. 
The next entry, from the Satoke ki, tells us that on the 1st day of the 9th 
month of An'ei 7 (1778), NyOi Mitsugi was pardoned and reappointed to the 
post of kanjo bugyo, in his sixty-seventh year. His new stipend was 100 koku .. 
and his official salary, 50 koku.77 
There is nothing between this report and an entry from the KudiJke ki 
for the 3rd day of the 6th month of An'ei 9, two years later, recording that 
Mitsugi had been arraigned before the highest court and dismissed from his 
75 The Fudoson (1'lb~) is Fudo myoo (1'lb~.3:.), Acala, the god of fire. 
76 It was treated as a wondrous event when drops of moisture appeared on the Fudoson's brow. 
People made special offerings to the temple and paid for special services at these auspicious 
times. Mitsugi explained that the wooden statue simply absorbed moisture in hot, humid 
weather, and when the temperature dropped, it contracted. If the humidity was high, drops of 
water would condense on the statue. His view was that the temple was profiting by duping the 
people. 
77 Page 235. 
post A summary of the judgement follows. Mitsugi had been reappointed 
because the domain's financial situation was in disarray and he was someone 
known to have ideas about what to do. He had, however, pursued his own 
interests in a series of devious schemes, working tirelessly to succeed in 
bringing about the destruction of the domain. Having perpetrated such 
deceptions inside this kuni and beyond, he was guilty of heinous crimes for 
which the penalty was an official order to commit seppuku. Through the 
clemency of the daimyo, however, it was instead decreed that he should live 
the remaining years of his life in exile in the vl'llage of Kawarata1:78 
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An entry from the Satoke ki adds that while he was imprisoned within 
the court buildings, he wrote the following lines on a fan that he left behind 
Basho wrote of his jouney to the west: 
Abandon the world, count it as nothing 
but on nights when it snows you will still be cold 
Mitsugi wrote of his mountain dwelling: 
I am to turn my back on the world and travel deep into the 
mountains 
but when people don't have food to eat they will still die. 
If you think about it, not being constantly fed manju like a 
spoiled child, and spending night after night in a place where 
snow covers the ground, is nothing more than the duty of any 
loyal and filial person, even if he does freeze to death. It is 
merely to eschew commonplace attitudes and emotional 
reactions. 
To have the endurance of the ancients and take matters of 
life and death in one's stride, regardless of the opinions and 
judgements of others, however, (is even more difficult). That 
is how real ministers conduct themselves.79 
A rather sympathetic piece is inserted here, from the Fujita shi 
shoroku(Abridged record of the Fujita family), noting that during his second 
term in office NyDi Mitsugi was advanced in years but in robust health and 
extremely energetic. He strove diligently to rescue his reputation from the 
damage it had suffered in the Horeki years, but the karo thwarted him at 
every turn, and a merchant named Miyazaki Genbei used dishonest means to 
78 Pages 235-36. 
79 TKD, page 236. 
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prevent his success. In the end, unable to show any results at all for his pains, 
he was once again meted out a severe penalty. The comment concludes with 
the remark: It is said that all right-minded people felt very sorry for him. 
One line from the Satoke kirecords that in Tenmei 4 (1784), during the 
incumbency of Tsugaru Nobuharu, Nyoi Mitsugi was granted a five-person 
support stipend and an extra allowance of five ryo in cash.Bo A different 
source, the Muetsu kithen explains that Mitsugi was accorded much respect 
during the early years of Lord Nobuyasu's rule, and that he had advanced 
gradually until he was appointedmotoshi, second in rank only to the karo. From 
his written communications, it seems that Lord Nobuyasu thought of him as an 
uncle. After that, however, he adopted some unorthodox methods, which 
resulted in the suspension of his stipend and his banishment to a distant place. 
When Lord Nobuharu came into office and took charge of the administration 
he learned of Mitsugi's case. Because Lord Nobuyasu had thought of him as an 
uncle, Lord Nobuharu thought it regrettable that Mitsugi should be living so 
far away. He therefore ordered that he be pardoned, brought back to 
Hirosaki and permitted to wander about freely. This was a very filial decisi.on. 
People believed that he was acknowledging Mitsugi's past service and admired 
him greatly. 
From a Nyui family collection comes the simple entry: On the 6th day of 
the 4'1 month of Kansei 4, (1792) Mitsugipassed away at the age of Ba The 
description of Mitsugi quoted at the beginning of this chapter follows. A short 
summary of how he spent his time at Kawaratai, a list of his written works, and 
an outline of the lineage of mathematicians whose works he compiled complete 
the entry. The small section about Mitsugi's activities in Kawaratai 
encapsulates much that is so interesting about these traces. This is in fact 
the last contemporary comment so far located about the way he lived his life. 
During the time he spent in exile in the village of Kawarata1: some seven 
ri from Hirosaki, he would regularly gather the elderly men and women around 
him and teach them Chinese and Japanese or tell them funny old moral tales. 
Bo Page 237. 
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All the villagers, both old and young, looked after his every need and loved him 
as they did their own parents. 
When he arrived the entire village had been illiterate, but many young 
people of both sexes visited him to study basic arithmetic and writing skills. 
Some even learned to read classical Chinese or to do quite advanced 
mathematics problems. From that time, many public-spirited people came from 
thearea.81 
IV Texts of our time 
In a note to the opening paragraphs of the 1993 English version of his 
article, "The Thought of Nyui Mitsugi", Kojima Yasunori provides a list of his 
twentieth century scholarly predecessors. My own study owes a debt to that 
historiographical lineage, and is perhaps part of it, chronologically at least. A 
number of the listed works appear in my bibliography, particularly those 
connected with Mitsugi and the reforms, where I have drawn on much the same 
pool of sources as Kojima and his predecessors. 
The earliest project Kojima records is a three-part account of Nyui 
Mitsugi's life, entitled Nyoi Mitsugi Den, which was contributed by Fujii Shoji 
in 1938 and 1939 to three successive issues of Utou, a local historical journal 
published in Hirosaki. In fact, the first version of this biography appeared 
before that: in 1935, at the beginning of the first volume of the Complete 
Works. In addition to this biography and celebratory tracts produced for the 
actual launching, several essays on Mitsugi and aspects of his life and thought 
were also published around the time the Complete Works became available.82 
81 TKD, page 237. 
82 They included Nomura Kentaro's, "Tokugawa-Period Economic Thought", which appeared in 
Utouin 1939, and three further pieces written by Fujii and published in 1941: "Nyui Mitsugi's 
Philosophical World View" in Utou. and "NyUi Mitsugi's Place in the History of Thought" and "The 
Utility and Practicality of Learning" in Gekkan To-o, an Aomori-Prefecture monthly. In 1957, 
Haga Yoshichiro's essay, "On Nyui Mitsugi and his Legitimate Heir", also appeared in two parts in 
Mutsu Sh1dan. None of these four works has been referred to in my work. Where the subject 
matter was of interest, they were overtaken by later studies to which I had access. Generally 
speaking, the hagiographic tone in earlier writing about Mitsugi had faded away by the 1960's. 
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During the 1960s, when local histories such as the Hirosaki-shi shi 
(History of the city of Hirosaki) were being compiled and published, journal 
articles appeared from a new generation of local historians, who examined 
aspects of the reforms and Mitsugi's thought. Among them were: Miyamoto 
Masumi, "On the Economic Thought of NyUi Mitsugi"; Okawa Tetsuo, "A 
Comment on the Horeki Reforms in the Tsugaru Domain"; Haga Yoshichiro, 
"Scholarly Traditions in the Tsugaru Domain"; and Miyazaki Michitaka, "The 
Theoretical Background of the Horeki Reforms in the Tsugaru Domain". 83 
Considerably later, "NyUi Mitsugi: the man and his achievements. A lesson in 
the history of local administration", by Tanaka Mamoru, was published in Ajia 
Bunka KenkyiJ, in 1977. 84 
The concerns motivating this study, though, diverge significantly from 
those of most of its antecedents, for although Tsugaru's Horeki reform 
program has been the object of intermittent enquiry by local historians, the 
subject of domain-level famine relief is, like the actual experience of famine 
itself, not often addressed in histories of the Tokugawa period. And, while a 
scattering of domain-level reformers have appeared in historical narratives, 
studies of the cosmological and intellectual preoccupations of these regional 
administrators are not common. Mitsugi's attempts to alter the distribution of 
socio-economic and administrative entitlements in Tsugaru have been quite 
plausibly construed as inevitable outcomes of the fundamental contradictions 
inherent in the bakuhan political system, particularly by those writing in the 
1960s. At the same time, there is enough evidence of Mitsugi's idiosyncratic 
world view and the sense of urgency in his approach to political and social 
action to make for an interesting exploration of how he himself represented 
that system in his writing. It is clear too, that the frequency with which 
famines occurred in Tsugaru was not merely a symptom of class inequality, but 
of other forces as well. 
84 Okawa, "Commentn, inHirosaki Daigaku Kokushi Kenkyu, (Studies in Japanese History, Hirosaki 
University), no. 24, 1960. Miyazaki's "Theoretical Background" appeared in Chihoshi Kenkyu, a 
journal of local history, in 1965 and was republished by Tsugaru Shobe in 1977 in The Culture 
and History of Aomori Prefecture. 
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Subsequent work on local history has built on the substantial work of 
these previous scholars, and over the same period, thought and political 
economy have had to make way for other areas of research. The original 
Japanese version of Kojima's article appeared in the first of two collections of 
research articles on the Tsugaru region published in 1984 and 1988. The early 
volume concentrates on historical themes and the other is more eclectic. Both 
were edited by Hasegawa Sei'ichi, who teaches at Hirosaki University. Since 
then, he has put together several pamphlets. One of them contains his own 
examination of the reception among local shrines and temples of the Horeki 
reforms, and Kojima's essay on Mitsugi's short chapter about the virtues of 
upland rice as a food crop found in the third volume of the Complete Works. 85 
Overall, except for Kojima's interest in exploring the ways in which 
Mitsugi's thought adhered to the Sarai - Shundai heritage while continuing the 
intellectual tradition established in Tsugaru by students of Yamaga Soko, most 
of the research effort on the Tokugawa period has gone into locating, sorting 
and explicating documents; then interpreting them fairly uncritically in the 
context of familiar narratives. The recently updated histories of Hirosaki City 
and Aomori Prefecture have basically conserved the narratives, but added (alas, 
mostly too late for me) splendid collections of documents that will be most 
useful for future scholars. 
One work that must be included in this discussion is the MA thesis of 
Asakura Yuko, completed at Hirosaki University and entitled, "Kinsei koki ni 
okeru Tsugaru-han no kenkyu". The essay focuses particularly on the reform 
process during the years 1753-56, and in her research Asakura made extensive 
use of the bound copies of the domain's daily records housed in the Hirosaki 
Municipal Library. She gleaned many snippets of detail, especially about 
policies enacted in the countryside, to include in her work. Since the diaries 
have yet to be transcribed and published, access to the material they contain 
is difficult to achieve without focussed searching and a fair amount of time. I 
85 Hasegawa Seiichi (ed.), "Tenkanki hokuo han no seiji to shiso", Hirosaki daigaku jinbun gakubu, 
1993. 
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became very grateful for Asakura's work after deciding that reform policies, 
other than those connected with famine relief, had a place in my study. 
From this short exploration of works that focus in some way upon his 
life and work, it is probably obvious that Nyui Mitsugi has not travelled far 
from Tsugaru as an object of historical enquiry. While Kojima's work has been 
an inspiration and guide on thought, the most significant recent writing on 
reform in Tsugaru is that of Mark Ravina. My study shares its focus on the so-
called "dead" middle of the Tokugawa period with his recent monograph, Land 
and Lordship in Early Modern Japan86• This was the time when domain 
governments were firmly established, with their precedents well and truly set 
at home, and their external relations with the bakufu and neighbouring domains 
on the whole settled and manageable - though some old animosities towards the 
Tokugawa still festered. 
Because Tsugaru was located, however, on the geographic and 
institutional periphery of bushisociety, with its culture of personal feudal 
bonds, patrimony and suzerain power, the domain does not serve well to 
illustrate the points Ravina makes about levels of sovereignty.87 In Chapter 
Two, I note some of the ways in which different spheres of sovereignty were 
constantly being negotiated in Tsugaru, affecting the policy choices available 
for managing the economic wellbeing of the polity. A consideration of the way 
in which the polity of Tsugaru evolved, for example, throws some light on the 
spheres of power that were crucial in shaping life and meaning in the domain, 
and therefore the reform options open to it by the middle of the 1700s. That 
approach results in my explaining the relations between Edo and Hirosaki in 
different terms from Ravina's, and my finding the suggestion that capital 
development could have been left to the private commercial sector in Tsugaru 
during the 1750s impossible to entertain. 
Ravina considers the relation between political economy and ideas in his 
discussion of particular reform policies adopted in Tsugaru (Hirosaki), Awa 
86 Ravina, Land and Lordship, page 4. 
87 Ravina, Land and Lordship, pages 34-42. See also my remarks in footnote 29 on page 29. 
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(Tokushima) and Yonezawa. His accounts of these reform programs, along with 
the ideas behind them, make for informative comparisons. The choice of 
Tsugaru as a domain to compare with Awa and Yonezawa is, however, leads to a 
less subtle analysis than might have resulted from an examination of three 
more equal cases. As I pointed out in the Introduction, Tsugaru was not in any 
respect a major domain in Tokugawa Japan. Both the others were significant 
kuni("country" domains): Yonezawa because of its powerful Uesugi daimyo 
dynasty and Awa (Tokushima) for its precocity in trade and commerce. 
Tsugaru was a newly-founded domain, still struggling to develop enough rice 
paddy to sustain itself at the time when indigo was already an established 
commercial crop in Awa. 
Awa's kokudaka (putative taxable wealth) in 1615 was 258,000 koku, and 
Yonezawa's an already vastly reduced 300,00 koku, but Tsugaru's was only 
47,000 koku. It was not until the end of the seventeenth century that a few 
peak harvests of over 300 ,00 koku were recorded: and the domain's status was 
not raised to 100,000kokuuntil the nineteenth century. The Uesugi lands in 
Yonezawa were reduced further in 1664, but the domain's rank then remained 
around 150,000 koku, three times that of Tsugaru throughout the eighteenth 
century. The Yonezawa polity was also founded on a much firmer footing than 
Tsugaru. It was administered by experienced leaders with a cohesive band of 
retainers who had their own heritage of disciplined, benevolent rule.BB 
Instead of Tsugaru, the Nanbu (Morioka) domain would have made for 
more robust and nuanced comparisons in Ravina's framework. Nanbu was a kuni 
ruled by an established daimyo dynasty. It had larger land area, higher 
putative wealth in 1615 (200,000koku), and even worse weather than Tsugaru; 
as well as a dramatic trajectory of initial success and later failure in gaining a 
foothold in the wider commercial economy. The comparisons made in this study 
between Tsugaru on the one hand, and Nanbu and Hachinohe on the other, are 
only regional in nature and are focussed on harvest failures and strategies for 
BB ibid. pages 1-4, and others. Ravina makes much of Uesugi Harunori (1751 - 1822), but the 
family had for centuries been involved in the political and military machinations of the centre -
both Kamakura and Kyoto. 
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coping with famine. Even though those two domains were as isolated from the 
major urban centres as Tsugaru, and grew their crops in similarly unfavourable 
climatic conditions, their experiences of famine were not parallel. 
Tsugaru has been located in this chapter through the lens of the 
sketchy biographical data available on Mitsugi. Chapter Two comprises a 
discussion of the domain as geographic place and part of the Tokugawa polity. 
Chapter two 
The Precarious State of Tsugaru 
OshG - domain of the Ezo, so swift to take cover at every 
attack and so swift to retreat into their mountains when 
pursued. OshG - where everywhere the massive mountain 
ranges form a natural barrier to human traffic. 89 
OshG - surrounded by the Japan Sea, tempestuous and 
inhospitable, and the Pacific Ocean, its waters barred in their 
course by the jagged Kamikita Ranges. OshG - with its thick 
winter mantle of snow, coldest place in all of Honshu, since 
time immemorial plagued by failed harvests. 
Pitiful OshG - with barely fifteen percent of its land arable, 
compared to twenty-five percent in Kyushu. Thus handicapped 
in every respect by unfavourable natural conditions, how can 
Oshu manage ... ? Sato Hiroshi 90 
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Professor Sato was writing during the Meiji period; but Tsugaru, in the 
furthest corner of Oshu, is still considered one of the most isolated and 
vulnerable regions of Japan; and not altogether without reason. Neither of the 
region's principal cities, for example, has yet been linked to Japan's 
contemporary political and economic centres by the fast rail system. In 
contrast, both Morioka and Tsubota (Akita), the castle towns of Tsugaru's old 
neighbours, are on Shinkansen routes.91 Just as distance and the local 
mountains are still barriers to fast overland communication, so, too, climatic 
conditions continue to pose a threat to farming. Apples are presently the 
mainstay of Aomori prefecture's agricultural sector, but, while they are less 
vulnerable to fickle weather than rice, a bumper crop can be wiped out in a 
matter of hours by a typhoon, as happened in 1991, when the fresh fruit 
harvest was reduced by around 80%. 
89 Oshu (~:1-l'l)is the Sinicised name for the province of Mutsu(~.i~). Mutsu, as can be seen in 
Map 1 on page 11, refers in history either to the provinces of Iwashiro, Iwaki, Rikuzen, and 
Rikuchu as well as Mutsu, or just to the northernmost province of Mutsu. 
90 Sato Hiroshi, OshiJ sangyo soetsu (Introduction to the industries of Oshu), quoted in Tsugaru, 
page 66. 
82 Morioka and Akita are terminal stations of two branches of the Tohoku Shinkansen network. 
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Documents attest to the frequency of harvest failures in Tsugaru: not, 
it must be admitted, "since time immemorial", but certainly during the 
Tokugawa period. Of all the adverse conditions affecting harvests in the 
domain, the weather was certainly the most commonly recorded. Snows that 
did not melt until late spring, cold growing seasons, wet summers, floods, and 
strong on-shore winds were all among the climatic conditions that could come 
between Tsugaru's farmers and adequate crop yields. Since rice was the 
primary source of income for the entire polity, poor harvests threatened the 
proper conduct of government affairs at elite administrative levels, as well as 
the very survival of the labouring rural and urban populations. 
As the administration of a substantial tozama domain, the Tsugaru 
government was in many respects autonomous, as Mark Ravina points out.92 
Most day-to-day policy issues were dealt with entirely at the local level; but 
when fiscal crisis occurred in the 1750's, there were constraints on the range 
of measures administrative officials could propose. Like the crisis itself, which 
linked the treasury in Hirosaki to merchant houses in Osaka and financiers in 
Edo, these constraints were partly imposed by the workings of the Tokugawa 
political settlement and partly shaped by conditions particular to Tsugaru. 
In this chapter, some characteristics of the domain and its history are 
introduced. Some issues are raised that became important when Mitsugi 
attempted to implement the Horeki reform measures. One of these is the way 
in which the domain was founded, late in the sixteenth century. Tsugaru 
Tamenobu and his successors opened up large amounts of territory to rice 
cultivation, committing the domain to exclusive dependence on rice as the 
foundation of wealth and the basis of the taxation system. At the same time, 
many local bushibecame Tsugaru retainers without relinquishing their direct 
association with the lands and farming villages comprising their hereditary 
fiefs. A second important issue was the degree to which the domain had 
become indebted to merchants and financiers in the Kamigata and Edo, and a 
92 Mark Ravina, Land and Lordship, pages 25-7. 
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third is the degree to which established rituals, customs and beliefs had come 
to govern the rhythms of social and economic life in the domain. 
Much of what we know about Tsugaru during the Tokugawa period is 
accessible to us only because of the centralised and bureaucratic nature of the 
shogunal government in Edo. During the seventeenth century, Tsugaru was 
drawn increasingly into its structures and systems of control, and it is 
impossible to give an account of the state of the domain in the mid eighteenth 
century without constantly juxtaposing local conditions and events with those 
closer to the political and commercial centres of the Tokugawa polity. 
I The lay of the land 
Tsugaru's location and terrain were obviously not unrelated to the ease 
with which one wily vassal stationed there was able to usurp authority Nanbu 
over the region's five kori(districts) and create a separate domain. With a 
range of mountains between him and the authority of his chief in Morioka, and 
the resources of the fertile Iwaki River valley as well as the port of 
Tosaminato under his command, Tamenobu had geography on his side. The 
territory in dispute was even more distant from Toyotomi Hideyoshi's 
headquarters in Osaka. It must have been at some extreme periphery of his 
strategic imagination while he was taken up with extending his hegemonic 
authority eastward towards the Kanto at the same time as planning invasions of 
Korea and China. When Tamenobu petitioned for recognition of his exclusive 
claim over Tsugaru, Hideyoshi would have been only too willing to invest him 
with a separate fiefdom in return for demonstrations of loyalty and the 
promise of a secure frontier in the far north. 
After Hideyoshi's death and the final victory of Tokugawa Ieyasu, 
however, those same advantages were not so conducive to the functioning of 
Tamenobu's domain as part of the system imposed from the new political 
centre. To begin with, there was very little land suitable for rice cultivation. 
The water supply greatly exceeded demand, making extensive flood-control, 
irrigation and drainage works necessary before the river could be harnessed 
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and the domain's productivity increased. Even then, climatic conditions caused 
frequent harvest shortfalls and failures in this far northern domain. 
Whether or not the season was favourable and the crop bountiful, a 
significant portion of the annual tax rice collected in Tsugaru always had to be 
transported southward to Osaka and Edo to be exchanged for the silver and 
gold that supported the daimyo and his retinue during their compulsory 
sojourns in the capital. Different sea routes were favoured over the years, 
but delivering rice to the central markets always entailed long, risky journeys. 
On most routes the cooperation of agents, merchants and porters along 
the way had also to be arranged. Overland cartage was obviously unsuitable 
for heavy loads of grain. Travel on rarely frequented land routes, through 
mountains and sparsely populated areas, was arduous and dangerous, even for 
unencumbered individuals. Tsugaru's climate and location, therefore, were not 
at all suited to the political economy in which the domain was obliged to 
function. 
(i) Rugged mountains and swift-flowing streams 
The Ou mountain range, of which the volcano, Mount Hakkoda, is the 
highest point, formed natural boundaries between Tsugaru and the Nanbu 
domain to the east, and the Satake domain in the southeast. In the 
southeastern slopes rise some significant tributaries of the Iwaki River. 
Mount Iwaki, another volcano, rises on the edge of a series of steep north-
south ridges in the west and southwest, between which run streams that empty 
either into the Iwaki River or the Japan Sea. 
The Iwaki River flows almost due north after a sweeping turn northeast 
of Hirosaki. It drains the fertile Tsugaru plain, boarded on the east by the 
Tsugaru range, which forms steep barriers in the far north of the Tsugaru 
peninsula and a watershed down its eastern coast. South of Lake Jusan on the 
Japan Sea side of the peninsula is a long strip of swampy sand dune country 
that obstructs drainage and causes the lowlands beyond to be unusually wet. 
As the number of waterways marked on the map indicates, the Tsugaru plain 
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was extremely well watered by the Iwaki River and its tributaries. Just 102 
kilometres long, the Iwaki rises in the Shiragami Mountains to the west of 
Hirosaki, flows east past the castle, then through the plain and into Lake Jusan, 
a large shallow lagoon that empties into the Japan Sea.93 The final stretch of 
the Iwaki after its confluence with the Taira River at Fujisaki is sometimes 
called the Okawa, or great river. See Map 4. 
The network formed by the Iwaki River system through the Tsugaru 
plain was vital to the productivity of its arable areas, and so also to the 
economic survival of the domain. One of the primary preoccupations of the 
second, third and fourth Tsugaru daimyos over most of the seventeenth 
century was opening up these areas for rice cultivation. The river system 
provided the main arteries of the irrigation and drainage systems required for 
rice production; it also served as the first stage of the transportation system 
that conveyed Tsugaru's newly generated wealth, in the form of tax rice, to 
central markets in Edo, Kyoto or Osaka. Logs of construction timber, one of 
Tsugaru's earliest profitable export commodities, were also transported down 
the river on the first leg of a journey from the domain's forests that would 
most often end in one of the three major cities. Within the domain, a variety 
of goods, including timber to be used in the construction of the domain's new 
castle at the Takaoka site (now Hirosaki) were also delivered by river. 
By the end of the seventeenth century, silt deposited in Lake Jusan by 
Tsugaru's rivers over the centuries had made the lake so shallow that Jusan 
(formerly Tosaminato) ceded its centuries-long prominence as the region's 
principal shipping centre to Ajigasawa and Aomori. This was in spite of a large-
scale dredging project undertaken by the third daimyo in 1694, employing 
3 ,000 workmen for three months. Jusan remained, however, the port through 
which all the rice being shipped away from Tsugaru passed, before being 
transhipped at Ajigasawa. Kanita, on Mutsu bay, and Imabetsu on the Tsugaru 
Strait were the principal timber ports. Those five ports, along with Fukaura, 
93 Lake Josan is sometimes referred to as Josan-numa, or Josan lagoon. The name of the port, 
Tosaminato, uses the Japanese pronunciation jusan, which is tosa. The characters signify the 
number thirteen. 
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Tsugaru Strait 
Map 3: Relief map of the Tsugaru domain 
Source: Zusetsu Aomori-ken no rekishi, page 99 and end insert map 
on the Japan Sea cast, and the three main land border posts, were all 
supervised by a machi bugyo (town magistrate). 
Roadways and footpaths through Tsugaru territory naturally followed 
the waterways where possible, only taking to ridges and passes when necessary. 
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These overland networks were gradually registered, and descriptive maps or 
charts of the various routes drawn up. The old ichi-ri-zuka (earth mounds) or 
ichi-ri-matsu (pine trees) that had been placed along well-used roads at one-ri 
intervals, were gradually augmented by a system of posts.94 After a road 
distances survey in Genroku 6 (1693), the Tsugaru ri(m) was reduced by one 
fourth to conform with what was becoming a standard length in the rest of the 
country. The fact that this change was made after almost a century of control 
and regulation from Edo is an indication of how long it took for Tsugaru to be 
drawn into the bakufu-domain administrative system even in simple matters. 
In accordance with the practice being adopted in cities and larger towns, 
avenues of trees were planted along stretches of Tsugaru's major roads, such 
as the one between Hirosaki and the Ikarigaseki barrier.95 Since most overland 
travellers entered the domain on this road, it was thought of as the domain's 
Omote dor1~ or main street. A new section, which was constructed after a 
severe landslide completely blocked the old roadway, was planted with pine 
trees in 1685.96 Another 540 were planted in a different section in Genroku 1 
(1688), followed by 1,884 in 1694 and a further 2,000 in 1697, so that a good 
portion of the last stage of a journey to the castle in Hirosaki along the major 
external route was through an avenue of pine trees. 97 Some of these pines are 
still standing. 
(ii) Forces of nature 
Archaeological evidence suggests that rice was being grown in the 
Tsugaru region before the third century CE.98 There is, however, no reason to 
believe that its cultivation was continuous, or that rice agriculture historically 
had the kinds of cultural significance that are currently the subject of 
94 One ri(.lfl.) usually equals about 3.93 kilometres or 2.44 miles, but the rimarked out in Tsugaru 
until 1693 were one third as long again. 36 chO(T) = 1riand50 chois approx. 5.5 km. 
95 Seki(~) signifies a barrier. I use the word Ikarigaseki intact, instead of writing 'the Ikari 
barrier', because it is also the name of the village nearby. 
96 Conrad Totman refers to bakufu encouragement of roadworks, and the general attention given 
to tree planting and marking distances, in Early Modern Japan, pages 153-54. 
97 HSS, p. 158. 
98 Mark Hudson, Ruins of Identity. Hawai'i: Univeristy of Hawai'i Press, 1999, page 198. 
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Map 4: The Tsugaru domain. showing main roads. some rivers and itabi. 
Based on: Maps on map insert and pages 234, 240, 159 of Zusetsu Aomori-ken shi. 
contention.99 Farmers on the Tsugaru plain have always benefited from 
precipitation that falls when winds from the north and west encounter the Ou 
Mountains, but there has never been a guarantee that the rain will stop after 
an optimal amount has fallen, or that cold wet summers will not spoil crops. 
Nor has the region ever been completely sheltered from the most 
severely cold yamase winds blowing in from the northeast. Tsugaru lies firmly 
in the area described as "suffering from spells of abnormally low temperatures 
99 Emiko Ohnuki-Tierney, Rice as Self. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993, pages 30-36. 
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in summer" that are seriously disruptive about once a decade.100 Since it was 
still the case in the 1980s that "a temperature deviation of 1.5°C below normal 
results in a rice harvest about 30% below normal", it is reasonable to suppose 
that cold summers were even more destructive in the 1700s.101 Some yamase 
effect occurs in most years, and the eastern domains of Nanbu and Hachinohe 
were more often affected than Tsugaru, but it was in the periodic extremely 
severe years that disaster struck all three domains.102 
Tohoku's cold summers are explained in at least two ways. In both cases 
they occur because the polar front passing from south to north and bringing 
the tsuyu rainy season in early summer is blocked by a high to the northeast of 
Tohoku. That high can be caused either by cold sea water temperatures or by 
ash ejected into the stratosphere by major volcanic eruptions. The standard 
geographer's explanation is that when low temperatures persist for long 
periods in the waters of the Okhotsk Sea, a strong anticyclone forms to the 
northeast of Japan, and cold air flows over the northern and eastern Tohoku. 
In these conditions, the cold northern Oyashio current flows further south 
along the Pacific coast before the seas are warmed by Kuroshio current 
flowing from the south.103 
The volcanic eruption theory has been proposed by Jusei Kondo, whose 
work is based on Sendai Meteorological Observatory records. Kondo has 
identified seven periods over the 300 years from around 1680 during which 
frequent lean years have been caused by cool summers in Tohoku. He calls a 
lean year one in which the rice harvest is less than 80% of normal. Not 
surprisingly, the first four of these seven periods are 1692-1703, 1747-57, 
1783-86 and 1833-38, coinciding with the Genroku, Horeki, Tenmei and Tenpo 
famines of the Tokugawa period. Kondo concludes that the cold spells 
occurring before the Tenmei and Tenpo famines, and two of the three later 
100 Glenn T. Trewartha, Japan: A Geography. London: Methuen, 1965, pages 371 and 377. 
101 Jusei Kondo, "Volcanic Eruptions, Cool Summers, and Famines in the Northeastern Part of 
Japan", Journal of Climate, Vol. 1, August, 1988, pages 775 - 788, page 755. 
102 See Map 5 for the location of Hachinohe on the Pacific coast. 
103 Trewartha, pages 45-46. 
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lean periods were all caused by volcanic eruptions. He did not have data on 
which to base any determination about the Horeki famine. 
Because of the unpredictable summer temperatures, whatever the 
cause, and long winters, with heavy snows and only around half the year frost-
free, almost no double cropping has ever been possible in Tsugaru. The region 
is also too far north for mulberry leaves to prosper, so raising silkworms was 
not a profitable option during the Tokugawa period. Sweet potatoes became an 
important supplementary source of nutrition in Japan's famine periods after 
the beginning of the seventeenth century, when they were introduced from the 
Ryakyas: but they could not be grown in Tsugaru either.104 
To provide a snapshot of the range of climatic and other disasters that 
regularly struck Tsugaru and its people, a resume of the disasters and portents 
recorded by chroniclers during the twenty years before Mitsugi came to power 
will do very well. It is found in second volume of Tsugaru no yoake, by 
Yamagami Shosuke, and the relevant chapter section is entitled Sai-i zokuhatsu 
(~AiWE56), "One disaster after another".105 Yamagami's chronological narrative 
is based on a prodigious number of sources, listed together at the end of the 
book, but he does not supply reference notes. 
Nobuaki, the sixth daimyo, succeeded his dilettante spendthrift father, 
Nobuhisa, in 1731. A major epidemic of an unidentified disease in 1733 caused 
many deaths.106 Major fires occurred in the downtown area of Hirosaki in 1734, 
in the port of Ajigasawa in 1735 and in the domain's other major port, Aomori, 
in 1737. The Iwaki River flooded in 1737, and two years later the region 
suffered an earthquake followed by strangely hot, dry weather and 
aftershocks for ten days. Black clouds appeared in the sky that turned out to 
be smoke from an eruption of Usugatake in Ezo. Then a typhoon struck, 
bringing with it fierce winds that toppled giant old trees, and heavy rains that 
tasted of salt. Even then, there was some rice to harvest, and the domain 
104 Trewartha, Japan, pages 357-3n. 
105 Yamagami, Tsugaru no yoake, 2, page 84. The following summary is based on pages 84-90. 
106 Aomori-ken sh1; page 185. 
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scraped by. In the 6th month of 1739, a flotilla of Russian fishing boats 
appeared in the Pacific off Hachinohe and caused a flurry of surveillance 
orders from the bakufu. Tsugaru was instructed to strengthen its watch over 
the northern coast.107 
Famine overtook Tsugaru the next year, after a cold summer in the 
classic pattern. Many villages harvested no rice at all. In the 11th month 
hungry people began wandering about in search of food and begging in the 
towns. Kayu (rice gruel) was served in shelters for the destitute in Aomori and 
Hirosaki. Around 430 people died. By the spring of 1741, an increasing number 
of people were starving, and there was unrest everywhere. Incidents of 
hungry dogs attacking and killing weakened people were reported. A good 
harvest that autumn relieved people's hunger, but rumours and discontent 
continued to ferment. Nobuaki finally issued a law prohibiting gossip and 
criticism about the domain's administration. 
A big fire caused severe damage in the northwestern port of Kodomari, 
and then an outbreak of rabies occurred that wiped out most of the dog, fox 
and draught horse population of the domain, and also caused human casualties. 
Before spring came, fires also occurred in Aomori and Kajita. In the rh month, 
a tsunami struck the west coast, washing away a large number of people, houses 
and rice fields.108 Over the year's end and into the 1st month of 1742, 
Usugatake erupted again, depositing up to twenty centimetres of ash and grit 
over a wide area of Tsugaru. 
Towards the end of summer that year, the rivers of the domain swelled 
and bad flooding occurred in the Kanagi district and along the Sotogahama 
coastline. More than 60 people and a number of farm horses were drowned, 
and extensive damage was caused to houses, fields and irrigation 
infrastructure.109 In the spring of the following year, the Iwaki River flooded 
again, washing away great quantities of rice and timber. At the end of 1743, in 
107 Recorded also in the Kudoke kiand found inTRK, page 197. 
108 Ibid., page 198. 
109 Ibid., page 199. 
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the 12th month an ominous comet appeared, distorting moonlight and sunlight 
over the New Year period. The people were unnerved, and in fulfilment of the 
signs, a drought delayed rice-planting the next spring (1744). In intense, dry 
heat in the 5th month, the Motomachi district of Hirosaki went up in flames in 
the biggest fire the city had ever seen. Well over three hundred residences 
burned to the ground, and there was extensive loss of property and stores.110 
Six days after the fire, before the remains had been cleared up, the daimyo 
returned from attendance in Edo. He died eight days later.111 The day after 
his funeral, heavy rains broke the three-month drought, in answer to many 
prayers and a special pilgrimage made by yamabushito Mount Iwaki. But, the 
Iwaki River system flooded, destroying houses, timberland, farmland, horses, 
many bridges and 20,000 kokuof rice.112 
Tsugaru Nobuyasu, who was to give Nyui Ichirozaemon the name Mitsugi, 
and create for him the special post of motoshi, was the six-year-old boy 
daimyo who succeeded Nobuaki. During the twelve years of his minority, 
domain elders were to govern Tsugaru. They presided over the onset of the 
Horeki crisis, and Mitsugi's appointment to his first eminent post. 
(iii) Bringing forth grain 
Enjoined by the bakufu to settle uncultivated lands and grow rice, the 
Tsugaru leadership turned very early to the task of opening up new areas and 
putting irrigation infrastructure in place. Much of the plain watered by the 
Iwaki River and its many tributaries was so swampy that in many places large-
scale drainage projects were necessary before it could be made cultivable. 
Water regulation remained vital to the farmers on the plain, and earthen 
embankments stand to this day as testimony to the time and effort put into 
securing the water supply and preventing flood damage. 
Although the most striking increases in the productivity of shinden (new 
fields) occurred during the lengthy incumbency of the fourth daimyo, 
11° Kudoke ki, in TRK, page 200. 
111 Loe.cit. 
112 Ibid. page 202. 
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Nobumasa (r. 1656-1710), expansion began from the time of Tamenobu. People 
of retainer and non-retainer backgrounds were awarded fiefs, and relieved of 
their corvee obligations for periods of three to ten years, in return for 
undertaking to develop lands assigned to them. Attracted by these rewards, 
and offers of assistance in the form of building materials and food supplies, 
settlers came from other parts of Tsugaru, and from the neighbouring domains 
of Nan bu and Akita. Some even travelled from as far afield as Sendai, or 
Japan Sea coastal areas on Tsugaru's shipping routes. 
Among the investitures granted new settlers, kochigyo(1J,~1T) were 
small investitures with stipends of thirty koku, and shinchishi('#fr~±) were 
offered to retainers as new stipends at one hundred koku. The settlers 
numbered in the thousands, and came from both ashigaru soldier and farming 
backgrounds.113 The kochigyo arrangement was favoured by Nobumasa, the 
daimyo who presided over so many years of shinden kaihatsu (new field 
development). When it came to the swampy areas to the north of Goshogawara 
and Kizukuri, however, the domain took charge of the development process. 
fiefs originally granted in these districts were therefore mostly kurachi (~~) 
that took the form of stipendiary payments made to their holders from the 
domain's central granaries and treasury. 
From 1664 onwards, the biggest area of new fields in Tsugaru's history 
was opened up, mostly to the west of the Iwaki River. High ranking retainers 
were appointed to direct the settlement of specific areas; and the labour of up 
to ten thousand workmen contributed to such projects as the canal dug to link 
the Tappi marshes with the Iwaki, which alone led to the establishment of 137 
new villages. The area north of Kizukuri turned out to be thick with rushes and 
miscanthus reeds, and it was not until the 1670's that development there began 
in earnest.114 Earthen dams were built to block streams, and embankments 
constructed to redirect their flow. Drainage canals were dug to prevent waste 
water flowing into irrigation storage ponds and flooding them. The drainage 
113 Shinpen monogatari hanshi I, page 96. 
114 The name Kizukuri means "made of trees", and is said to be derived from the method used to 
make pathways through the reeds and rushes, by laying logs of wood on top of them. 
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problem, though, was intractable. Much of the land was at sea level, and the 
engineering feats required to redirect the streams involved were not 
performed until the 1930s. Tens of thousands of corvee labour hours were to 
be devoted to those swamps in the meantime, under both Nobumasa and his 
successor. 
One further hazard that had to be overcome before the extensive 
Kizukuri shinden area became fully productive was the long stretch of sand 
dunes to the west, along the Japan Sea coast. Strong offshore winds would 
turn into sandstorms and scour new growth and ears off the rice plants. To 
block these storms, as well as winds blowing down from Mount Iwaki, the 
daimyo planned to turn the entire area into a forest plantation. During the 
1680s a total of 690,376 trees were planted over the fifty-four byobu(folding 
screen) hills. Miscanthus, coastal barley, and silverberries were planted among 
the trees in order to prevent erosion. Labour was drawn from up to 646 
different villages. A law was passed, stating that anyone caught secretly 
felling trees in the area would have his head ground for fertilizer.115 
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Figure 1: Comparative chanaes in the productivity of Tsuqaru's established and newly 
developed rice fields 
Sources: Aomori-ken shiI, II; Zusetsu Aomori-ken no rekishi, page 205. 
115 l§f::l:ijE.;f-H::::-tt-J:J HSS, page 99. 
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It is clear that the increase in new rice-producing land area in Tsugaru 
was dramatic. The domain in fact recorded the greatest percentage increase 
in productivity in the entire realm.116 There is, however, substantial reason for 
doubt about the sustainability of that level of productivity given both the 
climatic conditions that prevailed during the Tokugawa period and the levels of 
expertise in hydraulic technology achieved. Tsugaru farmers were plagued by 
the domain's inability to control flooding during periods of excessive rain 
(iii) To market, to market 
Most shipments of rice destined for markets in the Kamigata and Eda 
began their trips from such river ports as Fujisaki, Sanzeji, and Itayanagi and 
Goshogawara. After the new rice-farming districts began producing, the port 
at Goshogawara handled so much rice that it gained the appellation of minato, 
usually reserved for sea ports. Another busy river station was the wharf in 
Hamanomachi, just below the castle at Hirosaki, where rice for retainer 
stipends was downloaded for storage. Extra rice was also supposed to be 
stored there for food relief in times of famine, but the pressing needs of 
supplying Edo and Osaka seem to have taken precedence over this arrangement. 
Straw bales of rice would be loaded on to locally built takasebune (flat-
bottomed river boats) operating out of each port. They travelled downstream, 
out to the coast across the Jusan lagoon, and then south to the main port of 
Ajigasawa. Even at this early stage of the journey, the cargo was vulnerable to 
damage and loss. A typhoon in 1690, for example, is recorded to have 
overturned a loaded boat from Itayanagi on Lake Josan before it reached the 
coast. 
From Ajigasawa, ships headed either east or west. As early as 1625, 
some loads of rice were dispatched eastwards from the newly designated port 
of Aomori, but it was not until the 1640s that the route was made reasonably 
secure. At that time, cargo shipped eastward had to be unloaded at the port 
of Choshi and carried on smaller boats up the Tone River to the Edo River, 
116 See, for example, the table in Tsukahira, Feudal Control. page 194. 
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downstream to Edo Bay and than across to the city's warehouse district. 
Tsugaru engaged a "Hitachi itako onyashiki azukari" (~~?lm*~~jkfJO in 
Choshi to supervise this process. The earliest shipment of rice from the 
Satake (Akita) domain on the Japan Sea coast to travel via the Tsugaru Strait 
and the eastern route to Edo set off in 1655 from Noshiro.117 
In the 1670's, when the Edo merchant Kawamura Zuiken was supported 
by the bakufu in expanding his shipping business to provide transport between 
the domains of eastern Tohoku and the capital, he made significant 
improvements to the port facilities along the coastline in Hitachi and Shimosa 
provinces, including Choshi and Kashima. Kawamura's shipping routes took boats 
toward Shimoda or Misaki so that they could then ride winds from the 
southwest safely into Edo Bay. He was able to reduce significantly the time 
and costs involved in the arrangement entailing off-loading cargo at Choshi, and 
there were also fewer risks of theft and other damage through leakage and 
handling. After 1664, when a branch of the Nanbu family formed an 
independent domain with its capital at the northeastern port of Hachinohe, 
ships sailing between Ezo, the Shimokita Peninsula, Tsugaru's ports and Edo 
began to call there as well. The number of rice shipments from Tsugaru 
shipped to Edo via the eastward route reached a peak in the 1750's. 
Waters in the Japan Sea were generally calmer than those on the 
Pacific coast, so as voyages between Tsugaru and the Kamigata were becoming 
more frequent and regular during the early seventeenth century, the western 
route was favoured. One small but telling piece of evidence of traffic along 
this coastline is an ema, or votive picture tablet, found in a temple in the 
Tsugaru port of Fukaura. It is dated 1633 and was offered in the name of a 
Shoji Tarozaemon of Tsuruga. He is thought to have been a ship's captain 
operating between Ezo and Tsuruga, which was the most frequented port on 
the Japan Sea coast at the time. Shipments of rice and other goods taking the 
westward route from Tsugaru would be loaded onto ocean-going vessels, usually 
117 HSS, page 173. 
95 
at Ajigasawa. The ships would either sail down the Japan Sea, through the 
Shimonoseki Strait to the Inland Sea and Osaka, and perhaps on to Edo; or, 
proceed as far as the Japan Sea port of Tsuruga, where their cargo would be 
offloaded and hauled overland to the shore of Lake Biwa. After crossing the 
lake by barge, it would be reloaded onto carts for the final leg of its journey 
to market. 
In the early 1600's, Tsugaru's shipments of tax rice were mostly 
handled by agents in Otsu and Kyoto. Shoji Taroemon and another Tsuruga 
merchant who acted for the domain both became so wealthy that they offered 
to repair Tsugaru's warehouses and other buildings in Kyoto free of charge, 
and declined the domain stipends offered them in recognition of their 
services.118 For some time after 1678, the domain's own ships were used to 
carry much of the annual rice harvest directly to Osaka via the Shimonoseki 
Strait, but as technologies improved, long distance shipping agencies took over. 
Kaga, Echizen, Echigo, Shonai and the other provinces along the coast all had 
ports on a variety of routes plied by seafaring traders: some hugged the coast 
while others ventured further out to sea. The craft they sailed included 
hagasebune (shallow-drafted boats) dongurisen (acorn-shaped boats?), and 
long-distance hokkokusen (north country ships), later replaced by the 
kitamaesen with their huge rectangular sails.119 Regularly each spring, traders' 
ships would set out for the northern territory of Ezo, loaded with such goods 
as clothing, sugar, cotton, paper, sake, salt, and tatamifacing from the Kinai 
region and ports on the Inland Sea. The most ambitious pattern was to trade 
en route, and arrive in Ezo with rice and straw goods which could then be 
traded for seasonal marine products such as herrings and sardines, other dried 
or salted fish, konbu, and dried fish fertiliser.120 
After 1644, when a branch of the Nanbu daimyo family broke away and 
formed an independent domain with its capital on the coast at Hachinohe, ships 
118 HSS, page 174. 
119 Oishi Manabu et al. (eds.) Nihon zenshi. Tokyo: Kodansha, 1991, pages 638-639. 
120 Maruyama Yasunari, Joho to kOtstJ. Tokyo: Chuo koronsha, 1992, page301. 
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Map 5: Overland and sea routes between Tsuqaru and the three main cities. 
Sources: Joho to Kotsu, pages 32-33; Hanshi daijiten I, page 45, Totman, Early 
Modern Japan, Map 6. 
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operating between Ezo, the Shimokita peninsula, the Tsugaru ports and Edo 
began to call there as well. Eventually, the ports of Aomori and Ajigasawa 
became key ports on both the eastward and westward routes to the south, as 
well as for ships sailing north to Ezo. Thus, the integration of the Tsugaru 
region into a shipping network centred on the ports of Osaka, Nagasaki and 
Edo completely erased its historical linkage into the far northern trading 
community of Japan Sea ports. 
(iv) Travelling from the end of the road 
Tsugaru is where the old Usha and Osho highways both begin.121 Their 
very names - the main routes from the 'frontier' and 'the end of the road' -
suggest distance and remoteness.122 The Oshokaido was one of five officially 
designated highways converging on Edo, along which most daimyo were required 
to approach the city on their sankin kotaijourneys.123 The official part of this 
road, however, was south of the Shirakawa barrier, which, as Dazai Osamu 
reminds us, marked for the poet Basho the bounds of civilization as he knew it. 
North of Shirakawa, lines on maps are often misleading, in that they often 
represent little more than the kinds of "wretched bridle tracks" that was the 
Ushokaido along which Isabella Bird travelled via the Yatate Pass to the 
Ikarigaseki barrier late in the nineteenth century.124 The Ushokaido was one of 
a number of lesser roads that merged with a main highway on the way to Edo. 
Both these routes from Tsugaru originated at the port of Aburakawa on 
Mutsu bay, and travellers on the Ushokaido could join the Oshokaido at either 
Shirakawa or Koriyama, in present day Fukushima prefecture. Just east of 
Aburakawa, on the Oshokaido, was the Tsugaru fishing port of Aomori. To the 
northwest, the road through Matsumae led towards Cape Tappi and terminated 
at Minmaya, which was the port used by most boats crossing to Ezo from 
Tsugaru. 
121 The Osho ka1do (!~Hi'lttri!l) and the Usho kaido (~::J1·i'lttri!l). 
122 OshtJ is derived from michinoku (~~~).the far end of the road, and UshtJfrom Dewa (t±:l~~). 
thought to come from 1deha, or 1dehashi, the frontier. Cited from Kida Teikichi in Dazai, Return, 
page 103. 
123 The other four were: the Koshokaido, the Nakasendo, the Tokaido, and the Nikkokaido. 
124 Isabella Bird, Unbeaten Tracks in Japan. London: J. Murray, 1888, page 357. 
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From Aburakawa, the Ushokaido passed through Shinjo and Namioka 
before arriving in Hirosaki. It continued southwest through the Ikarigaseki 
barrier and across the Yatate pass into the Akita domain, then ran south to 
Odate before turning west to Noshiro on the Japan Sea coast, and south again 
to the castle town of Kubota. From there it turned inland, passing through 
Yokote before leaving Akita and proceeding south to Yamagata and Kaminoyama, 
then through the Kosaka pass to Koriyama. 
Until 1665, the official route taken by the daimyos and their 
processions took neither main route, but headed out of Hirosaki in a westerly 
direction to the Japan Sea port of Ajigasawa. It then turned south and 
followed the Japan Sea coast through Fukaura and Omagoshi, then across the 
border into the Akita domain. It joined the Ushokaido a little south of 
Noshiro. The bansho, or checkpoint, for the border crossing between Tsugaru 
and Akita was near Omagoshi. A manned police guard post was situated just 
south of the coastal village until 1621. In that year construction of an official 
compound began, and a man of the rank of machi bugyo, or town magistrate, 
took charge. Lodgings were available to the north of the village. 
From 1607, there was a bansho functioning at Ikarigaseki as well. After 
1665, when the official route to Edo from Hirosaki was changed to exit the 
capital along the Ikarigaseki highway, the checkpoint quickly became the 
domain's most substantial barrier and inspection point for both goods and 
people travelling over land. For the next two hundred years, the Tsugaru 
daimyo and his sankin kotai entourage set out for Edo along this route, and 
official bakufu inspectors entering the domain from Akita used it as well. The 
barrier itself comprised three separate checkpoints and official lodgings were 
situated in the nearby settlement of the same name. 
People approaching Tsugaru from the Hachinohe and Nanbu domains to 
the east would pass through the Nonai barrier. Before the secession of the 
Kuroishi branch line from Tsugaru, this barrier also consisted of three check 
points. They were all situated on the Oshukaido, but the two furthest east 
were incorporated into the Kuroishi domain. Just over the border, travellers 
and goods would pass through a Nanbu checkpoint on the Oshukaido before 
heading south towards Morioka. 
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All these barriers and inspection points required staff, ranging from 
the presiding machi bugyo, who were rotated on four-monthly shifts, to 
military guards and military off ice rs to do the policing, and machi doshiyori 
(town elders). Although the settlements at all three of Tsugaru's land barriers 
were very small and confined, someone with the rank of a machi bugyo usually 
took charge. The personnel under him were responsible for such tasks as 
securing the barriers themselves, interviewing travellers and checking their 
permits, inspecting personal baggage and commercial goods, or dealing with 
fugitives and an array of weaponry: lances, bows and arrows, firearms, 
ammunition, and bamboo fuse cords.125 
Each person passing through a barrier was required to submit an official 
permit specifying permission to either exit or enter the domain. Those who 
left were supposed to return through the same barrier unless they had applied 
to do otherwise. Some indication of the workload of barrier staff is given by 
some statistics from Kyoho 2 (1717), showing the number of people passing 
through each of the barriers, in one direction only. A monthly average of 250 
individuals were processed at Ikarigaseki, 100 at the Nonai barrier, and forty 
at Omagoshi. Records were made of all comings and goings, including the 
nature and quantities of the commercial goods and luggage inspected. A great 
deal of this surveillance and record-keeping brought no gain at all to this far-
off domain, except the appearance that it was conforming with Edo's 
requirements and protocols should inspectors arrive. 
For internal purposes, bans were sometimes placed on taking specific 
goods out of the domain. From itemised lists of these proscribed exports, 
some idea of Tsugaru's basic needs and fears can be gained. Proscribed goods 
included cows and horses, rice and all other grains, soybeans, precious metals 
(including bronze, iron and lead), farming implements, firearms, linen thread, 
125 HSS, pages 160-163. The following details are taken from the same pages, unless otherwise 
indicated. 
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raw cotton, benibana (safflower, whose flowers were used to make yellow dye, 
and seeds squeezed for oil), and raw lacquer.126 From 1687 onwards taxes were 
imposed on imported goods considered to be inessential and export products of 
value to the domain and its people. To discourage smuggling, especially in hard 
times, temporary check posts would be set up at other points on Tsugaru's land 
borders and along the coastline. 
Messenger runners and post horses were also provided at assigned post 
stations along main roads, in accordance with the system instituted by 
Hideyoshi to facilitate the movement of goods and people. By bakufu decree, 
at least one hundred men and horses were kept at the ready at post stations 
on the Tokaido, for example. Those along the Oshukaido between Edo and 
Shirakawa were required to have twenty-five. Needless to say, though, the 
volume of traffic on Tsugaru roads was almost imperceptible compared with 
that on roads leading directly to the Tokaido. 
If the number of runners or horses at a post station was not adequate, 
particular nearby villages were called on to make up the shortfall, either in kind 
or the cash cost of acquiring them elsewhere. Provision of this service was a 
tax obligation levied by the domain on the designated villages, but excessive 
burdens were compensated for in cash. Such payments were made to villages 
that provided sakanamochi(fish-bearing) runners, who delivered fresh fish 
from the coast to the castle in Hirosaki.127 
The provision of labour and horses for these communications services 
would have been an imposition in many Tsugaru districts, bringing none of the 
the growth recorded in some post stations on well-used routes leading to 
bustling commercial centres. Still, providing fast messengers and strong 
horses was one way in which some villages were able to ease the pressure of 
their tax dues. The headman of the village at Omagoshi, for instance, 
126 Cattle and horses were used as draft animals, while textiles, oil and lacquer were among the 
commodities whose production was encouraged from time to time by the Tsugaru government. 
127 ibid. 
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supplemented his income in the 1830's from an official appointment supervising 
the supply of horses at the post station.128 
There were two hundred places in Tsugaru where horses could be 
requested. Between Hirosaki and Aburakawa, for example, Namikawa was one 
of four such stations, and the village assigned to provide back-up supplies was 
Nakanomura.129 For the main Hirosaki post station in Shiowakemachi, three 
horses were levied on each of ten of the town's machito work six shifts a 
month; making a total of 2,160 regular shifts to be filled by horses in rotation 
through the year. Hiring out these horses was an important source of 
supplementary income in the neighbouring villages. In addition to the monthly 
shifts, there were up to fifteen extra ones for relief horses, which could bring 
the total in any one year as high as 4750. Hostile relations over competition 
and burden-sharing between post stations and supporting villages does not 
seem to have developed to the extent it did on more heavily travelled routes. 
In official Tsugaru hiring regulations dating from 1744, just before 
several years of widespread flooding, the following charges are set for a trip 
on horseback between Hirosaki and the port of Aomori, via ShinjCi. The 
distance was estimated at about 12 ri (around 47 kilometres or 29 miles). 130 
Persons carrying the free allowance of 348 mon, plus 19t mon per ri 
five kanme of baggage, or less 
Persons carrying between five and forty 348 mon, plus 29 mon per ri 
kanme of luggage 
Charge for a companion on foot 174 mon, plus 14t mon per ri 
From the start of winter in the tenth month until spring in the following second month, 
or whenever the snow cover is as deep as winter's, a surcharge of 30% will be added. 
128 HSS, p. 163 
129 HSS, page 162. 
130 loc cit. 
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All travellers had to submit their trip schedules and lodging plans for 
approval before they set out. Those who planned to pass through a domain 
border barrier were required to have their exit and entrance marked on their 
permits at the check posts, and then submit the documents for inspection 
when they returned. While lodgings were availab1e at many post stations on 
the busier routes in the southern and western provinces, in Tsugaru they could 
only be found at barrier posts, in Hirosaki, and at the busier port settlements. 
Conditions seem to have been Spartan. The lodgings at Tsugaru's main overland 
barrier village at Ikarigaseki were still smoke-blackened structures like sheds, 
with leaky rooves and barely adequate provisions, well into the Meiji Period.131 
Runners conveying official documents for the domain government during 
the Horeki reform period were required to complete the journey between 
Hirosaki and Edo in eleven days during the summer months and thirteen in the 
winter. Later in the eighteenth century, express services were being paid over 
three ryofor a delivery made in six days during the winter, and around one 
third of that amount for one taking ten to twelve days in summer. In 1868, 
when the Tsugaru daimyo was vacillating over the decision to continue 
supporting the resisting northern domains or the rebellious southwestern 
forces, a message sent from Lord Konoe in Kyoto took twenty-four days to 
reach the castle in Hirosaki. 
In sum, overland trips between Tsugaru and the southern centres, and 
often within the domain itself, were generally arduous and costly for the 
traveller, and burdensome for those who assisted. Message services over long 
distances to and from the centres of power were neither consistent nor 
reliable. By the mid eighteenth century, internal communications were 
sufficiently developed to enable the tendrils of government power to 
penetrate the domain from Hirosaki castle. Tsugaru complied with the 
requirements of Edo's regulatory authorities, maintaining at a rudimentary 
level all the accoutrements of a functioning link in the bakuhan transport and 
communications networks. It is indisputable that from 1580 onwards Tsugaru's 
131 Bird, Unbeaten Tracks, page 361. 
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communications links with the hubs of Japanese cultural, political and economic 
life became stronger and stronger as the region was steadily being integrated 
into the Tokugawa polity. It also needs to be borne in mind that the kinds of 
roadside fadlities, stimulating exchanges, and hustle and bustle evoked in 
writing about the sankin kotai system and the growth of provincial towns were 
experienced by only a very privileged few of Tsugaru's inhabitants, and far 
away from the domain itself.132 
II Political economy 
Tsugaru's desperate financial predicament in Horeki 3 (1753) was 
similar to those experienced periodically by other domains, and even the 
bakufu. This crisis, with the reforms enacted to address it contributed 
significantly to the domain's own version of that sine curve pattern so often 
evoked in Tokugawa period histories. Tsugaru was reduced to such a degree of 
indebtedness just at this time for a complex of reasons: cash loans were no 
longer as readily available as they had been during the seventeenth century; 
low market prices for rice had decreased the buying power of retainers' 
incomes; the money economy and commodity markets had expanded into the 
countryside from the major cities; a cluster of natural disasters, local and 
regional, had reduced agricultural productivity; rice transport routes were not 
safe and secure; and, the cash outputs involved in meeting official ritual 
obligations as well as maintaining domain personnel, residences and warehouses 
in Edo and the Kamigata were constantly increasing. 
Tsugaru's economic structures and systems were proof against none of 
these inroads and stresses, and their conjuncture in the 1750's threatened 
domain bankruptcy. The interwoven webs of local and shogunate politics and 
politics did not allow much freedom of movement. 
132 See, for example, Constantine N. Vaporis, "To Edo and Back: Alternate Attendance and 
Japanese Culture in the Early Modern Period", Journal of Japanese Studies, 23.1, 1997, pages 
25-67; or Katsuhisa Moriya, "Urban Networks and Information Networks", Chapter Four.in 
Nakane and Oishi (eds.) Tokugawa Japan. 
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(i) The Tokugawa compact 
Tsugaru owed its very existence as a separate domain polity to the 
process that established Ieyasu in Edo. Tsugaru Tamenobu, founder of the 
local daimyo dynasty, secured the fief and title by means not dissimilar to 
those employed by the new Sei-I Taishogun: a combination of skilful military 
strategy, opportunistic alliances, betrayal, and targeted homicide. He started 
by invading and conquering, or otherwise taking possession of, all the castles 
and strongholds in Tsugaru held by vassals of the regionally powerful Nanbu, 
still actually his own overlords. Then, needing sanction for his position as local 
strongman, he turned to the supreme commander of the land, Toyotomi 
Hideyoshi. 
First, he dispatched emissaries with gifts of highly-prized Tsugaru 
hawks and horses for Hideyoshi. Then he took troops and joined the campaign 
against Odawara castle. These overtures clearly met with the Taiko's approval, 
for in 1580 Tamenobu was granted possession of Tsugaru, with a stipend of 
45,000 kokuand the right to adopt the surname. Now Tsugaru Tamenobu, he 
travelled to Kyoto during the following decade and met Hideyoshi in person, 
between continental invasions. He arranged with members of the Konoe house 
for his new domain to adopt a variation of their family crest, and was also 
granted a minor imperial post in recognition of his new status. Tamenobu 
continued supporting carefully chosen hegemonic campaigns; most importantly 
the Tokugawa cause at Sekigahara, two years after Hideyoshi's death. In 
response, the triumphant Ieyasu added a small grant of 2000 koku from his 
own Kozuke territory to Tamenobu's investiture. With that, Tamenobu had 
secured a fief of 47,000 koku, the hereditary rank of daimyo, a new surname, 
the court rank of junior fourth, lower grade, and the title of Steward of 
Eastern Kyoto. 
For his own part, Ieyasu had attained the elevated status of Sei-I 
Taishogun through strategic perspicacity, and he applied those same skills to 
creating an administrative regime to preserve that supremacy. Every 
conceivable threat to central power was anticipated and forestalled through 
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the direct control of shogunal agencies. Ieyasu's participation in the Nobunaga 
and Hideyoshi regimes had furnished him with a range of experience in these 
matters. He and his immediate successors determined that the Tokugawa 
dynasty would never be destroyed by treacherous house vassals or alliances of 
enemy daimyo. Nor would it be undermined by unruly faiths and ideologies, or 
unbalanced by sudden inundations of wealth, either from foreign parts or 
within the realm. 
foreign contact was severely restricted and kept under close 
supervision from Edo. Christians were carefully watched until this foreign 
faith was proscribed altogether, along with the socially disruptive fujtJ fuse (;;r::: 
~;;:r-:::tfm) Buddhist sect. Imported books were strictly censored, and foreign 
trade conducted only at officially policed, designated ports with persons 
arriving on ships registered in only four countries : Korea, China, The Ryukyus 
and Holland. 
The construction of any kind of ocean-going vessel inside Japan was 
forbidden, and the money supply regulated from the centre. The bakufu alone 
kept the right to issue legal tender, and directly controlled gold, silver and 
copper mines. All daimyo had to seek shogunal permission before starting 
significant construction projects in their domains; and, as a further security 
measure, the castle headquarters of a number of daimyo were dismantled. 
Succession arrangements in daimyo houses were regulated and closely 
monitored, with unsatisfactory or illegitimate heirs being among the grounds 
for attainder and other severe penalties. 
Probably the most damaging of all shogunal policies for the economy of 
underdeveloped domains like Tsugaru was the continuation and refinement of 
Hideyoshi's hostage system, sankin kotai ($i!J~{-I\:). It was compulsory for 
each daimyo to maintain at least one official residence in Edo. His closest 
family members were to be permanently housed there, and he was required to 
stay there himself during periods of compulsory attendance upon the shogun. 
The journeys of each daimyo to and from the capital took place between 
specified dates, and even the locations where they ate lunch and stayed · 
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overnight were set down. The Tsugaru daimyo, for example, was to arrive in 
Edo during the third month of alternate years, take eighteen days for the 
journey, spend his ninth night in Yamagata and have lunch on the fourteenth 
·-··· .. ··-----. 
\ 
day at Shirakawa. I~_:!!)?,assible that the domain's sixth daimyo died as a 
result of a conditioncont~~ti;ed on his homeward journey in 1744. 
7! i .... ~- ' .-.. J.> j\.J'·~~. . • .. ~ .1··~--
(ii) The Tsugaru polity '" 
From the outset, political factors were not favourable for the 
implementation of the Horeki reforms. Tsugaru Nobuaki had died prematurely 
in the 5th month of 1744, just after returning from Edo to find Hirosaki 
recovering from a major fire. He was only twenty-six years old. His son and 
designated heir, Nobuyasu, was a child of five or six, and therefore required 
by bakufu law to remain in Edo with his mother until his coming of age at 
eighteen years.133 In the 2nd month of Horeki 3(1753) Nobuyasu had his first 
audience with the shogun, Tokugawa Ieshige; and in the 12th month of the same 
year he was formally invested at at fifth lower junior rank, Tosanokami. He 
did not leave the comfort and security of life in the domain's official residence 
in Edo until the 4th month of 1756. 
As daimyo, Nobuyasu was to head a government with a full complement 
of administrative responsibilities. He had to maintain a large number of 
retainers, and ensure that that the domain could afford their allowances and 
stipends. This entailed constant adjustments to investitures, taxation 
methods and currency arrangements. The government was in charge of land 
development and routine public works within the domain, but could also be 
called upon to provide labour and materials for large-scale construction or 
repair works being undertaken in bakufu territories. Internal order and 
stability were maintained by domestic legal codes, judicial procedures, and 
policing, while bakufu perceptions of external threat could result at any time in 
133 In fact, Nobuyasu was born in Hirosaki castle to the daughter of an Edo townsman, who had 
become a favourite of Nobuaki's. He was adopted by his father's wife, who was Matsudaira 
Tadatsune's daughter, and taken to Edo to live with her. 
demands for active service from the domain's military forces, which had 
therefore to be kept in constant readiness. 
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The duties of the bushiretainers who were appointed to posts in the 
domain's bureaucracy were therefore widely various and correspondingly 
onerous. It is on the basis of these powers and functions that the argument is 
made for domains being state-like.134 The antecedents of the administrative 
hierarchies in the Tokugawa period were the military ranks in the retinues of 
earlier daimyo-commanders. The number of official employees in a domain 
therefore depended partly on the way in which its founding daimyo had gained 
his fief, and partly on the degree of trust the bakufu had in him. It also 
depended on the thoroughness with which the system of standardised land 
surveys, first implemented under Hideyoshi, had been carried out. 
In these surveys, the size and productive capacity of particular fields 
were first determined. Then a value was assigned to those fields according to 
the amount of rice they could be expected to produce in a normal year.135 
Values were then extrapolated for other nearby areas of land in the same 
holding, village or domain. The amount of rice was measured in koku, and the 
total value called the kokudakaof the lands involved. All land was subsequently 
taxed according to its kokudaka, regardless of whether it was actually planted 
in rice or any other crop. When fiefs and stipends were granted to daimyo or 
retainers, they were usually measured in koku. 
In some regions, implementation of the kokudaka system resulted very 
early in individual farmers being permanently assigned to the cultivation of 
specific plots of land. This distinguished them from bush1: with their military 
or administrative duties, who would be assigned incomes according to their 
rank, usually based on an area of land and measured in koku. There was not 
necessarily a connection between a designated stipend, or official post, and any 
particular piece of land. Hideyoshi reinforced this separation of occupational 
134 See Chapter 2, "The Nerves of the State", in Ravina, land and Lordship. 
135 Philip C. Brown discusses standards of thoroughness and accuracy in land surveys in his 
article, "The Mismeasure of Land: Land Surveying in the Tokugawa Period", Monumenta 
Nipponica, 42:Summer, 1987, pages 115-155. 
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status with his sword hunts, after which only bushiwere supposed to carry 
military weapons, and only farmers were to cultivate the land. 
Domains like Tsugaru that evolved from territories unified under the 
leadership of a local bushi commander who subsequently became daimyo, 
tended to contain a large number of subordinate vassals with their own 
retinues of soldiers. These vassals had usually been attached for generations 
to particular localities, with military and family relations to the people who 
farmed the land and resided in the villages. It was unlikely that all these bushi 
and their descendants would ever be completely cut off from their hereditary 
lands - whether or not their overlords had been killed or driven from their 
local castles in Tamenobu's campaigns. They had more real power, status and 
independence as holders of jikata chigyo, landed fiefs in the countryside, being 
able to extract their own incomes directly from the cultivators of the lands 
assigned them. 
In Tsugaru, large numbers of bushiwere never all moved off their lands 
at once to be housed in urban quarters, because the Tsugaru daimyo did not 
ever suffer punitive attainder or even a reduction in his territory, as happened 
in Yonezawa, for example.136 Tsugaru remained in possession of all the rural 
lands its retainers were identified with. 
The demands of a central bureaucracy, the requirements of a standing 
army, and possible disloyalty, however, were separate matters. In the end, a 
good many Tsugaru retainers were required, by reason of their official or 
military occupation, or because their submission to Tamenobu's authority had 
not seemed wholehearted, to reside in designated bushiresidential districts, 
mostly in Hirosaki. They retained their sword-carrying and surname-bearing 
status, which was affirmed by the location of their residences; but in some 
cases were obliged, even at this early stage to move from jikata chigyo status 
to receiving periodic salary-type payments from the central treasury. 
136 Ravina outlines the fate of the Uesugi house on pages 72-74 of land and lordship. 
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Arrangements in the countryside, however, were much more ambiguous, 
and the situation became more complicated with the long period of land 
reclamation. Some solid farming households had laid the foundations for 
becoming extremely wealthy and influential landowners over the following 
century, possibly even for purchasing bushistatus. Some bushiof lower ranks 
who had been able to set themselves up on modest holdings were eventually to 
become the tenants of either more prosperous and astute senior retainers on 
large established estates, or of wealthy farming households. Even more 
unfortunate men would become nago or landless labourers, with their 
households permanently under threat of starvation in bad years. 
(iii) Markets, productivity and balancing the budget 
There is no question that the key economics structures and institutions 
of the Tokugawa period were put in place to consolidate and maintain the power 
of the bakufu in Edo. It is therefore no accident that this discussion is 
shaped in large part by the policies and institutions of the Osaka and Edo 
centres. 
The shogun's government took direct control over the main centres of 
commerce, finance and industry. Markets were watched over by bakufu and 
domain officials, and in the earlier decades were primarily viewed as organs for 
the conversion of bushi grain allowances into money for the purchase of other 
necessities. One key move that facilitated the evolution of bakufu financial 
management was the appointment as early as 1670 of ten official business 
agents to handle its affairs. These included the Konoikeya in Osaka, which 
became one of Tsugaru's principal creditors.137 
By the middle of the eighteenth century, one outcome of the economy-
growing policies of central and domain administrations was that a wide range of 
products other than rice were appearing in many market places. The machinery 
for marketing commercial goods had therefore grown in complexity, which in 
137 "Kinsei Osaka ryogaesho keiei no keisei katei - junin ryogae no sosetsu to Konoike ryogae ten", 
by Sakudo Yotaro, contains an analysis of the development of the Konoikeya as one of the ten 
money-changing businesses officially designated by the bakufu as agents. Bankingu, Sangyo 
keizaisha, no. 175, October 1962, pages 32-54. 
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turn made reforms necessary in the economic management of all jurisdictions, 
from the bakufu to the smallest domains. 
To make up for the lack of bakufu-minted money in circulation, for 
example, some western domains issued their own internal currency notes, called 
hansatsu. The bakufu ban placed on this expedient, as well as Arai Hakuseki's 
recoinage and the organisation by Yoshimune of urban merchants into kabu 
nakama during the Kyoho reform period, represented three significant 
attempts by Edo to keep control over the economy during the first half of the 
eighteenth century. Kabu nakamawere officially registered commercial guilds, 
each controlling the warehousing and marketing of a particular commodity, such 
as paper, tea, tobacco, salt, sake, soy sauce, and cotton in one or another stage 
of production.138 Most of these guilds were located in Osaka or Edo. 
Over the decades after 1700 when these fiscal and commercial 
adjustments were being made, however, rice prices in the central markets had 
fluctuated violently. This was due to runs of good and bad agricultural seasons 
in a number of key rice-producing regions, followed by the Kyoho famine (1732-
33). The price of one kokuof rice in Osaka ranged from around just 20 monme 
of silver up to as much as 150 monme.139 The bakufu reacted by encouraging 
frugality and cutting the amount of money that was in circulation, and these 
measures set up the conditions for depression. When large quantities of rice 
arrived at the central markets after a succession of good seasons, storehouses 
overflowed and prices dropped: so the daimyos, hatamoto retainers of the 
bakufu and other bush1: who all relied on exchanging their rice stipends for 
specie, suffered drastically reduced incomes. This squeeze coincided with 
marked price increases in commercial markets where the bushishopped, which 
was an outcome of earlier bakufu monetary policy. 
138 Relations between the bakufu and Osaka merchants are discussed by Nakai Nobuhiko and 
James L. McClain in "Commercial Change and Urban Growth in Early Modern Japan", pages 568-
575; and bakufu price policies byTsuji Tatsuya, in "Politics in the eighteenth century", pages 
449-456; in Hall (ed.) The Cambridge History of Japan, Vol. 4. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1991. 
126 Tsuji, "Politics" (see note 109). In normal times, prices were around 40-70 monme per koku. 
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In the 1730s and 1740s, the bakufu was able to solve its own immediate 
problems by extracting more tax income from its extensive lands, and officially 
debasing the coinage. For the Tsugaru treasury and retainers, though, efforts 
to raise revenue met with less success. In fact, the situation of domains and 
bushiwas made even worse by a bakufu decision in 1730 to allow speculation in 
rice futures, which exacerbated the tendency to borrow against future 
harvests and stipend payments. 
By the middle of the eighteenth century, then, the basic functions of 
the central market places had changed, and bakufu policies had become mostly 
reactionary. Instead of simply converting tax rice into money for the purchase 
of a few essential goods, the key markets were negotiating complex systems of 
value and exchange. Their combined dealings determined the relative values 
throughout the polity, not only of tax rice and other grains, but of a variety of 
commercial manufactures and commodities, of the coinage issued by the 
bakufu, and of a number of forms of credit as well.140 
Beyond Eda and Osaka, also, the effects of expanding commercial 
activity were being felt and economic policies adjusted accordingly. In many 
domains, attempts were being made to engineer a shift from primarily 
concentrating on rice production and the exploitation of fluctuating grain 
prices to the promotion of more diversified commodity production. Tsugaru, in 
contrast, had not yet settled on a safe, reliable routine way of shipping its tax 
rice to Osaka; and still resorted to a disadvantageous series of dealings with 
grain agents and financial institutions in order to cover expenses in Edo. 
(iv) Debt 
When he was appointed kanjo bugyo, and charged with reforming the 
domain's economic administration, one of NyUi Mitsugi's earliest decisions was 
to order a complete and thorough audit of Tsugaru finances. As a result, it 
140 The ways in which bakufu attitudes to the uses of money changed, the place of hansatsu, and 
the emergence of credit facilities during this period are ontlined in the article, "Tokugawa chuki 
ni okeru shinyo seido no tenkai - tokuni kinya to zaisei no kenren o chashin to shite", by Sakudo 
Yotaro. Rekishigaku KenkyiJ, no. 264, April 1962, pages 66-70. 
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was revealed in 1754 that the domain was in crippling debt.141 Cash and rice 
were owed to a range of financial houses, merchants and money-lenders in the 
Osaka area, Edo, and Tsugaru itself. 
Converted into gold equivalents, these arrears were worth a total of 
around 350 ,OOOryo, which was nearly double the domain's entire income in a 
good year. 142 One such year for which detailed statistics are available was 
Meiwa 14 (1777). Since no significant growth in domain productivity occurred 
between 1750 and 1790, this year offers a meaningful comparison. In Meiwa 
14, 159.000 koku of rice was harvested; gold income was 1,800 ryo, and silver 
1,800 kan. At one ryoper kokuof rice, or 60 kanof silver, the total income 
was around half the 1750's debt figure. Records showing that the harvest of 
1777 was regarded as bountiful (:l:f'F) amplify the critical nature of the Horeki 
crisis.143 
Kamigata debt fell into three main categories: 
a) current loans with three major merchant houses - the Ibarakiya 
Konoikeya and Satoya; 
b) payments overdue on a variety of old loans; 
c) assorted old, outstanding, and new payments due on credit raised 
through the use of promissory notes made out on anticipated rice 
shipments. These notes were called kome kitte. 
In the Kamigata, which included Osaka and Kyoto, loans were taken out 
and recorded in units of silver currency. Sixty monme of silver are taken as 
equivalent to one ryo of gold in the following table. 
141 Kudo Mutsuo published a series of sources from which the debt figures have been calculated 
in ·Horeki kaikaku mae in okeru Hirosaki-han no zaisei jojo", Hirosaki Daigaku Kyoikugakt.bu kiyO, 
No. 9, 1962. 
142 Note: 4 bu= 1 ryoof gold 1 kan=JOOOmonme= 3760g of silver 1 monme=10 fun 
From the 1740's until the turn of the century, 1ryo=61 monme5 fun? rin. 
Rice prices fluctuated, but were usally between 50 and 80 monme per koku. In 1754, rice cost 
45.9 monmeof silver for one koku. and in 1755, 66.8 monme. 2.5 hyo= 1 kokuof rice. 
143 Kojima, •Thought", page 143. 
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Type of loan Si Iver amount Gold equivalent 'Yo of 
total 
Ibarakiya 5,422 kan 993 monme 90,383 ryo 37.0 
Konoikeya 573 kan 341 monme 26,222 ryol bu 10.7 
Satoya 277 kan 319 monme 14,801 ryo3 bu 6.1 
(+10180 ryoin gold) 
Overdue payments owed on 5,744 kan595 monme 96,236 ryol bu 39.4 
various types of loans (+346ryo1 bu in gold) 
Previous loans in silver on rice 435 kan986 monme 7,266 ryol bu 3.0 
notes 
Debt carried on undredeemable 299 kan 910 monme 4,998 ryo2 bu 2.0 
old rice notes 1.6 
Currently negotiable rice notes 229 kan 632 monme 3,827 ryo 
Short-term unsecured loans 30 kan 500 ryo 0.2 
Total 14,648 kan 295 monme 244,235 ryo 100.0 
Table 3: Tsugaru debts in the Kamigata in Horeki 4 (1754) 
Sources: Asakura, page 22; Kudo, pages 2-3. 
Included in the total amount owed in the Kamigata is a sub-total of 
96 ,236 ryo and one bu, representing overdue repayments. These arrears had 
already been itemised as far back as 1737 in a summary found among Tsugaru 
records, and they constituted 39.4 percent of the entire Tsugaru debt in the 
Kamigata area. In addition to these long-overdue repayments, another 
significant component comprised loans taken out as credit advanced on kome 
kitte. These promissory notes would be issued to Tsugaru personnel by the 
official purveyors and merchants who staffed the domain's Osaka agencies. 
They were used for many different kinds of purchases, and were thus 
equivalent to loans in silver cash from various merchants with retailing 
businesses. 
Because of the significant harvest failure in 1749, rice did not reach 
the Kamigata granaries in significant quantities, and debt in unredeemable 
kome kitte had escalated steeply in the first few years of Horeki, from 1751. 
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Very little had been paid off the principal amounts borrowed since the late 
1730's, but now even the interest was outstanding on many of these loans.144 
The lists of arrears owed to Ibukiya contain clear indications that the 
Horeki financial crisis had much earlier origins. Among the loans taken out 
with Ibukiya for which repayments remained outstanding in 1754, the earliest 
listed had been taken out in Kyoho 10 (1725). The stated purpose of another, 
taken out interest free in Genbun 2 (1737) for the amount of 1,169kan 
439 monme 7 fun was to cover repayments in si Iver currency that were already 
outstanding at that time.145 
There are also signs of earlier financial ills in the accounts with the 
other two houses. Although the total amount owed to Konoikeya was less than 
that owed to Ibarakiya, there is a marked trend in Tsugaru borrowing away 
from Ibarakiya and towards Konoikeya, around the end of the 1740's. The 
exact dates are not clear, but there are notes written in red ink beside some 
entries to record that Ibukiya had refused to lend further amounts. This 
would account for the shift to Konoikeya.146 As the crisis deepened in the 
1750's, small amounts were in fact borrowed from Ibarakiya: but it was from 
Konoikeya and Sato that larger loans were obtained, even though arrears in the 
domain's repayments to the Sato household had already reached the equivalent 
of 10,180 ryo by 1749.147 
One striking manifestation of the relationship that developed between 
Tsugaru and the Kamigata financiers was the number of individuals among them 
who were awarded official stipends by the domain. Three types of investiture 
were involved: chigyo, fuchi, and hyosh1: Chigyo were based on the putative 
rice yield of a given area of land, and were therefore measured in koku. The 
enfeoffed individual received a fixed share of that yield, or the equivalent in 
cash. Fuchiwere rationed allowances of rice or other grains, ranked according 
to the number of persons who could theoretically be supported by the ration. 
144 Ibid, pages 6-7, 12. 
145 Kudo, pages 3-5 (kanjobusoku gintai murisoku chiJshaku, i11i!JJt;i::=JEj.R?llf~riJJE9=1111f). 
146 Ibid., page 5. 
147 Kudo, pages 2-6. 
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Hyoshi simply designated the number of straw bags of rice presented to the 
individual each year. 
Ibaraki Montoro was the recipient of the most generous settlement: a 
ch~yostipend of 700 kokuper year. Impressive, too, was the grant of 550 
koku and fuchi rations for ten persons to Konoike Shinjuro, while another 
member of his household was awarded 500 koku. 148 These stipends ranked the 
three financiers among the highest six percent of 299 Tsugaru retainers, who 
were listed in 1758 as receiving stipends of 100 kokuor more. A total of sixty-
one stipends were awarded, including some to men believed to be employees of 
the Konoikeya and Ibarakiya. The name Satoya does not appear in the records 
at all. This could mean simply that another family had taken over, either the 
whole establishment or the money-lending section, by the time Tsugaru became 
a significant client. 
Compared with what was owed in the Kamigata, undoubtedly the 
economic powerhouse of the country at this time, debts outstanding in Edo did 
not amount to a great deal: just a little less than twenty percent of the 
Kamigata total. The nature of the loans was different too. Rather than an 
amount made up of relatively large sums borrowed at low interest rates from 
influential merchant families, the Edo debt consisted of an accumulation of 
small, separate loans taken out at very high rates of interest. Nearly all the 
lenders listed are individuals, rather than established banking houses. A 
significant proportion of Edo loans were also taken out from blind persons' 
associations, and agencies representing temples or shrines, licensed by the 
bakufu to lend out money on interest as a source of income. 
Difficulty with loan repayments in Edo seems to have occurred rather 
later than was the case with Kamigata debt. The first recorded arrears are in 
instalments overdue in the early 1740's. It is not clear whether there was no 
official borrowing in Edo at all until then, or whether any loans taken out 
earlier had been duly discharged. 
148 Kudo, page 19. 
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Type of loan 
New loans taken out after 17 43 
Payments owed to customary creditors in 1749 
Outstanding commitments on rice shipments 
New loans with associations for the blind, or 
shrines or temples. 
Old and new gold debts with the same 
associations. 
Loans in qold associated with official obliqations. 
Total 
Table 4: Tsugaru's debts in Edo in Horeki 4 (1754) 
Source: Asakura, pages 28-29;Kudo, pages 12-16 
Silver amount 4Yo of total 
10,610 ryo 25.3 
10,916 ryo 26.2 
9,817 ryo3 bu 23.4 
5,543 ryo 3 bu 13.3 
3,074 ryo 7.3 
1,938 ryo 4.6 
41,900 ryo2 bu 100.0 
As was the case with older loans taken out with Kamigata merchants, 
very little of the principal amounts had ever been repaid; and in 1754 no 
interest had been paid. Of the official Tsugaru debt contracted in Edo from 
Enkyo 3 (1746) through Horeki 3 (1753), a total of 8,632 ryowas made up of 
outstanding repayments on borrowed principal amounts: the remaining sum of 
almost 2000 ryorepresented arrears in interest payments. That is to say, 
almost 20% of the debt accrued over some five or six years in Edo was 
attributable to the very high interest rates in that were being charged in that 
city's money markets. 
From the 1740's, redemption of Edo loans taken out with kome kitte as 
surety had begun to fall behind; they were then renegotiated as they became 
due as loans in gold cash at higher interest. By 1754, out of the total of 
9817.3 ryo owing on these loans, some 6727 ryowas for the_ principal amounts 
borrowed and just over 3090 ryo was for interest payments.149 
Borrowing from guilds of zato (blind persons) and agencies of shido 
(shrines and temples) tended not to require collateral security, and was 
therefore prone to higher interest rates.150 Recourse to such loans became 
essential for the Tsugaru personnel in Edo when remissions of rice from 
149 Kudo, page 14. 
150 Ibid., page 18. 
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Tsugaru began to fall short of expectations. The number of defaults grew 
steadily during the years before 1747, when they suddenly increased, along 
with the number of new loans being taken out and the amounts being 
borrowed.151 That was the year when severe flooding affected the rice harvest 
in Tsugaru, so that deliveries to the domain's granaries were reduced and 
stores fell below optimal levels. Some kome kitte were clearly issued after 
domain officials must have been aware that there would be insufficient granary 
rice to redeem them. 
Neither the rice stores nor the financial situation had recovered before 
the harvest failure of 1749 occurred. From then onwards, more and more loans 
of small amounts in gold currency were taken out, to be repaid in instalments 
over five or ten years. A little later, when the domain began allotting the 
stipends of retainers serving in Edo directly to interest payments on their 
loans, borrowers could leave their loans unredeemed for longer and longer 
periods. Lenders, too, were able to profit by negotiating higher interest 
payments after insisting that desperate borrowers should take out bigger 
loans than they had requested. 
The Horeki financial crisis in Tsugaru, then, was not a sudden calamity. 
It had been developing over three or four decades, at least, and was the 
outcome of continued borrowing and overspending, inadequate accounting 
procedures, and an unpredictable official annual income. 
III Ideological, religious and intellectual 
positioning 
If the reason why a political ideology evolves is the need for "a social 
agreement, in thought and action, to view a system of government as legitimate 
and just", then, by the time Nyai Mitsugi was appointed to address the threat 
of immanent bankruptcy, ideology had fulfilled its role in Tsugaru. 152 Any 
doubts about the legitimacy of the ruling regimes, in either Hirosaki or Edo, 
151 Ibid., page 17. 
152 Ooms, Ideology, p. 5. 
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had long been settled. Elements of both these well-entrenched ideological 
structures of legitimation were to prove important to the acceptance or 
rejection of particular Horeki reform policies. 
Problems arose around matters of occupational status groups and the 
delimitation of the functions and powers that went with them. There were 
ramifications stemming from current conceptions of the proper relations 
between farmers, bushi, and the land; and from long-accepted ideas about the 
economic functions an~ social status appropriate to the merchant fraternity. 
The customary roles and independence of Tsugaru's established religious 
institutions were also challenged; and, eventually the authority of Mitsugi 
himself was destroyed, partly because he lost the support of the domain's 
esteemed elders. What was at stake was more than the ideological foundation 
of elite privilege and domination, but epistemologies and even religious beliefs 
and practices were being called into question. 
Although none of the Horeki reform measures in themselves directly 
attempted to control what went on in people's minds and hearts, the basic 
premises of Mitsugi's social vision, as well as the power vested in him as an 
individual, were clearly obstacles to the success of the reforms. In the end, 
his policies seem to have offended the beliefs and principles of a number of 
influential groups in Tsugaru. Social roles and institutions in the polity were 
disturbed to the extent that rebellion was in the air. 
On the other hand, without the capacity to conceptualise the impasse 
that had been reached in Tsugaru, and to theorise possibilities for change; 
without the conviction that actions could be founded in appropriate authority 
and intention; and without some confidence in criteria for deciding what was 
just, true, or good, it would not have been possible for Mitsugi, or anyone else, 
to address the situation at all. It was in large part because of the intellectual, 
ideological and spiritual affronts posed by the reforms that Mitsugi's 
opponents were able to clarify their positions and unite against him. 
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(i) Ideologies of domain and bakufu rule 
Hermann Ooms, in Tokugawa Ideology, constructed an account of the 
ways in which scholarly and religious individuals associated with the bakufu, or 
aspiring to be, contributed to the construction of a field of beliefs and ideas 
that legitimated Tokugawa rule. Over several decades, a variety of elements 
were drawn from Shinto, Buddhist, and Confucian codes to shore up multiple 
dimensions of bakufu legitimacy. These cosmological rationalizations for the 
social and political outcomes of bushi dominance over the other social orders 
contained religious and mythical elements as well as the Hayashi school's 
particular strain of Zhu Xi Confucianism. 
In Ooms' view, the end of the seventeenth century saw the culmination 
of a gradual process of sacralization of the entire Tokugawa social and political 
order, producing an all-embracing new socio-political discourse. Supported by 
ritual, this discourse constituted the Tokugawa ideology in which warriors were 
transformed into virtuous rulers, and society was represented as a "sacred, 
undifferentiated whole", wherein the commoner classes were committed to 
subordination and service. And so, the government in Edo and other privileged 
bushiwere able to deflect attention away from the structural reality, in which 
the elite strata of one occupational group had illegitimately seized military and 
political power. 
Insofar as the Tokugawa ideology emanating from Edo had an influence 
in Tsugaru, it was in the elevation of two behavioural values: respect for, and 
loyalty to, superiors; and the assiduous pursuit by each individual of the 
occupation inherited along with his social status.153 This emphasis on the social 
hierarchy the obligations of each individual according to his occupational status 
is directly linked with the close association of Yamaga Soko (1622-85) and his 
school with several members of the Tsugaru daimyo household. 
Although the structure of legitimacy pieced together by the early 
rulers of Tsugaru mirrored in many respects that of the Tokugawa shoguns in 
Edo, there were some significant variations. Tamenobu, for example, in the 
153 Women's status was determined by that of their male relatives. 
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process of securing power over the Tsugaru region in the 1580's, was careful to 
construct a separate line of access to imperial court circles as well as seeking 
recognition from the chief commander of the bushihierarchy. While he looked 
in turn to Hideyoshi and Ieyasu for formal investiture as daimyo, at the same 
time he rekindled an old family connection with the Konoe courtier family in 
Kyoto. 
The Konoe were among the very few lineages from which empresses and 
court advisers were traditionally chosen. This strategy of Tamenobu's made 
for a complicated process in Kyoto in 1600, when power and influence seem to 
have passed full circle. After his victory at Sekigahara, Ieyasu needed to gain 
the assent of the emperor to legitimate his claim to the title of Sei-I Tai-
shogun. Tamenobu, on the other hand, used his connections with the Konoe to 
have court representation made to Ieyasu on his behalf to ensure confirmation 
of his own position in the political hierarchy as Tsugaru's daimyo. 
Tamenobu's tactic of drawing on both the shogun and court circles for 
legitimation of his status served his successors and Tsugaru well right up until 
the fall of the shogunate in the 1860's. Even at the bitter end, when daimyo 
throughout the land, and the Tokugawa authorities themselves, were deeply 
divided between the cause of imperial restoration and preserving the bakufu, 
this dual support structure gave Tsugaru's ruler more flexibility in making his 
decision. At the last minute, Konoe contacts sent information from Kyoto 
about the progress of negotiations underway there, and Tsugaru pulled out of 
the northern alliance, which was already at war against the southwestern 
putsch. As a result, while Nagaoka castle burned and Aizu was humiliated, 
Hirosaki remained unscathed. So it was that links with Kyoto were not only an 
element of the legitimating structure that instituted Tsugaru as a domain and 
Tamenobu's descendants as daimyo: they enabled Tsugaru to survive as an 
independent polity even after the demise of the bakufu. 
Despite the role of court connections in Tsugaru's long life as a political 
unit, elements of Shinto belief stressing the unbroken imperial line and Japan's 
unique relations with the gods were not significant in mid eighteenth-century 
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Tsugaru. Where religious legitimation was concerned, the founding Tsugaru 
daimyo concentrated very early on merging his temporal authority with the 
power generated in local fields of belief. Even before being granted 
permission to use the Tsugaru surname, when he was still manoeuvring to unify 
the region under his leadership, Tamenobu made Mount Iwaki a symbolic and 
ideological ally. He encouraged his retainers to put their faith in the manji (?d) 
and the priest's staff, both of which were used by local mountain priests. He 
adopted the manji as the crest on one of his house banners, and a stylised 
depiction of the metal trimmings on the priest's staff for use on his own 
commander's standard. Thus, the spirits of Iwakisan and the mystics who 
worshipped there could visibly be seen supporting him. To this day the manjiis 
used as a symbol of the city of Hirosaki. 
In 1589, the sacred mountain erupted, and three temple buildings near 
the summit were burned down. Tamenobu took the opportunity to rebuild them, 
and as part of the process to rid Mount Iwaki of its association with Tendai 
esoteric practices. That was the faith of his erstwhile fellow countrymen and 
now declared enemies, the Nambu. Instead, he installed Shingon deities and 
accoutrements, and promoted the beliefs and practices of Shingon and Zen as 
the Buddhist elements in the belief structure associated with the mountain. 
Later, this trend was followed in Hirosaki as well. Tamenobu had chosen 
and renamed a place called Takaoka as his capital, and planned the castle he 
would build, but it was his son who supervised its construction. Tamenobu did, 
however, see the completion of the Omiyadono on Mount Iwaki, and fifty Rakan 
(arhat) statues installed there along with his personal dedicatory tablet, which 
all remained in place until after the end of the Tokugawa period. 
Nobumasa, the fourth Tsugaru daimyo and renowned developer of 
shinden, carried on the founder's tradition and oversaw a number of repair 
projects on Mount Iwaki's religious structures. In 1687, he dedicated one of 
them to the fourth shogun, Tsunayoshi, in commemoration of his forty-second 
year, which was regarded as an akudosh1~ or inauspicious year. He had the 
entire main hall of the Oriinomiya moved and rebuilt. The lavish style in which 
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the decorations were executed led to the results being given the title "Oku no 
Nikko", or the Nikko of Mutsu. In this ideologically economical gesture, 
Nobumasa wove together the authority of the shogunate, the power of the 
deities and Buddhas of the mountain, and the legitimacy of the Tsugaru domain 
and dynasty. 
(ii) Religious beliefs and practices in Tsugaru 
Like any other locality in eighteenth century Japan, Tsugaru was host to 
a wide range of belief and practice, of which the following three spheres of 
religious life represent typical differences among the origins, symbolic 
significance, and deities worshipped: firstly, the customs and practices 
revolving around Mount Iwaki, related so closely to the landscape of the 
domain; secondly, the installation of itabi, which are evidence of fourteenth 
century communities of faith in Dainichi Nyoraiand Amida Nyoraf, and thirdly, 
the major temple and shrine founded by the Tsugaru daimyos as projections of 
their power in the region. 
The origins of Buddhism in the Tsugaru region are unclear, but well 
before the sixteenth century priests in the vicinity of Mount Iwaki belonged 
to the esoteric Tendai tradition. Tendai Buddhism had been established in 
northern Tohoku since the time of Fujiwara dominance in the tenth and 
eleventh centuries. Shugenja(f~~f'f) and yamabushi(JlJfX) were actively 
engaged in their ascetic practices throughout the area. The mountain's old 
name was Onagoyama C*-=t-JJJ) and there are legendary accounts of the spirits 
of women being enshrined there.154 One was the dragon woman of Tatsubi 
marsh, who married a conquering warrior. Dazai Osamu quotes an account from 
the diary of Tachibana Nankei, a late eighteenth century medical scholar who 
travelled to Tsugaru. Local people told Nankei that the goddess of Mount 
Iwaki was Lady Anju, the woman mistreated by Sansho the Steward while she 
was in the province of Tango northwest of Lake Biwa. Whenever anyone from 
154 Gakko Yoshihiro (ed.), Tohoku reizan to shugendO. Tokyo: Chuji seihan, 1977, pages 49-53. 
The following material on Mount Iwaki is taken from the same source and Miyata Noboru, Yama 
to sato no shinko shi. Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kobunkan, pages 61-69 and 92. 
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that region entered Tsugaru, the Lady would express her anger by summoning 
forth "wind and rain and storms". Nankei reported that when severe storms 
struck the area, the local magistrate would still comb the area for natives of 
Tango.155 Whatever her origins, the female deity of Mount Iwaki continued to 
be a symbol of fertility and nurturing for the surrounding lands and their 
people. 
Adding to its mystery, Iwakisan is one of a number of free-standing 
conical mountains in Tohoku that are called moriyama or moyayama (60.I), 
literally "misty mountains". The hazy, forested valleys on their slopes are the 
objects of special religious observances and practices, and, in the case of 
Mount Iwaki, it was believed that these slopes seclude the ancestral spirits of 
surrounding villages. That means that the mountain is identified with local 
tutelary deities, and is welcomed directly into the shrine of each village in 
springtime and farewelled back to the mountain in autumn. The clan deities and 
tutelary deities of each village in Tsugaru were not necessarily always the 
direct ancestors or clan heads of the inhabitants, because people had moved 
from place to place and formed new communities, especially in the shinden 
areas. Sometimes they installed their original deities; sometimes local ones, or 
they took advice from a yamabushi or some other mountain ascetic as to 
appropriate deities. These included Hachiman, Inari, and Kumanomiya as wel I 
as established regional deities. 
The annual pilgrimage to the summit of Mount Iwaki was the most 
significant communal religious observance in the domain. Men were forbidden 
to set foot on the mountain outside the pilgrimage season, for fear of 
disturbing the spirits and deities that were constantly coming and going; and 
women could never approach it. A mountain guardian is still enshrined at the 
foot of Mount Iwaki, where pilgrimages used to be made outside the 
designated season. One particular place on Mount Iwaki, called Okuraishi, was 
where spirits of the dead were believed to go a certain time after death. In 
the area there are several grave markers and Jizo shrines, and there is a dry 
155 Dazai, Tsugaru, pages 7 4-75. 
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stream bed nearby, dotted with piles of little stones. That is where the bones 
or bodies of the poor were sometimes left. All these spirits, too, were 
believed to travel back to their home villages each year to watch over the 
harvest, and then return after the festival of thanksgiving. Climbing the 
mountain during the pilgrimage season, therefore, was not only an act of 
thanksgiving for the harvest; it was a way of communing with this host of 
spirits. 
In the Tsugaru region - in the entirety of present Aomori, Prefecture, 
in fact - itabiare distributed in quite discrete areas, clustered either around 
Hirosaki and Nakabetsu to the west of Mount Iwaki, or in smaller groupings 
scattered along the south western coast. See Map 4 on page 83 for the location of 
itabi in Tsugaru. Itabi are small stone steles inscribed with Buddhist texts or 
motifs in Sanskrit.156 Those in the vicinity of Hirosaki and Mount Iwaki were 
nearly all put in place between 1300 and 1330, while those in the western 
coastal region are dated after 1340. 
Well over half the total of the identified 290 odd itabi are dedicated 
to Dai'nichi Nyorai, and only one fourth are inscribed with the "Namu Amida 
Butsu"prayer to Amida Nyorai- in contrast to the Kanto region, where more 
than eighty percent of itabi are dedicated to Amie/a Nyora1: A good three 
quarters of the itabiin the Hirosaki - Nakabetsu area are dedicated to 
Dainichi Nyorai, while just over half those in the western area are dedicated to 
Amida Nyorai and less than one third to Dainichi Nyorai. 
The conclusion has been reached from this clustering of distributions is 
that the earlier itabiwere installed by adherents of the old Tendai esoteric 
sects centred on Mount Iwaki, and influenced by Kumanomiya. Those beliefs 
and practices reached Tsugaru overland, through Hiraizumi. The itabi 
belonging to the later period were installed after Jodoshu (Pure land sect) 
teachings had travelled up the Japan sea coast, with the trading ships, and 
entered the region from the west. Thus, while Tsugaru remained in many 
156 The most comprehensive summary of recent research on Tsugaru's itabi is in Zusetsu Aomori-
ken shi, pages 159 -162. 
125 
respects beyond the institutional frontier of the Japanese state for another 
two centuries, itab1: and other elements of material culture that represented 
Yamato civilization were a familiar part of life in the region much earlier. The 
land route from Hiraizumi to the Tsugaru port of Tosaminato (Josan) and the 
Japan sea coastal shipping route, which linked Tosaminato with trading ports in 
Ezo, Sakhalin, Manchuria and further north, dated from the eleventh and 
twelfth centuries, when the inhabitants of the Tsugaru region lived and traded 
as part of a far northern cultural community rather than as a Yamato 
outpost .157 
Another example of the early establishment of religious institutions and 
practices is the Choshoji temple of the Soto sect, which was said to have been 
established by Tamenobu's Oura ancestors. After being dismantled and moved 
several times, it became the domain's tutelary temple and burial place for 
daimyos. After the Meiji government's shinbutsu-bunri decree ordering the 
separation of all Shinto and Buddhist institutions and places of worship, special 
halls were built in Choshoji's grounds to house the Rakan, Kannon and other 
Buddhist images that had been installed in Mount Iwaki's temples over nearly 
three centuries by Tsugaru Tamenobu and his successors. People making the 
annual climb to the shrines on Mount Iwaki's summit these days routinely 
complete their pilgrimage by returning to Hirosaki and paying respects to the 
removed statuary at Choshoji. 
The other major shrine associated with the Tsugaru house was Koshogu, 
which was built to honour the economic expansionist daimyo, Nobumasa. The 
daily records of this shrine, the Takaoka Reigenk1: became one of the most 
important documentary sources for eighteenth and nineteenth century domain 
history. See pages 57 and 58. 
157 The monograph, Tsugaru Andoshi to kitakata sekai, edited by Ogushi Masashi, Kawade shobo 
shinsha, Tokyo 1995, contains chapters on itab1; the fortress at Fujisaki on the Aseishi River, 
and the links between the Hiraizumi Fujiwara, the Tsugaru Ando, and the kenchoji temple in 
Kamakura. 
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(iii) The influence of Yamaga Soko 
While the early Tsugaru daimyos obtained enough practical advice and 
guidance in political matters from relatives and patrons linked with the bakufu 
and court, politics and bushi ethics as subjects of intellectual engagement 
made their mark in the domain during the long incumbency of Tsugaru 
Nobumasa (b. 1646; r. 1656-1710). At the age of fifteen Nobumasa began to 
pursue classical and military studies under Yamaga Soko. Apart from the ten 
years (1666-1675) Soko spent under the supervision of the Ako daimyo after 
offending bakufu censors with his teachings and publications, Nobumasa 
remained his student and friend until Soko died in 1685, and heavily promoted 
his teachings and influence in Tsugaru. Nobumasa's younger brother and two 
sons also studied with him, and Nobuhisa, the fifth daimyo, continued to invite 
Soko's followers to teach in the domain. A considerable number were awarded 
retainer stipends and stayed on in Tsugaru. 
Soko's eldest daughter, Kame, married an eminent Tsugaru retainer who 
took her family name. He later became a domain elder and was given the title 
of Tsugaru daigaku.158 Kame's descendents subsequently became the main 
Yamaga family line, and the Tsugaru domain officially sponsored the publication 
of a number of Soko's works. Until Matsudaira Sadanobu decreed in 1790 that 
Song Confucianism was the preferred tradition for teaching in domain schools, 
and Tsugaru scholars complied, Soko's thought and the military arts of the 
Yamaga school were predominant elements in the education of the domain's 
elite. Soko, along with Sorai and Shundai, was among the few Japanese 
thinkers commented upon in favourable terms in Mitsugi's writings. 
IV Fields of power and room for 
manoeuvre 
Poor harvests not only caused misery and abandoned fields in the 
villages; they also meant that retainers' allowances had to be cut, and less rice 
shipped to urban wholesale markets. So in Osaka there would be less silver 
158 Yamagami, Tsugaru, pages 454-456. Kojima, "Thought", pages 150-51. Kudoke ki in TRK, page136. 
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cash available for repaying loans and credit advances. Little would be left to 
exchange for gold to settle the domain's outstanding accounts in Edo, where 
the daimyo's compulsory biennial attendance was an ever-increasing financial 
burden. Existing loans had to be refloated and additional credit negotiated, 
until even the interest payments were too much to bear, and the principal sums 
could not possibly be repaid without drastic changes in the domain's budgeting 
processes. 
This was the process that had reduced Tsugaru's finances to such a 
perilous state by the early 1750's that the government's focus shifted from 
merely coping with immediate disasters to a concerted search for more 
fundamental solutions. To be effective, any change would necessarily alter the 
balance of power maintained amongst the various interlinked structures and 
interests in Tsugaru's political economy. Furthermore, reform policies would 
need to be congenial with the ideological, intellectual and metaphysical terms in 
which the polity was conceived and the individuals within it fulfilled their 
various roles as rulers, producers, marketers, protectors, and so on. 
From the bakufu side, three elements of the settlement with the 
domains combined to affect Tsugaru's political economy, and contributed to the 
crisis. The first of these was the exclusive emphasis on rice as the foundation 
of wealth, and the basis of the taxation structure. Related to this 
concentration on rice production was the constantly promoted social ideal, 
dating from Hideyoshi's heino bunripolicy, that the population should be clearly 
divided into occupational orders. Bushiwould not, as a rule, engage in 
agriculture, which would be left to the separate order of farmers. They would 
instead serve in the military and administrative hierarchies of the various 
domains and the shogunate. Households engaged in commerce would not be 
involved in agricultural, political or military pursuits. Thirdly, there was the 
hostage system, instituted by Hideyoshi and refined by the Tokugawa. Though 
conceived primarily as a security measure, this imposition eventually made 
financial control at the domain level impossible. 
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Thus it was that the balance of economic, political and ideological power 
in the domain depended upon forces emanating from the central bakufu 
structure as well as those that were generated locally. It was in the large-
scale, centralised markets of Osaka that Tsugaru was provided with the 
exchange services and credit arrangements essential to financing the domain's 
obligatory presence and duties in Edo; but it was the quality of harvests far 
away in the northeast that determined how much rice could be exchanged, or 
guaranteed, for silver and gold. 
It could well have been right there, in the very territory itself, where 
prayers and supplications for decent weather and adequate harvests were 
perennially treated as a matter of life and death, that some of the most 
insuperable obstacles to Tsugaru's prosperity lay.159 The location, the weather, 
the landscape and the resources of the domain may simply not have been up to 
keeping its political and economic machinery functioning at an adequate level to 
meet the demands of the time. There was no question, either, in the middle of 
the eighteenth century, of dismantling those fundamental structures and 
systems. They could be adjusted to accommodate change, but only within 
certain conceptual and strategic bounds. It was those bounds that NyOi 
Mitsugi transgressed in his reform program and his thinking. 
159 Hasegawa Sei'ichi, "Tenkanki", page 12 contains a memorandum to a temple on the need to 
offer constant prayers for the land (kum). 
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Chapter 3 
Disturbing the Status Quo - the Horeki Ref arms 
For better or worse, most societies have concluded, albeit 
tacitly, that scholarship and government are fundamentally 
incompatible. Harold Bolitho160 
Many of the crises that caused domains to embark upon reform 
programs during the Tokugawa period were financial ones. The impetus for 
reform often became more urgent because of a sudden disaster, which itself 
demanded immediate responses. Disasters exacerbated fiscal woes, disrupted 
the agricultural round, damaged harvests and often caused food shortages. 
Tax remissions were diminished, causing deadlock at domain government level, 
which in turn resulted in added imposts and forced loans. This lowered morale. 
Poverty and despair within communities then often led to protests and 
uprisings, or threats of criminal behaviour. 
This type of pattern tended to recur, over time and in different 
domains. Although reforms were implemented in a wide variety of sequences 
and combinations, they tended to fall into four general categories according to 
their main objectives. Emergency measures would first be employed to cope 
with the crisis or disaster; secondly, efforts would be made to monitor and 
restrict official spending; thirdly, extra demands would be made on established 
sources of income while new sources were considered; and fourthly, attention 
would be given to law and order, moral tone, and a sense of unity among the 
people. In the following list, examples of common policy measures are given for 
each Of these four objectives. 
•!• Dealing with the triggering disaster and its immediate financial 
consequences. This could require urgent repairs to infrastructure, immediate 
currency adjustments, forced loans from retainers or wealthy farming and 
merchant families, official debt renegotiation, and the distribution of food 
160 This is the opening sentence of Bolitho's review of Kate Wildman Nakai, Shogunal Politics: 
Arai Hakuseki and the Premises of Tokugawa Rule. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University .Press, 
1988. The review is in Monumenta Nipponica, 44:3, 1989, pages 354 ff. 
130 
relief. Domains in dire need appealed to the bakufu. The bakufu had recourse 
to support from all its vassals, in theory, but most often extracted assistance 
from Tokugawa house vassals. 
•!• Auditing and limiting official expenditure. Outgoing payments 
from the domain treasury were monitored, then eliminated, postponed or cut 
wherever possible. Daimyo processions, official gifts, seasonal observances 
and religious rituals became more modest. Commercial houses were contracted 
to provide official provisioning, banking, freight, shipping and other services 
that had been the duties of retainers. Retainers were sent to live outside 
expensive urban areas to cut the need for cash. Sometimes they were 
resettled on their landed fiefs to directly raise their own incomes, and pay 
taxes to the domain. This measure is now referred to as bushi dochaku 
(JEt±±~), or attaching retainers to the land. 
•!• Stabilising and expanding the economic base of the polity. 
Systems for assessing and collecting taxes were elaborated and applied. 
Administrative organs were rationalised. New land surveys were carried out. 
Landless people or immigrant settlers were offered subsidies of foodstuffs 
and grains, tax concessions, building materials and farming implements in 
return for tending deserted fields. Loan debt amnesties were declared and 
interest rates restricted. Fixed tax rates were applied to fields, regardless 
of crop yields. The production of new agricultural or industrial commodities 
was promoted, sometimes supported by domain monopsonies or monopolies. 
Specialty export industries were also promoted. A domain currency might be 
issued for domestic use, while precious metals and coins became government 
property. 
Raising the esprit de corps. social ethos. and moral tone within the 
~· Exhortations to ideal behaviour were issued publicly. Awards were 
made for exemplary conduct. Public rituals and ceremonies were performed. 
Scholars were installed or consulted as advisors to daimyo or shogun. Laws and 
regulations were issued to occupational groups setting out the duties and the 
responsibilities befitting their roles in the polity and economy. Temples and 
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shrines were repaired and refurbished. Legal codes were elaborated and 
promulgated, while harsh exemplary punishments were administered. Official 
schools were opened for retainers to be taught military arts, and classical and 
literary studies. The number of domains establishing official schools rose 
noticeably from the beginning of the Horeki period.161 Villagers were 
encouraged to send their children to local terakoya, or temple schools, and 
temples were exhorted to establish such schools. 
Eastern Midl 7th Genroku Kyoho Horeki TermeilKalsei ~ Tenpo 
domai'ls Century 1690s 1720s lJro-64 178ls&~ 18»-laa:> 1830s 
Tsugaru ., ., ., .., 
Hachinohe ., ., .., 
Nanbu ., ., ., 
Kubota ., ., 
Sendai ., ., 
Yonezawa ., ., 
Aizu ., ., .; 
Kawagoe ., ., .., 
Mi to ., ., ., ., ., 
Shirakawa .; 
Kaga .; ., 
Owari ., ., 
Bakuf u 
reforms 
., 
.; ., 
Western 
domai'ls 
Wakayama ., .., ., .; 
Okayama ., ., 
Hiroshima ., 
Tottori ., ., 
Chosho .., .; 
Takamatsu .; ., ., 
Tokushima ., ., 
Toso .; .; ., 
Satsuma ., ., 
Table 5: Reforms by Time Period. in the Bakufu. Some Eastern and Some Western Domains 
Sources: Yoshinaga Akira, "Hansel ka1kaktl' (domain government reforms) in the 
Kokushi Daijiten 11, pages 787-89; and "Tohoku shohan ni okeru hansei kaikaku no 
tenkai", pages 222-232. 
The east-west divide in this table falls somewhere between the Kii Peninsula and the 
Owari domain. The domains are chosen for their proximity to Tsugaru, their 
importance in Mark Ravina's monograph, their prominence in historical narratives, or 
simply to spread the geographic distribution in the table. 
161 Kokushii daijiten vol. 11, entry on domain schools(~~) pages 742 - 765. 
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While it is difficult to convey much that is relevant about reform 
programs in statistical terms, it is nevertheless interesting to note that 
domains in all regions of Japan attempted major adjustments two or three 
times during the period, and that in the complete data, numbers peak earlier in 
the commercially precocious west than in the east. 
The precipitating crisis in Tsugaru leading to Mitsugi's appointment and 
the Horeki reform program was the financial impasse reached in the aftermath 
of the 1749 harvest failure, which had been the final blow to an economy 
already severely weakened by an accumulation of long-term debts. Less than 
three years later, after coping with successive reform measures that imposed 
radical change on most facets of its existence, the polity was again confronted 
by the prospect of disaster: this time, in the form of a major famine. This 
was when the strengths and weaknesses of the new structures and systems put 
in place by the reformers were revealed in sharp relief. 
Most remarkably, mechanisms were already in place that enabled the 
distribution of food relief to the entire population: and a famine that was 
recorded to have caused around 50 ,000 deaths in Nanbu passed without a 
single life being lost to starvation in Tsugaru.162 On the negative side, the 
reform group was left with the goals of its earlier policies still not achieved, as 
well as the additional obligations they entered into after the 1755 harvest 
failure. This exacerbated already marked tendencies towards autocratic 
leadership and stifling control. The introduction of Mitsugi's universal coupon 
system, followed soon after by the exposure of corruption among official 
agents, provoked widespread resistance, abandonment of the reforms and the 
reversal of much that had been achieved. 
An account of the Horeki reform experience in Tsugaru can therefore 
be divided into two separate periods of policy implementation, and a short, 
final stage of unravelling. The first period lasted from around the time of 
162 Estimates of the casualties in Nanbu vary. The figure of 50,000 is taken from the entry 
headed Koryaku no k1kin in KDJ 12, pages 660-61. 
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Mitsugi's appointment at the beginning of 1753 until the extent of the rice 
harvest failure became clear, late in the autumn of 1755. The second was 
taken up with staving off famine in the domain, pacifying creditors and trying 
to shore up the domain's economy. The unravelling began in the 6th month of 
1757, when Mitsugi's hyofu (ration coupon) system was declared a failure and 
abandoned. It ended when he was dismissed and placed under house arrest in 
the 3rd month of 1758. 
I Crisis, change, and crop failure 
During the first three years, Tsugaru's Horeki reform program followed 
the familiar pattern. The domain leadership attended to the immediate crisis 
by making attempts to balance the budget and increase revenue. Moves were 
quickly made to control official expenditure and other outflows of cash. 
Surveys and investigations proceeded apace. The data collected was used to 
rationalise administration, first within the finance office in Hirosaki and then 
further afield. Changes were implemented in other government organs, in 
urban centres, and then the countryside. The arm of reform also extended to 
the domain's personnel and offices in the Kamigata and Edo. And, in keeping 
with general practice, the reformers turned their attention to improving the 
general moral tone of the polity. 
In line with policies aimed at saving money and controlling exchange 
procedures, the decision was made not to ship all the Horeki 4 intake of tax 
rice to central markets, but instead to store it in the domain's granaries for 
periodic shipment. Local currency reforms were also implemented and stipend 
payment procedures adjusted. The problem of domain income was addressed 
first by tightening central administrative control over the countryside and the 
collection of taxes. After that, effort was also put into increasing rural 
output and stimulating the production of potential export commodities. In the 
meanwhile, regular notices and instructions issued from government bureaus to 
people in all walks of life, admonished extravagance, encouraged virtue and 
insisted on diligent application to work. 
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(i) Attending to the immediate crisis 
The three leading advocates of reform were positioned at the head of 
Tsugaru's administration by the end of the first month of Horeki 3 (1753). 
Tsugaru Mondo had been sharing the responsibilities of domain government 
with his fellow karo(domain elders) since Nobuaki's death in 1744, and Monai 
Arieimon had served as goyonin (steward) since the 5th month of Horeki l.163 
The appointment of Nyui Ichirozaemon (Mitsugi) as kanjo bugyo (finance 
magistrate), noted in entry of the Kudo household diary headed the 11th day of 
the 1st month of Horeki 3 (1753), completed the group.164 
While decision-making power in the domain was eventually to be 
concentrated in the person of Mitsugi, it appears that at this stage he and 
Monai Ariemon worked in harmony. One impression of their respective 
approaches to administration is found in this snippet from the Takaoka 
Reigenk;. "Nyai's ideas kept rice and money circulating, and the morale of the 
people was kept up by Monai's integrity."165 For part of the year at least, 
Tsugaru Mondo was in Edo, supervising the ceremonial and rituals associated 
with Nobuyasu's coming of age and investiture.166 
Local debts, and the excessive amounts owed in the Osaka and Edo 
markets were put in order in the finance office, with the assistance of another 
kanjo bugyo, Kamayachi Heizaemon. He and Mitsugi succeeded in negoti_ating 
unlimited extensions for payments on 101,180 ryo in gold debt and 7,780 kan in 
silver, out of the total of 240,000 ryoin gold. For the remainder of the debt 
they obtained three-year loan extensions.-167 The need to send scarce cash out 
of the domain was therefore no longer quite so urgent, and the second element 
of Mitsugi's money-saving strategy was put in place: while rice was being 
"intentionally kept in storage" in the Tsugaru granaries, kome kitte (rice 
163 Satoke ki, in TRK, page 206. 
164 Kudoke ki, loc. cit. 
165 Quoted on page 12 in Okawa Tetsuo. •An examination of the Horeki reforms in Tsugaru". 
Hirosaki daigaku kokushi kenkytl, no. 30, 1962, pages 9-38, Takaokakiin TKD. page 217. 
166 He is noted in the Kudoke ki, TRK. page 206, as one of the attendants accompanying Nobuyasu 
on the occasion of his first audience with the shogun, Ieshige. 
167 Okawa, "Examination" page 18. 
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promissory notes) were sold to merchants in the local area and the Kamigata.168 
That brought currency into the treasury, and gave the finance office a small 
interval of breathing space. 
All official loans held by the domain with retainers were extended. 
These loans were in fact forced contributions deducted from regular 
allowances and stipend payments. The arrangement made at the time of the 
1749 harvest failure, that half the value of stipends would be held back, was 
still in effect. It applied to all allowances paid in cash, rice or other grain 
equivalents. From 1750, one third of the amounts of gold and rice normally 
remitted to Edo had also been held back.169 All the rice not being paid to 
retainers or sent to Edo was stored in the domain's granaries, along with the 
year's harvest that was not being shipped to Osaka. The goal was to save 
money and gain control over the exchange processes by directly exchanging 
grain for gold, instead of first selling it for silver. Local currency reforms also 
formed part of this strategy. A little later, enough rice had accumulated 
through the kome kitte scheme for the treasury to pay back to retainers one 
third of the total amount that had been borrowed from them, and to send an 
extra ten percent to Edo against what had been "borrowed" from there. 
Along with these cash-saving measures, it was announced that any funds 
paid in lieu of compulsory contributions of labour to public works, would be cut 
in half until the price of rice recovered to 15 monme. Proportional cuts were 
then made to the large amounts budgeted for the daimyo's sankin kotaitrips to 
Edo, as well as the cost of maintaining entourages and residences there. On 
the other hand, allowances for horses and expenses on the road were slightly 
increased so as to prevent shortfalls resulting in unauthorised borrowing at 
post stations along the way. No official allowances were paid out to shrines, 
temples, or domain officers stationed in the nine ports, though in some cases 
amounts of up to five percent were paid, in a gesture acknowledging hardship. 
168 Takaokak1; in TKD, page 228. 
169 Kudoke k1; inTRK, page 206. 
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(ii.) Counting costs and gathering data 
In a joint statement from the general director of the finance office, 
issued in the names of Sato Kanzo and Nyoi Mitsugi on the 15th day of the 8th 
month of Horeki 3, the disorganised state of the domain's book keeping and 
accounting is described: 
Due to the disorganisation and lack of ability of those who are 
employed in it, the office has become increasingly chaotic over 
the years. Numerous instances over-statement and under-
statement, as well as complete omissions, have been detected 
in the figures and calculations ... Clear summary statements of 
income and expenditure never appear at the top of a page. 
It was completely impossible, according to the report, "to get a clear idea of 
the financial state of the domain", and the two kanjo bugyo were therefore 
prevented from attending to "even the most pressing financial matters". They 
claimed that "private matters are mixed in with the official business" of the 
finance office, and because "this is so complicated to sort out, another office 
section is required". The request is spelled out, with the recommendation that 
someone of the status of kogashiraor above would be most suitable to 
supervise the task, with one or two other officers to work with him.170 
Their suggestion was taken up, and, as an item recorded in the Tsugaru 
hen san nikkifor the 10th month records, a new agency was to be established 
called the Oshirabekata yakusho, or general bureau of investigation. Sato 
Denzaemon (Kanzo), currently general inspector of the finance office, was also 
to head the Oshirabekata yakusho. Since his combined responsibilities were 
expected to be too onerous for one person, Mitsugi was to assist him in both.171 
These new arrangements were to be carried out under the supervision of Monai 
Ariemon.172 
170 SHS, pages 626-27. 
171 Contrary to accounts relating that the elder, Tsugaru Mondo personally chose Mitsugi to 
implement reforms, the nature of Mitsugi's appointment was, in formal terms, simply to assist 
Kanzo. I - )d;:-Ct§nltFei~t5l:f1*Fei~, :tll"Pl~~L;J:f:iTi&~ir:~rF~-'f'f~$fi ... ) loc. cit. 
172 SHS, pages 626-27. The entry from the Kudoke kiinTRK, page 206, which notes the 
establishment of the Oshirabekata is recorded under the same date as Mitsugi's appointment, in 
the first month of Horeki 3. A date in the 10th month, after the submission of the report in the 
sth month, seems more likely. 
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On the document registering the founding of the Oshirabekata yakusho, 
Ariemon's appointment as its general director appears with those of Mitsugi 
and Kanzo. In addition, the associated promotion of the accountants Kudo 
Sadakazu, Mizoguchi Ichizaemon and Kakizaki Toshiro as staff members to 
take care of official business is noted. A weighty pledge of off ice is set out · 
above all their names.173 
During the last three months of Horeki 3, the inspections and surveys 
advocated by Mitsugi and Kanzo in their finance off ice report were put in place. 
An audit of expenditure on retainers' rice stipends and money allowances was 
carried out in the 10th month. Shortfalls in official income from the 
agricultural tax were to be addressed by a comprehensive survey of all land 
under cultivation, including both the long-established and newly developed 
farming areas. Older fields had of course been assessed previously, but they 
were all inspected anew by appointed officials, along with those in the three 
more recently developed shinden (new rice field) areas. Inspection teams were 
enjoined to carry out their duties with the utmost propriety, accepting no gifts 
from farmers of cotton cloth, money or the like. They were to confirm and 
register an accurately assessed yield for each f ield.174 
All temples and shrines in the domain were also required to submit 
detailed information concerning their assets, personnel and income. In some 
cases several forms had to be filled out and submitted before the 
investigators were satisfied.175 The enquiry covered 
•!• the area of all lands within the bounds of each sect 
•!• a list of all buildings associated with the temple or shrine, giving 
their full names and their floor area, measured in tatami mats -halls, 
pagodas, hermitages, residences, and so on, including those that 
were unoccupied, not in use, or broken down 
173 SHS, page 627. 
174 SHS, pages 628-29. 
175 ibid., pages 678-79. 
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•:• the total annual income received in official allowances, rice 
offerings, gifts or any other form 
•:• the names and titles of the person in charge, and all other personnel, 
including priests have gone to Kyoto to study, or those currently 
residing at their head temples.176 
In a long memorandum, issued on the 27th day of the 12th month 
outlining changes that were to take effect in the new year, there is a clause 
setting out conditions that would apply to obligatory loans from retainers, 
temples and shrines, and rural, town and port magistrates. In effect, claims on 
the "loans", whether they were fully paid or not, were to be dropped by the 
finance office.177 Taken together with the insistence of the Oshirabekata on 
full disclosure from the shrines and temples, and the notice issued in the 
following 5th month, which stated their religious duties to the polity and the 
intention of the government to take responsibility for upkeep and repairs, the 
policy seems to be part of a broader plan to bring even shrines and temples 
under the financial and administrative umbrella of the domain. 
(iii) Reconfiguring the networks of power 
In late 1753, several new sections of the Oshirabekata were set up 
under the direct supervision of the kanjo bugyo. One was to handle all 
alterations to the payment of stipends and allowances, in rice or as money 
wages; another to approve and register any changes in family names; a third to 
supervise the employment and dismissal of mercenary troops; and a fourth to 
be responsible for deciding orders of hereditary succession to rank, official 
posts and family headship. It was necessary to organise the various bureaus to 
allow time for clerical work and record-keeping as well as daily face-to-face 
administrative business, especially during times when compulsory 
documentation was being submitted in response to requests for information by 
the new office. Shrines and temples, for example, were constantly furnishing 
176 The notice pressing for data on absent personnel and disused buildings is dated the 2rh day 
of the 2"d (intercalary) month of 1754. 
177 SHS, pages 629-31. 
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additional details about their personnel, buildings, income, landholdings and so 
on. 
Between the 24th and 27th days of the 12th month, plans for a complete 
overhaul of the domain bureaucracy were announced. A large number of 
bureaus and agencies were to be affected by amalgamations or eliminations. 
On the whole, these changes enhanced the structural power of the 
Oshirabekata by clearing away intermediate level authorities. Administration 
of the rice granary, the internal domain treasury, official loans, upland 
agriculture and animal fodder supplies were all among the matters placed under 
its direct authority, along with the oversight of cottage industries, control of 
the movement of goods in and out of domain warehouses, and the authorization 
of all the government's outgoing payments.178 A superintendent of monies had 
hitherto had control of expenditure, and the uplands had been under the 
supervision of Kudo Manzaemon, from a post in the now disbanded criminal 
investigation office.179 
Within the finance off ice itself, personnel were shuffled and 
reshuffled for several years. There had customarily been eight posts available 
at the level of kanjo bugyo, but the number of appointments seems 
deliberately to have been kept much lower, perhaps so that control would be 
more direct and possibilities for conflict minimized. An unusually large number 
of men were dismissed from their posts, with six departing during the three 
years from 1753. In the same period, only two new appointments were made: 
those of Kamayatsu Heizaemon and Kanehira Rizaemon. from 1754 onwards, 
the names of officials who seem to have been sympathetic with the reformers 
predominate: Mitsugi himself, Sato, Kamayatsu and Kanehira, for example. 
The personnel in charge of accounts also changed often, though it is difficult 
to tell whether records of their movements correspond in any way with those 
178 Ibid., pages 629-31. 
179 This seemingly odd arrangement was quite fitting, because the theft and smuggling across the 
border were a constant drain on Tsugaru's valuable timber resources. 
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of particular kanjo bugyo.180 In contrast, there are comparatively few changes 
registered in appointments to other posts. It was clearly essential to preserve 
some continuity among the bureaucrats who handled practical, day-to-day 
administrative matters, but at policy-making levels disruptions were frequent. 
This streamlining of structures and functions within the finance off ice 
quite closely resembles the alterations made in the bakufu finance off ice in 
Edo during the Kyoho reform period. In Tsugaru, the dismissal of personnel 
from positions within the office, the redistribution of duties among those who 
remained, and the careful fostering of those at kanjo bugyo level, all seem to 
have been aimed at gathering a concentration of officials who were both 
qualified and willing to expedite the reform process. 
One significant aspect of the changes taking place in administrative 
procedure was the appointment of influential merchants to quasi-government 
positions. Ashibane Jirosaburo and Takeuchi Hanzaemon, official purveyor 
attached to the domain's central paper goods store, for example, were made 
official Oshirabekata yakusho business agents.181 All currently engaged 
purveying merchants were required by the Oshirabekata to join the new agents 
in making written pledges of service. 
The general thrust of the reforms toward reduction of personnel and 
concentration of power also had ramifications in rural districts. Dismissals 
occurred regularly, well into the second year, and altogether some hundreds of 
posts were eliminated from various public works departments, including those 
connected with the supervision of dams, lacquer production, and new rice field 
development. An extract from the Monai Ariemon h1kkifollowing one from the 
Satoke ki dated the 12th month of Horeki 3 on the same subjects, indicates the 
removal of some hundreds of upland and forest officers alone. Ariemon 
180 Asakura Yuko has set out the comings and goings of the kanjo bugyoand accounting-officers 
in her unpublished MA thesis,"Kinseiki ni okeru Tsugaru han no kenkya: Horeki kaikaku no ichi 
kosatsu." I am grateful to Kojima Yasunori for giving me this, albeit handwritten and very 
faintly copied, essay to read. 
181 The Ashibane appointments are recorded in a document issued in Monai Ariemon's name, 
reproduced in SHS, page 639. That of Takeuchi is recorded in a Kudoke ki entry in TKD dated 
the 12th month of Horeki 3, page 227. 
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observes that the mountain areas he visited were rife with smugglers, and that 
the surveillance being paid for was totally ineffective.182 Many of these posts 
would have been seasonal or part time contracts, possibly held for generations 
in one family, and remunerated with small periodic allowances from the domain. 
One entry in the Hirayama diary for the 4th month of 1754 reads: 
For the past thirty-six days, evening after evening, people are 
being dismissed from their posts. Everyone works in hushed 
silence.183 
And the process generating this picture of widespread retrenchment 
was to go on. On the first day of the 6th month of 1754, a directive was issued 
announcing that the three offices staffed by magistrates with administrative 
authority over rural districts, towns, and shrines and temples were all to come 
under the direct supervision of the Oshirabekata yakusho, in the same way as 
the finance bureau. Inspections and surveys had resulted in this kind of 
estimation of the performance of the rural district office: 
It is a basic fact that the finance office and rural district 
magistrates have been the two administrative pillars of the 
countryside for a very long time. It is also true that trade and 
commerce in our rural areas are at present totally bankrupt, 
and this is causing difficult problems for the magistrates. 
This does not benefit the public purse at all; and, because 
funds are therefore very short, the district magistrates 
cannot function. As a result, justice does not prevail, properly 
functioning services do not exist, and matters are not handled 
with proper care. Therefore, all matters that were 
heretofore under the jurisdiction of the district magistrates 
will be absorbed into the finance office.184 
Several further adjustments were made to the structure of rural 
administration. Firstly, the way in which daikan (local intendants) were 
assigned to districts was changed. The three main districts of Tsugaru had 
previously been divided into 25 kumi(groupings). After a series of trials 
towards the end of 1753, the total number of kumiwas decreased, through 
182 TKD, page 215. 
183 A notice about lumber workers' dismissals also appears in SHS, page 635. Diary entry quoted 
by Asakura, page 48. 
184 Document 910 on page 636 of SHS contains some of this directive, quoted here from . 
Asakura, page 49. 
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several amalgamations of two, or even three, old kumito form one new kumi. 
The domain was then divided into twelve large blocks and a total of 24 daikan 
installed. Later, in the middle of 1754, one spread-out kumi containing a large 
number of villages was combined with a newly developed forestry area to form 
a single block, while the total number of blocks was cut by amalgamations of up 
to four or five old kum1: to make a total of seven blocks. This streamlined 
arrangement required the appointment of only 16 daikan. 
As well as this constant rearrangement of districts and posts, the 
incumbent daikan themselves also seem to have moved about a great deal. 
Their superiors were apparently determined that these local intendants would 
never be able to put down roots in the districts to which they were appointed. 
One Narita Kichisaburo, for example, is recorded as serving in the Fujizaki and 
Kashiwagi kum1: then Yokouchi and Uramachi, followed by Namioka and Tokiwa, 
over a period of less than two years. A short time later, during 1754, the 
number of men with the rank of daikan was reduced from twelve to seven, and 
24 "men of eminence and distinction" were appointed as major village headmen. 
Their appointments corresponded with those of the 24 earlier daikan, but were 
not particularly related to the seven new clusters of for which daikan were to 
be responsible. 
In line with their new duties, these village heads were appointed to 
bushiranks of omemie or above. That is, they were eligible to have direct 
audiences with the daimyo in the same way as hatamoto, and permitted to bear 
swords as well as receiving allowances to support fifty subordinates each. 
Administrative responsibility for two clusters of villages each was reason for 
them to be officially granted this status. Perhaps the most significant point to 
make about these twenty-four new appointees is that at least fifteen of them 
were from rural merchant households, or else were themselves purveying 
merchants who had special relations with the domain and a household business 
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of their own. In the twelfth month of 1755, the remaining nine persons were 
all registered as domain freight officers and inspectors of purveyors.185 
In the new chain of command, these wealthy rural figures with strong 
commercial links had their own administrative assistants, who supervised the 
clerks who headed each five-family group. They were accountable to the seven 
daikan, who were in turn answerable to the District Superintendent. This 
replaced the old structure of the five-family groups under a village headman 
who was responsible to a local daikan. In the overall disposition of power 
throughout the domain though, the functions assigned to the major village 
heads did not ramify far through administrative networks. They included, for 
example, scrutinising petitions for relief in times of shortage, dealing with 
accidental deaths, and keeping contact with banished persons. The daikan, in 
contrast, had quite far-reaching authority, in the legal, economic and political 
spheres. Among their responsibilities were surveillance of Christians, dealing 
with all loans of seeds and other foodstuffs, resolution of problems with 
neighbouring domains, concerning land use and timber resources in border 
areas, and distributing allowances to banished persons residing in their 
jurisdictions. 
(iv) Insulating Tsugaru's economy 
The most immediately recognised longer-term need was to make 
Tsugaru proof against uncontrolled penetration by the rapidly spreading 
market economy until the domain had sufficient money and saleable 
commodities to hold its own. This involved efforts to prevent excess money 
flowing out of the domain, and to harmonise official financial dealings inside 
Tsugaru with those in Osaka and Edo, so as to gradually co-ordinate economic 
management between the three arenas. The basis of Tsugaru's financial 
income being the money earned in exchange for its annual rice tax, the market 
in Osaka was a pivotal point for the fiscal health of the domain. Mitsugi set 
about eliminating the insecurity caused by the domain's dependence on the 
185 Asakura, page 59. 
144 
silver exchange in Osaka, by circumventing that stage in the process of 
procuring gold for Tsugaru's official outlays in Edo. 
The reformers sought to control currency circulation and exchange by 
all the people of Tsugaru, both within and beyond domain territory. Commerce 
within the domain was to rely chiefly on capital held by local merchants; limits 
were placed on the amount of cash that could be held by households without 
official permission, and the stipend inheritance law was revised to limit the 
domain's future obligations to pay retainers in cash. Exchange rates between 
gold and silver were pegged to those that applied in Edo, and all other market 
transactions involving money or rice were subject to approval by the 
Oshirabekata. A system of taxes levied in cash was applied on imports and 
purchases of some commercial products; and to slow the outflow of currency, 
increased taxes were imposed on transfers across the domain's borders. 186 
To compensate for inadequate amounts of cash within the domain itself, 
the currency system was adjusted to a silver standard and an internal 
exchange system put in place. The rates were set so that one monme of silver 
was worth sixty copper cash. For all official transactions, payments in the 
ports and in other places where domain cash was used, amounts were to be 
converted directly into cash at that rate. Officially designated merchant 
households were to run exchange agencies in the main centres: the Miyakawa 
in Hirosaki, the Takeuchi in Aomori, the Kikuya in Ajigasawa, and so on. 
During 1754, regulations were also issued forbidding commercial activity 
in the countryside, except for a few businesses permitted to sell sake, cotton 
and haberdashery, and the routine sale of necessities such as salt, miso and oil. 
Eventually, trade in cotton, for example, was limited to Motomachi in the 
Hirosaki downtown area, restricting opportunities for rural residents to outlay 
186 "Comprehensive memorandum on the circulation of gold, silver and copper money", SHS, pages 
640-644. The information on the regulation of exchange rates and licensed agents comes from 
the same source. 
145 
cash while greatly enhancing the position of the merchants licensed to handle 
it.187 
During the same year, arrangements were made for allowances that had 
been previously transferred in lump sums from Osaka to the Edo establishment 
to be sent directly from Hirosaki on a monthly basis. This money was 
"borrowed" from all the officials living in the nine port towns, who were from 
"meritorious families of good character". These stalwarts were obliged to 
make cash loans in return for domain rice coupons as security. Their 
contributions amounted to the value of some 46,144 kokuof rice, which was a 
demonstration that merchants appointed to these regional posts were able to 
meet considerable demands. 
An almost immediate result of this set of measures was an increase in 
the quantity of metal currency in the domain and a decrease in the amounts 
going out. Both the shift to sending remittances to Edo and the change to a 
silver standard made a difference. Merchants within the domain came into 
the possession of large quantities of rice through the receipt of rice coupons 
as payment for goods - in much the same way as merchants in Osaka did. They 
were able to sell this rice outside the domain at a significant profit. At this 
point it seems that Tsugaru was approaching a breakthrough in reaching a 
stable currency arrangement. The previous pattern of exchange and debt 
accumulation that routed capital from Hirosaki through the Osaka warehousing 
merchants and financiers to the Edo residences had been altered, to the 
benefit of Tsugaru's treasury and the domain merchants employed along the 
way. On the 10th day of the 9th month the finance office was able to send off 
800 ryoto Edo, in plenty of time to cover the domain's anticipated expenses 
there for the tenth month of 1755.188 
(v) Securing and augmenting income 
While powerful local commercial and landowning interests were being 
drawn into the net of centralized control and regulation, the vital role of the 
187 Documents 902 and 903, on page 632 of SHS. 
188 Asakura, pages 81-82. 
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honbyakusho, or land-owning farmers, was not ignored in the reforms. With 
the effects of the 1749 famine still being felt throughout the domain, urgent 
priority was given to keeping these farmers on their land. 
Takimoto Hisafumi has pointed out the rapid decline in the status of 
many of Tsugaru's village farmers between the Horeki and An'ei periods, 
demonstrating that without the kinds of policies Mitsugi was trying to 
implement, a fall in the number of small-scale independent farming households 
was inevitable. Takimoto traces a decline in three steps in the status of 
farmers after they had begun borrowing against their land. Landowners 
burdened by debt usually forfeited ownership of their land and became 
cultivators (EfM:) attached to the land, sometimes on fixed allowances. The 
next step was when the new landowner cut off their rights to income, but they 
were able to continue living and working on the land and raise their own food 
crops. This fate was also often suffered by junior members of large farming 
families, who had been split off from living and working as part of the main 
household. The status of these new households was takanashi(f'i!E~), for "no 
rice allowance". Finally, the family would be put off the land, and its head 
would be reduced to hiring himself as a day labourer. 
As well as attempting to maintain and strengthen the productive 
capacity of small-scall farmers, the reformers also made efforts to collect 
their surplus as efficiently as possible. This took the form of legal and 
bureaucratic regulation, financial controls and exhortation. In the eighth 
month of 1753, for example an exhortation was issued encouraging farmers to 
plant barley as a supplementary crop.189 
The process of calculating and collecting agricultural taxes was 
reorganised on the basis of data collected in the land surveys conducted early 
in the reform period. Firstly, the annual land tax due to be paid by every 
village was worked out. For each village a particular storehouse was then 
designated where the required number of straw bags of rice would be received 
and securely stored. This procedure of limiting each village to one assigned 
189 Hancho mkk1; quoted in Asakura, page 63. 
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storehouse seems not to have been practically accomplished for some time. In 
the 9th month of 1754, emergency instructions went out to kori bugyo(district 
magistrates) who were supposed to manage the receipt and storage of the 
harvest. Heavy snowfalls were preventing villagers from transporting rice to 
their assigned warehouses, and last-minute changes were to be made. 
New laws and ordinances were introduced like this continually, over a 
period of a nearly twelve months, after one major set announced by the four 
magistrates in the 8th month of 1754. They included such clauses as the 
following: 
•!• Tax payments in rice and annual cash payments or interest instalments 
outstanding from past years will all be cancelled. 
•!• Farmers are to 'inspect their fields and estimate yields, make their own 
adjustments, and then submit the figures to the daikan. 
•!• Labourers who go on foot or on horseback to work in mountain areas are 
to be paid in cash. 
There was also this warning on the payment of major tax instalments: 190 
•!• From now on, the total amount due is to be increased and the excess paid 
by the farmer. For those who neglect to comply, there will be no 
attention paid to inspection estimates, but a single adjustment will be 
made of an additional one quarter ryo. 
Then, in the first month of 1755: 
•!• Hereafter, no one whose own loan accounts are not settled is to receive 
any payments, or deliver his crop for storage or make any tax payments. 
Those whose obligations are very onerous should report their situation. 
And later, in the fifth month of the same year: 
•!• The taxation rate on fields with compulsory cash payments is to be 
lowered: from high to medium or low, and below that, to extra low. 
Policies such as this last one were needed to counteract the rapacity of 
some landowners and agents, whose diligence in collecting government revenues 
needed to be balanced with saimin, the protective care of the general populace 
190 These directives are in documents 918-921 on pages 640 - 47 in SHS. They include two very 
detailed memoranda on changes in the circulation and uses of money in the domain. 
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by an ideal government in the Confucian mould.191 With respect to the same tax 
collection procedures, though, some retainers who held fiefs with entitlements 
to rent in kind from their lands also needed extra consideration. 
The order of the 1st month of 1755, that tax payments could not be 
made by people with uncleared debts, can also be interpreted as direct support 
for merchants, even though it was supposed to be part of a strategy support 
the domain's honbyakusho. Scope was provided for the injection of capital into 
farming villages, and for lenders to have some control over farmers' financial 
activities. The domain was retreating from direct intervention in village 
affairs by central administrative personnel. Instead, official authority in rural 
districts was given to brokers who had a direct financial interest in keeping 
control over the borrowing and spending of village residents. 
Official appointments in rural areas increased dramatically between the 
twelfth month of 1754, when 64 purveyors were listed, and the end of 1755, 
when there were 137. There is little shift in the 27 in Hirosaki and the 22 in 
Aomori, but the increase of 85 in the countryside is dramatic, indicating a new 
emphasis on the sharing of privilege with "prominent rural persons".192 
Proofing the rural producers of the domain against the predations of 
commercialism, albeit by agents whose very livelihoods depended on it, was one 
of two important strategies for augmenting Tsugaru's commercial strength. 
The other was to encourage local production of saleable commodities, with a 
view to expanding the domain's export trade, which was heavily weighted 
towards resources such as timber, rice and marine products. It was intended 
that the manufacture and export of high-quality commercial goods would bring 
hard currency back into the domain and eventually make manufacturing 
industries in Tsugaru self-supporting. Marketing permits were also issued for 
the export of products whose sale outside the domain had previously been 
forbidden. They included ore from the domain's three sulphur mines, locally 
191 The effects of these efforts to stablise the management of the taxation system in rural 
areas are discussed on pages 683-686 of Goshogawara-shi shi. 
192 Documents 926 - 930 on pages 649-52 of SHS all relate to this process. 
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bred cattle, and the region's horses, which were so prized by military men of 
rank.193 Other established industries, such as the production of construction 
timber and Tsugaru-style lacquer ware, were encouraged to expand their 
outputs and explore new market possibilities. Finally, the domain introduced 
some new industries thought to have export potential. 
The principal new manufactures targeted were woven cotton textiles, 
sesame oil, medicines and indigo-dyed textiles. The purchase of six monme of 
ginned cotton (kuriwata) in Osaka, reported in the entry for the 4th day of the 
11th month of 1754 in the official domain diary, along with the "temporary 
employment of a cotton textile expert from Akita to teach everyone to weave 
cotton" clearly indicate the administration's determination to support the 
fledgling cotton weaving industry. 
Another entry during the same month reads: 
Starting next spring, sesame producing villages are directed to 
plant a surplus amount, so that it can be contracted out to an 
oi I manufacturer, who has undertaken to produce oi I equal in 
quality to what is sold on the Kyoto market. 194 
The same standards were to apply to cotton cloth and other Tsugaru 
manufactures, so that receipts from sales in the cities would increase and help 
defray current domain debt, while at the same the domain would build a sound · 
reputation for good quality exports. 
In the seventh month of 1754, and the first month of 1755, edicts 
encouraging the production of lacquer for commercial purposes were issued. 
Even though villages already producing lacquer had been exhorted in the past 
to increase their output, 'not a single additional tree had appeared', and this 
was 
in spite of official encouragement regarding concerted 
planting efforts and the indication of suitable places for 
lacquer plantations; as well as advice on raising small trees and 
the need to be careful about timing and growth stage when 
planting them out.195 
193 Documents 924 and 925 on page 649 of SHS. 
194 Honcho nikki entry for the 22"d day, 11th month, Horeki 4, cited by Asakura, page 88 .. 
195 Asakura, page 6 7. 
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The controlled placement of merchants with strong commercial 
interests and capital to invest in quasi-official positions in rural Tsugaru was 
consistent with all these efforts to further the domain's industrial production. 
(vi) Inculcating ethics and virtue 
Through the reform period, edicts, ideological formulations, practical 
intrusions, exhortations and role models were targeted at people from all walks 
of life throughout the domain. Among the undesirable attitudes and behaviour 
to be corrected were extravagance, reluctance to pay taxes, and neglect of 
occupational duties. One of the earliest notices in this vein concerned bush1: 
and is entered in the Satoke kion the 1st day of the ath in Horeki 3, two weeks 
earlier than the date of the memorandum announcing the new Oshirabekata 
reproduced in the Shinpen Hirosakishi shi document volume. The names of 
Mondo, Ariemon and Mitsugi all appear on it. 
Notice of a change in policy. Retainers in the towns are 
reverting to their old ways. Even when they are on official 
duty, in every matter the old attitudes and values and rivalries 
come back into play. Furthermore, during the time while our 
young daimyo has been growing up in Edo, retainers in the kuni 
have become lazy and degenerate: and furthermore, they are 
nearly all in disgraceful trouble with debt. It is our intention 
to rectify this situation.196 
With the investiture of Nobuyasu as daimyo by the shogun scheduled 
for later in the year, the reform faction was clearly feeling pressured about 
having the domain in good functioning order before the young daimyo arrived in 
Hirosaki to be installed as head of Tsugaru's government. When their 
attention turned to the countryside, priority was given to removing the 
seductions of commerce that were associated with extravagant displays of 
consumption in dress, diet and housing. A regulation issued in the 1st month of 
Horeki 4 prohibited indulgence in inappropriate refinements throughout rural 
Tsugaru.197 Strict limitations were also placed on the sources of temptation by 
the elimination of most marketing activities, and in a stronger memorandum of 
196 Satoke kiin TRK, pages 206-7. 
197 Document 902 on page 632 of SHS. Kudoke kiin TRK, page 207. 
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the 2nd month of 1755, people were forbidden to sell tea or cut hair, to thatch 
roofs or hire themselves out as carpenters without written authorisation.198 
The role of shrines and temples in the political economy of the domain 
was threefold: to unite the people in a common awareness of their duties to 
each other and to their polity; to unceasingly offer prayers for peace and 
prosperity in the domain while properly observing the calendar of religious 
observances; and to keep their own accounts and records up to date and in 
proper order. A notice circulated to all the temples and shrines registered in 
the domain on the 28th day of the 5th month of Horeki 4 (1754) reads: 
Of all the administrative matters throughout the realm, there 
is none that takes precedence over caring for the people, no 
matter who they are or of what station. There is no better 
means of caring for the people than by providing them with 
sustenance. Even though human powers cannot prevent 
natural calamities, you can certainly pray for unity and 
tranquillity among the people ... from dawn until dusk, be 
absorbed in your prayers so that you forget your meal. Pray 
for the kum; pray for our ruler. It is your duty to pray 
unceasingly, without losing concentration for these things ... 199 
In town, merchants were to give up using the family names they had 
adopted and ref er to themselves only by the names of their businesses. 
Individuals were exhorted to behave in decent and helpful ways towards their 
fellows, and to report exemplary examples of pious and filial behaviour.200 
From the 2nd month of Horeki 4, more and more individuals considered to be 
mystics or "loyal and devoted persons" were singled out in Tsugaru's towns for 
official praise and rewards. A Mother Go, for example, who daily "bestowed 
her care and compassion upon others", was judged to be commendably 
benevolent. A farmer who reported a strange shadow on one of his fields was 
granted a ten-year suspension of his tax payments, because it was considered 
so mysterious. Other farmers who also had shady fields protested against the 
wastefulness involved, and volunteered to contribute the tax.201 
198 Document 923 on page 648. 
199 Document 914 on page 638 of SHS. 
200 Umeda nikki entry in TRK. page 207. 
201 Asakura citing Han nikki, pages 96-97. 
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So it was, that the hapless farmers and labourers who bore the brunt 
of the burden caused by Tsugaru's financial woes were rewarded with adequate, 
though by no means bountiful, sustenance, shelter and infrastructure, while 
being bombarded constantly with exhortations to improve various aspects of 
their personal, social and communal lives for the good of the realm. Many of 
the changes in financial administration were expedited by the creation of a 
new stratum of financiers, particularly in areas outside the urban centres of 
Hirosaki and Aomori, where they added to the intrusions and pressures on 
farmers' lives. What had hitherto been a process of directly appropriating the 
rural surplus in kind had been transformed into more convoluted sequences of 
borrowing and lending, producing and collecting, purchasing and financing, all 
mediated by merchant financiers. The final destinations of as much wealth as 
could be commandeered were the domain's treasury and granaries, and 
discretion over its disposal entirely in the hands of Oshirabekata officials. The 
end result after nearly three years was that, in effect, the entire domain was 
governed from this bureau, and what remained of the original administrative 
structure continued to exist in name only. 
II Facing the famine: tightening the net 
In the 9th month of Horeki 5, the domain's harvest was officially 
declared a failure, caused by continual summer rain, low temperatures and two 
frosts in the gth month. Even in normally hardy fields, the rice stalks had 
withered. In a notification to the bakufu, the situation was described 
succinctly 
Notification of loss: out of our formal investiture of 47,000 
koku, 280 koku has been lost. We harvested 2,620 koku out of 
an expected harvest of 32,150 koku in the old lands, and lost 
over 161,130 kokuout of an anticipated total of 196,353 koku 
from the new fields. 202 
To add to the distress of the domain's treasury, plans were being made 
for the new daimyo to arrive from Edo to be installed in the castle in the 5th 
month of Horeki 6. In the event, he was accompanied on his journey back to 
202 Kudoke k1~ in TRK, page 209. 
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Hirosaki by the elder, Tsugaru Mondo, the steward, Monai Ariemon, and the 
newly appointed overseer, Nyui Ichirozaemon (Mitsugi): the three chief 
administrators presiding over the reforms.203 This is one indication of the 
scarcity of domain officials capable of carrying out responsible tasks during 
the 1750's. Evidence of the immense expense of domain ceremonial is also 
found in the report that from the 26th day of the 5th month until the 5th day of 
the 6th month, 6,340 members of staff were involved in the feasting and 
entertainments, which included Noh performances, presented for the daimyo, 
his family members and entire entourage.204 
(i) Attending to the immediate crisis 
The Satoke ki entry for the 15th day of the 11th month records that an 
inspection was undertaken of the storehouses of all rural households previously 
been registered as well off. Food supplies calculated to be surplus to their 
needs were appropriated by the domain and redistributed to the poor and 
needy. Merchants were prohibited from buying or selling food grains without 
permission. As a result, according to our scribe, even though the harvest was 
less than half that of 1749, hungry people did not appear in great numbers, and 
not a single person died of starvation.205 
The stipends of retainers, which had only just been restored to their 
real value, once again became subject to "borrowing" by the treasury. Later, in 
the 6th month of Horeki 6, all jikata chigyofiefs were converted to granary 
stipends, at the rate of sixty percent of the formal investiture. Stipends paid 
on investitures made in the years before 1711 were all to be converted to 
okura1ri(stipends paid in rice from the domain treasury), and those that had 
been watashikata (handed straight to the fief-holder in annual amounts) were 
to become okurawatash1: (paid in regular instalments from the domain 
granaries). "Lands granted retainers as fiefs", the notice concluded, "can turn 
203 Kudoke k1; in TRK, page 210. 
204 Satoke ki, in TRK, page 210. 
205 Satoke ki, in TKD, page 229. 
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out to be good or bad, and this should not result in advantage and disadvantage. 
Please register the amounts of any losses you suffer."206 
This announcement indicates that Mitsugi was taking advantage of 
harvest failure to move towards transforming the nature of retainer 
remuneration. Many investitures had originally been in the form of rights to 
exact taxes directly from the yields of particular areas of farmland. When 
those who lived on their own fiefs Uikata chigyO) could not collect adequate 
rice allowances because of poor harvests, they could be shifted to periodic 
salary payments administered by treasury and granary officials. The first step 
was for the domain itself to collect agricultural taxes, then distribute 
allowances due to retainers at their invested amounts from its granaries and 
treasury. Even though they were already being paid in this way, and had moved 
to live and work in urban areas, however, some retainers still retained direct 
links with the lands and people in their fiefs. 
The domain waived all the agricultural tax obligations of farmers, and 
Mitsugi announced a general amnesty on debts held inside Tsugaru that were of 
more than ten years' standing. The government was also to take responsibility 
for any private loans contracted with lenders outside Tsugaru that were still 
outstanding.207 Eventually, an appeal for relief rice to augment food supplies 
was sent to the bakufu on the 13th day of the 3rd month in 1756, along with the 
details of the harvest failure quoted above.208 
(ii) Mitsugi alone at the helm 
Mitsugi's appointment to an administrative post created specifically for 
him was announced from Edo on the 23rd day of the 12th month of Horeki 5. He 
was to take up the position at the beginning of the following year. His new 
title was motosh1: or overseer, and it was granted in conjunction with a 
promotion to the quasi-military status of steward. The new office was created 
in response to the Horeki emergency, and no further appointments were ever 
206 Kudoke ki, in TRK, page 210. 
207 I f!lf~~~J.liJ=f§nX:f~:lji: J Tsugaru henran nikk1~ inSHS, page 659. 
208 Monai Ariemon hikki, in TRK, page 210. 
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made after Nyui's dismissal two years later. Nothing like it seems to have 
been done before. The authority associated with announcing the position, 
asking for policy suggestions to be submitted, and then vetting the candidates 
was said to have been Lord Nobumasa, the young daimyo himself. It should be 
noted that Mitsugi's most congenial colleague, Tsugaru Mondo, was with 
Nobumasa in Edo at the time. 
From the amount of comment preserved in various records, it can be 
concluded that this was regarded as an unusual, and not entirely welcome, 
development. There seems to have been a significant degree of controversy 
over the appointment from the start. "Notwithstanding his personality, great 
results are expected of him", for example, cannot by any means be read as an 
'( 
unconditional endorsement of the chosen candidate.209 Further evidence of 
division in the administrative ranks is that although Ariemon was promoted to 
the rank of karo at the same time, he declined the appointment. This is the 
first obvious sign that factions had begun to coalesce around Ariemon on one 
side, and Mitsugi and Mondo on the other. The impression is reinforced by the 
observation that although he rejected this prestigious appointment on account 
of illness, Ariemon remained inside the castle even after the new daimyo, 
Nobuyasu, had been formally installed. Ariemon's retirement from office was 
not formally recognised until the 12th month of Horeki 6.210 
His withdrawal left authority over the entire reform program, already 
consolidated in the Oshirabekata yakusho, now concentrated in the single 
person of NyUi Mitsugi. All petition documents, for example, were to be 
submitted to him, and all appointments to the Oshirabekata yakusho made by 
him. He was to have purview over officially contracted merchants and freight 
agents with responsibility for handling the domain's rice, silver, gold and cash 
and stipend allowances. Later, they were also to manage the hyofu(exchange 
coupons) system from the unso yaku (distribution bureau) under his supervision. 
209 r;t;t;·t!tJf~=::g-::f:f§f.i.J~::k::ZJJX:;JJ.a-1Jll.Ef!rBJ Hanchonikkientry for 14th day, 1st month, Horeki 6, 
quoted in Asakura, page 107. 
210 Extracts from Satoke ki, Takaokaki, Monai yuisho, in TKD, pages 221-222. 
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Further afield, the motoshiwas to have direct authority over daikan 
and village group headmen in the countryside, as well as timber cutters and 
other workers in upland and mountain areas.211 All in all, this was an ideal 
position from which to hasten the process of creating an economy less 
vulnerable to outside prices and cash flows, and eventually self-sufficient 
enough to participate in commodity markets. 
(iii) Issuing the hyofu 
Mitsugi's next move was to organise the collection and then 
redistribution of all material resources and other goods throughout the entire 
domain, using data collected in surveys and inspections. The goal was to ensure 
that the basic needs of all Tsugaru's people were met at a level that that 
enabled each of them to function at a conscientious and effective level in his 
or her own particular domiciliary and occupational circumstances. All items of 
market value in the possession of every household in the domain were gathered 
into predetermined collection points. This clean sweep included not only gold, 
silver, rice, cash money and commercial goods, but daily necessities, household 
utensils and farm implements as well. 
Under the supervision of the official merchant, Ashibane Jirosaburo, 
everything collected was taken into supervised care by the domain's bureau of 
statistics, and detailed inventories were made. Produce and commercial goods 
where temporarily stored in the domain's official warehouses. Meanwhile, all 
merchant households were required to submit for each of their enterprises 
and residences a meticulously detailed business statement. The entire stock 
of collected material goods was then divided between selected merchants, 
according to their status and specialisation. Everything was to be 
redistributed, item by item, to households in the domain according to the 
number of persons they contained and the requirements of those persons to 
sustain a basic livelihood at their occupational status level. 
211 Documents 931 - 933, on pages 654-55 of SHS. 
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This drastically thorough redistribution of goods and equipment was 
based on a set of complex calculations done by Mitsugi himself.212 He worked 
out the needs of individual people based on their gender, age and occupation, 
and the lifestyle and obligations appropriate to them; then applied those 
indices to statistics gathered on population and material goods in the surveys 
he had instigated over the years since at least Horeki 3. These surveys had 
been both detailed and intrusive. One made in Horeki 5, of bushihousing in 
Hirosaki, required numbers of rooms and their floor areas for all structures, 
as well as detailed plans of properties, giving compass directions, boundary 
neighbours and the types and dimensions of all buildings on them. In Horeki 6 
another survey covered all the domain's urban settlements, machiby mach1: and 
even included temples and shrines.213 
The means used to carry out the redistribution were booklets of 
coupons, called hyofu, which were essentially ration coupons for a variety of 
goods. A small number, for partial payouts of domain rice, were issued on the 
29th day of the 10th month, and after the end of that month individuals were 
able to submit the coupons to granary officials, one by one, in exchange for 
rice. The hyofu issued to retainers were a kind of kome kitte (rice promissory 
note) secured by the grain held in domain granaries; but they could be used as 
well as exchange for other foodstuffs and commodities. In contrast, those 
used by the general populace were dakan-nashi That is, they were not 
assigned particular values in rice or silver that could be exchanged for goods 
of equivalent value. Instead, they contained entries marked with official seals, 
recording the number of persons in the household and their requirements for 
particular items, food and other resources. These goods were to be provided 
by the merchants specified to handle each commodity. Before any exchange 
could be completed a store's accountant and packager had to mark the client's 
212 NMZ 2, "Setsuyo soku", pages 259-266. 
213 Hasegawa Sei'ichi, "£MWJ5.l.M~r, lllT::IJ~lt~bbl:'.:-".)v"·(" (Registers of residences in the 
Hirosaki downtown and urban areas during the Horeki period), Tsugaru kinsei shiryo ,3. Tsugaru 
kinsei shiryo kankokai hensho, Hirosaki: Hokubo shinsha, 1986. 
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coupons to show how many individual rations of the item had been claimed and 
provided. Only then could the goods be handed over by the clerk.214 
People were obliged to follow this procedure in order to obtain even the 
simplest necessities of life, while at the same time food was still quite short, 
and most of the population was living at the most basic level. In contrast, 
merchant enterprises acting as agents received ten percent prof it on the value 
of all transactions. Anything further was profit for the domain. Merchants 
were thus prevented from generating profits through their own contacts and 
acumen: they simply reaped the benefit of sharing out survival rations and 
essential goods to the people at large. The wealth of the domain was to pass 
through its treasury and granaries under the eye of the motosh1: and 
merchants were merely the instruments for achieving its redistribution. 
The cumbersome nature of the processes involved, the enrichment of 
participating merchants, and the resentment of at least one individual, are 
made clear in a bitterly critical extract from the Takaokaki included in the 
Tsugaru kyDki denrui section on Nyui Mitsugi's life. It is paraphrased on pages 
63 and 64 in Chapter One, section III (ii). 
To underpin the value of hyofu, Mitsugi and his colleagues kept control 
over hard currency, which was used as the medium of exchange for officially 
supervised transactions, mostly outside the domain, such as the remittances 
sent off regularly to Edo. The ambivalent nature of metal specie in the early 
eighteenth century as still partly commodity and partly medium of exchange 
makes this an interesting division, since hansatsu were often issued by domains 
with the intention of making them the sole medium of exchange locally, without 
the backing of precious metal coinage. Mitsugi therefore did not apply to the 
bakufu for approval of his hyofu issue, because they were regarded as tokens 
to be substituted directly for goods rather than functioning as domain 
currency. 
214 TKD, pages 226-27. 
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With money and precious metals being held in the domain treasury, and 
the exchange of goods completely restricted to the use of hyofu in specified 
merchant houses, Tsugaru's population was effectively cut off from commercial 
activity of any kind. Only retainer officials and privileged merchants had any 
involvement with managing the circulation and distribution of commodities, 
both inside and outside t_he domain. Thus, the effects of the development of a 
money economy in the urban market centres, felt in Tsugaru since the turn of 
the century, were to be checked at the boundaries of the domain: the 
barricades were erected, in the hope that the local economy would convalesce 
and develop a degree of robustness that would enable it to re-enter the wider 
marketplace. 
Immediately after the hyofu were issued, there were adequate supplies 
in local stores, and goods were easily obtained, but as time passed "everyone 
was bothered because when they went out shopping, the clerks would ignore 
them", and "no-one treated them with any consideration".215 In Hirosaki, the 
miso, and oil shops were all very low in stock, and therefore people would 
appear at the crack of dawn, scrambling with one another to run from store to 
store. Retainers and townspeople suffered, according to one contemporary 
comment, "as much distress as a harvest failure would cause".216 Some 
members of the merchant fraternity, who could not make the profits they 
desired inside the domain, arranged transactions and carried on their business 
outside its borders, leading to shortages within Tsugaru. 
There is not enough evidence for any conclusions to be drawn about the 
reasons for this extreme turn towards state control over the economy. There 
seems to be no reason for thinking that it was planned from the start. Perhaps 
Mitsugi was inspired by the success of his food redistribution, or perhaps it 
was a desperate attempt to cure Tsugaru's persistent, and worsening, economic 
ills. Writers of household diaries were more taken up with the day-to-day 
215 Document 940, on pages 664-666 in SHS. 
216 Loe.cit. 
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effects of the reforms, and the official records do not as a rule contain 
anything as lengthy as policy discussions. 
In his writings, though, Mitsugi clearly expressed two important 
convictions that were given practical expression during his period of active 
participation in Tsugaru's administrative affairs. The first was the need for 
leaders to take positive action to improve the situation in their domain. If 
they were pusillanimous and refused to take the risks entailed with bold 
decision-making and interventions, concentrating instead on self-cultivation or 
busily wringing their hands in a show of concern, then that was a serious 
dereliction of duty. The other was the importance of the population at large to 
the wealth and survival of the polity. If people were harshly treated by 
authorities, or left to fend for themselves in times of hardship, they would end 
up fleeing their villages or starving to death. Since the entire domain 
depended for its continued existence on farms and workshops being able to 
maintain and increase their outputs, it was imperative for the administration to 
ensure that the people had sufficient means of production and an adequate 
livelihood.217 
III The net unravelling 
A year-long tussle developed in Edo during the latter half of Horeki 7 
over the allegedly chaotic situation in Tsugaru among a number of influential 
figures connected with the domain. A detailed account appears on pages 64-6 7 
in Chapter One. The principals involved were: the daimyo, Tsugaru Nobuyasu, 
who was in the capital fulfilling his sankin kotai obligations; Matsudaira 
Tadatsune, a bakufu official serving at Edo castle, who had been Nobuyasu's 
patron and childhood guardian; Tsugaru Mondo, who was in the capital with the 
daimyo; and Mitsugi, who was meanwhile travelling between Edo, Hirosaki and 
Kyoto attending to domain matters. In the end, Tadatsune prevailed and 
217 The two works in which these ideas about administration are most clearly expressed are 
"Gochuron" (.Ii.EE.~) and "Shigaku yoben" (Jit;~#J#). "Gochuron" and three makiof "Shigaku 
Yoben" are reproduced in SHS, pages 719-809. 
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Mitsugi was dismissed and put under house arrest in the third month of Horeki 
8, as recorded in the records paraphrased in Chapter One, section III (ii). 
Meanwhile, in Hirosaki disintegration in the hyofu system was 
accelerated by rumours about the Ashibane men. They were accused of 
working with a covey of associates to profit privately by printing and 
distributing conterfeit hyofu. As the account in Chapter Once indicates, 
Mitsugi himself was reported to have arrived back in Hirosaki on the 12th day 
of the 6th month and begun investigations, but the system was not formally 
abolished until the 29th day of the 6th month, when Ashibane Jirosaburo was 
arrested and the domain ceased issuing hyofu.218 
Jirosaburo had been in charge of both issuing and distributing the 
hyofu, and had brought into the organisational structure he managed a number 
of merchants who were new to official duties. Only those who were given 
supervisory roles had previously had any experience as official purveyors or 
freight managers. Many of the new recruits were rural merchants, and a 
number were the sons and younger brothers of the older generation of 
privileged merchants. The implementation of the scheme had therefore, 
perhaps unwittingly, been put in the hands of a whole new stratum of younger 
profiteers, with no experience of official service. 
From the available evidence, it seems that the hyofu system fell apart 
very quickly, apparently because of the lack of administrative supervision over 
the merchants. No procedures appear to have been put in place to ensure 
transparency and accountability in their activities. In any case, the use of 
hyofuas a medium of exchange worked directly against profit maximisation 
and would not have been congenial with the entrepreneurial instincts of 
ambitious merchants. It was unlikely, therefore, that they would be eager to 
remove obstacles to the smooth functioning of the new system. 
During the 7th month, rice allowances were distributed to retainers, 
another debt amnesty was announced, and the gold, silver and other valuables 
218 Ibid. Document 944 on pages 668-6 70. 
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that had been collected from people throughout the domain were handed back 
to them.219 On the 20th day, a notice was addressed to retainers and temples 
and shrines holding country-based fiefs directing them to return to dealing 
directly with the cultivators on their lands. They were warned, however, that 
at this time especially, farmers are to be treated in such a way 
as to avoid suffering and hardship over such things as 
collection of levies. If farmers are treated improperly in any 
way whatsoever, the law stipulates that your stipend will be 
converted to okurairi in perpetuity. 
Another memorandum sent out on the same day, to be communicated to all 
farmers in the domain, read as follows: 
On the lands of all persons receiving income from investitures, 
if there is any inappropriate behaviour towards farmers, or 
they are driven to destitution by levy extractions, this should 
be reported to the daikan through the village group head, and 
after investigation the investiture of the offender will be 
terminated. 
And, on the 25th day, 
Tax rice payments made by retainers to the treasury have up 
until now been handled by the individuals concerned, but if 
payment is not submitted by the determined date, the 
investiture will be ordered converted to an okurairi stipend in 
perpetuity and all independent cultivators, farmers, field and 
mountain labourers will be removed from the jurisdiction of 
the fief holder and put under the authority of the domain 
treasury, according to the law.220 
It is possible to read from these warnings an indication that the move away 
from jikata ch~yohad not been at all popular among the landed fief holders, 
since threats of other forms of investiture were regarded as deterrents. 
Merchants, too, were eager to return to their old ways of doing things. 
After the punishment of the Ashibane family, as a group they expressed the 
wish to withdraw from the prominent role that had been thrust upon them. On 
the 25th day of the 7th month of Horeki 7, they petitioned saying: 
219 Extract from Takaokaki, on pages 233-34 in TKD. 
220 Documents 948 and 949, from the Koku nikki, on pages 671-73 in SHS. Extract from Satoke 
kiin TRK, page 212. This extract ends with the comment that all the new ways were being 
abolished. 
We, who have for generations always handled the business of 
your land have always been of a lower class. We are 
overwhelmed with shame, and humbly request that our titles 
be changed back from "respected purveyor to the domain" to 
"official merchant and freight agent". 
This request was rejected, and a number of leading merchants were instead 
appointed as managers in the finance office. 221 
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In their previous posts, they had been constrained as a commercial class, 
but at this stage they were not only being appeased but being placed in 
positions of considerable influence and responsibility. Another measure that 
favoured commerce was the cancellation of the general debt amnesty; and yet 
another was an official increase in the interest rates on loans being negotiated 
for the financing of a purchase of two thousand bales of old rice for sake 
production. Finally, in the 10th month, the domain returned to circulating 
standard currency, the actual stuff of commercial profit. 
In the 7th month, before the year's harvest was gathered, a warning 
was issued that a new three-year compulsory loan was to be imposed on 
retainers' stipends. Those with stipends over one hundred koku, one hundred 
and fifty hyo, or fifteen ryowere to forego one third of their allowances. For 
those serving in Edo, the rate was one quarter. Stipends over fifty koku, one 
hundred hyo, or ten ryo, were levied at one quarter (one fifth in Edo), and 
those of over 35.50 koku, or seven ryo, at one fifth (one sixth). In addition, a 
compulsory loan of up to one quarter was to be levied on all merchant 
enterprises in proportion to the total amount of rice they handled.222 Also in 
time for the harvest, tedai (clerks) who had been appointed functionaries of 
the Oshirabekata were returned to their original status as village group 
headmen. The village group heads, however, continued on in their posts, though 
their paid stipends were reduced to "thirty koku of the harvest" for each of 
them.223 
221 Hirayama Nikki. 
222 TRK, page 212. 
223 Tsugaru henran nikki, 9th month. Kaku nikki, 6th day 10th month. Documents 960 and 961 on 
pages 677-78 of SHS. 
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Mitsugi seems to have set off for Edo again as soon as possible after 
the harvest business was over in Horeki 7, and he remained in his post as 
motoshithe spring of 1758. After his dismissal and disgrace, the power that 
had been concentrated in his position was fragmented and weakened. Any 
regulations that used to be enforced on his authority alone, like the three 
mentioned above from the 20th and 25th days of the 7th month dealing with tax 
rice payments, the treatment of farmers and extraction of stipends, now had 
to be handled by the remaining karo and yonin (elders and stewards). 
From Horeki 8 onwards, the merchants of the domain began to draw 
back from the front line of administrative matters, but the village group 
headman remained as an integral part of rural political culture. Through them, 
the representation and authority of influential farmers was strengthened. 
Even after the reforms had disintegrated, the domain continued to carry out 
the practical business of collecting harvest taxes through arrangements and 
connections made between village group headmen. 
Village commercial agents, however, lost their functions as the domain 
moved back towards a system of direct appropriation. Their place completely 
disappeared with the Kansei reform bushi dochakuruling that urban-dwelling 
retainers should return to the countryside and resettle on deserted lands. 
These bushiwere to become actively involved in agricultural life and draw their 
income directly from the land, thus bypassing the distribution of stipendiary 
grain allowances by agents. 
Resort to the bushi dochaku measure always appears to be a move in the 
direction of conservatism and stability, on the principle that if retainers 
directly managed the land, it would improve their morale and ethics. They 
would be guaranteed rent and develop interdependent and binding relations 
with the farmers who contributed their labour. After the Tenmei famine 
(1782-87), however, there was a dramatic increase in the number of ownerless 
and deserted fields in Tsugaru; and, many of the people who had been saved by 
Mitsugi's radical policies were dead. 
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IV Patterns of reform 
(i) Regional diversions 
Tsugaru was unusual among Tohoku domains in undertaking reforms 
during the middle of the eighteenth century. Some larger neighbours - Nanbu, 
Sendai and Kubota - had been among the ten or so domains engaging in reform 
some decades earlier, around the time of the bakufu's Kyoho reforms. During 
the 1750's and 60's, only six domains in the eastern regions, compared with 
twenty in the west, instituted changes significant enough to have been 
recorded as reforms. 
By the Horeki period, most domains had experienced serious fiscal 
difficulty, and Tsugaru was by no means alone in having accumulated crippling 
debts over many decades. Another problem, particularly in the east and not 
unrelated to domain debt, was that successive famines had left rural areas 
with seriously depleted populations and growing numbers of neglected fields. 
This jeopardised official income in agricultural taxes, and made financial 
planning for economic expansion impossible. Also associated with the 
aftermath of famine were food shortages, rising taxation rates and disruptions 
to administrative practices. These conditions combined to undermine morale, 
as well as law and order. Reformers responded by focussing attention on 
spiritual, ideological and educational matters. 
Climatic conditions in Tohoku seemed perennially to require that efforts 
be made to expand, or sustain, or recover rice production levels. The hope 
during the eighteenth century in Tsugaru seems to have been, at least 
temporarily, that once income from the agricultural tax had stabilised, 
production of commercial commodities and participation in the wider market 
economy could be developed and supported. One way of coping with the 
domain's unreliable rates of productivity was initially to involve the government 
in commercial capital investment so that the resulting prof its could be applied 
to making the domain's economy strong enough to withstand pressures from 
outside. 
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Other Tohoku domains adopted a variety of reform strategies. Some 
tended to preserve the old principles of collecting agricultural taxes. In 
Sendai, for example, reforms around 1780 were based on a system of fiefs 
that continued to be directly managed by retainers in the countryside. In 
effect, this turned out to be the supervision by bushi of honbyakusho 
(landholding cultivators) who used the labour of indentured landless peasants 
to cultivate lands that were increasingly in pawn. In this arrangement, 
expropriation by the domain of the rural surplus was facilitated by its 
retainers. They had access to a supply of indentured labour as well as the 
agricultural expertise and management skills of the honbyakusho, who were 
ever more likely to be burdened by debt and lose their farms to creditors. 
The Satake (Akita) domain strategy was different again. There, the 
government instituted a domain monopoly on selling rice, and at the same time 
sought to insulate the economy from external conditions by issuing domain 
currency in the form of silver certificates.*# In contrast to both Akita and 
Date policies, a succession of reforms in Yonezawa, during the period from the 
Horeki through the Tenmei era (1751-89), achieved successful outcomes when 
links were deliberately forged by domain authorities with major farming and 
merchant families. 
The ongoing economic challenge through this period in Tohoku was to 
preserve agricultural labour strength in villages while at the same time 
encouraging the production of commercial commodities. In a region that had 
been developed to concentrate on rice as a single crop, it was difficult to draw 
adequate labour power to agricultural villages when the natural flow was away 
to other regions and jobs in commercial and craft enterprises. Some domains 
encouraged small-scale industries in rural villages to halt the breakdown of 
farming communities and limit the predatory activities of urban merchants. In 
Tsugaru - and at bakufu level as well - value had always been given by some 
thinkers to farming and rice production not only for the wholesomeness of 
rural life, the possibilities of food self-sufficiency and increased tax 
remissions, but also as a source of capital accumulation in the economy. 
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In western and southern domains, by this time the economic emphasis 
had begun to shift towards the development of specialised export industries. 
Tokushima, for example, was so heavily committed to the production of 
commercial goods that the domain actually imported rice for daily consumption. 
Crops such as cotton, tobacco and indigo; handicraft manufactures like lacquer 
ware, metalwork and textiles; and food products like soy sauce and miso were 
all beginning to appear as regional specialties in inter-domain markets.224 To 
bring together the management skills, expertise and capital required for these 
commercial enterprises, links were forged between domain officials, merchants 
and wealthy farmers. This process, too, led to resentment and unrest among 
social and occupational groups excluded from the new wealth-generating 
structures. Along with domain debt, popular uprisings were a common 
phenomenon. A number of domains, both east and west reacted by revising 
rules and penalties to regulate public behaviour. 
Reform programs, therefore, were devised to address particular 
constellations of problems, determined by the size and location of the domains 
involved. Yoshinaga remarks that by the eighteenth century a number of 
measures that belonged to the seventeenth century period when domains were 
being established had faded away altogether from reform agendas. These 
included land surveys, developing new fields, and the conversion of landed 
investiture systems to those involving stipends distributed from central 
granaries and treasuries. 225 The Tsugaru and Date cases, where jikata chigyo 
fiefs remained an integral part of the domain political economy, demonstrate 
that this general observation is not universally applicable. 
(ii) The Tsugaru trajectory 
In Tsugaru at the time of the Horeki crisis, both the choice of reform 
measures and the pool of leadership talent were limited. There was no reason 
to expect that agricultural productivity could be increased beyond the levels 
224 A discussion of eighteenth century regional commodity specialization can be found in Shinbo 
Hiroshi and Hasegawa Akira, • Shohin seisan ryutsu no dainamikksun, Chapter 5 in Hayami Akira 
and Miyamoto Matao (eds.), Nihon keizai shi, Vol. 1. 
225 Kokushi daijiten, vol. 11, page 788. 
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already reached. Regular harvest failures and intermittent famines had left 
farming villages with diminished populations and deserted fields. Any attempt 
by the domain to raise its already high taxation rates would only have led to 
more desertions. 
In any case, harvests and income from the agricultural tax were always 
going to be subject to the vagaries of the region's climate, which at this time 
was only marginally suited to large-scale rice cultivation, and would not support 
the production on a commercial scale of crops which had proved successful as 
prof it-generating exports elsewhere. Income from construction timber and 
seasonal marine produce, the domain's most significant trading commodities 
other than rice, had already reached a peak in the late seventeenth century. 
In those conditions, the effect of further commercial activity in a 
situation of this kind would have been to drain precious specie out of the 
domain with little or no hope of reciprocal gains. With its official debt already 
close to overwhelming, as a polity, Tsugaru could only try to minimise 
expenditure, raise productivity levels and use every means available to 
accumulate cash currency in the domain's treasury until the arrears were paid 
off. Priority had to be given to keeping owner-cultivators secure on their 
farmland. If industries with commercial potential could be fostered in the 
meanwhile, there was a chance that the domain could be safely exposed to the 
market networks expanding from wealthier regions. 
In terms of leadership, there were two unfavourable conditions for the 
implementation of Tsugaru's Horeki reform program. They were: Nobuaki's 
premature death and the arrival of his successor in Hirosaki late in the 5th 
month of 1756, when the domain was still reeling from the 1755 harvest 
failure; and the very small pool of domain elders involved in central domain 
policy formation. The lack of experienced middle and high-level bureaucrats 
was very likely the reason for Tsugaru Mondo's making requests for policy 
suggestions to all the domain's retainers, regardless of rank. 
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During the period of Nobuyasu's minority, the senior elder, Munakata 
Sakuyuemon, is said to have worked himself to death trying to address the 
social and economic effects of the 1749 harvest failure and resultant 
famine.226 Tsugaru Mondo was Sakuyuemon's successor, and a familiar of Nyai 
Mitsugi's. Mitsugi entered the elite political leadership party after regaling 
Mondo with suggestions and observations on the state of the polity. Mondo 
was said to be agreeably impressed by his perceptive ideas, and Mitsugi was 
catapulted into a senior post where his stipend of 1.000 koku was equal to that 
of Arai Hakuseki, advisor to two shoguns in Edo earlier in the century.227 
Mitsugi's capacity to keep producing ideas and policy measures seems not to 
have waned at all during the five years he was in charge of the finances and 
administration of the domain. 
Mondo, Monai Ariemon and Mitsugi were therefore the three key 
figures responsible for designing and implementing the reforms. While 
Ariemon's integrity and Mitsugi's ingenuity were widely acknowledged in 
Hirosaki, acceptance of the reforms in the early stages undoubtedly depended 
on Mondo's authority as well. The measures implemented before the end of 
1753 were aimed at streamlining the domain's top administrative structures, 
clarifying chains of command and accountability, and setting up an accurate, 
transparent accounting system. Policies were based on data gathered in 
comprehensive initial surveys of the domain and the new bureaucratic order 
put in place, consolidating power in the off ices of the kanjo bugyo (finance 
magistrates) and the general inspector who headed the Oshirabekata, a new 
bureau of investigation. 
From the beginning of 1754 onwards, Mitsugi made a sequence of 
orderly decisions. One of them, the temporary stop on gold remittances to 
Edo was one of the earliest and most significant changes in the way the domain 
spent its income. This was an important move in the direction of treating the 
226 rtt:::JJfF:tlwrr~~15' l..,-C~a-~ \...,, Jl:~=~t+*~f~ l..,-Cfr9~it I:? J Takaokaki, in TKD, page 
225. The account of Mitsugi's submissions to Mondo appears later in the same passage. 
227 Bolitho points out that this was not a very high allowance by Edo standards. Review of Nakai, 
Shogunal Politics. 
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domain's financial affairs as an integrated whole, rather than as three or more 
disconnected systems. Outlays to Eda were the domain's biggest single 
expense, and lack of information about rice prices and gold-silver exchange 
rates prevented proper budgets being kept in Hirosaki and exacerbated the 
tendency to borrow in both Osaka and Eda. 
Steps were then taken to articulate the political and economic 
administrative organs in other urban centres and the countryside with those 
functioning in Hirosaki. As well, significant cuts were made in cash and grain 
outlays on allowances for official functionaries whose tasks often existed only 
on the account legers; and agricultural tax income boosted by the streamlining 
and regulation of collection and recording procedures. 
At this stage, while priority was being given to the parlous state of the 
treasury, Mitsugi seems to have been laying the groundwork for more radical 
reform, by making moves to strengthen the esprit de corps of the retainers 
and boosting the general morale of the domain so that the changes he planned 
would be less disruptive. As was the case in numerous other domains, such 
attempts to codify and impose acceptable attitudes and behaviour anticipated 
the establishment of an official domain school. The domain school was founded 
during Tsugaru's next reform period, in the Kansei era (1789 - 1781). 
The basic thrust of the policies implemented until the summer of 
Horeki 5 (1755), therefore, was not so much towards suppressing social change, 
or halting commercial development, but rather for the domain to go through a 
process of financial adjustment and economic growth before attempting to 
hold its own against the predations of commerce: which, after all, were 
already playing a considerable part in the grief afflicting Tsugaru's treasury. 
The reformers did not simply react conservatively and try to block commercial 
development. They were working at setting up the conditions for eventually 
widening the scope of economic activity within the domain. 
Mitsugi made a concerted attempt whenever the opportunity offered to 
decrease the number of jikata chigyo (landed fiefs) held by Tsugaru retainers, 
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an important step in most narratives of development in the direction of 
economic sophistication. Furthermore, he was not at all reluctant to make 
mutually congenial arrangements with merchants to draw commercial 
management skills and capital into the official sphere. These measures 
achieved a certain degree of success, although it is possible, with hindsight, to 
detect signs at this early stage of Mitsugi's idiosyncratically abrupt and 
sometimes blinkered approach to going about achieving his objectives. His 
social and collegial skills do not appear well developed. 
Before the end of 1755, it became clear that the reform program would 
be completely derailed by the massive crop failure. The limitations imposed on 
a domain whose economy was based on rice production, and the vulnerability of 
Tsugaru to the elements, were vividly exposed by the revelation in the 9th 
month of the extent of that failure. There had not been a worse harvest since 
the one in 1695, which was followed by the Genroku famine. The response of 
the reformers was immediate: first to address the financial repercussions of 
the famine, then to draw the administrative net even tighter. 
The decision taken to use the rice so deliberately stored in the domain's 
granaries as part of financial policy the previous year was crucial to the 
survival of Tsugaru's population, but its consumption was a blow to the domain's 
struggling economy. Large amounts were distributed: in reduced retainer 
stipends and as relief food to the people at large. Very little remained for the 
regular shipments south. Mitsugi and his colleagues hastily renegotiated loan 
schedules in the Kamigata and in Edo. They arranged a much-reduced 
remittance to Edo, literally buying the time they needed to once more put the 
affairs of the domain in order. 
These emergency measures, as well as the previous structural reforms, 
were devised and implemented reasonably smoothly while relations between 
Ariemon and Mitsugi remained cordial and co-operative. When differences 
surfaced, however, and they clashed over ways of dealing with the young 
daimyo's succession, marriage and investiture far away in Edo, Mitsugi prevailed. 
Ariemon withdrew, leaving Mitsugi alone with the responsibility for dealing 
172 
with an economic crisis that had become, if anything, worse than it was when 
he was first appointed. There was the added pressure now of pledges to repay 
the renegotiated loans. 
Mitsugi probably sealed the fate of the reforms by drawing men from . 
established farming and commercial households further into the central organs 
and mechanisms through which the Oshirabekata controlled finance and 
commerce. When he selected eminent merchants to manage the domain's 
granaries and the distribution of stipend allowances, those left out were cut 
off from access to the most favourable and lucrative business opportunities. 
In the countryside, too, a majority of the new ojoya(village group headmen), 
who replaced the existing network of daikan (local administrative intendants), 
were rural merchants or wealthy farmers. 
This shift, from employing the old stratum of licensed urban merchants 
and official purveyors to the domain, to the inclusion of merchants in the 
domain's financial administrative structure, was one of the strategies designed 
to cope with Tsugaru's economic weakness in the face of external commercial 
and financial forces. The domain's resources had long been subjected to both 
direct and indirect exploitation by networks of merchant houses spreading 
from local coastal ports through intermediate ports like Choshi, Tsuruga and 
Otsu, and into Edo and the Kamigata. The attempt to turn merchants into the 
domain's own instruments was a move towards gaining control over these 
process of transfer and exchange. 
The moves to redistribute food supplies and other necessities for daily 
life and work by means of the hyofu system, and to weaken the place of jikata 
chigyo were significant features of the second phase of economic interventions, 
though the success with famine relief must surely have been the most 
remarkable. It appears that the hyofu system may not have been planned from 
the very beginning, but that it was precipitated by the harvest failure, which 
produced a change of direction between the first and second phases. Such a 
dramatic move was inevitable in a domain where official spending was profligate 
and agricultural tax remissions unpredictable; especially given the need to 
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catch up from even further disadvantage after the famine year. Recognising 
the domain's position, Mitsugi moved to rebuild Tsugaru's commercial and 
financial base by making the government itself an investor in commerce and 
diminishing the number of retainers with the power to sap resources from the 
centre by means of their landed holdings. It was clearly not a propitious 
moment for attempting such changes so suddenly. 
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Chapter 4 
Not a soul was lost: Tsugaru's famine that wasn't 
When government is straying from the Way, Heaven issues its 
warning in the form of a natural disaster. Tung Chung-shu228 
The suffering people struggle for ferns on Mount Shouyang 
While everywhere their fires are banked, and their bamboo 
doors shut. It is spring and the second month; yet there is no 
joy in verse. For whom are the colors of the land bursting 
forth? Emperor Go-Hanazono229 
0 Almighty Lord God, who for the sin of man didst once drown 
all the world, except eight persons, and afterward of thy 
great mercy didst promise never to destroy it so again: We 
humbly beseech thee, that although we for our iniquities have 
worthily deserved a plague of rain and waters, yet upon our 
true repentance thou wilt send us such weather, as that we 
may receive the fruits of the earth in due season .. Amen. 
The Book of Common Praye,:;.30 
Famines imply starvation, but not vice versa. And starvation 
implies poverty, but not vice versa Amartya Sen231 
Famine can only be understood properly when it is solidly 
placed in its social and economic context. Andrew Appleby232 
When whole communities suffer food deprivation, they lose not only 
their means of physical survival, but also a vital medium through which 
individual, family, and community life is ordered and given meaning. In this way, 
famine threatens the very foundations of being. Food is so scarce that most 
people are severely weakened by malnutrition. Significant numbers starve to 
death. The suffering of victims is unspeakable, indelibly scarring the lives of 
those who survive. Fundamental tenets of law, custom and belief are 
228 Quoted in Matsumoto, "The Idea of Heaven', in Najita and Scheiner (eds.), Japanese 
Thought, page 186. 
229 This poem is said to have been addressed to Ashikaga Yoshimasa by the emperor during the 
period of drought and famine between 1457 and 1460, when Yoshimasa was continuing to outlay 
extravagant amounts of money on building projects and entertainments. Quoted in H. Paul 
Varley, The Onin War, page 118. 
230 The Book of Common Prayer, London: Cambridge University Press. (No publication date) 
Ratified, 1571. 
231 Amartya Sen, Poverty and Famines. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981, page 39. 
232 Andrew Appleby, Famine in Tudor and Stuart England Stanford, Stanford University Press, 
1978, page 3. 
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repeatedly transgressed in the struggle for survival. Normally hidden 
machinations of power become starkly visible. Famine is first apprehended as 
demographic and economic crisis, but its insidious effects resonate in social, 
political, and cultural life long after food supplies are restored. Small wonder, 
then, that famines provide entire peoples with some of their most disturbing 
memories and deepest fears. 
One does not need to have suffered to remember. In 1846, a Justice 
of the Peace called N.M. Cummins, who was a landlord in County Cork, 
addressed a letter to the Duke of Wellington after visiting some of his tenants 
during the "Great Hunger". This well-fed witness found one "wretched hamlet 
deserted", and his account continued: 
I entered some of the hovels to ascertain the cause and the 
scenes that presented themselves were such as no tongue or 
pen can convey the slightest idea of. In the first, six 
famished and ghastly skeletons, to all appearance dead, were 
huddled in a corner on some filthy straw, their sole covering 
what seemed a ragged horse-cloth and their wretched legs 
hanging about, naked above the knees. I approached in horror, 
and found by a low moaning that they were alive, they were in 
fever - four children, a woman, and what had once been a man. 
It is impossible to go through the details, suffice to say, that 
in a few minutes I was surrounded by at least 200 such 
phantoms, such frightful specters as no words can describe. 
By far the greatest number were delirious either from hunger 
or from fever. Their demoniac yells are still ringing in my 
ears, and their horrible images are fixed upon my brain ... 
the same morning the police opened a house on the adjoining 
lands, which was observed shut for many days, and two frozen 
corpses were found lying upon the mud floor half devoured by 
the rats.233 
This compelling passage evokes images like those found in Japanese brush 
paintings depicting the agonies of hell. For Cunningham, writing as a regional 
specialist, it illustrates the human cost of empire and industrialization. In 
Arnold's work it sets the scene for a study seeking out the "wider, even global, 
significance of famine", and representing it "as a phenomenon of far-reaching 
233 Quoted in Arnold, Famine, pages 17-18, from W. Cunningham, The Growth of English Industry 
and Commerce during the Early and Middle Ages, vol. I, page 388. 
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political, social and cultural importance as well ... as demographic catastrophe 
and economic malaise".234 
As Arnold's objectives imply, although each famine is a unique historical 
event, from a historian's point of view there are properties of famines that con 
be discussed and compared in fairly general terms. These include a range of 
immediate and underlying causes of food scarcity; the effects of starvation on 
social groups; and the measures taken by individuals, families, communities and 
governments to cope with famine. Recent scholarship on these subjects is 
used in the first section of this chapter to suggest interpretive schemes for 
the subject matter of this chapter; and in the last two sections to provide 
frameworks for discussing pre-modern Tohoku's vulnerability to famine, and 
the various strategies and interventions available for forestalling the worst 
consequences of harvest failure. In between, the second section contains a 
discussion of famine in Japan, Section III is devoted to a more detailed 
account of famine events in far northern Tohoku during the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries, and Section IV contains material specific to the 
experience of famine in Tsugaru. 
I Famine in human history 
(i) Famine as phenomenon 
In accounts of famines, no matter when or where they occur, we read 
strikingly similar descriptions of how victims and social groups are affected. 
The very young and the very old weaken and die first. Mourning rituals can not 
be properly observed. People find themselves foraging for all manner of 
strange insects and animals. Some of what they eat makes them ill. Violent 
offences are committed against the persons and property of those who appear 
to be storing food for themselves. Travellers are accosted and robbed of food 
stuffs and other possessions that might be exchanged for food. 
The hungry who have enough energy desert their homes and villages to 
seek food and employment in towns and cities, where their appearance is often 
234 Arnold, Famine. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988. Foreword. 
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the earliest notice of rural hardship. They dress in rags, having sold their 
clothing, personal effects and other possessions to buy food: but prices are 
impossibly high. Households sell or abandon females or children. Muscles 
waste, minds wander, and vision blurs. Unclean and forbidden foods are 
consumed. The weak are killed to end their suffering; or for their flesh. The 
dead are left unburied. Bodies clog pathways and ditches, preyed upon by birds 
and animals. Frantic survivors sometimes break into official storehouses or 
government offices, or join together in random mass protest. These elemental 
political acts are rewarded with relief; or brushed away and ignored; or 
brutally punished, even with death. 
Given the fact that each particular famine is actually a unique cluster of 
such a range of phenomena, it is not surprising that casualty figures are often 
quoted very tentatively. Tracing the numbers, or times, or proximate causes, 
of individual deaths is clearly a challenging task. Because victims always die in 
impoverished conditions, and often in large numbers, burial documentation and 
death registrations can be incomplete or non-existent. When the starving have 
fled far from their home districts, their identity and origins can be an 
insoluble puzzle after death. Those who flee and survive are often counted as 
casualties in their places of origin, which may well have suffered a major 
demographic crisis. 
A further complicating factor in determining whether or not people are 
victims of famine is epidemic disease. Relations between starvation and 
epidemics are extremely complex; and the task of tracing their roles in the 
mortality of historical victims is time-consuming and complicated, even when 
records exist. This, nonetheless fascinating, line of enquiry is discussed by 
Ann Bowman Jannetta, in a short chapter on deaths in Hida during the Tenmei 
and Tenpo famines.235 People whose organ functions are breaking down because 
of starvation can display symptoms, such as fever, mental impairment, bloody 
vomit and constant diarrhoea, which are common to a number of medical 
235 Ann Bowman Jannetta, Epidemics and Mortality in Early Modern Japan, Chapter VII, 
"Epidemics and famine", pages 173-187. 
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conditions. They can therefore appear to have contracted a disease when they 
are simply terminally hungry. On the other hand, even though famine kills off 
the most vulnerable hosts for infection very early, the resistance of 
malnourished survivors to epidemic disease can be lowered. If they flee to 
crowded urban areas, their chances of infection are raised considerably. 
To ascertain whether or not a person has starved to death, the most 
useful evidence would be records of food intake and the proximate cause of 
death: but, for most pre modern or early modern human communities, this 
information is unavailable. We must instead have recourse to whatever data 
have survived. These can be statistics on fluctuations in food prices, and on 
variations in mortality rates, sometimes in particular locations. They can be 
used together with descriptive accounts of the circumstances in which people 
died to draw at least tentative conclusions about whether disease was likely to 
have been implicated.236 Even when disease is recorded as the proximate cause 
of death, however, malnutrition can still have been heavily implicated, through 
lowering the victim's resistance to infection. 
Severe malnutrition to the point of organ damage can also cause serious 
injury or sudden death when starving people are suddenly provided with normal 
subsistence foods, in a relief or rescue effort, for example. This ironic fate 
befell some victims of the Genna famine when a conscientious young daimyo of 
Tsugaru attempted to save his subjects. He was, unfortunately, unfamiliar 
with the insidious effects of starvation on the human body. 
(ii) Famine as historical event 
Archaeological evidence of famine events is older than any written 
records. It is still not possible, though, to say with any certainty when famines 
made their way into human experience. By the eighteenth century, though, a 
236 A discussion of these matters in the English case is found in "Famine, disease and crisis 
mortality in early modern society", which is the editors' opening chapter of Walter and Shofield 
(eds.), Famine, Disease and the Social Order in Early Modern Society, pages 1-73. 
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great deal of evidence related to famines had accumulated in Japan, and in 
that context the Horeki famine has been regarded as a significant event.237 
Because the drastic harvest failure that triggered famine throughout 
most of Tohoku in 1755 did not result in the normally anticipated outcomes in 
Tsugaru, but was instead prevented from claiming lives, I have referred to it 
as a "famine that wasn't". It is sobering to find so few cases in history with 
which to compare Tsugaru's experience. The deliverance of vulnerable 
communities from starvation and death has seldom been noted. In history, as 
in life, good news is probably rarely important news, and the impact of averted 
disasters is negligible compared with the vivid impressions left by mortal 
calamity - as evidenced in the preceding pages. Leaving unwritten stories of 
success to one side, though, failure to avert famine in the past was probably 
due at least partly to logistic obstacles; but there has also been in history a 
certain thread of fatalism where starving people are concerned. 
This fatalism has taken different forms, for it has been grounded in a 
variety of belief systems. A kind of Malthusian fatalism goes some way toward 
explaining the indifference shown by English overlords to suffering in their 
Indian and Irish colonies, for example, or by Russian Czars to the fate of their 
peasant subjects, or by people in famine-free countries to starvation victims in 
China and India. It was in some quarters accepted wisdom that famine was 
inevitable, because it was one of Nature's essential periodic correctives for 
overpopulation. This argument can still be encountered in reference to the 
Bengal, Ethiopian or Sahel famines, where combinations of natural disaster, 
civil strife and unstable international commodity prices are much more to the 
explanatory point. 
More nuanced neo-Malthusian theories are currently being developed by 
ecological historians, environmental scientists and population experts, who are 
concerned about the long term capacity of the earth to accommodate a human 
237 Saito Osamu discusses work on the chronology of famines in Japan in "The frequency of 
famines as Demographic Correctives in the Japanese Past", Discussion Paper Series A, No. 386, 
Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University. Tokyo, 2000, pages 4-5. 
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population expanding at present rates. The approaches of some scholars of 
the !ongue durie may be justified in the long run, but simpler Malthusian 
arguments no longer provide satisfactory explanations for the ghastly scars 
left by dearth and famine in the collective human memory. To be sure, from 
time to time particular populations have temporarily outgrown their food 
resources - and perhaps developed new technologies as a result of dearth and 
suffering. It is true also, that famine claims large numbers of lives when 
. normal supply lines are blocked, by natural or human-induced disasters. It is 
not possible, however, to demonstrate that food supplies in pre-industrial or 
early modern societies would have run out if such famines had not occurred.238 
Long before Malthus, another type of fatalism is written into historical 
narratives. So-called natural calamities like famines, which seem to have 
occurred through no obvious design of man, have long been interpreted as 
portents from Heaven or malevolent spirits. In the Christian tradition, 
climatic catastrophes and famine are often read as signs that Heaven is 
offended by the sins of mankind, in general or in a particular place. In Chinese 
civilizations, natural disasters have for millennia been signs that a ruling 
regime has lost celestial favour. In contrast with the Christian case, it is not 
the subject population that is believed to have transgressed: but it is their 
suffering through plagues, flood, pestilence and famines that signals a ruler's 
failure to properly order society and bring relief to the people. If the dynasty 
does fall, the disasters are then portrayed as significant portents in historical 
narratives. 
The Tenpo famine in Japan, for example, is often cited, among other 
negative events, as evidence of the irreversible decline of the Tokugawa 
bakufu. Disasters other than those deemed natural, which also presage regime 
collapse in Chinese civilizations, include succession disputes in the ruling family, 
popular rebellion, economic instability, and barbarian military threats on the 
238 See, for example, the arguments presented in Sen, Poverty, pages 174-79, and Arnold, 
Famine, 34-42. 
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frontiers. Christians, too, have long prayed for deliverance from such events, 
over which they also assume Heaven's power: 
From lightening and tempest; from plague, pestilence, and 
famine; from battle and murder, and from sudden death, Good 
lord, deliver us, From all sedition, privy conspiracy, and 
rebellion: ... 239 
While the possibility of direct intervention from the heavens has lost 
explanatory power in many circles, it is more difficult to abandon the idea that 
famines and other human disasters, both present and past, might sometimes 
occur in contexts where men and their leaders have behaved in inappropriate 
or inadequate ways. Governments frequently do fall if they are corrupt, or fail 
to properly maintain infrastructure, or neglect to regulate the provision of 
services, or are cavalier about the security of their citizens. In a post-modern, 
democratic system their demise might be explained in terms of unemployment 
statistics, bank failures, the crime rate, crowded schools and hospitals, 
political nepotism, or interruptions to utility services. These are all clear signs 
of failure at state level. 
In pre-modern societies the failure of states to promote the social and 
economic welfare of their populations clearly caused disasters, which were 
read in moral and religious idioms: but these interpretations also signalled real 
structural weaknesses that were very probably implicated in causing disasters 
like famines. Below Heaven, the idea of portents can be applied usefully by 
giving careful attention to the wider social, political and economic contexts in 
which famines occur. Signs of vulnerability to famine can be seen in the means 
by which power is gained, expressed and articulated in any society. 
As well as signalling that all is not well in relations between men and 
their rulers, famines are also sometimes interpreted as events that actually 
change the historical fate of a people through their sheer weight as events. 
The Great Famine has been put in this category by Joel Mokyr, as David Arnold 
noticed. Mokyr claims that this famine "completely altered the course of Irish 
239 From "The Litany" in The Book of Common Prayer, page 29. 
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history", at the same time as making "Ireland into a demographic anomaly which 
singles it out as sui generis in modern European history."240 
In contrast to these more immediate outcomes of famine, the approach 
taken by historical geographers, ecologists and some Annales historians, has 
been to examine whole ages of plenty and dearth, development and decline, to 
shape narrative accounts of the very long term rise and fall of peoples and 
states. These studies trace the deep ecological, climatic and geographic 
changes that have taken place in a region, and their influences on the survival 
of societies over extended periods. The distinct characteristics of any single 
historical event are not relevant in most such studies, but the recurrence of 
mortality crises like famines can be signs of the long-term lack of 
sustainability of a particular way of life or a social structure or even an entire 
civilization. 
(iii) The nature of causes 
There have developed, alongside different ways of understanding 
famines as events, at least three different approaches to explaining why they 
occur at particular historical junctures in specific places. These approaches 
concentrate on immediate causes, prevailing structural conditions, and the 
effects of much longer-term transformations. Evidence at all three levels of 
causation can be examined to account for famines in history; even though in 
the past most famines were understood and experienced in terms of their 
immediately apparent causes, with ultimate responsibility perhaps attributed 
to supernatural agents, or blame for the worst outcomes directed at 
scapegoats, political powers or commercial operatives. 
Until recently, then, the immediate causes of famine have for the most 
part been recorded as either human agency or natural calamity. Man-made 
famines were either deliberately engineered, as weapons of mass murder, war 
or coercion, or they were the outcomes of col lateral damage. The capacity to 
withdraw food or provide access to it is one of the greatest powers one person 
240 Arnold, page 17. 
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or group has ever been able to wield over another; and the history of sieges 
and blockades is therefore long. The strategies used by Stalin against the 
people of the Ukraine, and by Nazi occupation authorities against the western 
Netherlands are recent chilling examples of this type of famine causation.241 
Famines characterized as natural events have been treated as the same 
type of unpredictable disasters as those that trigger them: volcanic eruptions, 
violent storms, droughts, floods, plagues of plant disease, rodents, or insect 
pests, all of which disrupt the production of food. 
Generally speaking, disasters that are purely climatic or seismological 
events have retained their natural label, but causes of famine like plagues of 
pests and ruinous plant diseases, which were viewed as natural in the past, have 
gradually been recast, along with epidemics, as human disasters that can be 
avoided. It is now widely accepted that given appropriate applications of 
scientific knowledge, political willpower, education and economic infrastructure, 
none of these events need happen. Governments are increasingly expected to 
use the powers invested in them to deliver their polities from such horrors. 
In the case of plant disease, for example, human agency can easily be 
part of a pattern of causation or prevention - at the farming level, in local 
communities and in governments. Farmers through the ages have experimented 
to develop high-yielding and disease-resistant plants. They have also co-
operated at community level to develop methods of maintaining soil fertility 
and field hygiene. Local leaders and governments have contributed to research 
and experimentation, sometimes mandating the introduction of certain crops 
and practices, or insisting on the concentrated cultivation of particular plant 
varieties. Large-scale monoculture, though, has always risked devastation 
through abrupt climate change; or on contact with diseases and pests to which 
the favoured crop or variety is not immune. Dearth and famine can result when 
241 Stalin's terror in the Ukraine was initiated in 1932, when the region's harvest was forcibly 
requisitioned and access to food imports cut off. Davies puts the death toll at ·some 7 million" 
on page 965 of Europe. The Dutch Hunger Winter was imposed on the region containing such 
major cities as Amsterdam, Rotterdam and The Hague, from October 1944 until May 1945. High 
mortality rates were recorded after the already rationed food supply ran out in February 1945. 
the vulnerable crop is a staple food or a key market commodity that is 
exchanged for cash or food. 
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The Irish potato famine was an extreme example of this scenario. It 
was triggered by the arrival across the Irish Sea of the fungal blight, 
phytophthora infestans, which wiped out Ireland's potato crops over several 
years, even though it had had only nuisance value where it came from. This 
virulent disease was therefore, according to the eminent historian, Norman 
Davies, the immediate cause of "one of Europe's worst natural disasters". 242 
The relatively recent introduction of the potato into Ireland, however, and the 
speed with which it had become the dominant staple food of the poor, as well 
as the bias towards planting only particular high-yielding varieties, were all 
outcomes of human interventions and il')teractions. The squalid, malnourished 
life of the Irish tenant farmer and his family, whose diet the potato comprised, 
was also the end product of a range of human institutions, beliefs and 
practices, some of which emanated from powers as far away as London and 
Rome. It is therefore not possible to claim, as Davies does, that this was a 
natural disaster! 
Infestations of insects and rodents as causes of crop failure are similar 
to plant diseases in that they are often thought of as coming from nowhere. 
Clearly, though, human ignorance or carelessness can result in pests being 
introduced. This was probably the case with the leaf hoppers that travelled 
from the Chinese mainland to Kyushu in Japan and triggered the Kyoho famine 
of 1731-32. Effective methods of eradicating pests or diseases by human 
agency were not available then, so Kyoho period farmers resorted to consta~t 
parades around their rice fields with pine torches burning, bells jangling, drums 
beating and conch horns blowing - and mostly to no avail. It might be observed 
t~at modern chemical measures taken against plagues and blights have caused 
more damage in the long term, to soil, cultivators and consumers, than pest 
infestations would have done: and that would bring us back again to human 
agency, at the structural or social level. 
242 Davies, Europe, pages 832-33. 
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(iv) Structures and circumstances 
Wars, storms, fires, insect plagues and floods afflict entire populations 
indiscriminately; but the capacity to prevent or control the damage is never 
evenly spread, either through societies or among them. Historically, some 
occupational groups, classes or castes have always been more affected by food 
scarcity than others. More recently, famines have only occurred in countries 
of the so-called Third World, where, in turn, some groups suffer mortality 
crises and others do not. Reasons for this uneven spread of damage and 
suffering can be found in the structural or circumstantial level of causation, 
where social institutions and conduits of power are implicated. 
Amartya Sen has argued that when famine conditions prevail, for 
whatever reason, the people who die soonest in any socio-economic system are 
always those poorest in entitlements to own and exchange goods. According to 
Sen, an individual's survival will depend "on what he owns, what exchange 
possibilities are offered to him, what is given to him free, and what is taken 
away from him."243 Although his position has been criticized for over-
simplifying the relations between poverty, starvation and famine it does not 
seem inappropriate as a way of considering famine in Japan during the 
eighteenth century. The social, political and economic structures of the polity 
were not designed, and only rarely functioned, to prevent mortality crises from 
developing after major natural (or man-made) disasters. Typhoons, insect 
plagues, droughts and floods are serious natural calamities, but they do not 
cause famine and death where societies have developed the exchange 
mechanisms, welfare regimens, food substitution strategies and commercial 
regulation to cope with them. 
Since famine is always a concomitant of wider imbalances and ills, causes 
need to be traced in more structures and practices than those directly 
243 Sen, Poverty and Famines, page 155. Sen has since developed his entitlement argument, and 
produced more complex analyses of starvation and famines, but the concept is a helpful tool for 
explaining famine deaths in Tokugawa period domains where income was predominantly dependent 
on rice production. 
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connected with food production and population statistics.244 Economic, political, 
social and cultural forces all influence the mechanisms by which food is 
produced, distributed and consumed. These various fields of power can be 
examined, and their contributions to food scarcity and the allocation of 
entitlements assessed. For, whether or not a natural calamity develops into a 
human disaster at a given juncture is governed by the particular circumstances 
in whi.ch it occurs. These circumstances are shaped by the institutions, 
technologies and practices a human society has put in place over time. 
Within a polity, the access of each separate household or family to food 
is determined by its capacity as a unit to grow and store, or to buy food. In 
turn, that capacity depends on its entitlements to use land and labour; or to 
earn and possess some kind of medium of exchange, such as money. When a 
polity is prepared to intervene with crisis management strategies that alter 
normal structures and entitlements, natural disasters can often be prevented 
from causing severe famines. That was, after all, what Nyui Mitsugi achieved 
in the wake of the Horeki harvest failure. 
II Farmers and famines in Japanese 
history 
As Amino Yoshihiku and others have argued, rice cultivation was never 
universally practiced throughout Japan. On the other hand, some parts of the 
country have been inhabited by settled, rice-cultivating communities for longer 
than its recorded history. Forms of state that developed after the 
introduction of writing were largely funded by revenues raised as agricultural 
taxes, primarily on rice. Japan's farmers produced solid foundations and means 
of maintaining a variety of social and political systems, from an aristocratic 
monarchy managed by a centralized court elite, to regency rule over a system 
of estates held by noble families, to authority shared by emperors and shoguns, 
to scattered fiefdoms under regional generals, religious institutions and court 
loyalists. 
244 Appleby, quotation on page 167, above. 
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This fragmentation of central power was resolved in part by general 
submission to the Tokugawa shogunal dynasty, which presided over the country 
from Edo under the putative authority of the imperial dynasty some distance 
away in Kyoto. The new court-bakufu-domain political structure was sustained 
by agricultural wealth garnered by means of a comprehensive and closely 
monitored taxation system, based on rice productivity units and processed 
through central grain markets. Eventually, that same farming sector was also 
to bear the brunt of the expansion of Japan's military-industrial power in the 
name of a constitutional emperor. 
In all these forms of state, through deliberate design or systemic 
outcome, farmers were consistently subordinated to more privileged social 
strata comprising aristocratic, religious, military, commercial or industrial 
elites. During the Tokugawa period, as the geographically segmented economy 
gradually expanded, and commercial tendrils reached out to join resources and 
products with money and markets, the majority of those whose occupational 
status attached them to the land became increasingly disadvantaged. Their 
entitlements to food, cash wealth, material goods, and technology decreased 
over time, and many were finally alienated from their land after years of 
accumulated debt and hardship. Along with this tendency towards rural 
impoverishment, vulnerability to famine increased. 
(i) Records and images 
In any version of that very popular genre, the Japanese historical 
chronology or timeline, terms indicating harvest failure and famine appear with 
almost monotonous regularity. The most common among them are fusaku, 
kyosaku, and daikyosaku (7F{'F, ~{'F, *~f'F), for a poor harvest, a harvest 
failure and a major harvest failure. And, sometimes preceded by one or more 
harvest failures, periodic appearances are made by kikin or daikikin (AA.ti, *AA. 
ti), indicating famine or major famine. Although it is difficult to discern any 
statistical or qualitative consistency in the ways these terms are used over 
time, places and publications, the last two seem most often to indicate total 
harvest failures that resulted in severe food deprivation associated with 
starvation and a significant number of deaths. 
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The Meiji period compilation of historical documents, Nihon no kikin 
sh1ryo(Materials on famine in Japan), opens with a comprehensive time line of 
some four hundred and fifty natural disasters that occurred over two millennia 
or so up to the year Meiji 25.245 It originates in the year 660 BCE, when the 
first emperor was said to have ascended to the throne. The first three items 
in the list are famines, recorded for the (Japanese) years of 568, 666 and 976. 
Needless to say, there is no documentary material in the collection connected 
with those early events, and also, famine is no longer usually considered to be 
simply a natural disaster to be listed beside such events as typhoons and 
earthquakes. The first entry in the timeline mentioning the Tosan region, 
which included present-day Tohoku, is in the year 1342 (682 CE). 246 It notes a 
calamity associated with wind, which was perhaps a typhoon. Famines in Tosan 
appear in entries for 709 and 710 CE; the cause recorded in both cases is rain. 
Since this was around the time the Japanese imperial court, then 
situated in Nara, began to engage the Emishi peoples further afield with some 
persistence, it is not surprising that climatic events in the eastern mountains 
begin to appear in records, though parts of Mutsu and Dewa were to remain 
beyond the direct reach of the central government for nearly a thousand more 
years.247 There are ten instances of famine in the Tosan region noted for the 
eighth century: two in association with water, two with wind, four with drought 
and one that afflicted the entire land.248 The other was associated with wind, 
water and rats. Dewa is first mentioned by name as having experienced famine 
245 Shihosho keijikyoku (comp.), Nihon no kikin shiryo, pages 1-34. 
246 The Tosando actually took in all provinces east and north of the Tokaido, except for the 
seven of the Hokurokudo. That is, the Tosando extended from present-day Shiga and Gifu 
prefectures, through Nagano, Gunma and Tochigi as well as taking in all of Tohoku. 
247 The land surveys initiated by Hideyoshi and continued in the early Tokugawa decades, despite 
the fact that they were incomplete and inaccurate in some cases, were the first instances of the 
institutional reach of a Japanese central government extending through the region. 
248 ITT[-Jl.=: +-§8, which is to say, "the thirty-one provinces of all the various regions". "The 
fifty-eight provinces (or countries) and three islands" are referred to in Nara period texts. 
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in the year 846 CE, and Mutsu in an entry for 1402, when it suffered the 
combined onslaught of wind, drought, famine and water! 
What is to be made of all this? Certainly nothing terribly much can be 
concluded from very early chronologies, except that famines and natural 
disasters have for a very long time been amongst the events recorded as 
Japanese history; and that records are more likely to be kept during relatively 
peaceful times when a degree of administrative authority is in place. It is 
possible sometimes, though, to use other sources to flesh out the bare 
chronological record. A number of descriptions of famines survive in historical 
chronicles and other literature from pre-Tokugawa times, even though there is 
actually very little evidence of the experience of the victims themselves. Paul 
Varley, for example, has used material from a diary. He quotes a passage 
written by the Zen priest, Taigyoku, in the Hekizan Nichiroku (~Ill 13 ~). It 
centres on the starvation death of a young child on the streets of Kyoto in the 
3rd month of 1460 CE.249 This famine appears in the Kikin sh1ryotimeline 
entries for the Japanese years 2120 and 2121, along with a catalogue of 
calamities caused by wind, water, drought, epidemic disease and insects 
inflicting the Goki (Ji.~) and Shichido (t~).250 
The child had died in the arms of his mother, who had travelled to the 
city to beg for food because the district where she lived had been overtaken 
by famine after three successive years of drought. The passage contains an 
account in her voice of the rice crop failure at home in Kawachi, the excesses 
of local officials, the weight of tax exactions and the unavailability of cash 
loans. Then, a few lines further on, Taigyoku describes a large group of nobles 
indulging in an extravagant flower-viewing party just a couple of city blocks 
away from the woman. The priest expresses concern at the extremes of 
misery and lavish consumption he has witnessed - the division "between the 
249 Varley, The Onin War, page 117. This diary is a rare personal record of the period preceding 
the War, written by the Rinzai zen priest, Taigyoku (::tc~, 1421-1472?), of Tofukuji. It contains 
entries from the first month of 1459 to the end of 1468. 
25° Kikin shiryo, page 20. 1460 and '61. The Goki were the five provinces around Kyoto: 
Yamashiro, Yamato, Kawachi, Settsu and, from AD 716, Izumi. The Shichido were the regions of 
Saikai, Nankai, Sanyo, San'in, Hokuriku, Takai and Tosan: which is to say, Japan without Hokkaido 
and the Ryukyus. 
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starving poor and the stinking rich", as David Arnold styles it - and he records 
that he presented funeral money to the bereaved mother, as well as promising 
to say a service for the child's salvation.251 His account vividly highlights the 
gap between those with access to food and drink in the Ashikaga shogun's 
capital and those without. He also honours the woman's agency in recounting 
her attempt to save herself and her child. But even this degree of 
sympathetic engagement is far from a firsthand account of the experience of 
starvation and famine. 
There is certainly no way of knowing whether any of the events 
described in such texts, or recorded in the disaster timeline, had any relation 
to what was going on in remote Tsugaru, or, for that matter, whether they 
happened at all. The stories and images, though, accumulate and reinforce 
each other to form one kind of popular historical narrative, providing an ever 
richer font of images to draw on through the Tokugawa period. Mention of 
wind as a problem in the eastern mountains in the region's earliest entry is a 
sadly accurate hint at conditions a millennium later. For it was to be the cold 
northeasterly yamase winds, blowing southward from the north pole over the 
Sea of Okhotsk and onto Japan's Pacific coast, that would regularly cause crop 
failures in northern Tohoku.252 
It is also interesting to note that the Horeki 5 famine year, listed for 
the Tosan region in the long disaster timeline, was noted to be a windy, watery 
one. This is a description that is certainly corroborated in many other 
chronologies and accounts of the famine. Tohoku is noted in one history after 
another as having born the brunt of famine in Japan during the seventeenth, 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and those cold, rainy summers are an 
episode in the longue duree of climatologists who theorize about a "little ice 
age" during that time. Similarly, the 1460 famine in the Kinai area, too, is part 
of a wider historical narrative: the waning of the Ashikaga shogun's power, 
251 Arnold, Peasant Societies, page 2. The dead boy will be saved in the afterlife. 
, 
252 Kenkyosha's New Japanese-English Dictionary defines the yamase (lll'W) wind as "a cold, dry 
wind blowing down from over the mountains", which does not accord exactly with older 
descriptions. 
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then the lapse into political confusion, military clashes and the sengoku period. 
for those educated in Chinese political theory, as Zen priests often were, and 
historians have tended to be since, the series of natural disasters, persistent 
famine, peasant revolts in the countryside, and intrigues in the capital all 
combined to signal serious dynastic decay: the incumbent political regime had 
lost Heaven's mandate to govern. 
Political authority in the Tokugawa period was less contested, and 
because the bakufu imposed a system of record-keeping and reporting, teams 
of local and central bureaucrats created a huge number of documents and 
records. Among those that have survived the predations of insects, floods, 
fires, wars and modern carelessness, some can be used to suggest and 
reconstruct elements of famine experience. Local temple registers used for 
keeping track of Christians, for example, are useful sources for tracing death 
statistics. Because literacy skills were acquired by many people other than 
those whose official duties demanded them, texts from beyond the official 
sphere also exist. Texts of all kinds are in general more numerous for the 
years from the Genroku period onwards. There are diaries, daybooks, guide-
books and travellers' tales, which refer to famines and famine conditions in a 
variety of ways. 
(ii) The narrative trajectory of the Tokugawa period 
While famines clearly demonstrate the practical implications of socio-
economic and political relations between the privileged, well-connected social 
strata and the rest of the population, in Tokugawa Japan they also reflected to 
some degree the relationship of men and their institutions with the natural 
environment - topographic, geographic and climatic. This can be seen in the 
variations in timing, causes and severity of famines during the period among 
the regions of Japan. 
The Kan'ei famine, for example, occurred over three years from 1640 
and has been associated with a number of natural causative factors. It was 
the first large-scale disaster to confront the bakuhan system after the 
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Shimabara war. The southwest and central provinces suffered severe drought, 
with the entire region from the Kinki through Shikoku and Kyushu having lost 
up to half their draught animals to a cattle plague in 1639 and '40. In the 
Kumamoto domain in Kyushu, an insect infestation further damaged crops. 
Conditions were particularly severe in the Kansai area, where corpses were said 
to have littered the roadways and could be seen floating down the rivers day 
after day.253 In the Hokuriku domain of Kaga, cold winds and heavy rain ruined 
harvests, while in Tsugaru it was so cold that the nashitrees were blooming in 
high summer. Elsewhere in Tohoku, Aizu had heavy rains and hailstorms in the 
6th month and frosts fell in Akita in the 8th.254 
During the Genroku period (1688-1704), much of northeastern Japan 
was devastated by recurrent extremely cold and wet weather during the rice-
growing season, making the Genroku famine one of the region's most serious. 
In contrast, the Kyoho famine, being the first of the so-called san dai kikin 
(three great famines), was primarily a western disaster. It was caused by 
leaf-hoppers, which spread through Kyushu and Shikoku to western and central 
Honshu as far as the Wakayama domain on the Kii peninsula. 
The Kyoho famine combines with the Tenmei and Tenpo famines and the 
Kyoho, Kansai and Tenpo reform programs to shape popular conceptions of the 
course of Tokugawa period history. The patterns of plenty and dearth, 
however, varied from region to region, as Kikuchi Isao points out in the opening 
paragraphs of his recent monograph.255 In Tohoku's historical chronicles, while 
the standard outline of three or four famines is retained, they are not the 
same as those that shape the national narrative. For this region, the Horeki 
famine of 1755 is combined with the T enmei and Ten po famines to make three 
great famines; and the Genroku famine of the 1690's is added to frame a 
narrative with four. The Kan'ei famine was also experienced in Tohoku, but the 
national blueprint of three or four key negative turning points is generally 
253 Morita, Nomin, page 149. 
254 Kikuchi, Kinsei, pages 13-14. 
255 Kikuchi (1997), Kinsei no kikin, page 1. Dates for the Kyoho period are 1716-36, for the 
Tenmei period, 1781-89, and for the Tenpo period 1830-34. 
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preserved in narratives of ups and downs in the region during the Tokugawa 
period. 
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Figure 2: Number of famine years recorded in half-centuries. 1600-1850 
East denotes the Tohoku region; 
Central, the Kanto, southern Tosan, Tokai and Hokuriku regions; and 
West, the Kinai San'in, Sanyo, Shikoku, and Kyushu. 
Sources: Kikuchi (1997), Kinsei no kikilT. Morita, Nomin. 
Widespread drought was again experienced in central, southern and 
western Japan in 1770; but two years later there were major harvest failures 
in the south and west due to flooding after continuous spring and summer rain. 
1778 saw more floods in Kyushu and the Kansai. Then, in the following year 
Sakurajima erupted in southern Kyushu. In 1782, persistent spring and 
summer rains again caused crop failures in the south and west, and in 1783 
Mount Asama erupted violently in central Honshu. 20,000 people were killed 
directly by the eruption, but the ash and laval flows combined with 
unfavourable weather patterns in other parts of the country to trigger the 
Japan-wide Tenmei famine, which was to last at least five years. 256 The 
natural factors associated with that prolonged famine are listed, according to 
location, as excessive rainfall, drought, cold growing seasons and the Mount 
256 Kondo, "Volcanic Eruptions", page 776, discusses the meteorological consequences of volcanic 
eruptions. 
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Asama volcanic eruption. The last calamitous famines in most Tokugawa period 
narratives were those of the Tenpo period, which peaked in Tohoku in 1836-37. 
No matter which three or four famines gave shape to what kind of 
narrative, however, those were clearly not the only times when people died of 
starvation during the Tokugawa period. Added to the so-called major famines, 
a significant number of smaller-scale or regional famines, like those of the 
early seventeenth century mentioned above, meant that in most places 
throughout Japan famine conditions were experienced, on average, at least 
once every forty to fifty years.257 Since life expectancy for Tokugawa 
villagers at birth was arou~d forty years, it is reasonable to suppose that the 
famines were part of living memory in most farming villages.258 Historical 
accounts of village stores being disastrously empty at times when crops failed 
indicate that starvation was often connected with extra taxation imposts, or 
importunate creditors, or the activity of grain merchants privy to information 
on market trends further afield. 
Most shoguns had access to sufficient information, to have understood 
the nature and effects of famine: but, apart from the efforts of Yoshimune to 
help domains in Kyushu and Shikoku during the Kyoho famine, very little 
leadership in famine relief emanated from Edo, Compared with the prominence 
given famines as historical events in Tokugawa Japan, accounts of efforts to 
predict and forestall them are very rare. Even Yoshimune's relief measures 
could be viewed as rather less than charitable, and certainly not the result of 
much foresight. He simply shipped surplus rice from bakufu granaries in Osaka 
to distressed domains, on credit. The Kan'ei famine had demonstrated very 
early, to bakufu and domain governments alike, the importance of maintaining 
relief granaries against food scarcity; but in the long run this basic tenet of 
benevolent government was observed more in exhortation than practical action. 
257 Ibid., page 779. Kondo's graph of rice crops in Tohoku between 1830 and 1980 shows clusters 
of lean years occurring consistently every thirty to forty years, even as rice production 
increases. 
258 See Saito, "The Frequency of Famines", page 21, for population and life expectancy figures. 
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Matsudaira Sadanobu's success in saving the domain of Shirakawa from 
the Tenmei famine immediately following his arrival there as daimyo, is 
portrayed as a rare exemplary case of jinsei(1=rffr.), or benevolent 
administration, in the classic Confucian tradition.259 A quick glance through the 
statistics on popular protests and uprisings in Tokugawa Japan, the petitions 
presented by the protagonists, and the justice meted out by authorities, 
however, strengthens the impression that aspirations after such practical 
concern on the part of governments were considerably more developed in the 
minds of hungry subjects than in those of their rulers.260 
It is significant, also, that two of the three great central and western 
famines, and three of the four major famines in Tohoku all occurred during the 
latter half of the Tokugawa suzerainty, despite the logical expectation that 
earlier experiences might have led to improvements in both prevention and 
relief strategies. In general, then, intermittent famines are recorded in all 
regions from the beginning of the Tokugawa period, with some longer-term 
causal factors overlapping from place to place and local events triggering 
famines of varying severity at specific times in particular locations. Famines 
occurring from the Genroku period onwards were recorded as more severe, 
with increasingly large numbers of casualties. As yet, there is no way of 
knowing whether this is a reflection of the increased severity of famines or 
developments in the keeping and preservation of records. 
259 Ooms, Charismatic Bureaucrat, pages 49-53, discusses Sadanobu's succession and food relief 
program. He also points out that the new daimyo's ailing stepfather and predecessor, 
Matsudaira Sadakuni, had probably already instigated the purchase of relief rice before his 
replacement arrived in Shirakawa. 
260 Scheiner, "Benevolent Lords", in Najita (ed.), Japanese Thought, pages 39-62. Scheiner's 
essay explains the emergence of millennial style yonaoshi ideas in Tokugawa Japan. In it he 
discusses the concept of jinsei(benevolent rule) as it was understood by Dazai Shundai, who was 
one of Mitsugi's role models. He also refers to the use in some domains of the term onbyakusho, 
which he translates as "honourable peasants" (for want of something less awkward in English to 
represent the Japanese honorific). 
Anne Walthall, Peasant Uprisings in Japan. Chicago: University of Chigago Press, 1991, pages 57-
61, contains the peasant petition of 1644, the resultant policy changes and penalties inflicted by 
the bakufu in the legendary Sogoro story from the Kanto region. Pages 94-95 cover the 
grievance meeting of a group of peasants with officials in the western domain of Tsuyama, and 
pages 109-116 the punishments for a subsequent riot in 1727. 
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(iii) Poverty and famine in the Tokugawa period 
To begin at the beginning of Sen's line of reasoning, we can say that a 
growing proportion of Japan's rural population during the Tokugawa period was 
poor, in that they suffered relative deprivation in the society as a whole.261 In 
the face of well-substantiated claims that popular material culture reached 
extremely comfortable standards in some instances, it is still possible to find 
evidence that from time to time less privileged groups went hungry. And when 
families or villages were very short of food some individuals were malnourished 
to the point where they starved; and starvation in its extreme stages resulted 
in deaths. 262 When the number of people dying was significant enough for 
someone to have made a note of it, famine had struck. The course of events in 
all the Tokugawa period famines discussed in this study is the same: a harvest 
failure was followed by prolonged and severe food deprivation associated with 
a significant number of starvation deaths. 
In the aftermath of any famine, there was inevitably a shortage of 
farm labour in the countryside. Recovery to previous levels of productivity was 
therefore slow, and this in turn depressed domain government incomes from 
agricultural taxes, leading to increased official borrowing. A visible after-
effect in many domains was the number of deserted fields and villages, whose 
cultivators and occupants had either died of starvation or fled. It was in these 
conditions of general rural impoverishment and desolation that commercial and 
financial interests from urban areas were able to penetrate villages, through 
their capacity to offer loans secured against future harvests. As harvests 
failed, and defaulting occurred, land gradually accumulated in the hands of 
moneylenders, commercial landlords and wealthy farming households. The 
cultivator often ended up as a tenant farmer, pressed by both landowner and 
261 The degree of poverty afflicting the population in general varied significantly over time and 
region, as can be seen in the evidence marshalled by Conrad Totman and Susan Hanley in their 
articles "Tokugawa Peasants: Win, Lose, or Draw", and "How Well did the Peasants Live?" 
262 Progressive crises of this kind, from food deprivation through widespread hunger and 
starvation to famine, are discussed in the works of Sen, Arnold and other scholars specializing in 
the history, causes, symptoms or prevention of famines. 
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the domain authorities; or as a hired casual labourer, with no resource or 
entitlements. 
Thus an overall pattern emerged where, although the economy expanded 
through the eighteenth century while the population remained almost static, a 
large part of the farming sector experienced increasing poverty and insecurity. 
Key wealthy rural landholders, who had previously cushioned the harshness of 
lean years for the relatives and tenant dependants who worked their lands, 
gradually gave up cultivating all but their most productive land. They gave over 
some less fertile areas to relatives and rented out fields to tenants in purely 
commercial arrangements, investing their own surpluses in money-lending or 
industrial ventures in local villages and towns. Those same households were in 
large part those who held powerful positions in village administrations, 
including the right to allocate tax burdens among farmers. This gave certain 
established households hereditary political and economic advantages over the 
majority of other villagers, who cultivated smaller or less productive fields and 
had limited rights, or no rights at all, to make use of public lands. Given these 
trends, the insecurity and anxiety of poorer villagers increased, resulting in 
more and more protests and uprisings, especially in times of food scarcity. 
Notwithstanding the upheavals and distress that accompanied them, 
food supply crises continued to occur with increasing frequency, as did the 
angry reactions of disadvantaged groups in towns and villages. Tokugawa 
authorities cruelly punished protest leaders, and sometimes granted particular 
petitions. They failed, however, to address the fundamental causes of the 
disturbances, despite the fact that the spectre of famine had long been 
acknowledged as a serious threat to the survival, prosperity and peace - not 
only of individuals, households and local communities, but of entire polities as 
well. 
III Harvest failure and famine in Mutsu 
Today, Tohoku produces 20cro of Japan's rice harvest, despite a climate 
that allows only single cropping. A significant proportion, including some very 
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popular household varieties, comes at competitive prices from around 
Hachirogata in Akita prefecture, close to the border with Aomori prefecture. 
This was also the border between the old provinces of Mutsu and Dewa; Mutsu 
originally comprising roughly the area that is now Aomori prefecture. See Map 1 
on page 10. This is an indication that the region was not terminally unsuited to 
any kind of rice production. In hindsight, however, it is clear that given the 
conditions that prevailed during the Tokugawa period, Nanbu, Hachinohe and 
Tsugaru were on the very margins of viable rice country. All three domains 
were exposed to the cold, northeasterly yamase winds. The Tohoku Pacific 
coast was particularly vulnerable to cold weather, and the cold atmospheric 
conditions there often brought flooding rains to Tsugaru. These three 
northern domains did not, however, always have parallel experiences of dearth 
and famine. 
Terminology is not consistently used in official records or histories of 
food scarcity and famines, while measures and definitions are rarely provided. 
From the sources listed for Figure 3 and Table 6 (see pages 192,194), however, 
it can be concluded that Tsugaru had at least fourteen bad seasons in the 
period between 1591 and 1839, of which nine were complete crop failures; and 
that Nanbu had nine crop failures, but as many as forty-three bad harvests. 
(i) Early trends 
It did not augur well for Tsugaru that within months of Hideyoshi's 1591 
confirmation of as daimyo, the farmers of his newly-established domain 
registered a major harvest shortfall of about 80 percent. A quarter-century 
later, in Genna 1 (1615), the year Tokugawa Ieyasu besieged Osaka castle and 
killed Hideyoshi's heirs, there was a complete crop failure in Tsugaru: and the 
following year was so bad that the rice seedlings were not even planted out in 
the domain's paddies. The harvest of Genna 1 was recorded as a daikyosaku, 
indicating major crop failure with less than 25% of a normal yield harvested. 
It was caused by a typhoon with heavy rain in early summer, followed by 
yamase winds and then early frosts, which fell on the ears of grain during the 
ath month before harvest time. 
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According to the Eiroku nikk1: when news of this crop failure reached 
the second daimyo, Nobuhira, who was in attendance in Edo, he hastened home. 
Taking the old official route, his entourage crossed the seaside border with 
the Satake (Akita) domain at Omagoshi, on the 27th day of the 12th month. 
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Figure 3: Number of years. in 25-year intervals. in which major harvest failures 
or famines were recorded for Nanbu. Hachinohe and Tsugaru. 1600-1850. 
Sources: Arakawa Kikin, pages 42,71; Kikuchi, Kinsei no k1kin, pages 1-5; Kasai, KegaJ1: 
pages 4-7. 
Note: The Hachinoe domain did not come into existence until 1664. 
The men carrying the daimyo's palanquin had to pick their way through, and 
sometimes over, several hundred corpses scattered over the sand. They were 
the bodies of people who had been trying to flee the domain he ruled. It was 
also recorded in the Eiroku nikkithat when the daimyo reached Hirosaki, the 
corpses of famine victims choked the castle moat, and that piles of bodies 
were being made on the outskirts of town when the daimyo reached his capital. 
In the following year, Nobuhira was so disturbed at the number of 
empty houses appearing in Tsugaru's towns and villages that he made 
arrangements to import rice from Echigo for distribution to the hungry. When 
it arrived, he had the rice cooked and fed to needy people, who had not eaten 
adequately for a year or more. Many of them died immediately, and their 
corpses were added to the large piles of starvation victims on the outskirts of 
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Hirosaki. These heaps of bodies were called gakiyama (!~*'rll), evoking the 
hungry ghosts of one of the Buddhist hells. Nobuhira then applied to the 
bakufu and obtained a further 10 ,000 koku of rice on loan. The distribution of 
this relief grain, some of it in the form of convalescent-strength gruel, aided. 
the eventual recovery of the domain. 
The Kan'ei famine years of 1641 and 1642 brought severe hardship to 
both Tsugaru and the neighbouring domain of Nanbu, where less than half 
normal yields were harvested in 1640 as well. A substantial number of 
starvation deaths were again recorded in Tsugaru. Although the third daimyo, 
Nobuyoshi, obtained rice on emergency loan from the bakufu, he did not engage 
in a sustained relief effort to compare with that of Nobuhira during the Genna 
famine. In contrast, the Nanbu administration once more had enough grain and 
cash reserves to provide relief for most of the hungry, albeit on starvation 
rations, and almost no deaths were recorded. 
The general pattern during these early decades was for poor harvests 
in Nanbu to be precipitated by extreme climatic conditions; whereas, in 
Tsugaru, what were actually milder versions of the same environmental factors 
were exacerbated by government mismanagement, and famines occurred. In 
the fledgling domain of Tsugaru, administrative inexperience and incompetence 
led to the neglect of official involvement in preparations for disaster relief, 
such as the supervised storage of food grains. To make matters worse, 
manpower was subtracted from the agricultural routine for irrigation works in 
new rice fields that were being established, and construction projects like the 
new castle. There was therefore a generally higher incidence of both famine 
and casualty rates in Tsugaru than in Nanbu until the Genroku years. 
In the following table, because of the way data were selected to keep 
the table manageable, the tendency of bad harvests to cluster in periods of 
two to five years is not so obvious, but that is a feature in the northern 
Tohoku domain records. It is noticeable, too, that a pattern recurred in Nanbu, 
of two or three less-than-optimal harvests followed by a drastically reduced 
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one, which was sometimes followed by famine; then one single bumper harvest 
would follow, after which there were two or three very lean years. 
Table 6: 1-b-Yest in ~ Hachiiohe Cl1d Tsm:n.i from - .• 
Year Nanbu Hachinohe Tsugaru Year Nan bu 
1694 50+%1oss 50+%1oss 1748 50+%1oss 
95 Famine Famine Famine 49 50+%1oss 
96 25+%1oss 50+%1oss Famine 50 
1699 75+%1oss 75+%1oss 1753 50+%1oss 
1701 50+%1.oss 50+'Yoloss 1755 Famine+ 
02 Famine Famine 75+%1oss 56 50+%1oss 
1705 50+%1oss 50+%1oss 50+%1oss 57 25+%1oss 
1707 25+%1oss 50+%1oss 50+%1oss 1767 50+1oloss 
1711 25+%1oss 1772 50+1oloss 
1716 25+%1oss 73 50+%loss 
1720 25+%1oss 50+%1oss 74 
1723 25+%1oss 25+%1oss 1776 50+%1oss 
24 25+%loss 25+%1oss 1778 25+%1oss 
25 50+%1oss 25+%1oss 79 25+%1oss 
1728 25+%1oss 50+%1oss 25+%1oss 80 25+1oloss 
29 25+'Yoloss 25+%1oss 81 25+%1oss 
1733 25+%1oss 25+%1oss 82 25+1oloss 
1737 50+%1oss 50+'Yoloss 83 Famine+ 
1741 25+'Yoloss 25+%1oss 50+%1oss 84 Famine 
1744 25+'Yoloss 25+%1oss 85 Famine 
Notes on Table 
25+'Yoloss represents the Japanese term fusaku(/GW); 
50+%1oss represents the Japanese kyosaku(l29f'F); and 
75+'Yoloss represents the Japanese daikyosaku(*.1291-t). 
1o Termei 1694-1785 
Hachinohe Tsugaru 
25+'Yoloss 
25+%1oss Famine 
Famine 
50+%1oss 
Famine+ No deaths 
50+%1oss 
50+%1oss 
50+%1oss 
50+%1oss 50+%1oss 
50+%1oss 
50+%1oss 50+'Yoloss 
75+%1oss 50+'Yoloss 
50+%1oss 
25+%1oss 50+'Yoloss 
50+%1oss 50+%1oss 
25+%1oss 
25+%1oss 50+'Yoloss 
Famine+ Famine+ 
Famine+ Famine+ 
Famine+ 
Famine, or k1kin (Mil), means a complete harvest loss followed by starvation and a 
significant number of deaths. 
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Famine+, used for daikikin C:*Mil), indicates a complete harvest loss followed by many 
starvation deaths, usually lasting into the following year, often occurring through a 
number of regions, and possibly accompanied by epidemic disease. 
The percentages are those devised by Morita for use with Nanbu figures. His basic 
table has been altered according to the other sources given. I have left out years 
when only one of the three domains recorded harvest losses, unless severe damage was 
noted for Tsugaru. 
Sources for Table 6: Morita, Nomin, pages 143-145; Kodate Yoshimi,"Tsugaru kikin 
shiryo no ichi kosatsu", pages 49-50; Kasai, Kegaji, pages 4-6. 
After bad harvests had triggered a famine, even when good seasons followed 
the social and economic repercussions still often lasted for several years. 
(ii) The Genroku famines 
Because famine recurred intermittently during the Genroku period, the 
most severe suffering occurred at different times in the three Mutsu domains, 
but for all three the results were exhausting and debilitating. In Nanbu, the 
Genroku famine was the first to assume what was to become the classic 
regional form. In the early 1690s, abnormally cold and wet weather caused a 
succession of bad harvests, with yields hovering around one half normal 
expectations. In the Nanbu pattern outlined above, Genroku 3 and 5 (1690 and 
1692) were particularly bad years, but a normal harvest was achieved in 
Genroku 6. The following year, however, a daikyosakuof less than one quarter 
the normal yield was recorded, and signs of famine began to appear. The 
Nanbu government was able to distribute relief rice all the way through 
Genroku 7 (1694 ), but, when rain and cold temperatures reduced the 1695 
harvest by 70%, famine conditions spread through the domain, affecting the 
northernmost districts most severely. 
In Genroku 9 (1696 ), after much improved weather during the growing 
season, but with significantly diminished manpower in the fields, the harvest 
intake recovered to around 80% of optimal levels. Through the previous year, 
and in the winter and spring months of Genroku 9, though, a total of around 
40,000 people are recorded to have died of starvation. 
In Hachinohe, the climatic conditions were much the same as those in 
Nanbu. As early as Genroku 7 (1694) the domain placed an embargo on th.e 
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export of grain. Even though there were many hungry people in Hachinohe over 
the following three or four years, no deaths from starvation were registered 
and they could even offer some relief to victims who had fled from Tsugaru.263 
Towards the end of the 1690s, though, there was the same series of poor 
harvests as was recorded in Nanbu. 
The Genroku famine struck Tsugaru in the year Genroku 8 (1695), and 
up to the ath month of Genroku 9 as many as 100 ,000 deaths due to illness or 
starvation were said to have occurred. The incumbent ruler was the 
celebrated and apotheosised fourth daimyo, Nobumasa: he who had presided 
over the latest and most meteoric increase in Tsugaru's productivity, which, 
according to the Jokyo period land survey, had surpassed 300,000 koku (see 
Chapter 2). Cold yamase winds were recorded for the spring and summer of 
Genroku 8, followed by frosts and early snow, resulting in a harvest of about 
30% of normal yields. The people are recorded to have been still wearing their 
watairiwinter garments, padded with raw cotton, as the middle of summer 
approached. 
Despite the weather, during the 6th month of that year Tsugaru's 
government authorities shipped 100,000 hyo(bales) of rice out of the domain 
through the port at Ajigasawa. The threat of famine must already have been 
palpable at that stage. Equally arresting are the domain's records of corvee 
labour, requisitioned from farming villages at the rate of three hundred men 
each day to work on constructing stone ramparts for Hirosaki castle and 
enlarging the southern irrigation reservoir.264 More evidence of the 
insouciance of Tsugaru's bushi elite can be seen in one anecdote from Edo. On 
the 1st day of the 8th month of 1695, after the Sendai, Nanbu and Akita 
daimyos had all reported significant harvest failures in their domains, the 
shogun, Tsunayoshi, enquired about conditions in Tsugaru. Nobumasa, oblivious 
of his people's plight, is said to have given his overlord great pleasure when he 
answered that the domain was anticipating at least a 70/'o harvest. 
263 Morita, Nomin, page 150. 
264 Ibid., page151. 
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When, in the middle of the 8th month, the gravity of the situation in 
Tsugaru became apparent, work on the castle walls was halted and notification 
sent to Nobumasu in the capital. The embarrassed daimyo had to wait for the 
Akita daimyo to communicate the sad news to the shogun before he could apply 
for the 10,000 ryohe knew was generally available towards relief. In 1696 and 
1697 up to 15 ,000 chobu of land in the domain was left completely unplanted; 
but, although the assessed tax obligations of those empty fields were waived, 
no reductions were made in the amounts collected from other areas. Payments 
stood as the presiding daikan had assessed them. Given this combination of 
natural disaster, financial opportunism, political carelessness and tax 
extraction, the appalling and much-quoted figure of 100,000 Tsugaru lives lost 
in the Genroku famines seems understandable, if exaggerated. 
Extrapolating from the population of 149.569 persons registered in 
1706, the drop in Tsugaru's population would have been something like 40%. 
This seems impossibly high, even considering the number of people who might 
have fled in search of food and work, and the depressed birth rate for several 
years after the famine. Still, the story is told that four separate burial places 
were designated, where day after day large holes were dug and four our five 
hundred bodies buried together at a time. Sometimes, when there were more 
corpses than collectors could cope with, the birds and dogs would tear them to 
pieces in the streets.265 
Both Tsugaru and Nanbu enjoyed standard harvests in Genroku 10 and 
11 (1697 and 98), but the following year brought continual rain and low 
temperatures that resulted in a major harvest failure in Nanbu, where 20,786 
people were given relief aid. Harvests in the following three years were dismal. 
Relief aid was provided to 2,858 people in Genroku 14 (1701) and to 54,111 
people in Genroku 15. Some 20,500 deaths during those two years were 
attributed to starvation. In Nanbu, then, famine conditions prevailed over at 
least eight of the Genroku years, with extreme harvest shortfalls resulting in 
265 Tsugaru shijiten, page 153. 
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the domain's reserves being drastically reduced by constant distributions of 
relief grain. 
Less than optimal harvests followed for several years, but a good 
harvest in Genroku 13 (1700) brought some relief. In Genroku 14 and 15, 
persistent rain and floods again caused significant crop damage. Tsugaru's 
government seems to have recovered a great deal of optimism after a good 
harvest in Genroku 16; for when the rice price rose to a favourable level, four 
grain dealers in Ajigasawa and Aomori were given permission to export their 
very large stocks of rice. The next year's harvest was not a complete disaster, 
but it was recorded that there was insufficient food grain in the domain and 
that starvation deaths again occurred. 
In Genroku 15 (1702), the weather in Hachinohe was very cold at the 
beginning of the 6th month. The rice plants did not ripen at all, and in the 
middle of the ath month, typhoon winds and heavy rains caused floods. A loss 
of 17,800 kokuwas recorded, against the domain's formal assessment of 
20 ,000 koku. A major famine resulted. A note recorded on the 20th day of the 
1st month of Genroku 16 referred to villages in turmoil, and beggars and gangs 
of hoodlums being driven away. In a survey conducted in the 3rd month of the 
same year, 13,660 people were registered as suffering from hunger, and 
16,745 had left for other domains. 1,230 head of cattle and horses had 
already died, and another 378 were in piteous condition. Three years 
previously, the total population of Hachinohe was recorded at 56,664 people, 
which would make the hungry portion in Genroku 16 around 30%.266 
The effects of famine on these three domains reflect variations in 
their vulnerability to cold weather, and the degree of awareness and flexibility 
within their respective governments. In Nanbu, where crop failures were 
familiar, and experience in domain management comparatively long, some coping 
strategies had developed. But in Tsugaru, an area that is recorded to have had 
plenty of rice since the thirteenth century, and had recently experienced its 
most abundant harvests ever, there appears to have been little apprehension 
266 Morita, Nomin, pages 150-151. 
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of the danger of famine and no procedural provision for relief. The following 
text, which notes these contrasts between the two domains, was written after 
the Genroku famine . 
. . . even the farm labourers in the countryside and the lowest-
ranking bushi attendants all ate rice both morning and evening. 
Not for them any awa (millet), hie (deccan grass), or barley. 
There was also very little common knowledge about local 
sources of wild foods. Even though the roots of certain 
grasses and the leaves of some trees were quite edible, it was 
a rare individual, even among farmers, who knew about them. 
Last year when there was a crop failure, there they all were, in 
the countryside, in the towns, and in the temples, looking about 
for their food. From around the end of the eighth month, a 
lot of people dug fern shoots (warab1) and ate them morning 
and evening just to stay alive. They are normally a luxury. 
Some other items that people found to eat were: white 
radishes, soy bean leaves, wisteria leaves, konbu, wakame, 
straw, goosefoot grass, taro and the young shoots of 
arrowroot vines ... It was the first time that people in 
Tsugaru, from the wealthiest elite all the way down to the 
poorest country folk, had ever been obliged to eat this kind of 
food. 
But, there is a place in Nanbu, called Tanabe, that doesn't have 
many rice fields, where they have always lived on other grains 
and made dishes and gruels from wild foods. Even during this 
last famine there wasn't a single person in that place who died 
of hunger. In this domain too, some people were able to 
survive this latest disaster; and from now on if we could 
prepare everybody better, no matter how badly the harvest 
failed, we could avoid the awful distress of deaths by 
starvation. 267 
In breaking away from the Nanbu administration, the Tsugaru 
leadership left behind the kind of corporate administrative memory and 
traditional practices that went some way towards helping Nanbu cope 
comparatively well through most of the seventeenth century. Hachinohe, with 
its significantly smaller land area in an extremely exposed location suffered 
consistently worse weather conditions, and was not able to build up sufficient 
reserves before experiencing an extraordinary number of inclement growing 
seasons through the Genroku period. 
267 Nihon shomin seikatsu shiryo shuse1; Vol. 7. Tokyo: SanjO-ichi shobo, Pages 302-3. 
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(iii) The Horeki famine 
The Horeki ('.i:M) reign period (1751-1764) did not deliver the wealth 
and prosperity implied in its name to the province of Mutsu. Nor was it a good 
time in other parts of northeastern Honshu. The famine of 1755, often 
referred to as Hogo no kikin ('.i::liO)Mii), was a disaster of the order of the 
Tenmei and Tenpo famines for the entire Tohoku region. It affected domains 
in Dewa province on the Japan Sea coast, throughout Mutsu, and south into the 
Kanto region. 
In the Tsugaru domain, floods had already caused a huge crop loss of 
131,873 kokuand a number of starvation deaths in Kan'en 2 (1749). Nanbu, 
Hachinohe and Tsugaru all noted harvest shortfalls in Horeki 3, and famine 
conditions were recorded in Hachinohe. One or more of the three Mutsu 
domains noted harvest damage in the years Horeki 3, 5, 6 and 7. See Table 6, 
page199. 
In the autumn of Horeki 4, on the other hand, all three Mutsu domains 
recorded abundant harvests. Because it was generally a bountiful year in the 
northeast, rice prices in the region fell markedly, making it more profitable for 
grain to be shipped to the Edo market than sold locally. Merchants operating 
along the Sanriku Pacific coast were able to prof it from the price difference 
and bought up large quantities of rice, particularly in Nanbu268• Even under 
those conditions, it would have been prudent for indebted administrations not 
to ship their grain away immediately, but to store as much as possible until the 
market price rose, as it regularly did, in the following spring. 
The Horeki 5 agricultural year began with a reasonably promising early 
spring. But chilly winds began to blow across the northeastern area from the 
middle of the 5th month; then it rained constantly from the 6th month until the 
end of the sth month, with only six or seven clear days recorded in Nanbu and 
Hachinohe. Heavy downfalls caused landslides and floods that broke through 
dams in Hachinohe, leaving much of the rice crop under water. Yamase winds 
blew over Tsugaru from the beginning of the 6th month, and the sth month was 
268 Kikuchi, Kinsei no kikin, pages 135-36. 
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extremely cold, with frosts falling on the 16th and 17th nights. The freezing 
temperatures instantly withered crops in the few fields where ears of rice 
were on their way to ripening. It was so cold in most fields that the seedlings 
didn't grow at all, but stayed as short as they were at planting out time. 
Occasionally a small ear formed, but none ripened. On the sanpuku, or doyiJ 
days, which were usually the very hottest in midsummer, it was as cold as the 
I 
beginning of winter and people were wearing several padded jackets at once. 
The feet and hands of those who went to tend the rice fields were chilled to 
the bone. 269 
Hachinohe, with a formal assessment of 20,000 koku, reported a total 
crop loss of 18,573 koku.270 The Nanbu and Tsugaru harvests duly came in at 
around 20% of normal expectations. In the shinden (newly-developed) areas of 
Tsugaru, the damage was most severe, with a shortfall of 161,130 koku in fields 
assessed as yielding 196,353 koku5 to 2sho. In the older areas, 34,280 koku 
was lost of an assessed 47,000 koku. When these desolate fields were 
covered with early snow during the 10th month, a few unripe ears poked up 
through the flat whiteness. Hungry vagrants took to hanging about burial 
ceremonies conducted on the edges of the fields, so as to scavenge the small 
makura meshi(pillow food) dumplings that mourners left as offerings on the 
fresh graves of the dead. The people could do nothing but wail and lament that 
famine had come to Oshu.271 
In Nanbu, where the omotedaka (formal assessment) was 100;000 koku, 
and 148,000 kokuwas the normally expected harvest from newly developed 
shinden areas, 75,7170 kokuof the omotedaka was lost, as well as 122,530 
koku in the shinden. Of the total loss, the quantity of rice that was not 
damaged by flooding or strong winds, but simply failed to ripen, was 186,628 
koku. Many of the flooded fields were permanently ruined, their earth works 
and irrigation equipment completely swept away. The cost of losses and 
269 Namikawa Kenji, "Tsugaru hansei no tenkai to kikin", Rekishi, No. 52, 1970, pages 23-41, 
page 24. 
27° From Hachinohe han nikki, cited in Kikuchi, Kinse1; page 126. 
271 Kasai, Kegaji, page 74. 
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damage quoted in Nanbu's report to the bakufu was higher than the amount 
that was to be registered at the time of the Tenmei famine, twenty-six years 
later.272 
In western Tohoku, too, the Satake domain in Dewa experienced a 
record-breaking, cold, wet and windy growing season; then further damage was 
done by insect pests. After flooding rains swept away embankments and dykes 
through a large portion of the domain's rice farming area on the 24th day of 
the 5th month of Horeki 5, an insect plague destroyed what remained of the 
crop. The infestation lasted through the following year as well. To the south 
of Akita, in the Yonezawa domain, cold temperatures prevented the maturation 
of 75,820 kokuof grain, while heavy rain washed away or flooded another 
37,780 koku.273 The large Date domain, on the Pacific coast south of Nanbu, 
reported a total loss of 540,000 kokufrom an assessment of 620,000 koku. In 
Aizu, inland and to the south, around half the harvest was lost to cold 
temperatures and flooding, making the Horeki 5 experience in that domain 
significantly more severe than that of Genroku 8. 
At that point the narrative paths diverge. While other domains in the 
northeast experienced starvation deaths and desertions numbered in the tens 
of thousands, not a single famine death was recorded in Tsugaru, and most of 
the farming population stayed on their lands. Under the leadership of Nyui 
Mitsugi, the administration was reorganised to function efficiently as the 
central mechanism for supporting and sustaining the domain and its population. 
Relief rice was immediately distributed to the destitute; while a series of 
levelling economies and frugalities were enforced throughout the domain. 
On the 15th day of the 9th month, all demands for taxes were waived, 
and small cultivators were permitted to keep what they had harvested for 
their own household use. A loan amnesty was proclaimed, and a strict ban on all 
profiteering put in place. Powerful village headmen, other local officials and all 
wealthy households who were in a position to take advantage of this 
272 Kikuchi, Kinsei, pages 133-34. 
273 Yonezawa shi shi: kinsei hen 2, in Kikuchi Kinsei no kikin, page 128. 
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redistribution of resources were forbidden to make private profits. Officials 
policed restrictions and bans, while all the people of Tsugaru, regardless of 
their age or rank, were urged to petition the domain administration if they 
suspected that anything at all was amiss. Storehouses were systematically 
searched and all surplus grain confiscated and added to the relief store. No-
one was permitted to keep rice aside for any purpose whatsoever, even for 
religious rituals. 
In the Sa toke ki diary, an entry for the 11th month of Horeki 5 reads: 
Dealing in grain was forbidden. If hidden stocks or illegal 
trading were discovered, the offenders were driven from the 
village or banished from the domain. We were absolutely 
forbidden to make mochi, even at new year's.274 
Everyone in the domain was treated equally. No-one was permitted to be 
extravagant, and no-one died. Every month throughout the bitter spring and 
early summer of Horeki 6, relief rice was delivered to each village. 
In Nan bu, where famine relief was very effectively managed during 
most of the seventeenth century, in contrast to the devastation caused by 
harvest failures in Tsugaru, the Horeki famine was particularly hard. The 
domain's earlier financial and economic stability had already been badly shaken 
by the succession of Genroku famines; and the mines that had hitherto 
steadily brought in supplementary income were almost exhausted. In Horeki 3, 
the bakufu struck the final blow to any hope of economic recovery in Nanbu by 
officially requesting support for repairs to the Tokugawa mausoleum at Nikko. 
This compulsory contribution cost the domain considerable manpower and 
50,000 ryo in gold, most of which was borrowed. After the Horeki 4 bumper 
harvest, therefore, the Nanbu administration arranged to ship more than 
100,000 kokuof grain to the Edo market to help offset its official debt and 
cover normal expenses in the capital.275 
To address the domain's financial plight, a frugality order was 
promulgated; expenditures were carefully monitored and forced loans imposed 
274 TKD, page 229. 
275 Morita, Nomin, page 156. 
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on the allowances of retainers. Administrative reforms were undertaken, and 
efforts made to maximize annual agricultural tax income. Despite these 
measures, the debt burden was overwhelming. The domain finally resorted to 
the sale of investitures at a rate of fifty ryo per hundred koku of fief. In the 
middle of the 6th month of Horeki 5, there was not enough rice left in the 
domain's granaries to cover even reduced stipend allowances.276 
After the dimensions of the harvest shortfall became clear, and grain 
supplies had almost run out, official efforts were made to stabilize grain prices 
at affordable levels. Enforcement was impossible, and a black market 
developed because the set prkes were so low. With imports from other 
domains blocked off, food deprivation became acute. Major temples set up 
emergency refuges, eventually supported by the domain through the new office 
of food relief commissioner. There were only scant supplies of grain to 
distribute, made up as weak gruel, and large numbers of people died in 
overcrowded refuges.277 
Many farmers escaped death by giving up their cultivating rights, their 
status and their homes to landlords and creditors. They became nago(~-T), 
owing labour to their landlords; or yadai(mft), who had the same status as 
nago but worked for merchant households. The bones of many rural people 
littered the roads leading south; and hitokai (A~) dealers prowled the 
countryside looking for women and children to kidnap and sell.278 Famine 
conditions lasted into Horeki 7, and were not broken until that year's crop was 
harvested. It is estimated that around fifty thousand people died. 
In the Date (Sendai) domain, too, which usually dispatched around 
250,000 kokuof rice to the Edo exchange each year, bakufu requirements of 
assistance with construction projects at the Ueno shrine in 1749 had brought 
about the exhaustion of relief stores. A shipment of some 300,000 koku, 
including even seed rice that had been collected from village to village in order 
276 Kikuchi, Kinsei, pages 135-6. 
277 Kikuchi, K1kin, pages 138-9. 
278 loc.cit. 
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to meet the demands of creditors in Edo, sank near the port of Choshi. From 
that time onwards, there were no official grain reserves to call on, and the 
domain became increasingly indebted to Osaka merchant houses for annual 
cash advances on its rice harvests. Date's established commercial households 
and wealthy farming families, like those in Nanbu, were invited to make cash 
payments in return for bushi status.279 
A medical specialist from Miyagi prefecture who studied shumon 
aratemecho(compulsory household religious registers) from eighty-seven 
locations in the Date (Sendai) and Nanbu domains, found deaths registered for 
individuals of all ages, and sometimes of whole families at a time, with regional 
mortality reaching a peak in Horeki 6. Using proportionally generalized figures 
from his survey, Aogi calculated that the death toll in Nanbu from the Horeki 
famine would have been 68 ,900. He adjusted that figure downwards to 49 ,100, 
though, to allow for two factors: In the abundant year of Horeki 4 few people 
would have gone seriously short of food; and, the rates of famine mortality in 
his data for Horeki 5 and 6 increased in proportion with the distance north it 
was gathered. Another casualty total, gained from figures reported from 
various Nanbu daikansho, is 49,594 deaths, along with 7,043 houses left empty. 
It is interesting to note that the people of Tanabe in the mountains of 
northern Nanbu, who had survived on alternative foods during the Genroku 
famine (See page 204), suffered very few casualties during this much more 
severe subsistence crisis.280 Other sources suggest that the Nanbu population 
dropped by only 2,217 between Horeki 5 and Horeki 6, but, as happened at the 
time of the Kyoho famine, it is likely that official casualty figures were kept 
low for bakufu consumption .. 281 As well, there are the unknowns always 
associated with determining death tolls that were discussed in Section I (i). 
Aogi noted, by the way, that in most of the death registers he examined, 
the name and alternative names, date of death, place of residence, occupation, 
279 Ibid., pages 136-37. 
28° Kikuchi, Kinse1; page 134. Kikuchi gives the reading tanabufor S3~lm. and Odate gives 
tanabe. 
281 Morioka-shi sh1; cited in Kikuchi, page 133. 
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and family connections of the deceased were entered. Details on close 
relatives and given names sometimes enable the sex of an individual to be 
determined. Only occasionally was the proximate cause of death entered. 
Many registers, or parts of registers, belonging to the temples he consulted 
had been damaged or were missing, due to fires, floods, insect infestation and 
other disasters. His findings on the Date domain were that the death toll was 
between twenty and thirty thousand, with the areas north of Sendai being 
most severely affected.282 
In the Hachinohe domain, which had already experienced famine 
conditions in Horeki 3, and was to be visited by disaster again in Horeki 12, the 
outcome of the devastating harvest failure of Horeki 5 lasted until the 
summer of the following year.283 A local doctor recorded in a diary called 
Jimoku kyosairoku (II=§ !25.J ~~) that the Horeki 5 famine was: 
... a far more dreadful calamity than anything in stories 
passed down through the ages, or written in the ancient 
records. The assessed fields yielded nothing but chaff and 
straw. 
There were fern shoots and the roots of arrowroot vines to 
eat ... and we would all race to get to the familiar places in the 
woods and hills and dig out food to bring back. We made kayu 
(gruel) out of horse chestnuts for elderly people, and mochi 
(glutinous rice cakes) from acorns for the children. Those 
were the elegant dishes. 
We also boiled seaweed and pine bark, flavoured with straw, 
and sometimes added a taste of straw or chaff. Lacquer 
berries were used as a substitute for soybeans. They would 
stave off hunger for a while, but they poisoned some of the 
weaker old people and children. They suffered terrible 
cramps and quite a number of them died. I felt so sorry for 
them that I made up a medicinal broth from dried leaves, and 
that saved quite a few lives. 
It was pitiful to watch people making meals out of the chaff 
they would normally have fed to animals. Day by day, all the 
chickens, dogs, cows, and horses became thinner and thinner, 
and during the night they died. 
People just managed to cling to life from one moment to the 
next, by whatever means they could. There was no way really 
to eke out even a bare living. We had no clothes on our backs; 
282 Ibid page 134. Miyagi ken shi22. 
283 Kasai, Kegaji, page 66. 
there was nothing but suffering all around, and only death to 
look forward to. We could not even offer help to our closest 
relatives, or show any consideration whatsoever to old friends. 
The moneylenders and pawn shops had all emptied their 
shelves and shut up shop. It was the kind of time when the 
small number of businesses that could stay open would sell off 
expensive things at ridiculously low prices. That's just how it 
was. 
If people or horses in this most isolated and far-off village 
died of hunger, their homes and stalls would simply turn into 
their graves. Crows would relish their eyeballs, and dogs would 
gnaw on their arms and legs. When people with bad eyesight 
shuffled about in the street, skulls would roll about in all 
directions. 
The smell was an affront to our noses. Every five steps we 
took, we saw or heard something unspeakable that would 
literally make our hair stand on end. Right before our eyes 
real scenes appeared directly from tales of the most evil 
tortures in the depths of hell. It is said that around one third 
of our people starved to death during this time. Even though 
some of us managed to stay alive, we knew that unless we could 
find real, lasting help, all of us - the living hungry ghosts, the 
dying tormentors in hell, children and grandchildren, and babes 
in arms - would soon be reduced to nothing but tattered 
remains of life's flotsam and jetsam.284 
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In this most marginal northeastern domain, the Horeki weather had not yet 
taken its toll. In the first week of the 7th month of Horeki 9, after two days 
of very heavy rain, the domain suffered major floods, which washed away seven 
hundred bridges and 207 dwellings. Scores of people were killed and the 
damage caused amounted to 45 ,081 koku. Then, before the domain could 
recover, further severe flooding occurred after heavy summer rain in the 
following year as well. 
284 Morita, pages 156-57. 
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(iv) The later eighteenth century 
When warning signs of what would become the Tenmei famine appeared 
in Tsugaru in 1783, the export of rice was prohibited, and all grain in storage 
was collected by the domain. Severe restrictions were placed on the use of 
rice for manufacturing sake, miso and soy sauce. Authorities also requisitioned 
cash from wealthy farmers and merchants, some of whom were granted bushi 
status in return for their "donations". Official domain refuge shelters were 
set up, where the lives of some of the starving were actually saved. The 
government redeemed pawned farm implements on behalf of their owners, and 
continuously exhorted farmers not to leave their land. Loans were taken out 
with the bakufu to fund the return of retainers to their lands. Unfortunately, 
these commendable emergency measures were not matched by foresight: the 
domain treasury had sent its entire agricultural tax intake of some 400 ,000 
hyoto Osaka and Edo the previous year. It was therefore not long before 
people began to die of starvation and cold. In Hirosaki, it was recorded that 
seven great holes were dug to bury the dead.285 
One outcome of the extreme food shortages and suffering of the 
people during the Tenmei famine was that the resentment and despair among 
them reached new levels. Public opinion by this time had turned against rich 
merchants and bureaucratic functionaries, and anger was expressed in the 
widespread violation of laws, conventions and taboos. Wealthy households were 
targeted by more and more violent break-ins, often under the cover of 
deliberately lit fires. Travellers were set upon by highway robbers. Anything 
edible found anywhere at all was fair game, including all kinds of plants, trees, 
roots, leaves, nuts, seeds and bark, as well as cats, dogs, horses and cows. 
Newly covered graves were reopened for the fresh flesh they contained. 
Young children and weak old people were murdered so that their flesh could be 
eaten or sold.286 Organised groups planned strategic attacks on the households 
of rich merchants and farmers and made away with goods and food stocks. 
Government officials and agencies were confronted with strong, angry demands 
285 Hirayama nikki, in Amori-ken shiII, pages 427-430. 
286 Kasai, Kegaji, pages 131-32. 
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and petitions. Before the famine was over, a succession of rural uprisings and 
mass break-ins had occurred in the centers of Hirosaki, Aomori, Hirosu, 
Kizukuri, Ajigasawa and Fukaura. 287 
During the Tenmei famine Tsugaru lost 81,702 people, which was around 
one third of its population. Some 64,000 deaths are said to have occurred in 
Nanbu and 30 ,105 in Hachiohe. If the Horeki famine was precipitated by 
natural causes and managed, for better and worse, by the interventions of the 
state in both Tsugaru and Nanbu, measures taken against the Tenmei disaster 
were both late and inadequate. By this time, the predations of commercial 
markets, too, were an important factor contributing to high prices and food 
scarcity, for mechanisms had become sensitive enough for grain to flow where 
the profits were greatest. It was after this famine that the rice riots and 
other forms of protest noted in Tsugaru became more widespread in the 
northeastern domains. 
III The makings of famine in Tsugaru 
In the chapter of his monograph on famines devoted to discussing the 
nature of peasant societies, Robert Seavoy poses the question: 
During long periods of peace, why do peasant populations 
increase their numbers to the maximum carrying capacity of 
the land during normal crop years and periodically endure 
seasonal hunger or famine during consecutive poor crop 
years?288 
While the farming population of Japan clearly endured hunger and famine at 
periodic intervals, Seavoy's dilemma seems a peculiar one indeed for a student 
of Northeast Asian social history to ponder. The implications of this question 
are: firstly that the farming population of say, Tsugaru, for example, had lots 
of children during good times; and secondly that their dying in periodic famines 
was due to their failure to produce and store enough excess grain to cover 
their needs in poor crop years. 
287 Kasai, Kegaji, page 159. 
288 Robert Seavey, Famine in Peasant Societies, pages 9-10. 
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It would have to be pointed out in answer, firstly, that the population 
sometimes scarcely managed to replace itself, much less increase to anything 
near "the maximum carrying capacity of the land". Secondly, it might be 
retorted that production did increase, but that landlords, money-lenders and 
the state habitually expropriated more than was truly surplus to the needs of 
rural families. Seavoy's premise that there were many periods in farming life 
that could be characterized as long and peaceful is also dubious. As the title 
of Alan Macfarlane's monograph, The Savage Wars of Peace, so vividly suggests, 
periods of dearth and famine regularly inflicted all the horror, destruction and 
suffering of war upon rural households and villages.289 
Famine and starvation in the domains of Tohoku were certainly not 
caused by population problems in the Malthusian sense, but an argument could 
be made that chronic underpopulation, combined with the bakufu's bias towards 
rice as the economic base of the polity, constrained the economic development 
of the region. 
(i) Why people starve 
As the figure below suggests, people in Mutsu suffered starvation and 
famine for complex sets of reasons, natural, sociopolitical and economic. The 
weather, of course, played a large part in ruining crops. As well, however, 
despite the sanguine image portrayed by the dominant ideologies, economic, 
social and political forces combined in the Tokugawa polity to distribute what 
budget surpluses there were amongst elite bushibureaucrats, influential 
religious institutions and prominent commercial households. Meanwhile most 
of the farming population became increasingly impoverished through tax 
extraction. The chain of famine causation in Tsugaru clearly began with the 
natural environment and a hierarchy of rights to the appropriation of food or 
the means to acquire it. The distribution of entitlements to land, labour and 
means of exchange left many households with no bargaining or buying power, 
and nowhere to forage for food. When climatic events triggered crop failures, 
and food was scarce, the burden of tax obligations pushed households over the 
289 Alan Macfarlane, The Savage Wars of Peace. Oxford: Blackwell, 1997. 
poverty line to the point where members suffered serious food deprivation, 
starvation or death. 
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Source: Adapted from Millman and Kates, "Toward Understanding Hunger", in Newman 
(ed.) Hunger in History, page14 
(ii) Natural calamity 
We have seen that over the two and a half centuries of Tokugawa rule, 
the people of Japan experienced famines that were triggered by a wide range 
of causes. Insect pests and foraging animals, afflicted domains from Fukuoka 
in the south to Akita and Hachinohe in the north, and although cold, wet 
weather was the scourge of the northeast, drought was sometimes a problem 
in other regions. Volcanic eruptions caused serious disruptions to seasonal 
plantings, and typhoons in summer often ruined crops that were on the point of 
being ready for harvest. 
In Nanbu, Hachinohe and Tsugaru, the especially bad times were when 
low temperatures, constant rain, and the yamase winds combined. Even now, 
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although rice seedlings are usually planted out a little later in Tsugaru than 
Nanbu, and sturdy, cold-resistant varieties have been developed, the harvest is 
still usually earlier in Tsugaru. Growing conditions on the Nanbu side of the Ou 
Mountains remain less favourable for the same, old, reasons. In a book written 
early last century by Morita's father, the typical Nanbu pattern for bad years 
is described as follows: 
Spring temperatures would stay low and snow would stay on 
the ground until late, so that the planting out of rice seedlings 
was delayed. Then in around the 6th month the rainy season 
would begin, and rain continued to fall while the temperatures 
stayed cool and the yamase winds blew from the northeast. 
When summer came, people would still be wearing their padded 
clothing, the sun would shine only weakly and the young plants 
would make no progress at all. The ears of grain would begin 
to form very late, and then the cold winds and rain of autumn 
would arrive. A heavy frost around the middle of the sth 
month would turn the plants white, and they would wither 
where they stood.290 
Because of the weather, the odds in Nan bu had always been against 
abundant rice harvests; so the people had become accustomed to raising millet, 
soy beans and other upland crops as emergency food supplements. The Nanbu 
fields were even measured using larger units than elsewhere because their 
productivity was so low. If conditions were good, of course, it was far more 
profitable to grow rice than anything else in Mutsu, so domain authorities in all 
three domains insisted on generation after generation of farmers giving 
priority to raising and planting out rice seedlings, even in years when the 
weather was unpromising. 
(iii) The makings of disaster in relations of power 
In geographic and political terms, as we have seen, Tsugaru was a 
peripheral domain in the Tokugawa structure. The population had grown over 
centuries, from the interaction of northern peoples with those from the south 
who gradually moved into the region and expropriated the land and resources. 
The social organization and political institutions of southern and central Japan, 
290 Morita, page 146. 
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including the preference for settled rice cultivation, were formally imposed 
over the whole of the Tsugaru region by 1611. This was the year when Tsugaru 
Nobuhira, the founding daimyo's son, moved into the new castle he had built in 
Hirosaki. The political compact his father had entered into with the Tokugawa 
shogun, in order to retain possession of the domain, obliged Nobuhira to obey 
directives from Edo to a degree not necessarily imposed all other daimyos.291 
In opening up vast areas of new land for rice cultivation, the second, 
third and fourth Tsugaru daimyo not only exceeded the achievements of all 
their peers, they committed generations of farming subjects to an enterprise 
for which the climatic conditions were to be unfit. Furthermore, the political 
economy of the Japanese state had been founded on the expropriation of 
surplus production by the governing elite. With extensive groundwork done by 
both Nobunaga and Hideyoshi, the structures and mechanisms of that process 
were already highly developed by the time Ieyasu was establishing his bakufu 
in Edo; and the division of the population into separate occupational groups was 
an ideal fast becoming the reality in many domains. 
During the decades of expansion in Tsugaru, people of both farming and 
bushibackgrounds were given incentives to settle in the newly developed areas. 
The result was a population spread rather thinly over large districts where 
water flows were only just under control, and the climate only marginally 
suitable. The region was in fact endowed physically with enough flat land and 
water resources for quite adequate rice production, even in the Tokugawa 
period: but it was the unreliable weather - excessive rains and low 
temperatures - during the growing season that regularly brought on calamity. 
While the new domain's institutions and economic base were being 
developed, Tsugaru's resources in manpower, wealth and materials were 
291 Ravina, in Land and Lordship emphasises this punctiliousness in Tsugaru relations with the 
bakufu, but it seems quite natural, since the other major northern domains had been 
acculturated to central authority to a much greater degree than the Tsugaru lineage, and 
therefore did not need to alter, or devise, ways of doing things in order to conform to the Edo 
models. The fact that there was so much land available for developing new rice fields is an 
indication of the degree to which Tsugaru had not been penetrated by southwestern patterns of 
social and political organisation. 
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seriously depleted. There was the construction of an entire new castle, 
completed in 1611, the surrounding residential and commercial areas, and then 
refurbishing of the monumental Choshoji temple, to commemorate the domain's 
founder, Tamenobu. As well as meeting the financial costs of these projects, 
the huge amounts of labour was obtained by the imposition of corvee levies on 
rural villages.292 This drain of manpower from the countryside meant that 
important seasonal tasks were neglected or skimped. The collection and 
preparation of organic fertilizers, for example, and working them into the soil 
before planting out; or the preparation of seeds, starting them off at planned 
intervals, raising the seedlings, and the successive plantings of different rice 
varieties to ensure optimal harvests, were tasks that required effort and co-
ordination over a long period beginning towards the end of winter and lasting 
until early summer. During 1615 on the Choshoji site alone, one thousand 
labourers from farming areas were drafted every day, starting after New 
Year's; exactly coinciding with the most demanding time of the agricultural 
year.293 
As well as routinely failing to be guided by the agricultural calendar, the 
Tsugaru administration did not seem to accrue much wisdom concerning 
reserves of food grains. This was a subject that seemed to exercise NyiJi 
Mitsugi's mind a great deal. The domain's record of selling off surplus rice 
good years, and even in the spring of bad years, so that there was none left in 
storage against famine is evidence of astonishing short-sightedness - as well as 
debts and overspending in Edo and the Kamigata. The lack of attention given 
to provision for famine relief was partly an outcome of the prosperity of 
earlier years, but Tsugaru's trajectory through the Genroku famine years, for 
example, is a telling example of the contribution human institutions can make to 
suffering and disaster. 
Structural and circumstantial causes also included inappropriate rural 
administrative practices and heavy tax exactions. Tax rates in Tsugaru were 
292 TRK, pages 66, 67, 68. 
293 Loe. cit. 
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higher than allowed for the usual equal shares for ruler and people. They were 
actually over 60% at times. The rate was a proportion of the assessed taxable 
yield, called the ?t*, but in Tsugaru this was rarely accurate, and the yields 
were much higher. The rate went down according to the quality of the fields. 
Comparing Tsugaru's taxation method with Nanbu's, it was not as fair or 
rational, as it was lighter on fields that yielded more. In Tsugaru, even geden 
low-grade fields were taxed at around 60%. Probably in both domains, the 
exactions were at lower rates of the actual harvests than figures suggest; but 
it was still true that the less land a farmer cultivated, the greater his burden, 
and the less grain his family were able to reserve for food. When farm 
households were living on the margins, one harvest shortfall would often beget 
another because of the loss of manpower caused by the first. Discussion of 
the ways in which the Tsugaru government contributed to famine disasters is 
continued in the following section. 
IV Managing the hazards 
(i) Measures taken by farmers 
The first obvious preventative measure against starvation that could be 
taken at household level was to avoid dependence on rice as the dominant 
source of nutrition. Not surprisingly, it was the farmers in Nanbu who came up 
with the longest lists of alternative foods to rice, and many different varieties 
of food grains that could be used for re-plantings after early- and mid-spring 
crops had failed. It is recorded that during the Tenmei famine relief 
foodstuffs originating in Nan bu were delivered as far afield as Echigo. 
As well as the large range of rice varieties, farmers in Nanbu had 
developed 51 kinds of early ripening millet, 97 midterm varieties and 119 late 
ripening varieties. For glutinous millets and hie (deccan grass), too, they could 
distinguish respectively 5 and 28 early varieties, 9 and 29 midterm ones, and 
96 and 28 late ripening kinds! For years when the snow melted late or the 
spring and summer were cold, grains belonging to the late groups would have 
been vitally important. In addition to those very hardy grain types, they also 
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Figure 5 (opposite): Hazard sequence for a rice-producing household in Tsugaru 
Source: Adapted from Millman and Kates, in Newman (ed.), Hunger in History, page 6. 
raised different varieties of kibi(another millet), wheat, barley, soy beans and 
azuki beans.294 
One resourceful feature of this considerable ongoing effort was 
developed around the custom of one or more villages banding together to 
contribute to a savings scheme so that a pilgrim could be sent on a trip to the 
shrines at Ise. Apart from the serious task of petitioning the kamiwhen he 
got there, this pilgrim delegate would be charged with closely observing 
farming practices along the way while on his trip, and, where possible, seeking 
out the seeds of promising plants to bring home for experimental planting. As 
well as wearing the amulets he brought them, and hearing his accounts of the 
journey and the prayers he had offered on their behalf, the villagers would 
plant and carefully monitor the seeds he had bought or otherwise gathered. 
Names for early-ripening rice like Sendai kowase, and Tsugaru wase, or 
Miyako mochi for a glutinous variety give clues to the origins of some of the 
seeds Morita lists from an older record.295 The farmers would use manures, 
cut grass, and other fertilisers with great care during these experiments, in 
hope of discovering or breeding developing hardy crop varieties. Mutsu 
farmers also tried to heat irrigation water for planting out time by digging 
extra channels around the borders of their paddies. Chilly water that had 
filled storage ponds during the spring melt would be exposed to warmer spring 
air temperatures before being flooded over the rice seedlings. 
Even with the kind of ingenuity and perseverance evidenced by these 
measures, much of Nanbu's population and the rest of Mutsu's inhabitants seem 
to have lived on the edge of starvation. Many times over, after a few good 
years, official managers and merchants in all three domains gambled on a 
bumper rice harvest and invited the market to gobble up the contents of their 
granaries, only to have the region overtaken by crop failures. Larger, more 
294 Morita, Nomin, pages 140-143. 
295 Loe.cit. 
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wealthy households were able to store some grain for emergency use, or even 
grow cash crops or engage in money-lending. 
The smaller-scale owner-cultivator had access to his crops, but it was 
incumbent upon him to give priority to rice production and most of his output 
was expropriated in taxes. He was hard put to stretch what was left to 
maintain his family, save seed and pay for fertilizer. Family sizes in the region 
were not large, so options for starving households were reduced to selling off 
property, migrating, or waiting at home, conserving their energy and hoping for 
food relief. The property sold or pawned often included farm implements, or 
even the land itself, leaving households even less able to produce viable outputs 
and thus even more vulnerable to famine. 
(ii) Interventions by governments 
The Tsugaru administration compared very badly with that of Nanbu in 
its capacity to conceive of strategies for countering the damage done by 
famines. Apart from periodic suggestions that farmers plant cash crops, there 
seems to have been little practical effort to break down the predominance of 
rice production as the focus of agriculture, even though crop failures 
repeatedly devastated food supplies, and it was a struggle to recover both 
population and production levels after they occurred. Despite the remarkable 
increases in domain productivity during the seventeenth and early eighteenth 
centuries, official spending Edo and Tsugaru more than kept up with income, 
resulting the depletion of reserves and mounting debt 
The average Tsugaru daimyo did not live to see his forty-ninth birthday; 
so, given that they spent their youth in Edo, a number of them must have ruled 
with no recollection of the horror of famine. Perhaps that was why the second 
daimyo distributed cooked rice grains instead of gruel to victims of the Genna 
famine. In spite of these hiatuses in memory and practical experience at the 
highest level, though, it would be surprising if there were not domain elders 
with living memories, or at least fathers and grandfathers to tell them 
cautionary tales. Whatever the reason, the domain in general neglected the 
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maintenance of relief stores: perhaps repeated experiences of poor harvests 
that did not trigger famines in some perverse way added to the corporate 
carelessness. 
The role of commercial markets in the Tsugaru political economy also 
militated against the careful management of food supplies. At times when 
harvests in the northeast were abundant and prices therefore lower than 
those further south, commercial agents could profit handsomely from sailing 
north to buy up rice. Merchant activity of this kind depleted rice stocks in 
Tsugaru just before the Genroku famine, and in Nanbu just before the Horeki 
5 harvest failure. Sometimes bureaucratic efforts were made to control rice 
prices after famine conditions developed, but stocks had often been sold off 
to visiting merchants at market prices during the early spring before food 
supplies for the following winter had been secured. 
As the earlier discussion of domain debt showed, from at least the 
Genroku period onwards there was a constant demand for substantial rice 
deliveries to the Tsugaru agents in Osaka to meet domain expenses in Edo and 
outstanding debt repayments. Importunate offers of payments over the local 
market price from merchants on the spot were therefore not easy to turn 
down. Neither was the planting of alternative food crops of minimal market 
value likely to be officially encouraged. 
Tsugaru's government did open official famine relief shelters when mass 
hunger was apparent, but, as has been noted, they seem more often than not to 
have been places where large numbers of people simply went to die. This 
impression is consistent with Kikuchi Isao's comment that official shelters 
were often no more than a gesture symbolising the compassion of rulers, while 
there is little evidence of serions intentions to actually save the lives of the 
starving people who took refuge in them.296 
During the Horeki crisis in Tsugaru, several deviations from customary 
government practice were very effective. They included: the storage of a 
296 Kikuchi Isao, "Kikin to segyo koya", in Watanabe Nobuo, Kinsei Nihon no minsho bunka to se1ji, 
Tokyo: Kawade shobo shinsha, 1992, Pages 189-206, page 202. 
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substantial amount of rice from the previous year's harvest in the domains 
granaries; the strict control of all grain marketing; the early provision of relief 
rice; and the collection and redistribution of all surplus food grains in the 
domain. Nyui Mitsugi demonstrated through his reform and relief measures in 
Horeki 5 and 6 that radical departures from precedent and custom could 
indeed save lives, and that they were best undertaken at the highest levels of 
government. 
The Horeki 4 harvest failure was of life-threatening proportions, and 
was followed throughout northern Honshu by the Horeki famine. In most of 
the Tohoku region, this was a famine that destroyed lives and lands and 
livelihoods on a large scale. In Tsugaru, it wasn't. 
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Chapter 5 
Order in the social world, security for the people 
Said the dragonfly to the praying mantis: 
You seem to have the disposition of a warrior, always fronting 
up to things swinging your axe. What an aggressive attitude to 
life! That is why you have the reputation expressed in the 
saying, "Like the mantis standing up against the great Imperial 
chariot, swinging his little axe." This is a metaphor for not 
knowing your proper status, pointing out how silly it is to pit 
oneself against impossible odds. Don't you feel humiliated? 
The praying mantis replied, saying: 
I do not take any pleasure in being aggressive. And, it is not 
the case that I am unaware of what you say. I just seem to 
have the natural disposition of one born into an axe-wielding 
lineage. I have always been this way. I don't necessarily wish 
to face up to great chariots and vanquish them; but nor do I 
wish to be crushed by them. It is simply my lot to want to 
stick by my principles, and to put the welfare of my family 
first. Surely this is common to all living things, not limited 
just to me. Even the likes of parasites and Mayflies open their 
mouths and snap at things that come too close to them. 
Nyui Mitsugi297 
Despite the title of Mitsugi's allegorical work, "Gochuron" (3iil~m1), 
which means "Debate among five insects", only the dragonfly and the mantis 
appear in it. 298 The introduction is dated Horeki 12 (1762), which is the 
earliest date to appear in any piece of writing by Mitsugi contained in the 
Complete Works. The piece appears to have been written during the years he 
spent under house arrest after his dismissal in Horeki 8 (1758), and in it very 
strong convictions are expressed, in the voice of the praying mantis, about the 
nature of good administration. Contempt and frustration are also expressed, 
towards those who did not share his views. The mantis is particularly scathing 
about those who remain passive or retreat in the face of imminent danger; in 
what can be read as thinly disguised censure of Mitsugi's colleagues in the 
Oshirabekata for their failure to support his reform policies. 
297 NMZ 4, "Gochoron", pages 315-42, pages 321-22. 
298 The work and the three other insects are discussed on page 53. 
230 
In his introduction to "Gochuron", Mitsugi refers to his respected 
predecessor, Yamaga Soko, whose banishment to Ako he perhaps recalled with 
some special sympathy at the time. He was, he claimed, modelling himself on 
Soko in "setting out his argument in the guise of insects' voices". In so doing, 
it was his intention to "clearly distinguish right from wrong", and "attack those 
who believe in the dead practices (~~O)fi"V.) of Zhu Xi". 299 This is the 
earliest evidence we have from Mitsugi's own hand of his scholarly identity and 
sense of vocation. It was during that same period of detention that he also 
wrote "Shigaku yoben" (A primer for aspiring scholars), his most thorough 
exposition of his positions on various themes in the field of what would now be 
called political economy. 
An animus against Zhu Xi and the other Song Confucians is striking in 
much of Mitsugi's writing, particularly when he is on the subject of domain 
administration. In his work dealing with the imperfect fit between Japanese 
social and political life and the underlying tenets of Song thought, Watanabe 
Hiroshi throws some light on the reasons for the dissension among Japanese 
Confucian scholars about the nature and purpose of self-cultivation. Watanabe 
suggests that in Imperial China any individual could, theoretically, aspire to 
gaining a responsible government post. Men with such ambitions therefore 
needed comprehensive moral, theoretical and practical training to prepare 
them for a wide range of contingencies. In Japan, where offices were 
hereditary and generally stable, self-cultivation had tended to shift either 
towards training in specialized practical matters like the military arts, or to 
concentration on the private, inner lives of individuals - perhaps in search of 
the kind of fulfilment their administrative work did not provide. 
Whatever the problems Mitsugi faced in the course of his work - and 
they were not few - the need to escape monotony does not seem to have been 
one. Both in and out of office, he seems to have had his mind not only on 
political and economic challenges but on quite practical matters as well. 
299 Mitsugi refers to Soko as his respected teacher (x-T) in the introduction to "Gochuron", 
pages 315-19. 
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Another text believed to have been written during the twenty years between 
Mitsugi's two terms in office is" Okabokl' (~~fffitc), his account of the benefits 
of cultivating upland rice. This is an example of the kind of project dealing 
with practical, hands-on problems to do with agronomy, applied maths and 
surveying that comprised a second field of intellectual engagement for Mitsugi 
in his persona of domain administrator. 
A great deal of his writing is focussed on the meaning of life as a bushi-
administrator in the polity, the moral responsibilities it entailed, and the 
attitudes of mind appropriate to dealing with the demands of the position. 
Mitsugi lived at a time when the ideological edifice legitimating bakufu rule and 
the notional division of society into four occupational groups was firmly in place. 
The arguments in his written works were therefore never about whether the 
bushi ought or ought not be privileged and in charge, but instead focussed on 
the appropriate mindset for a retainer official, how his duties in society were 
defined, and practical ways of fulfilling those duties. 
The following sections are arranged along those lines. In the first, 
some traits of bushi administrators are discussed in terms of what Mitsugi has 
the praying mantis and dragonfly arguing; then some views on the role and 
functions of the bushiin society, as expressed in his commentary on the Ako 
roshiincident, are introduced. In the second, some pieces about work, 
occupations and vocations are commented upon; and in the third, his account of 
work on some practical problems is summarised. 
I A samurai's priorities 
In the "Delusion and enlightenment" (i*•F-fr) section of "Shigaku yoben", 
Mitsugi wrote: 
Society is in turmoil and the people are destitute, yet there is 
not one single scholar directing his attention to administration 
and relief (~i?r). What a wretched state of affairs.300 
300 NMZ 1, "Shigaku yoben", pages 1-408, page 281. 
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Scholarship should, he had already stated in the section entitled 
"Constancy and change" (115~), be "of use to the domain".301 There was no point 
in learning to expound the words and phrases of the rites and the classics 
without aspiring to make positive contributions to the great task of governing 
the country. It was not a matter of "learning all about the ancient sage kings, 
Confucius and Mencius". It was essential instead to "learn from them". The 
Six Classics were merely traces of the Way left to help lead people in the Way. 
To Mitsugi they were in fact all "lifeless dregs" Ctli**i*B~~) of the Way.302 
They were not the Way itself. The task of the scholar was to take into 
consideration all that was sought after by the sages, Confucius, and Mencius in 
their various fields of endeavour, and then put them to use in the "here and 
now".303 
Mitsugi repeatedly stressed the importance of throwing all one's effort 
into addressing the problems of the day. His insistence on direct intervention 
in the affairs of the present, without any hesitation or indecision, perhaps 
originated from his experiences in office when the domain was in crisis - or 
perhaps that was just the constant state of affairs in Tsugaru. He portrays 
even a moment's delay in the face of wretched poverty and starving people as a 
grave moral failing. Expressions like konnichi tadaima (~ S %t~ ), "this very day, 
this very moment", occur repeatedly in his writing. At one stage we find the 
following passage (in which the underlined sections are all attempts at 
rendering konnichi tadaima): 
Governing the state COO*) is done this very day. at this very 
moment. The state is governed in accordance with the 
teachings of the sages. Apart from the teachings of the sages 
there is no Way of Government that is immediately relevant. 
There are no teachings of the sages that are not concerned 
with the immediate present. The teachings of the sages are 
immediate. The immediate present constitutes the teachings 
of the sages. 304 
The praying mantis conveys some of this sense of urgency to the dragonfly. 
301 Ibid., page 231. 
302 Ibid., page 391. 
303 Ibid., ·Delusion and enlightenment", pages 300-301. 
304 Loe. cit. 
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(i) Bushi as praying mantis 
After the mantis points out to the dragonfly, in the passage quoted at 
the beginning of this chapter, that any insect would be angry at the prospect 
of ending up in a child's collection, the dragonfly concedes that he does indeed 
attack in that situation. "No one", he concedes, "wants to be killed just for the 
transient amusement of a child." He then challenges the mantis, pointing out 
that he gives a completely different impression when he, the praying mantis, is 
fronting up to a threatening opponent. From the dragonfly's point of view it 
doesn't look anything like a bold confrontation with an enemy. Instead, it has 
every appearance of frightened timidity, as if the praying mantis is wringing 
his hands, in two minds about what he should do. 
The mantis retorts that such an interpretation was only to be expected 
from a common insect like the dragonfly, and offers to explain, adding that if 
the dragonfly opens his ears and listens carefully, he might get the gist of the 
argument. "What is commonly called timidity", says the praying mantis, "is to 
fail to perceive the kind of danger that makes a truly moral man feel 
threatened, but instead to run away from what the common people consider 
dangerous." 
Timidity, he goes on to say, is to investigate the situation thoroughly 
before anything happens, and when you perceive danger to feign illness and 
retreat in an effort to preserve your best interests, neglecting your duty and 
disregarding justice, not going to the aid of the crisis. It is to show your face 
in peaceful times but to yield and snatch your own safety in times of difficulty, 
to dress up your actions in fine words. It is to take what the vulgar mob calls 
knowledge and make that your own, instead of making up your own mind by your 
own will. All of this is what the bushi and his lord call cowardice. Cowards can 
never distinguish between good and evil, and they make no progress at all. 
The mantis continues in this very critical vein, addressing the failings of 
what can be assumed to be the majority of Tsugaru's key administrators. They 
all suffer from the vice of being ignorant of the Way and are therefore unable 
to grasp the truth. They become wedded to old names and forms. This is 
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because their natural inclination is to neglect the public good and attend to 
their own private affairs. Those of us who wield our axes are not of that ilk; 
we are merely setting up def enc es and keeping ourselves prepared for both 
calamities and opportunities. If a carriage should come in order to attack, we 
would shoot to kill. If a carriage does not come to run over us but passes us by, 
then we can fold up our defences and go home. 
Warming to his theme, the praying mantis continues his lecture. When 
we hear a noble carriage coming, he concedes, we don't deliberately go and 
place ourselves in front of it. There are times, though, when we accidentally 
meet up with one. Then we stick to our principles. The common instinct would 
be to jump in, boots and all; but we know our strength is puny in comparison 
with theirs. How can we be called useless and aimless just because we 
recognise that we will almost certainly lose a fight, and retreat to safety. We 
all have to survive, you know. We might be very small in stature, but that has 
nothing to do with the size of our commitment. 
Mitsugi seems to be implying that he had confronted the domain's fiscal 
crisis, the famine, and the opposition to his reforms, with the best intentions, 
but that the obstacles turned out to be insuperable. There is no doubt, though, 
that this piece is sending the message that active intervention is preferable to 
standing back and watching a bad situation get worse. 
(ii) The misguided loyalty of the Ako retainers 
Perhaps the clearest discussion in all Mitsugi's works of the way men of 
bushi status ought to envisage their role in society is his commentary on the 
Ako vendetta.305 Because of Yamaga Soko's history as a protege of an early 
Ako daimyo, and the strong views expressed in his written works about the 
vocation of the bushito keep order in society, it is interesting that Mitsugi 
should have come down so strongly on the side of the legal decision that the 
305 The daimyo of Ako, Asano Naganori, drew his sword and slightly injured Kira Yoshinaka inside 
Edo castle. Naganori was ordered to commit seppukuand his domain was confiscated. The next 
year, forty-six erstwhile Ako retainers (and one virtual comrade) broke into Kira's residence and 
killed him. The case was the subject of great public interest, a shiso ronso(philosophical 
controversy), and kabuki dramas - which were quickly banned by bakufu censors. 
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forty-six roshi(r!J:.±) had committed a capital crime. His assessment of the 
immorality of their behaviour was much less equivocal than that of the bakufu 
judges or Ogyu Sorai. Both the official verdict and Sorai's commentary on the 
incident were tempered by recognition of the loyalty and single-minded 
dedication of the Ako rosh1: but, according to Mitsugi, these were the very 
qualities in which their delusions were most manifest. 
Let's consider, he wrote, a situation in which bushihid what was on their 
minds and kept their eyes firmly shaded. If you were to carefully examine the 
traditions of all the people of heaven and earth - Japan, China, India, and the 
barbarians as well - you would discover that there is not a single warrior 
principle that allows a virtuous soldier to kill a man in those circumstances. 
This, he adds, is what is meant in Japan by, "the supreme warrior (*'flfit) does 
not kill". This is the fundamental meaning and true virtue of being a fighting 
man. That is why, he goes on to explain, I never try to argue with someone who 
tells me that he has his own good reasons for killing someone. He is violating 
the most basic of principles (in harbouring private reasons for murder, but is a 
person who values resentment over principle). 
Whenever one person kills another, he himself is inevitably bound to 
submit to a death penalty. I do not believe that there has ever been a single 
case of one person living under heaven being killed by another, or even by a 
large group, that has ever been sanctioned by heaven: not from the time the 
heavens and the earth were created until this day. That is why it says in the 
Yijing that the godlike warriors of old were perceptive, intelligent and 
knowledgeable, but they did not ever kill other men.306 
Recently forty-six samurai from Ako under the leadership of Oishi 
Kuranosuke killed Lord Kira to avenge their own lord's death. They argued that 
they had gone to Edo and struck him down because he was evil. From the start 
Oishi resolved to kill him out of resentment. He did not shirk from confronting 
Kira and fighting him: and therefore it is said that he understood the principle 
306 NMZ 1, "Shigaku yoben", page 164. 
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of doing his duty to his ruler. But in the end, that principle was no principle 
and neither Kira nor Oishi and his followers escaped the death penalty. 
In the Reikiit says that it is wrong to kill while still feeling 
resentment.307 Oishi killed Kira, and then later Oishi died. Neither of them 
won or lost. If Kira had still been regarded as a real foe of Oishi's ruler, why 
would Oishi have been sentenced to death? Striking against a foe without 
justification is not among the principles of the way of the bushi Precisely 
because they privately banded together in enmity and harboured resentment 
for the purpose of avenging the virtue of their lord, they ended up as common 
executed criminals. Because they behaved in a way that appealed to the vulgar 
attitudes and beliefs of the mob, they were thought to have upheld bushi 
ideals. In fact, they forgot who they really were, abandoned their own people, 
and off ended gravely against the mighty laws of the realm. 308 
Mitsugi condemned the way in which the Ako forty-six confused their 
affection for their ruler and their sadness over his death with their public 
duty, as well as their apparent desire to earn a public acclaim by a gratuitous 
display of loyalty. They had inappropriately conceived of themselves as 
military retainers, and even then not behaved according to the true way of the 
warrior. 
Mitsugi acknowledged that the first duty of a samurai who has a post as 
a military or administrative retainer is to his lord, or daimyo. This was to 
recognise the first of the basic Confucian social relationships, that between a 
ruler and his minister, or kunshin (7!J;'f!i.). The Ako roshihad, however, 
completely neglected the virtuous way of the ruler and minister. Their 
overlord was dead and his castle had been surrendered to the bakufu. If they 
had wanted to act as bushiretainers, they could have done so by bravely 
meeting their deaths def ending it. There was no doubt about the appropriate 
way for ministers without a ruler to conduct themselves; that was a simple 
307 loc.cit. The Reiki(~~) is the Liji, the Record of Rites. 
308 NMZ 1, "Shigaku yoben", page 164. 
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matter. If the ruler was dead and his territory and headquarters confiscated, 
his retainers were no longer his ministers in the real world. 
As his ministers while he was living and ruling, it had been their 
ordained occupation to serve him, and join with him the sacred task of 
protecting their homeland. They were not hired hands, grateful to him for the 
handouts they received so that they could maintain their households and feed 
their families. The lord had not existed for the purpose of granting favours, 
but to make manifest the will of heaven in his land through the agency of his 
retainers. That had been their justification for living: carrying out the will of 
their ruler to achieve his purposes. 
After his death and the confiscation, there was no ruler, no ministerial 
duty to uphold, no domain in which to serve. What remained to the retainers 
were their wives, their parents, their children, their brothers and their 
friends. It was incumbent upon all men at all times to strive to the utmost to 
sustain these relationships, to keep their families from cold and hunger and to 
follow the way of filial piety and brotherly love. This was the great way of 
human relations (::kMffO))~:). Just for the sake of reputation, to leave home and 
discard one's family like a handful of dirt or mustard seeds, is something that 
even an animal wouldn't do. 
II Vocation as mission 
Bito Masahide, writing in the 1960's and again in the 1980's, has 
explored possible reasons for the relatively peaceful acquiescence during the 
late sixteenth century to the enforced separation of military service from 
farming as an occupation. He suggests that it was at least partly due to the 
much older idea of an individual's shiki (lll) being linked in people's minds to the 
Tokugawa concepts of yaku(~) or shokubunCJl.7J'), combining the ideas of 
social rank, occupation and a corresponding set of duties.309 These ideas seem 
continuous with what Mitsugi construed as an occupation ordained by heaven, 
309 Pages 4-6 of Bito Masahide, "Society and Social Thought in the Tokugawa Period", a lecture 
published in The Japan Foundation Newsletter, Vol. IX, No. 2,3, 1981. Pages 1-9. 
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which he referred to as tenmeishoku (*.{i'pf$..). They do not necessarily, 
however, imply the kind of active commitment that he brought to the category. 
(i) Occupations ordained by heaven 
In Mitsugi's writings, a tenmeishoku, or tenshoku, is not portrayed as an 
inevitable fate to which an individual had to resign himself, but it is instead 
construed as something more like a mission he was being appointed to 
accomplish. It could give people a heightened appreciation of themselves and 
their occupations. This in turn was, as Herman Ooms argues in Tokugawa 
Ideology, a way in which a sense of subordination could be ameliorated and 
desires for upward social mobility foreclosed, especially when members of a 
governing elite adopted an ideological scheme that equated hereditary 
occupations with tenshoku.310 On the other hand, though, such a belief could 
also work to raise the consciousness of the privileged and heighten their 
awareness of their responsibilities towards those they governed. In Mitsugi's 
case it offered a compelling argument for striving to meet those 
responsibilities. 
According to his exposition in the bugei(martial arts) subsection in 
"Shigakuyoben", every single person had a tenshoku, literally ordained by 
heaven, and therefore bore the responsibility of devoting himself to that 
occupation. For the bush1: farmers, artisans and merchants these were 
separate and interdependent functions, as he explains: 
The occup~tions of farmer, tradesman and merchant are the 
three determined by Heaven, and as they are each 
accomplished they contribute to the ongoing welfare of 
society. The farmers should provide various foodstuffs so 
that everyone, from the emperor above to the common people 
below, should have enough to eat without ploughing the fields. 
Is this not the great good achieved by farmers? 
The craftsmen should repair people's homes and make tools 
and implements so that everyone, from the emperor above to 
the common people below is clothed and warm without needing 
to weave, and everyone has enough tools without enduring heat 
310 Herman Ooms, Tokugawa Ideology. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985. See, for 
example, his section on Suzuki Shosan's application of Buddhist concepts in an ideology directed 
at distinguishing the four occupational classes, pages 122-43. 
and cold to make them. Is this not the great good achieved by 
the tradesmen? 
Merchants should deal in various commodities and operate in 
many countries, travelling by ship and cart through China and 
Japan, never faltering over long distances, so that from the 
emperor above to the common people below, all can live their 
lives and manage their affairs without haggling or making 
arduous journeys. This is the great merit of the merchants. 
By means of success in these, their ordained occupations all 
reap their reward and provide support for their parents, 
families and servants. Is this not what is called the bounty 
bestowed by Heaven?311 
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In this way, he went on, the three orders each play a part in creating 
abundance in the realm through devoting themselves to their respective 
occupations. The bushi alone, who drew his stipend without even the slightest 
evidence of achievement in his appointed occupation, was nothing more than a 
parasite on the people. There were those who believed that they were 
adequately fulfilling the role of bushiby becoming skilled experts in the 
minutiae of military tactics, archery, horsemanship, the sword and the spear, 
or by being able to acquit themselves appropriately at a tea ceremony or 
poetry gathering, but this was simply the adoption of "the outward form of a 
bushiby those who were in fact the idle unemployed."312 
According to Mitsugi, the tenshokuof the bush1: which he referred to 
as 11 the way of the bow and arrow", was to attend to the way of the ruler and 
govern the people with virtue so as to secure their success in their occupations 
and thereby bring prosperity to the realm. These were the objectives of the 
bushi as he strove to serve his ruler. The occupation of the retainer was 
therefore to engage in a wide range of activities that were connected with 
governing the domain, including keeping the peace and managing the economy. 
There was no question but that those who were not assigned military roles 
should actively serve in some other capacity. 
This position echoes that of Yamaga Soko, who had questioned the place 
of bushiin peaceful Tokugawa society, asking: 
311 NMZ1, "Shigaku yoben", pages 152-3. 
312 Ibid., page 154. 
240 
How can it be that the samurai eats without tilling the soil, 
makes use of things without making anything, and is able to 
profit without buying and selling?" 313 
Mitsugi made the same general point as Soko that those who had previously 
been warriors were now to identify themselves as moral and ethical exemplars. 
Soko, however, tended to stress the need for bushito realize moral ideals by 
living exemplary lives and admonishing the other orders. Bushi not only ought 
to know, he taught, what tasks were fitting to their status, but they were also 
to: 
... bring righteousness and the rule of Heaven to the realm by 
meting out swift punishments to any members of the other 
three orders who behaved in an immoral way.314 
Mitsugi seems to have been more taken up with the practical 
implications of administrative responsibility. Bushi, he believed, should engage 
in statecraft in order to bring about prosperity and well being in the domain. 
The demands of the times would not permit the view that it was noble and 
virtuous for bushito be removed from worldly affairs, ignorant of financial 
matters and disinterested in economic activities. 
(ii) The trouble with Zhu Xi 
Mitsugi expressed a lot of irritation about the conduct of those who 
seemed to have forgotten what the occupation of a bushiwas: those who 
averted their eyes from the political reality of a domain wracked by poverty, 
while seeking above all else comfort, peace and quiet for themselves. Lacking 
the courage to face the crisis, they feared failure and cowered away from 
acknowledging their responsibilities, prudently doing only "the bare minimum 
required in their official capacities". He despised them, accusing them of 
setting their sights very low, and at the same time protecting their interests 
behind a fa~ade of virtuous modesty and reticence: 
The only thing they have learned is that it is a virtue to be 
seen concentrating on the cultivation of humility. This means 
that even when they see the anguish of their ruler and the 
313 Yamaga Soko, Nihon Shiso Taikei 32. Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1970. Page 31. 
314 Yamaga Soko, page 32. 
peril of the land they are not moved to come forward and make 
an effort to help. Not wishing to draw attention to 
themselves, they simply defer to others whenever there is 
risk involved. When the situation gets really tough, they take 
evasive action. On occasions when instructions from the 
daimyo are conveyed to the administration, no matter what the 
task is, these people let others take the lead while they just 
follow along, mouthing ingratiating phrases about how humble 
and unworthy they are. Their only concern is for themselves. 
Never do they anguish over the terrible state of the domain. 
This is how pusillanimous they are, using their modesty and 
humility as a front. They pile caution upon hesitation until in 
the end they bring down disaster upon their land and their 
ruler.315 
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Mitsugi seemed to have no doubt that the cause of this kind of passive 
bureaucratic behaviour, which had his colleagues feigning humble reticence in 
order to avoid taking decisive action, lay in the study of the introspective 
Method of Mind associated with Zhu Xi Confucianism. He claimed that the 
energy of Cheng-Zhu scholarship was directed exclusively at the cultivation of 
the individual mind, while matters of state and devotion to public service were 
dealt with by perfunctory commonplaces. He concluded that as a result the 
concerns of intellectuals and scholars had become quite remote from the 
issues involved in achieving competence in government. 
Mitsugi argued that the real Confucian tradition was not fundamentally 
concerned with the moral rectitude of individuals, but with bringing unity and 
order to the world and wise government to its various states. That there were 
so many retainers who "abandoned administration and relief work" and "failed 
to alleviate the distress of the domain", but instead "concentrated from dawn 
till dusk on ascetic exercises for the improvement of their own minds", was 
because they had been led astray by "Zhu Xi's Confucianism, the scholarship 
for cowards".316 He protested that: 
The Song scholars begin by establishing a programme for the 
study of the mind: its nature, its functions, then its cultivation 
and training. The very first stage in their programme is to 
completely internalise all the teachings of the sages, and it is 
right from that initial point onwards that learning diverges 
315 "Shigaku yoben", NMZ 1, page 293. 
316 The last epithet is found in NMZ 4, "Gochuron", page 333. The preceding quotations are from 
NMZ 1, ·shigaku yoben", page 213. 
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from [seeking] the way of good government, so that it is 
eventually completely cut off from the concerns of the 
present day.317 
Mitsugi was particularly critical of the order of priorities in the Daigaku, 
complaining that it is not until the final step in the prescribed scholarly agenda 
that "ruling the land and bringing tranquillity to the realm" appears. He strains 
more than a little, I think, to read this passage of the Daigaku as suggesting 
that the achievement of good government will come about simply as a natural 
outcome, and only after the individuals in charge have perfected their own 
personal moral cultivation. Any suggestion that engagement in concentration on 
the self might be permitted to precede scholarly attention to the practice of 
good government he seems to have found completely intolerable. 
Zhu Xi's teachings, he complained, not only failed to tackle questions 
concerning administration and government, but they provided as well an evasive 
excuse for urgent matters to be put off indefinitely by his passive colleagues. 
In the Daigaku it says that we should first make an exhaustive 
study of the principles of things and cultivate the individual 
person, and then after that think about the matters of good 
government and tranquillity in the realm. How long, then, does 
it take to cultivate the individual person? And furthermore, if 
cultivating the self necessarily precedes governing the state, 
are we supposed to go ahead and just ignore the social 
breakdown and poverty that are before us right here and 
now?31s 
Later, in the section on rewards and punishments, shobatsu('.lltfll), he 
insists that there is no point in renouncing one's life in the present so as to 
cultivate the inner self and therefore be of no use to the state (kokka). On 
the contrary, genuine reverence for Confucius and Mencius would be to apply 
their teachings now, in present conditions, and govern the state accordingly. 
Mitsugi's is clearly engaged in a polemical exercise inspired to some extent by 
frustration at the metaphysical preoccupations of some of his colleagues who 
317 NMZ 1, "Shigaku yoben", page 243. 
318 NMZ1, "Shigaku yoben", page 161. 
were reluctant to actively participate in administrative affairs. His 
interpretation of the Daigaku is therefore rather partial. 319 
III The teachings of the sages and the basis of 
wealth 
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The teachings of the sages were, Mitsugi wrote, the very stuff of 
government. The reality, or indeed the truth, of what had been learned was 
determined by the outcomes it produced in the practice of government. He 
summed it up this way: 
The application (Jf.l) of the teachings of the sages is a matter 
of practical effort, just like harvesting grain after tilling a 
field or drawing water after sinking a well.320 
Reliable moral knowledge was not, according to Mitsugi, located in the actual 
texts containing the teachings of the sages. Nor was it to be discovered 
through introspection or the identification of the individual self with a 
universal absolute. It is fairly clear, though, that he did entertain the belief 
that the innate goodness of the universal order could be at least partly known 
through the careful investigation of phenomena in the real world. But, more 
than anything else, following the sagely teachings meant exerting an effort to 
deal with real things. The range of subject matter covered by what he termed 
"teachings of the sages", therefore, included agriculture, public works, 
surveying and applied mathematics. 
319 This is a translation of the offending ·eight items" of the Daigaku(Daxue}, as they appear on 
page 331 of Wm.Theodore De Bary (ed.}, Sources of Chinese Tradition. New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1999. Daigaku(lit. Great Learning) means something like advanced education, 
or study for adults. One of the Song Confucian Four Books, it is an extremely short work: the 
following passage comprises nearly half of the entire text. 
The extension of knowledge lies in the investigation of things. 
It is only when things are investigated that knowledge is extended; when 
knowledge is extended, that thoughts become sincere; when thoughts become 
sincere that the mind is rectified; when the mind is rectified that the person 
is cultivated; when the person is cultivated that order is brought to the family; 
when order is brought to the family that the state is well governed; when the 
state is well governed that peace is brought to the world. 
From the Son of Heaven to ordinary people, all, without exception, should regard 
cultivating the person as the root. It can never happen that the root is disordered 
and the branches are ordered. 
320 NMZ 1, ·shigaku yoben", page 301. 
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(i) Cultivating the realm 
In Mitsugi's scheme of what was worthwhile, agriculture took a 
prominent place. It was the source that sustained life, brought benefit to the 
people, abundance to the land, and wealth to the polity. There were, however, 
two forms of the way of cultivation: that of the common man (JI A) and that 
of the gentleman (~r). The person following the first form plans solely in 
terms of his own benefit, and turns his hand to whatever is most immediately 
profitable. Eventually this leads to widespread poverty in the land. Those 
following the second form take into account the benefit of the entire country, 
eschewing immediate profit until eventually the mountains are prospering, new 
fields have been opened up, and the country is wealthy. 
Since it is the earth that is the source of all things, giving forth 
treasure and riches, he argued, to value the money before our eyes and shut 
off the fount of wealth is the height of stupidity. "The Way of Cultivation", he 
repeated, "is the great foundation upon which the people are sustained". When 
the time comes in which "we are as sparing with clods of earth as we are with 
money", people will live in communities and make progress in their occupations. 
When the people are actively engaged in their occupations, the lands of the 
domain will be opened up. If, however, money is prized and the way of 
cultivation neglected, the mountains, forests and lands will all fall into ruin. 
That is why "the way of the art of cultivation is the principle of rule over the 
land, riches for the world, and profit for all".321 
He goes on to argue that rice is the most important of the five grains, 
but then inserts a justification for making sure the people have plenty to eat: 
Theft occurs in the world because of greed. Disorder as a 
result of greed arises when there turns out to be insufficient 
grain. When there is enough food and clothing, people 
understand what it is to have dignity. 
So it is that Guan Zhong says, "If people are poor they will 
take their family responsibilities lightly. If they neglect their 
households they will offend against the law and when they 
commit offences they are difficult to govern. When people 
are prosperous they take their families seriously. When they 
321 NMZ 3, "Okaboki", page 215. 
take their families seriously they respect authority, and when 
the people respect authority they are easy to govern.322 
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When he observed merchant households engaged in money-lending and 
profiteering, for example, he regarded that as an instance of theft. They 
were forgetting their appointed occupation, which was to be of service to the 
domain by circulating and increasing its wealth through their commercial 
activity. Mitsugi himself did not seem to have expected Tsugaru to grow 
wealthy on agriculture alone. During the reforms he encouraged the 
production of commercial commodities and freed up the export of livestock 
and mining products. But while he did not avoid the reality of commercial 
expansion, there is no sign that he shared, for example, Kaiho Seiryo's 
optimism regarding the emergence of a competitive economic and social 
structure. Tsugaru was still in a position where it was important to foster 
agricultural productivity while carefully watching the state of public finances. 
The accumulation of private capital by merchant enterprises was neither 
desirable nor feasible under current circumstances, though the overall wealth 
of the domain was one of his main preoccupations. 
A little further on in this treatise, he calls on the ultimate authority: 
Confucius also said, did he not, that there is nothing that 
takes priority in government over making the people wealthy.323 
For people to thrive, they needed food, and the most essential foods were the 
five grains. Farming produced the five grains, and farming could not happen 
without farmland. Farmland was the possession of the ruler. He was the one 
who opened up the land, and when he opened up large tracts of land, then the 
· harvests of grain are also large. When there was sufficient grain, people 
gathered together, and where people came together it followed that treasure 
and riches would be abundant. This, according to Mitsugi, was what was known 
as "The virtue of the ruler" (~~). 
322 Loe. cit. The Guanziis a work of uncertain authorship, containing advice about practical 
administration, grain prices, food supplies and so on. This passage is taken from the "Bokumin" 
section. 
323 NMZ 3, "Okaboki", page 217. Taken from the Analects. 
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Virtue is the foundation and abundance the outcome. If 
abundance is taken to be the foundation, however, and the 
order of cause and effect reversed, then even when fields fall 
into disuse, money will not be made available for their 
restoration, and the country's farmland will be ruined. Revere 
the land as you do a deity; value grain as you do your ruler; 
treat money with the disdain you have for clods of earth; and 
regard profit as lightly as you do dust. Do this for even just 
one month and the finances of the state cannot help but 
improve.324 
From this kind of passage, it seems reasonable to assume that Mitsugi 
considered agriculture to be fundamental to the structure of the domain polity. 
Even though he did, in practice, enact policies for using trade as a means of 
making profits, he clearly believed that the prosperity of the domain was 
based above all else on productive agricultural activity, and that sufficient 
investment should be guaranteed for basic agricultural infrastructure. 
(ii) Mitsugi as agronomist 
Since he regarded agriculture as the foundation of all other productive 
activity, Mitsugi turned his mind to one of the basic provisions for farming: the 
problem of opening up new land. Even opening up land, though, he believed, 
should be done within set limits, stating that "it is a desirable thing to open up 
land for retainers, but when it is not done under strict control the necessary 
economies cannot be imposed."325 When land was developed according to a 
careful plan, the taxation system based on a putative yield for every field 
could be maintained. In the "Okaboki" essay, he gives detailed calculations for 
values of tax rates and areas of cultivated land, along with maps showing the 
land neatly divided into sections. 
After setting out his proposition that agriculture is the foundation of 
the polity, and discussing the opening up of new fields, Mitsugi goes on to 
advocate the cultivation of upland rice. In farming, he claimed, nothing 
offered more return than the five grains, and the most beneficial of the five 
grains to farmers was rice. Rice, however, no matter how much land was 
324 NMZ 3, "Okaboki", page 218. 
325 Ibid., page 228. 
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available, could not be grown without water. It was also an extremely labour-
intensive crop. Moreover, there was the anxiety every year over floods and 
droughts. Mitsugi decided to try growing paddy rice in a dry field. Right up 
until the time it was ripening, he found there was not the slightest difference 
from paddy rice. He concluded that if paddy rice were to be transformed into 
upland rice it would be as if the people had gained wings. 
We must plant it on the slopes and on the plains. There would 
be no need to worry about floods and droughts, or draining 
ditches and reinforcing embankments. The whole domain would 
be opened up and foodstuffs would abound. It would be a 
source of plenty for ten thousand generations. 
Mitsugi believed upland rice would be of benefit "not just to a single domain" 
but that it could "help the people of the whole country." 326 
He kept seeds from his harvest the first year and planted them the 
next, with the same results. After a period of ten years, holding seeds over 
from year to year and testing the crop in both cold and warm conditions, and 
recording all his results, he tried to convince the domain administrators that it 
was worth trying, but no-one would take him seriously. That, he explained, was 
because: 
Throughout the entire country all the daimyo set great store 
by money and profit but spare little thought for farming the 
land. So, why would anyone pay attention to what I have to 
say?321 
He had compiled detailed notes on cultivation techniques based on his 
experiments: on the scale and layout of the cultivated fields, on planting 
methods, on compass directions for sowing, and other details. 
In spite of his bushi status, Mitsugi actually succeeded in accumulating 
a great deal of practical know-how in such matters as water control and 
irrigation, soil quality and fertilizing techniques. Thus it was that when he was 
exiled to Kawaratai he was able to help the villagers improve their material 
326 NMZ, ·okaboki", page 224. 
327 Ibid., page 227. 
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well-being by growing their own rice, as well as teaching them new literacy, 
numeracy and cultural skills.328 
Plate 11 : From a collection of famine foods. 
On the right is the coarse millet called hie, sometimes referred to as 
deccan grass, or barnyard grass, in English. 
Source: "Kyoko shokubutsu zusen", reproduced in Nishimura Makoto and 
Yoshikawa Ichiro, eds., Nihon kyoko shi ko, Tokyo: Maruzen, 1936. 
328 See pages 4 and 48, in the Prologue and Chapter One, above. 
Chapter six 
The Measure of Things 
" ·~ . 
King Wen is on h~,,.JJh, he shines in Heaven! 
Zhou is an old people, but its Mandate is new 
The leaders of Zhou became illustrious, 
was not God's Mandate timely given? 
King Wen ascends and descends on the left and 
right of God. The Classic of Odes329 
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Ideas about numbers or measurement are fundamental to much of 
Mitsugi's writing, and seem to permeate, either directly or by implication, his 
understanding the universe and human affairs. Whether he is writing in 
Confucian didactic mode, reporting his findings as a hands-on practical man, or 
devising the schemata of a numerologist, ordered patterns and numerical 
categories shape his argument in one way or another. His applications of 
numbers range from very ordinary practical arithmetic, through surveying 
techniques and the application of Zhou period schemes to matters of everyday 
administration in Tsugaru, to mystical speculation on the creation of the 
universe. 
I The universe 
Mitsugi sets out his understandings about the creation of the universe 
in his "Explanation of the diagram of the Supreme Ultimate".330 The diagram is 
thought to be the work of a tenth century Daoist master: it is a schematic 
representation of the genesis of the phenomena that comprise and sustain the 
universe. In the classical interpretative tradition of the Chinese cultural 
sphere, Mitsugi uses the terminology and categories of the Yljing (~iii?e.), 
329 The poems in the "Classic of Odes" mostly date from early in Zhou period (circa 1040-256 
BCE). This is probably a ritual song. Sources, pages 25 and 38. 
330 MZ 3, "Explanation of the diagram of the Supreme Ultimate", pages 1-23. 
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Yang 
Activity 
The Way of qian 
becomes the male 
Yin 
Stillness 
The Way of kun 
becomes the female 
Transformation and generation of all things 
Figure 6: Zhou t>unyi's diagram of the Supreme Ultimate 
Source: De Bary (ed.), Sources of Chinese Tradiotion, page 674. 
Classic of Changes, intermingled with key concepts drawn from the Daoist 
tradition. Mitsugi was but one of countless thinkers who worked on the 
diagram and the ideas over many centuries. 
(i) The diagram of the Supreme Ultimate 
Mitsugi takes the title for his "Explanation of the diagram of the 
Z51 
Supreme Ultimate" (j;:ti~IDl) from Zhou Dunyi (1017-1073), the early Song 
scholar who refined the diagram. Zhou, whose "Explanation" was adopted as a 
foundational text of Song Confucianism C*-T-~) by Zhu Xi, against whose 
school of thought Mitsugi railed so strongly, also left a number of texts with 
strong Daoist affinities. As well as receiving Zhu Xi's imprimatur, his 
"Explanation" was included in the Daozang, a key compendium of Daoist texts.331 
The terms used for the two foundational creative forces in Zhou Dunyi's 
brief genesis account, wuji(~ti) and taiji(j;:ti), are both important 
conceptual categories in the Daoist tradition, even though Zhu Xi was able to 
locate the taiji(J.taikyoku) in the Confucian tradition as well, because of its 
appearance in classical commentaries on the Yljing. Mitsugi's works also reveal 
a strong affinity with the Daoist tradition, so it is perhaps not surprising that 
his interpretation of the Diagram of the Supreme Ultimate follows a very 
similar line to Zhou's, although he gives primacy to the four seasons and 
directions, illustrating his explanation with rectangular and square diagrams to 
explain the eight trigrams of the Yljing, rather than using the very simple 
circles of Zhou's canonical "Explanation". See next page. Both pieces are quite 
short, with Zhou's translated into English taking only around two pages of 
Sources, while Mitsugi's, a photographic reproduction of his own handwriting on 
small pages of Mino paper, occupies twenty-three, around half of which are 
filled with his diagrams.332 
331 De Bary, Sources of Chinese Tradition, page 6 71. I have not adopted the term "Supreme 
Polarity" for because I do not need the conceptual converse of "Non-polar" (~;fli) in this 
elementary discussion of Mitsugi's "Explanation". 
332 Ibid. The translation of Zhou's "Explanation" and his diagram are on pages 673-76. 
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In Mitsugi's "Explanation", the process in which a cosmic primordial 
unity is differentiated to form the "myriad things" comprising the universe 
begins with the ta1kyokugenerating (1:) the two modes (f~) of yin(~) and 
yang (f!JJ). 
In Zhou Dunyi's scheme, yin and yang alternate and combine to generate 
water, fire, wood, metal and earth, and the four seasons proceeding through 
them. Mitsugi has y1nand yanggenerating the four seasons, from which the 
eight trigrams are formed that than determine the eight cardinal compass 
points. It is arresting that on the first page of his piece, before he even 
points out Zhu Xi's errors, Mitsugi introduces as an alternative possibility the 
scheme of another Song figure, Shao Yong. Shao had the Ta1kyoku originally 
comprising y1nand yang forces, and the four seasons then forming as the 
Taikyoku constantly moved within itself, as it did, between states where yin 
and yang were alternately in the ascendant. 
I am not in a position to endorse or refute Mitsugi's reading of Shao 
Yong's interpretation, though it does differ from the one implied in Sources.333 
Apart from noting that Mitsugi was one of many scholars in the long history of 
thought in the Chinese cultural sphere who found it natural and congenial to 
study and apply both Daoist and classical Confucian ideas, there is no reason 
here to further examine the complexity of the intertwining that went on 
between Song Confucian, Daoist and Han Confucian interpretative thought - in 
any case, I have already exhausted my resources on the subject. My purpose 
is simply to point out that Mitsugi not only allies the line of his "Explanation" 
with Shao Yong's overall interpretation, but that his writings also reveal other 
elements in common with Shao's work, while the model "Explanation" is clearly 
Zhou Dunyi's. Whereas Zhou's diagram shows alternations and combinations of 
y1nand yanggenerating the five elements comprising the ki(%,), vital energy, 
which combines and coalesces under the influence of yin and yang to generate 
male and female; both Shao and Mitsugi adhere to the binary and quaternary 
progression through one further stage, in harmony with the Yij1ng numbers of 
333 De Bary, Sources, page 680. 
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four, eight and sixty-four. In all three schemes, the kigenerates and 
transforms the myriad things from earthly matter, or shitsu(W..), which 
subsequently goes on regenerating, alternating and transforming without end. 
It is important to note the place Mitsugi gives Shao Yong (1011-1077) in 
his interpretation of the workings of the universe, because Shao is by far the 
most significant Song figure in the development of ideas based on 
numerological formulations. His writings give primacy to the idea of constant 
change in the universe, and he derived numerically based patterns to explain 
the way changes occurring in heaven are linked to. what happens on earth. And, 
he extolled the capacity of the ancient sages to perceive and comprehend 
earthly matters in truly cosmic terms.334 These are also three distinctive 
elements in the writings of Mitsugi, who linked constant change in the affairs 
of the world to the need for administrators to be actively aware of the times 
they lived in and to react accordingly; and looked to the writings of the sages 
for patters and schemata to guide him in his actions. The Yijing was a 
particular source of inspiration in this regard. 
(ii) The Yijing 
One of the three most substantial texts in the Complete Works, is 
"Symbols from the Yijing', Mitsugi's study of the numerical concepts in the 
Yijing.335 It draws on the ideas established in the two works that come before_ 
it: his "Explanation" and "Symbols and their mathematical transformations". 
The Yljing, or "Classic of Changes", is thought to have been compiled within a 
century or so of 1000 BCE. It was used in the Zhou period as a divination 
manual; and was also called the Zhouy1: or "Changes of Zhou". The text, 
together with later Han and Song Confucian interpretations and c~mmentaries, 
came to be "ranked as the primordial source of traditional wisdom and the first 
of the Confucian classics."336 In the introduction to his scholarly, but 
nevertheless extremely helpful, translation of the Ytjing with an influential 
334 De Bary, Sources, page 680. 
335 NMZ 3, "Yisho", pages 49-155. 
336 De Bary, Sources, page 318. 
I .. 
! 
l 
L j; 
l 
'.! 
254 
commentary by the eminent Han scholar, Wang Bi (226-249), Richard Lynn 
makes the point that given the "dense and opaque" nature of the original text, 
its meaning in many times and places has depended entirely on the 
understanding of commentators who have interpreted the hexagrams and the 
Appended Phrases. The Song period interpretations of Cheng Yi and Zhu Xi, 
created in a cultural and scholarly environment separated by seven centuries 
from that in which Wang's commentary was written, therefore reveal a great 
deal to do with historical change in Chinese thought between the Han and the 
Song in the meanings they give to the "Changes of Zhou".337 
Regardless of, or perhaps due to, these transformations, the text and 
its appendages have for millennia been used as instruments for "penetrating 
movements of the cosmic order" and determining actions and decisions 
appropriate to the particular circumstances of ordinary individuals, rulers 'and 
states.338 Mitsugi is no exception to this general rule, and the record of his 
ruminations is some evidence of the kinds of ancient authorities important to 
scholars of his time and place who were out of sympathy with the Zhu Xi school. 
Mitsugi identified the Zhou period with the time when ideal rulers 
presided over perfectly administered states according to the wisdom of the 
sages. It was therefore important that King Wen, one of the founders of the 
Zhou dynasty, was believed to have devised the sixty-four hexagrams from the 
eight original trigrams and then written their associated judgements. The 
statements for each of the six lines in each hexagram are attributed to the 
Duke of Zhou, King Wen's influential younger brother and regent to his heir. 
Together, these elements form the invariable kernel of the Yijing. 339 
337 Richard John Lynn (trans.), The Classic of Changes. New York: Columbia University Press, 
1994, page 8. I have chosen this translation of the Yijingto work with because Mitsugi clearly 
used the works of Song scholars other than Zhu Xi and Cheng Yi, with whose commentaries he 
takes issue. Lynn's is the only work I know of that is not based on a Cheng-Zhu version. 
Belonging to the ranks of the uninitiated as I certainly do, I am drawn to the suggestion that the 
enormous range of meanings, from the weightlest to the most trivial, drawn from the Yijingover 
the centuries might be directly proportional to its opacity. 
338 Lynn, Changes, page 1. 
339 Ibid., page 4. 
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In the very first statement of "Symbols and their mathematical 
transformations", Mitsugi states the legendary links between the Yellow River 
chart and the Luo River diagram, the sage-kings, and the numbers in the 
Yijing. 340 According to Confucius, Mitsugi tells us, the mythical sage-king, Fugi 
(Ch. Fu Xi), originator of the eight trigrams, based them on a chart written on 
the back of a dragon-horse that had emerged from the Yellow River. And, the 
Luo River diagram was revealed to the sage-king U (Ch. Yu) by a spirit-tortoise 
that appeared while he was controlling the waters. He used it to divide.the 
land into nine numbers (provinces).341 Mitsugi asserts that: 
If these numbers and symbols are carefully examined then the 
mysterious ways in which change works in heaven and earth will 
be revealed; if they are pondered deeply the great patterns of 
change in heaven and earth will become clear.342 
He proceeds to set out a bewildering array of diagrams: familiar nine-squares 
and circles, triangles, circles within circles, circles around circles, a triangle 
within a nine-square within a circle, stars around hexagons and nonagons, and 
arrays of numbers associated with points of the compass arranged in 
concentric squares. 
His explanations begin with tens from the Yellow River chart and nines 
from the Luo River diagram, which are then combed them with the vital force 
principle(~~) of heaven and the matter principle (i:i~) of earth, the male 
and female principles and other symbols and numbers derived from the Yijing. 
He asserts that a full understanding of the changes in such phenomena as the 
sun and the moon, and day and night, will reveal the mathematical principles by 
which the universe is constituted. Thereby a conception will also be gained of 
the eternal, unwavering Mean, on which humankind must always depend.343 
340 £~!li¥BfPTl±\~m1:1:111MAWJzXBx-±t!.l=x-=:±t!!l19 ... 
341 NMZ 3, "YisO", page 27, with some vocabulary from Lynn, page 74. 
342 Quoted by the complier. NMZ 3, page v. 
343 NMZ 3, "Yiso", page 41. 
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II The realm 
When it came to theorising the administration of a polity, Mitsugi's 
model was the Zhou state, which overthrew the Shang around 1040 BCE, ruled 
through the time when Confucius lived and on until the third century BCE. In 
the introduction to his work, "Applying the Zhou/I', Mitsugi points out that the 
Appended Phrases in the Yijingwere all the work of Zhou figures, but that 
subsequent traditional commentaries applied to "conditions in China".344 That is 
to say, even the Han commentaries were written after the unification of the 
empire. Mitsugi found the ancient works more suited as guides to governing a 
domain, because the fragmented structure of administrative authority in China 
during the Zhou period was closer to that of Tokugawa period Japan. It should 
be understood, Mitsugi went on in his introduction, that after gaining a 
thorough understanding of the Zhouli (Jal fit), "The Rites of Zhou", we can apply 
its teachings to the benefit of the realm and its people; but if we do not fully 
understand the Zhouli and apply it in form only, we will cause harm to the real 
and its people.345 
One of the strongest ideas from the Zhouli and other contemporary 
texts that are constant themes in Mitsugi's works is the conviction that rulers 
who have received the Mandate of Heaven are morally bound to fulfil their 
duties by respecting Heaven and caring for their people. Heaven is the natural 
moral force of the universe, whose workings were linked with those of earth 
according to an overarching design. Insight into that design could be gained 
from study of the Yljing; and insight into the intentions of Heaven for the 
ordering of human existence were best sought in records of the practices of 
the early rulers of Zhou. The principal task of a ruler was to order his polity 
so that peace prevailed and the people flourished. 
(i) Applying the Zhouli 
In the Zhou administrative structure, the Prime Minister was the 
central figure, and in his administration were six offices corresponding to 
344 NMZ 2, "Sharei tsuyo", page 1. 
345 Ibid., page 3. 
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heaven, earth and the four seasons. The off ice of the prime minister 
corresponded with heaven; the earth minister was assigned education, the 
spring minister, the histories, the summer minister, the military, the autumn 
minister, justice and policing, and the winter minister, lands and peoples. 
Mitsugi elaborated this system with sixty bureaus attached to each off ice, and 
the six offices divided into seven grades, and so on.346 
t$!Yi Spiritual intelligence JC-T Emperor l1i' Daimyo 
j(ffej Supreme ultimate j(~::;k:fil Imperial Chancellor :::k::ti Great Elder 
~fl Yin lllJi{l Yang 1-i::::;k:fil i5:::k:fil *:ti Elders 
Nrista" of "ltekft Nnsle'of "lterijlt 
*~ :];'~~ :];'~~ *~~ *~~$~ t:flt,Jfj~ **,Jfj~ fflA Yonin 
nJ!HiX~ flfll~~ 'gfkj *~ ~ i~ m'.iE.$1-f Kanjo bugyo 
Ecrth R:sfrri1t 1h.rdr Coresion lfU ~ ~ t:pf)J llfT $1t Machi bugyo 
Water Carp:rre J<J( He.a.en 
11-e eijit official depTtrren1s of the 
RtW)Oo:::lmnistratf..esystem: ~ $1t Kori bugyo 
~ h:x.sehild ;tra:ruy,jtdicial, ~t±.$1-T Jisha bugyo 
militay, rexjoral, lure, crd cerem:ri::ll 
affairs,~ se£retaiat. 
Figure 7: Nyui Mitsugi's corresponding hierarchies for the Creation, Kyoto and Edo 
Source: NMZ 2, "ShtJrei tstJyo", pages16-17. 
His model for an earthly administrative hierarchy was founded in the 
order of creation under as found in the Y,jing. Heaven and Earth and the six 
forces are represented by the eight trigrams created from combinations of yin 
and yang with their greater and lesser forms, as shown in the first column of 
the figure. Wang Bi's explanation of functions of the eight is translated by 
Lynn this way: 
As Heaven (Pure Yang) and Earth (Pure Yin) establish positions, 
as Mountain (Restraint) and Lake (Joy) reciprocally circulate 
material force, as Thunder (Quake) and Wind (Compliance) give 
rise each to the other, and as Water (Sink Hole) and Fire 
(Cohesion) do not fail to complement each other, the eight 
trigrams combine with one another in such a way that, to 
346 NMZ 2, "Shurei tsuyo", pages 14-16. 
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reckon the past, one follows the order of their progress, and, 
to know the future, one works backward through them. 
The Divine Ruler comes forth in Zhen (Quake) and sets all 
things in order in Sun (Compliance), makes them visible to one 
another in Li (Cohesion), gives them maximum support in Kun 
(Pure Yin i.e. Earth), makes them happy then in Dui(Joy), has 
them do battle in Qian (Pure Yang, i.e. Heaven), finds them 
thoroughly worn out in Kan (Water Hole) and has them reach 
final maturity in Gen (Restraint).347 
Mitsugi goes on to explain that while the Japanese Imperial bureaucracy 
(second column), with its eight departments, adheres to the model, the 
functions and offices are not immutable fixtures and come and go with time 
and necessity. 
He then sets out an extremely simple hierarchy of contemporary 
off ices that would correspond with the bakufu and domain administrative 
arrangement. It is headed by a ruler (;g-), under whom the tairo(chief 
minister), karo(elders), and yomn(stewards) are ranked, followed by the four 
magistrates - for finances, town centres, country districts, and shrines and 
temples.348 The rest of the piece is devoted to various schemes based on nine-
square divisions applied to such matters as the distribution of lesser 
administrative posts, physical features of the lands of the realm, occupations 
of the people, and productive trees and crops. 
In contrast with this arcane piece are the two works entitled "A record 
of appropriate divisions" (f;t;)t"JB.). The first is written in Chinese, and the 
second, which is in two parts, in Japanese.349 They contain much the same 
material, and, while still firmly based on the concepts and numerology of the 
Zhou world view, they also contain evidence of some concern on Mitsugi's part 
to put things in order in the present. 
Mitsugi begins by stating the basic premise that when territory of a 
country (00±) is not divided up appropriately, then great losses result and 
uncontrollable abuses occur. It is therefore important to allot benefits and 
347 Lynn, Changes, pages 120-21. 
348 NMZ 2, "ShOrei tsoyo", page 17. 
349 NMZ 2, "Obunshi", pages 31 - 91; "Obunshi, Part 1", pages 93-128; "Obunshi, Part 2", 
pages 129-147. 
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responsibilities according to the Mean, and to set up standards that will guide 
the ruler.350 The glories of the dynasties of the sage kings were all due to 
their being founded on these principles. Think of a set of pitch pipes, where 
the tones of the twelve pipes vary according to their lengths. If the lengths 
are not in the appropriate proportions, then the sound is dreadful. It is 
exactly the same if holdings of land are not properly apportioned. The 
resources of the country will end up exhausted. These are very different 
phenomena, but they are governed by the same Way.351 
It is not only sagely rulers who hope for adequate territory and a 
wealthy population: bad rulers want the same. And, Wis not only sages who 
hate evil and appreciate virtue: bad rulers can be like that too. The reason why 
good rulers manage to achieve desirable outcomes and bad rulers do not, is 
that they follow different Ways in pursuing their goals. To seek good 
outcomes by doing evil is a very different way of going about things from 
driving away evil in order to do good. Even a sage who does not model himself 
on the Way cannot attain virtue. And, a lesser man can achieve anything if he 
will only follow the teachings of the sages. 
Having thus established that any leader who takes care to follow sagely 
models can satisfactorily apportion the land in his polity, Mitsugi turns to the 
territory itself. If it is not divided up in a properly ordered and fair manner, 
state income from taxes will not be adequate; and, if you overdo the taxes, the 
resources of the land will become exhausted. Mountain and forest areas, for 
example, will be ruined if arable land is allowed to go uncultivated. This is the 
beginning of poverty, where a great deal is extracted and very little put in. At 
that stage, a ruler is obliged to both borrow from others and raid his own 
realm. The more he consumes, the more he loses; and his endowment from 
Heaven (Nature) is lost forever. 
In his recent article, Brett Walker gives an account of this kind of 
damage in the domain of Hachinohe, one of the three far north eastern 
350 NMZ 2, "Obunshi", page 31. 
351 Loe. cit. The following paragraphs are paraphrases from the same page. 
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domains of Mutsu discussed in Chapter four, above. Unable to rely on taxing 
rice production, because of the climate, the domain encouraged farmers to 
engage in the slash-and-burn method to cultivate soybeans, which could be sold 
as a cash crop. Without intensive inputs of fertilizer, the soil became quickly 
depleted. As more and more land was cleared on the hillsides, not only did 
severe erosion and landslides cause loss of life and resources during the heavy 
rains often experienced in the region; but the wild boar that were endemic to 
the area lost their foraging territory, and took to rooting out farm crops for 
I. 
food. The results were harvest shortfalls and famine, resulting in loss of 
life.352 
Mitsugi had probably heard about the calamity in Hachinohe, but it is 
hard to know whether or not he connected it with the principles of the king of 
Zhou, who "made uniform the units of land measure and had charts drawn up of 
the nine regions" that had submitted to him, by "using the numbers from the 
Yellow River chart and the Luo River diagram".353 He then sets out a series of 
diagrams for dividing up a territory of 50 square 11: remarking that when the 
nine-grade scale is applied, "One knows about places without going there, and 
one understands what to do without seeing the territory."354 Allotting areas of 
land for the castle and administrative offices, he proceeds to suggest ways of 
calculating prices, stipends, profit margins, exchange rates between gold, silver 
and rice, and so on. 
Setting the value of annual stipends, he goes on to assert, ought to be 
an ongoing process, based on averages over a period of up to ten generations. 
If the people became accustomed to such a system, even if prices fluctuated in 
the short term, they would be able to budget for taxes and their own welfare. 
That is why the kings in the age of the sages took taxes at a rate of only one 
352 Brett L. Walker, "Commercial Growth and Environmental Change in Early Modern Japan." The 
Journal of Asian Studies, 60, no. 2, May 2001, pages 329-351. 
353 NMZ 2, "Obunshi", page 31. 
354 Ibid., page 33. 
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tenth: their laws were modelled on the balance of nature and responded to the 
needs of the times.355 
After this first basic outline of the ancient principles, Mitsugi launches 
into a critical assessment of the current practices of domain administrators in 
Japan. He begins by declaring that they ought to understand the Way of 
bringing stability to their domains by keeping the people in plenty. Confucius 
said that the lord is as a boat and his ministers are as the water. The water · 
either keeps the boat afloat; or it capsizes the boat.356 Yao said that when the 
wider world is in great turmoil, then stipends and incomes are wiped out for all 
eternity. That is why ministers who try to run the country by being mean with 
expenditure and always making economies and increasing taxes, are the same 
ones who do not take appropriate sentencing for robbers seriously (because 
they expect that widespread theft will be an outcome of their policies) 
Therefore, if the methods of accumulating wealth in a country are according to 
the Way, then it will survive; if they are not, it will fail. If your realm prospers, 
then your tax income will be enough, and to spare. If your income base is 
inadequate, that is because you do not understand the Way.357 
He sets out a hexagon of profit and loss, and explains that it applies the 
Way by taking from the top and benefiting those at the bottom, which is 
regarded as "applying justice to advantage".358 The high and the low are 
thereby kept in mutual contact, the high bestowing favours on the low and the 
low responding with affection for the high so that mutual feelings are close. 
Thus lasting stability, happiness and peace can be brought about if the lower 
benefit from the higher at the beginning, because everyone shares the 
benefits in the end. The Yijing says that when the high lose and the low 
benefit, then the happiness of the people will be unbounded.359 The hexagon of 
the Way of loss, in contrast, brings about the impoverishment of the people 
through the exaction of taxes. The high and low are therefore negating each 
355 Ibid., page 34. 
356 NMZ 2, "C>bunshi", page 42. 
357 Loe. cit. 
358 Ibid., page 43. 
359 Loe. cit. 
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other: the low resent the high and the high detest the low, and feelings 
between them are distant. This is how a country reaches a state of poverty 
and exhaustion, leading to disaster and rebellion. 
A little further on, Mitsugi addresses the idea of prof it, commenting 
that while the common people desire profit, the moral man desires to know the 
Way. Even though there is a contradiction between these two things, unless 
the government acts in accordance with the Way, profit will not come to the 
country. The moral man's desire to know the Way is founded in his desire for 
his country to flourish, but if he loses sight of profit altogether, how can he 
make his country flourish. If the world were completely without prof it, how 
would any life remain in it? In places where profit is to be found, everyone on 
earth will want to congregate. To places where there is human kindness, 
everyone on earth will be inclined to go. People never congregate in, or desire 
to go to, a place where there is impoverishment of resources and not enough of 
anything· to go around. 
The discussion then returns to the numbers and patterns of the 
universe, with Mitsugi stating that each of the sixty-four hexagrams, and the 
384 trigrams they comprise, speaks of the presence and absence of benefit. 
The Way of benefit that applies to the yin and the yang and the eternal cycle 
of life is therefore what must be carefully investigated. And, he begins his 
investigation with the two categories of benefit and loss, from which he 
generates to five major categories of loss (91;:) and the five of gain (1~ ), in the 
primordial patter of the five elements.360 
(ii) Dividing the land and managing resources 
Among the problems that Mitsugi addressed that seem more closely 
connected with the actual substance of bringing plenty to the land and its 
people were the storage of food grains in sufficient quantities to tide the 
domain over a disaster, and the establishment of farmland in advantageous 
situations, where sunlight and drainage conditions would be optimal. 
360 NMZ 2, "Obunshi", page 44. 
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"Doryo bunsu" (Measurement and apportionment) is one of two 
substantial works of around fifty transcribed pages each, in which Mitsugi 
addressed the task of sharing out the resources of the domain. It is written 
in Japanese and its content is similar to that of "Keikoku doryo" (Measurement 
for administration), which is written in Chinese and comes before it.361 Both 
chapters are based on the nine-rank scheme devised by the Duke of Chou, and 
the second begins with some strident statements about the provision of grain 
storage against want. 
On the opening page, Mitsugi states that: 
Lacking a reserve of three years' food is to be in a state of 
crisis. Being without six years' reserves is to be in a state of 
want. A country that does not hold nine years' food in reserve 
is no longer a real country. But this is not merely a matter of 
storehouses. The small-minded follow the Way of 
storehouses, and that is the main cause of impoverishment. It 
is really a matter of appropriate measurement and 
apportionment. 362 
He goes on to explain that it was part of the wisdom of the sages to recognise 
that Heaven waxes and wanes and therefore there will always be good and bad 
seasons. It was mankind's role to recognise that state of affairs, and work out 
the adjustments necessary for maintaining normal conditions. That would be 
done by long-term, basic planning that included the proper division of the 
country along the principles outlined in "Obunshi", above. 
Mitsugi sets out the nine types of land use in a country, ranging from 
the area given to the castle, official residences, shrines and temples, through 
farmlands for growing grains and vegetables, to wilder areas given over for 
firewood and fertilizer collection. In each of nine notional divisions of the 
territory, all containing land used in the various ways, is then allotted its share 
of residential land, farmland from which stipends would be derived, empty 
space and grasslands, roadways, fields, mountains and hills, rivers and streams, 
rocks and sand, rice paddy woods and forests, and swamps and marshes. The 
principle underlying this torturous process seems to be that if all the available 
361 NMZ 2, "Keikoku doryo", pages 149 - 189. "Doryo bunsa", pages 191-257. 
362 NMZ 2, "Doryo bunsa", pages 191-92. 
264 
land is put to suitable use, and its various resources divided equitably, if not 
equally, between the different socio/occupational strata of people so that all 
basic needs were met, then over time neither want nor surplus would result. 
Mitsugi's attitude to the duties and functions of commercial households 
was similar, though the context in which they worked and the resources they 
distributed were different.363 They were also, however, according the views 
expressed in "Shoka rido" to be aware that just as in Heaven there are the 
changes of waxing and waning, so on earth there are fluctuations between 
plenty and dearth, presence and absence, and for men there are movements 
between profit and loss, advantage and disadvantage. The merchants' Way of 
prof it was to work to create a balance so that there were never extreme 
shortages or great surpluses. 
Mitsugi conveys a strong sense of social and political hierarchy, but he 
also repeatedly refers to the importance of benevolence and providing for the 
poor. In this piece he complains that because distinctions between rich and 
poor have not disappeared, and the domain cannot meet all its needs without 
official borrowing, and merchants cannot make big profits without lending out 
large amounts of money, and no-one can show benevolence without feeling any 
loss, the entire world moves in the opposite direction and no-one ever takes 
the Way of Heaven. As a result, everyone is poor. Is there, he asks, a kind of 
magic spell that would enable us to live according to the Way of Heaven and 
yet selfishly use all the resources of our land, to continue extracting taxes at 
the rate of half each person's tiny budget until the country's finances are 
healthy, and yet have no-one suffering the slightest hardship?364 It does not 
seem to me that this piece implies that merchants should work for the good of 
the state, so much as that they should not deliberately set out to prof it from 
the loss or misfortune of poorer people, particularly those in farming villages. 
363 NMZ 2, "Shoka rido", pages 303 - 345; and pages 347-357. 
364 Ibid., paqe 304. 
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In some general remarks on a book written by someone else about ways 
of circulating wealth, Mitsugi makes it quite clear that he does not approve of 
the expedient of assigning small parcels of land to retainers because there is 
no money in the treasury to pay their allowances. There is no way then of 
ensuring that the units are viable or well managed, and more and more land 
falls into disuse when those who cultivate it fail to make ends meet.365 In the 
long run, a great deal of harm is done to the polity if its territory becomes 
fragmented, and then more and more land falls into the hands of fewer and 
fewer people leaving many villagers vulnerable to poverty and destitution. 
III Down to earth 
(i) Applying mathematics 
In contrast to his ruminations and calculations based on mystical 
numbers and ancient principles, Mitsugi also worked out a great many sample 
problems that are firmly grounded in recognisable properties of right-angled 
triangles and parallel lines. The three sections on surveying methods at the 
beginning of Volume Four of the Complete Works, for example, begin with 
measurements calculated in plane triangles, and then moves on to some 
problems applying methods of scale drawing. These methods are applied to 
calculating the height of .a nearby hill, or dividing up oddly shaped fields. 
In the third section, beginning on page 121, he actually explains how to 
construct a set of compasses, and then demonstrates the solution of some 
problems dealing with fractions using sectors of a circle.366 He then returns to 
more complex surveying tasks in sample neighbourhoods with hilly and plain 
areas, sketching out three-dimensional diagrams to illustrate his methods. 
Judging from the markings on the diagrams, he was making extensive use of 
similar triangles.367 
365 NMZ 3, "Tsuzai hitokoto hanrei" (Explanatory notes on the circulation of wealth), 
pages 305-328. 
366 NMZ 4, "Choken jutsu", pages 121-24. 
367 See, for example, the diagram on page 149 in NMZ 4, "Choken jutsu". 
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At a more basic level, but with the unexpected intrusion of y1i7and yang, 
is a work on elementary mathematics that was developed while he was in 
Kawaratai. It contains a quite ingenious explanation of place value based on an 
example using units for measuring length: after counting the ri, if there is 
something left over, we measure that with a smaller unit. So it is with hundred 
thousands, ten thousands, thousands, and so on.368 He demonstrates division 
and multiplication by using examples from real life, such as dividing a number of 
people in given proportions among several villages (an eighth-grade problem in 
Australia!) or paying registration fees for given numbers of horses and cattle 
at different rates.369 Further multiplication and division exercises are based 
on problems using the principle of moments and a diagram picturing an 
elementary weighing device made of sticks, twine and a two monme stone. One 
other interesting section on mathematics is an illustrated set of explanations 
about how to do division and multiplication problems using a nine-by-nine, 
eighty-one square number board and the rules of place value. It seems likely 
that methods based on the number nine would have appealed to Mitsugi 
because of its association with the Luo River diagram. 
These are all ordinary problems in mensuration, and they are solved 
using standard traditional Chinese methods, not resembling in any significant 
way the more elegant and complex display problems of the Japanese wasan 
mathematical tradition, and all demonstrably useful. From Mitsugi's point of 
view, he was also engaged in rational and useful activity when he spent time and 
energy working out mathematical solutions based on cosmic numerology for 
problems of supply and demand - of land, money and goods - in the domain, or 
the proper positions of government bureaucrats in a hierarchy. 
(ii) Being useful 
The matter of yo(ffl), meaning usefulness, or practical applicability, was 
of importance in Mitsugi's view of life as a worthwhile individual as well as a 
bushi-official. This idea in his written works has been explained by Kojima and 
368 NMZ 4, "Shogaku sanpo", pages 201-205. 
369 Ibid., pages 205 and 212. 
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mentioned by Ravina. 370 Suffice it to say that in Mitsugi's universe, unlike 
Yamaga Soko's, poetry clearly had an important social and cultural function. 
Soko wrote that: 
In Sagely Learning, neither literary study nor scholarship per 
se is necessary. If each day we concentrate on implementing 
what we have learned in ordinary affairs, that is enough, and 
no special effort or method of holding to reverence or the 
practice of quiet-sitting is necessary.371 
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Mitsugi clearly agreed with him on the subject of plumbing the depths of ones 
own individual psyche to discover the Way, as we have seen in his distaste for 
the principles expressed in the Daigaku. On the other hand, it is possible to 
speculate that Mitsugi found it expedient to emphasize his adherence to 
Soko's view of the world because of the official Tsugaru connections with 
Yamaga household and military arts tradition. 
Mitsugi's works indicate that he was, in fact, much more inclined to 
speculative thought about the order of the universe than was Soko, whose mind 
seems to have been focussed very much on the given world of Tokugawa Japan 
and its social order. It is instructive that he worked out his commitment to 
jitsugaku (scholarship grounded in real, practical truth) by teaching traditional 
martial arts; while Mitsugi tried, though in vain, to derive rational, universal 
principles for re-ordering society and politics, taught applied mathematics, and 
altered the entitlements of the poor so that they wouldn't starve to death. 
Mitsugi's deep interest in numbers was a rational extension of the 
concern his expressed with rational order and productive functions for 
everyone in the society he was part of, and the survival of the Tsugaru domain. 
Mark Ravina's claim that in Mitsugi's scheme of things, "merchants served an 
important but limited function", is probably accurate; but one of the strongest 
37° Kojima, "Thought and Practicality", Ravina, Land and Lordship, pages 123-24. Ravina points 
out the impracticality of Mitsugi's assumption in his trope for free-flowing commercial 
commodities, that access to an adequate water supply was free and equal in Tsugaru. I should 
have thought the periodic overflowing of wells by the heavens with more water than could ever 
be coped with would have been more relevant grounds for quibbling. 
371 Quoted in Minamoto Ryoen's seminal essay, ••Jitsugaku' and Empirical Rationalism in the First 
Half of the Tokugawa Period," in de Bary and Bloom, eds., Principle and Practicality, New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1979. 
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messages conveyed in Mitsugi's political writings is that he believed the same 
thing of everyone in Tsugaru, from the daimyo to the daughters of the poorest 
landless agricultural labourer.372 He is certainly recorded as having been able, 
himself, to switch between wildly different functions and tasks and approach 
them all with equal zeal: from visiting one of the most influential households 
attached to the imperial court in Kyoto and arranging for its patriarch to 
update the Tsugaru genealogy, to surveying drainage patterns and teaching 
reading and arithmetic to illiterate villagers while serving out a criminal 
sentence in an isolated village. 
Even when he was solving problems on the ground, so to speak, elements 
of his belief in consistent cosmic patterns still occupied his mind, though, as 
can be seen in the Kawaratai textbook. Yin and yang were part of his rational 
universe, at a time when even the most scientifically enquiring minds in the land 
were only just beginning to postulate proto-scientif ic arguments against any 
connection between Japan's earthly socio-political order and the workings of 
the cosmos. Mitsugi's sustained attempts to understand and apply a set of 
principles for good government that he believed had been established in the 
distant past seem considerably more enlightened and benign than the 
imposition by the Meiji government of a xenophobic and mythical cosmology on 
Japan's modern citizenry. His decision to redistribute material goods 
according to principles derived from the I-Ching and the Duke of Chou's 
administrative order also compares quite favourably with the faith that 
informs much economic policy making today in the unimpeded mechanisms of 
commercial and financial markets. 
IV Locating Mitsugi as a thinker 
Because so little is known about Mitsugi's early education, his personal 
contacts and correspondence, it is not possible to identify his intellectual 
peers or colleagues with any certainty. His apparently close friendship with 
the domain elder, Tsugaru Mondo, and their shared commitment to radical 
372 Ravina, land and lordship, page 124. 
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reform of the domain's political and economic administration, perhaps indicates 
commonly-held convictions about the duties of administrator-bushi derived 
from Yamaga Soko's thought. And, if Yamagami's account of the relationship 
between Mitsugi and Ashibane Chojuro is at all accurate, he shared many 
scholarly interests with this Kyoto-educated merchant, whose family had 
moved from Nanbu to Tsugaru after renouncing their bushi status.373 
To place Mitsugi as a thinker among others of the Tokugawa period, we 
need to turn to the contents of the published Works. Based on such criteria 
as the traditions he found congenial, the subjects and issues he chose to 
address, and the authorities he drew on, we can arrive at some tentative 
conclusions about his intellectual world and the currents of thought he might 
have been exposed to. There is no known evidence, though, to link him directly 
with any thinkers other than those he lists in passage quoted below, and the 
few already mentioned in previous chapters of this study. 
(i) His affiliations 
In "Shigaku yoben" Mitsugi provides an unequivocal statement of the 
scholarly traditions with which he associated himself: 
For more than 3000 years, since the time of the sage kings 
and Confucius, only Mencius and Zhuangzi have truly 
understood the sages. In Japan, there are only three genuine 
scholars. They are Yamaga Soko, Ogya Sorai and Dazai 
Shundai.374 
For him, as his writings strongly attest, political wisdom was founded in the 
way of the ancient sages, as revealed in the original Confucian canon. From the 
institutions and principles of the sage kings and the wisdom of Confucius in 
those texts, he gained inspiration and models in his role as a domain official. 
As we saw in this chapter and the previous one, the Zhouli and the Yijing were 
of particular significance to him in this respect. 
In Mencius, Mitsugi would have encountered the idea of the innate 
moral worth of each human individual and social group. His admiration of 
373 Yamagami, Tsugaru Yoake, Vol 2, pages 179-80. See page 88 for comment on Yamagami's 
work. 
374 NMZ 1, ·shigaku yoben", pages 300-301. 
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Mencius was not in keeping with the view of Ogyu Sarai. In his essay, "Bendo", 
Sarai criticized Ito Jinsai on the grounds that reliance on the Mencius led him 
to give the idea of universal human goodness precedence in his thought, over 
the ethical and benevolent qualities of the sage kings, as elucidated by 
Confucius. 375 
The study of Daoist texts, particularly the Zhuangz1: provided many 
Tokugawa thinkers with foundations for positive, optimistic and objective ways 
of thinking about the natural world and the human condition. Daoism was a 
formative influence on Kaiho Seiryo, and another prominent bushi-turned-
scholar, Ogata Koan, an eminent teacher of Dutch language and science in 
Osaka. Mitsugi might have drawn from the Zhuangzithe objective and proto-
scientific attitudes he took to practical problems in the domain, but this text 
was also clearly an aesthetic and literary inspiration - though even the old 
hermit character through whom he speaks in Miyama Sojihas an air of 
distance and objectivity when he muses about political and economic affairs. 
See pages 53-54. 
Although Mitsugi's thought is not modelled consistently on the work of 
any of the three Japanese kogakuscholars he praises, he did share with each 
of them concern over social, political or economic issues, as well as the strong 
emphasis they all placed on the direct interpretation of Confucianism's 
classical texts, without resort to the mediation of commentaries written by 
Han and Song thinkers. Since Soko and Sarai were two of the three key 
figures responsible for positioning ancient learning during the seventeenth 
century as a powerful rival tradition, to both the Cheng-Zhu neo-Confucianism 
of the Hayashi family and the Wang Yang Ming school as well, it is not 
surprising that they were two of Mitsugi's most respected Japanese forebears. 
Dazai Shundai (1680-1747) studied with Sorai as an adult, and he clearly 
375 Nijita, Tokugawa political writings, pages 9, 17. 
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appealed to Mitsugi because of the thoroughness with which he analysed issues 
in Tokugawa political economy. 376 
Mitsugi, in identifying himself with the kogakutradition, followed 
Sorai's example and devoted himself to the way of the sages. He learned to 
write competent standard classical Chinese and to compose acceptable Chinese 
verse, but there is no evidence that he ever attempted to speak the language, 
or that he found it important to reproduce the music of the ancients. His 
estimation of the Mengzi and the Yijing as important classical sources was 
shared with Sorai's kogaku interlocuter, the Kyoto merchant, Ito Jinsai. 
Unlike Yamaga Soko (1622-85) and his contemporaries Kumazawa Banzan 
(1619-91) of the Wang Yang Ming tradition, and Hayashi Razan, promoter of 
the Cheng-Zhu school, Mitsugi left no evidence either that he was exercised 
by the historical fact that the sages and Confucius were Chinese, and not 
Japanese.377 His identity as a bushi-retainer and scholar, located physically 
and politically in Tsugaru, but intellectually and historically within the Chinese 
cultural sphere, seems to have been firm and untroubled. Like Sorai, he 
seemed to believe that the sages and their social worlds were not necessarily 
any more distant from him and his than they were from his contemporaries in 
China and theirs. He left no hint either of ambitions to serve the bakufu in 
Edo, or a daimyo of another domain, as Sorai, Soko, Razan and Banzan all did. 
In contrast to Sorai's claim that bushi ought to live in the countryside 
and be in active contact with the farmers and villagers on whom they depended 
376 The general points made in comparisons between Mitsugi and other thinkers in the following 
paragraphs are taken from the following works unless other references are given: 
Robert Bellah, Tokugawa Religion. Wm. Theodore de Bary and Irene Bloom, eds., Principle and 
Practicality. Wm. Theodore de Bary and Ryusaku Tsunoda, comps. Sources of Japanese Tradition. 
John Whitney Hall, Tanuma Okitsugu. H. Harootunian, Things Seen and Unseen. Maruyama, 
Masao, Studies in the Intellectual History of Tokugawa Japan. Tetsuo Najita and Irwin 
Scheiner, eds., Japanese Thought in the Tokugawa Period, 1600-1868. Tetsuo Najita, Visions of 
Virtue in Tokugawa Japan, Tokugawa Political Writings, and "History and nature in eighteenth-
century Tokugawa thought", in Hall et al., eds., The Cambridge History of Japan, vol.4. Kate 
Wildman Nakai, Shogunal Politics. and •The Naturalization of Confucianism in Tokugawa Japan", 
and Herman Ooms, Tokugawa Ideology. 
377 Kate Wildman Nakai, •The Naturalization of Confucianism in Tokugawa Japan: The Problem of 
Sinocentrism", Harvard Journal of Asian Studies, vol. 40: no.1, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard-
Yenjing Institute, 1980, pages 157-199,. 
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for survival, Mitsugi's engagement with the Horeki financial and commercial 
reforms involved efforts to cut Tsugaru bushi off from the land and move 
them into the wider money economy through annulling their jikata chigyo 
investitures. It is easy to see the inspiration of Shundai's thought here. Dazai 
Shundai (1680-1747) recommended bushiparticipation in commerce and 
financial exchange as the only alternative to their permanent decline as a 
status group, not to mention general political and economic chaos. This 
generally pessimistic view was shared by Sorai, Soko and Banzan, who all 
recognised that the lack of economic productivity among the bushiwas 
untenable. 
Mitsugi's urgent sense of obligation to be actively involved in domain 
affairs can be seen, too, as an echo of Yamaga Soko's strong ideas about the 
vocation of the bushi, but it is not so simple to place a number of other 
elements of his thought in relation to the writings of these three thinkers. 
(ii) Mitsugi's contemporaries 
By the early 1700's, serious questions had already arisen in the 
Tokugawa polity about the proper basis of social and political knowledge; and on 
the answers to those questions depended other definitions crucial to the 
formation of social and political values: definitions of virtue, verifiable truth, 
and justice. The turn-of-century disquiet was prompted by the visible poverty 
of lesser bushiand villagers in many rural areas, by growing indebtedness 
among the highest orders of the bushi elite, and by rapidly expanding financial 
and commercial activity. Contenders for recognition as the possessors of 
authoritative knowledge sometimes called their scholarly pursuits jitsugaku, to 
emphasize either the substantial, moral quality of their wisdom in contrast to 
the empty falsehoods of Buddhist or Daoist beliefs, or else the real, practical 
applicability of their knowledge in contrast to the self-searching of some 
Cheng-Zhu followers. 
Thus, when Mitsugi was young, the three main categories of 
epistemological authority were: the natural universe, revealed by proto-
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scientific, practical investigation; the wisdom of the ancients, which was 
revealed, according to kogaku enthusiasts, by the study of appropriate ancient 
texts; and the great universal Principle (rim!) inherent in all beings and 
phenomena, which was revealed, according to Cheng-Zhu scholars, by plumbing 
the principle in one's individual mind and/or various external phenomena. One 
popular test of the validity of scholarly endeavour was the usefulness that 
could be claimed for its outcomes. 
Ando Shoeki (1703-62) was born just a decade earlier than Mitsugi, and 
lived and worked in close proximity to Tsugaru. He denied the validity of all 
enquiries, schools of thought and authorities. Instead, he advocated 
demolishing the entire Tokugawa social, intellectual and political edifice. 
Shoeki practised medicine in the Hachinohe domain, and, like Mitsugi, 
witnessed first hand the hardship and misery caused in Mutsu by famines and 
the unequal allocation of resources. 
Outraged by the way in which the bushi elite expropriated what 
farmers produced, Shoeki railed against the teachings of all sages, saints, 
Buddhas and Confucians. In his view, all traditions of thought or belief were 
nothing but artifices invented to justify socio-economic hierarchies and the 
parasitic existence of those who did not produce their own food. Unlike 
Mitsugi, whose reformist activism was motivated by belief in the validity of 
the sages and Confucius, Shoeki's response in the 1750's was to formulate an 
egalitarian social ideal. Men and women would live in monogamous relationships, 
producing food and clothing for themselves and their offspring in harmony with 
the rhythms of the natural universe, unimpeded by the laws of lords, shoguns, 
sages and deities. 
In far away Kyushu, and in contrast with Shoeki, who would have 
eliminated the need for money and financial institutions altogether, Miura 
Baien (1723-89) addressed the plight of destitute village farmers by drawing 
up a co-operative saving plan. He later developed a sophisticated theory of 
value. Like Shoeki, Baien rejected history and religion as sources of truth, but 
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instead of doing away with such human inventions as money he strove to analyse 
and them objectively in terms of universal natural principle. He held that: 
The comprehensive way of understanding Heaven-and-earth is 
the study of the logic of things ... and verifying everything by 
empirical evidence.378 
Having observed, for example, that commercial mechanisms and 
financial institutions had combined to increase the value of money, making 
everyday goods too expensive for rural households, he suggested a return to 
social utility as the sole criterion for the value of coins, rather than the 
scarcity and decorative appeal that had made gold and silver so sought after. 
The use of iron instead of precious metals in the production of money, 
according to Baien, would help match value with utility and volume. 
Mitsugi, too, was well aware of the negative effects on society at large 
of the rising cost of living caused by fluctuating relations between grain prices 
and currency values. He was not a radical thinker, but he did challenge social 
norms by expecting everyone in Tsugaru to co-operate with equal commitment 
to the public good, regardless of occupation or rank. His practical solutions at 
the time of the Horeki crisis were based on similar insights to those 
articulated by Baien; but they were aimed at intervening mechanically between 
the most damaging exchange processes and the disadvantaged parties. In the 
early stages, it was the domain treasury he sought to protect by circumventing 
the most costly exchanges in Osaka. When the domain was directly threatened 
by famine, he could only advocate doing away with money-grain exchange 
altogether and redistribute food resources directly. 
(ii) Later currents 
Just one generation after Mitsugi, another far more radical reformer 
also based his policy suggestions on painstaking measurements, surveys and 
calculations. Kaiho Seiryo (1755-1817), a scholar who had abandoned bushi 
status, was influenced by Shundai's treatises on commerce and exchange. 
Seiryo formulated a principle of the measurability of all phenomena to address 
378 Tsunoda et al. eds., Sources of Japanese Tradition, Vol. 1, page 482. 
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the problem of growing impoverishment among the bushi, who, he claimed, were 
ignorant of social reality and the principles of commercial exchange even 
though their existence depended on them. Seiryo studied under a Sorai 
disciple, was a student of Daoism, and admired Sorai and Arai Hakuseki, 
because they "discussed things with real facts in mind".379 Travelling widely to 
collect data, he worked alongside merchants and influential farmers to allocate 
numerical values to a wide range of material, social, economic and political 
phenomena, including personal loyalty and noble titles. Seiryo claimed that 
everything in heaven and earth could be assigned a value according to the 
profit or benefit it produced, and therefore could be made subject to 
commodif ication and exchange. 
As well as their use of mathematics, measurement and proportions in 
collecting and marshalling objective data, Seiryo and Mitsugi held in common 
the conviction that bushi should abandon the attitude that money matters 
were beneath them and begin to deal with their own financial affairs as well as 
taking charge of official money transactions and commercial ventures in their 
domains. While it does not seem that Seiryo would have contemplated, as 
Mitsugi did, the appointment of wealthy farmers or merchants to official posts 
previously filled by bush1~ the two men did, however, also share a sense of 
reformist urgency. Seiryo opposed the attitudes of those who would "leave 
things as they are" and "carry on as usual without changing things", declaring 
that people should broach social and economic reform as if they were "about to 
embark on a difficult manouevre" such as "walking in deep water". They needed 
to "roll up their cuffs" and proceed with "courage and decisiveness".380 
Another thinker of Seiryo's generation, and one he greatly admired, was 
the Kansai-born Yamagata Banto (1748 - 1821). Banto's early experience was in 
practical political economy, but he later developed an interest in scientific 
thinking and learned astronomy. The strategy Banto devised when he was given 
the task of engineering the Date (Sendai) domain out of its long-term debts 
379 Maruyama, Studies, page 294. 
380 Ibid, pages 296-297. 
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while he was working in an Osaka financial house is strikingly similar to financial 
reform policies planned by Mitsugi. In Santo's scheme, transactions between 
Sendai, agents in Edo, and the financier in Osaka were all direct. All the hard 
currency in the domain was collected and invested through one financier, while 
internal paper currency was used for all transactions within the domain. 
Santo believed, like Mitsugi, that since merchants did not pay 
agricultural taxes they should to contribute to the public good by keeping 
markets functioning smoothly through contributing their wealth and talents. 381 
Another point on which these two scholars agreed was their refusal to believe 
in disembodied spirits, magic or any other superstitions. Santo's claim that 
religious traditions were based on fabrications and mystifications was, like 
Shoeki's iconoclasm, far stronger than Mitsugi's controversial demurral at the 
miracle of perspiration on Acala's brow, but they were all in the same vein. 
One other thinker, who experimented with upland rice, like Mitsugi, and 
whose plans for an ideal society recall those of Ando Shoeki, with whom the 
comparisons began. Sato Nobuhiro (1769-1850) travelled, like Kaiho Seiryo, 
and gathered empirical data from a wide range of regions. Like Ando Shoeki, 
he was disturbed by rural poverty and decline; and repelled as well by the 
extent of infanticide he saw in the poorest areas of the northeast and 
southwest, including no doubt Shoeki's old home district. Inspired by the 
ancient sages, Nobuhiro claimed that proper management of the land and more 
appropriate institutions would relieve much of the distress he had witnessed. 
Like Mitsugi, he experimented with crops, including upland rice, that suited 
conditions in many domains better than paddy rice. Further inspired by ideas 
including Sorai's concern over institutions, Hirata Atsutane's Shinto, and the 
mercantilism of various European states, he planned a utopian, united Japanese 
polity in which industries would be perfected, goods circulated and government 
authority centralised. Unlike Shoeki, however, he did not envision a society in 
which the bushiwould not be in charge. 
381 Najita, Visions of Virtue, page 250. 
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Choosing stars from the galaxy that was eighteenth-century Japanese 
thought is a random exercise at best, particularly since the data on Mitsugi's 
intellectual interlocutors is so sparse. The themes have recurred, however, of 
status and obligation, the value and uses of money, the plight of the rural poor, 
the indebtedness of the bush1: and the authority of religious or spiritual 
beliefs, practical knowledge and historical knowledge. These identified with a 
number of different traditions and drew upon a variety of authorities. 
Yamaga Soko, for example, started as a student of Cheng Zhu neo-
Confucianism in the Hayashi school. He had also studied Daoism and Buddhism 
before he turned to the study of the ancients and then Shinto as well. Soko 
believed that for the sake of the country bushishould research the weapons 
technology and military strategy brought by foreign ships to Japan, which 
made him an early supporter of European studies too. In contrast, Baien, as a 
village doctor's son, studied medicine and Chinese classics at first, but was 
later exposed to serious mathematics and Western astronomy through 
contacts in Nagasaki. Untroubled by bushi status consciousness, he became 
convinced that the truth, reason and order of all things would only by revealed 
after thorough empirical study of the natural universe and man's social 
existence using objective, dialectical principles. 
It is obvious, then, that in his reliance on ancient texts as the basic 
sources for the principles of practical domain administration and distributive 
justice, in his commitment to the acquisition of practical skills and empirical 
knowledge, and in his identification with the Zhuangzi in his contemplative 
retirement years, Mitsugi exhibited an eclecticism that was not at all unusual 
in his time. He shared particular concerns with different thinkers of the 250-
year period, from the earliest kogaku scholars to the later students of 
empirical science. It was the circumstances of his life and career in the 
remote Tsugaru domain that determined the ways in which his intellectual 
activities worked their way out in practice. 
Extra Plates: The ahats from the summit of Mount Iwaki in their present 
accommodation in Chosho ii temple 
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Conclusion 
The power to feed the people in a far-off place 
Question: what you have set down above, is just about sending 
out rice and taking in money. Is there a difference between 
that and putting out money to pay for bringing in rice? I would 
say there is no difference. 
Answer: The first makes rice the priority; the second puts 
money first. Outside the cities, prices are high. In the capital 
the price is low. Both these facts come from the natural 
circumstances of geographical distance. Nyui Mitsugi.381 
And still the rain falls, and roads, bridges, rice-fields, trees, 
and hill-sides are being swept in a common ruin towards the 
Tsugaru Strait, so tantalisingly near; and the simple people are 
calling on the forgotten gods of the rivers and the hills, on the 
sun and moon, and all the host of heaven, to save them from 
this "plague of immoderate rain and waters." 
Isabella Bird.382 
A foreign contemporary of Nyai Mitsugi's, who shared his scepticism 
towards religious and superstitious beliefs, left behind influential texts on 
such subjects as the nature and outward forms of virtue, and the motivation of 
wealth. And, although Adam Smith (1723-90) is now most studied as "the 
founder of modern political economy", like some later thinkers in that tradition 
- Mill and Marx, for example - he was a serious social theorist and 
philosopher.383 It is from that nineteenth-century notion of political economy, 
in which state, social and religious powers are all considered relevant to the 
shaping of economic outcomes, that I have drawn the various threads of my 
argument. 
On a map of the eastern provinces of Japan drawn by a Korean emissary 
during the fifteenth century, the province of Mutsu occupies the eastern two 
thirds of Tohoku, and the "large village of Tsugaru" (?t'-E::km) the western 
third. The province of Dewa is far to the south, its northern border at the 
381 NMZ 2, "Shoka rido", page 308. 
382 Isabella Bird, Unbeaten Tracks in Japan, London: J. Murray, 1888, page 355. 
383 Robert Audi, The Cambridge Dictionary of Phtlosophy, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, pages 743-44. 
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same latitude as the Shirakawa barrier. Within Mutsu, but towards the border 
with Tsugaru, the term Ichi(~W!) is entered. The island now known as 
Hokkaido is labelled Ito(~lib). Tsugaru was thus understood by our 
cartographer's informants in Kyoto to be surrounded by, or contiguous with, 
lands occupied by the Emishi. 
Figure 8: Territories marked in part of the map made in the fifteenth century by 
a Korean emissary to Japan 
Sources: Map based on "Kaito shokoku kiff (Record of countries in the eastern seqs), 
reproduced in Morita, ed., Aomori-ken no rekishi, page 180. 
Compared with regions of Japan to the south, east, and west, Tsugaru 
was in fact a place with ambivalent relations to the country's political and 
institutional centre at that time, and was to remain so for more than another 
century. Although the port of Tosaminato had long been integrated into a 
trading network linking mainland China, Korea, and the island of Ezo with Japan, 
the penetration of Tsugaru's settlements and fortresses by land had been 
sporadic and partial. Most conspicuously enduring was the presence of 
Buddhist priests, who engaged in esoteric Tendai or Shugendopractices, or 
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else taught the·compassion of the Amidaand Dali11chiBuddhas, leaving their 
itabi as traces. 
When Nobunaga began his drive towards the unification of military and 
political authority, Tsugaru was scarcely on the map, so to speak, and when 
Oura Tamenobu thrust the region, and himself, into Hideyoshi's consciousness, 
it was at a time when the targets of the latter's ambitions were beyond the 
opposite boundaries of Japan, in Korea and China. Even if we avoid terms like 
parvenu and traitor, it is still the case that Tsugaru as a domain was definitely 
a latecomer so far as the Tokugawa settlement was concerned. The Nanbu, 
and Satake daimyo families, for example, who presided over Tsugaru's large 
adjoining neighbours, both had long histories managing substantial territories 
and armies. 
Political power in eighteenth-century Tsugaru was an amalgam of 
constantly shifting fields of influence. Some insight into the sources of that 
power is essential to an understanding of the nature of famines, even though 
their defining features as disasters were primarily economic and social, 
culminating in large numbers of the poor starving to death because they could 
not afford to buy food. Tsugaru's political economy, as I have interpreted its 
significance in relation to famine, was shaped by four sources of influence. 
They were: the domain's geographic location and climate; the authority of the 
incumbent daimyo in relation to the central power of the shogunate; the 
economic forces mobilised by the bakuhan system of shared power; and a 
number of ideas, beliefs and practices that were rooted in the local landscape 
and its history, as well as in various Shinto, Confucian, Daoist and Buddhist 
traditions. While Shinto traditions were at that time primarily local, those of 
the Confucian, Daoist and Buddhist cultural spheres were influential through 
the entirety of Tokugawa Japan, and far beyond its closed borders. 
for a substantial part of the seventeenth century, the domain of 
Tsugaru was establishing itself. Natural resources and manpower were poured 
into building projects in the new capital, as well as flood control and irrigation 
infrastructure in the establishment of huge areas of new rice paddy. 
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Compared with areas further south that had been developed under Sengoku 
daimyos like the Takeda of Kai, the Tsugaru plain was virgin territory waiting 
to be opened up for cultivation. This could have made for an economic 
advantage in the medium term, since the domain was willing to place bushi-
retainers on rural fiefs in newly-developed areas and was therefore briefly in a . 
position to manage the ratio of enfeoffed retainers to farmer-producers to 
the advantage of its treasury. 
From the very start, however, a significant number of retainers, who 
had long been established in their fiefs, were reluctant either to move away to 
the capital or to accept their stipends as treasury payments. Apart from 
those older households, the domain added to the complexity and stagnation of 
its economic life by periodically trying to move bushi from urban areas back 
onto the land. Two further drawbacks also connected with Tsugaru's location, 
were the weather and the markets. 
Whether or not volcanic eruptions or the often mooted "little ice age" 
were responsible, Tsugaru's weather during the Tokugawa period was not suited 
to the cultivation of rice as the primary source of official income and popular 
sustenance. Improvements in agricultural technology and civil engineering skills 
since then have meant that it is now possible to control the waters of the 
Iwaki River system, but that was not until well into the twentieth century. 
During crucial stages when the domain was being established, and into the 
eighteenth century, significant outlays in manpower and resources were wasted 
on riparian works. Kondo has pointed out that during the twentieth century, 
even without regular major floods, there were still sufficiently cold summer 
temperatures every three or four decades for rice yields to plummet for 
several years. Methods of raising rice seedlings under plastic, and warming 
water before it is circulated to paddy fields for planting out, have been 
developed, but the technology and materials required for combating climatic 
conditions were simply not available to Tokugawa-period farmers. 
Tsugaru's very existence as a new polity depended on its continued 
acceptance by the shogun and bakufu in Edo. The daimyos of the seventeenth 
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century could therefore not afford to appear ungenerous in their expenditure 
on gifts, performances of fealty, and the material accoutrements of domainal 
status. The costs of substantial building and infrastructure programs in 
Hirosaki, establishing and maintaining two sizeable residential compounds in 
Edo, and another in Kyoto, were added to the expenses of riparian works and 
the sankin kotaiprocess.384 Furthermore, the spending habits of the privileged 
strata were clearly profligate, as instanced by the lavish performances put on 
by the domain when Nobuyasu first arrived in the domain. 
Added to overspending, the actual ways in which the domain's income 
was handled exacerbated the problem: each year, grain from the agricultural 
tax intake was set aside for retainer allowances and castle needs, and the rest 
was shipped to the domain's dealers in Osaka to be exchanged for silver and 
gold. Gold transfers were then arranged by financial agents and sent to the 
domain's finance office in Edo. Silver and copper cash would also be sent back 
to Tsugaru. The domain was therefore not in control of the exchange and 
handling processes in either of the major market places. That was why, when 
he was put in charge of the Horeki reforms, one of the first things Mitsugi did 
was arrange to store rice in the domain and ship it off in periodic instalments 
to directly meet payments in Edo. Not only did this policy fulfil the ruler's 
duty to store grain against famines, it cut out a number of exchange processes . 
Despite Tsugaru's performance in outstripping all other domains in the 
project of increasing productivity by opening up new fields for rice production, 
the official accounts were in chronic deficit before the mid 1700's. Then, a 
series of disastrous floods caused such harvest shortfalls that the state of 
the domain's affairs approached bankruptcy. Apart from dealing with the 
crisis through new deals with market financiers, and arranging granary storage 
in Tsugaru for the new harvest, in his position as chief reformer Mitsugi tried 
to change the domain's spending habits. That raises the question of 
entitlements. 
384 See Tsukahira, Feudal Control. Chapter IV, for an account of the expenses involved in the 
sankin kotai. 
284 
Mitsugi repeatedly expressed a very strong sense of social hierarchy 
and orders of privilege, which can be seen in the number of graded divisions in 
his breakdown of the population in "Setsuyosoku" (Rules for economizing in the 
use of resources) for the calculation of their living costs.385 Alongside that, 
however, he set out equally robust ideas about the duty of governments to 
care for their people: not to make them all equals, but to give them all equal 
chances of surviving, and living productive lives appropriate to their 
occupational status, and their position within that status. 
The question of status, occupation and class is a complex one, but 
Mitsugi wrote frequently of all men being engaged in a particular occupation, 
and contributing usefully to the polity in that context: even in the case of the 
religious, who should concentrate on offering prayers for the prosperity of the 
domain and the health of the daimyo. He himself is recorded to have appointed 
merchants and farmers to official posts customarily held by bush1: so it does 
not seem that he adhered strictly to the hereditary principle, but instead 
appointed capable individuals, whatever their birth status. It seems to have 
been a practice in the domain, too, to appoint bushi of merit to elevated 
positions in the administration, as we have seen in the promotions of members 
of the Yamaga family, and of Mitsugi himself. 
There is evidence in the documents compiled from old diaries that it 
was relatively privileged persons and institutions in Tsugaru who were most 
incommoded by the Horeki reform policies, and the most vocal about the 
inconvenience and discomfort they suffered. These were people from the 
entrenched commercial and religious establishments, or from land-holding 
retainer families who were accustomed to extracting and disposing of their 
own income. In Edo it was the conservative political advisor, Matsudaira who 
was convinced that Mitsugi was corrupt. We do not know about the vast 
illiterate majority of Tsugaru's inhabitants. We do know that it was a well-fed 
man who complained that the inconvenience caused by the reforms was "ten 
times worse than the upheavals caused by a harvest failure". 
385 NMZ 2, "Setsuyosoku", pages 259-267. 
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Clearly, the ways of life to which privileged and relatively wealthy groups 
had become accustomed were significantly disrupted by the imposition of 
Mitsugi's reform policies. Retainers holding substantial landed fiefs, 
wealthy land-owning farming households, and merchants not holding 
privileged official posts were· all inconvenienced and deprived. And 
furthermore, by insisting that all shrines and temples participate in 
property surveys, by questioning the validity of locally recognized 
miracles and mysteries, and by refusing to outlay public funds for 
seasonal rituals, Mitsugi diminished the independence and authority of 
influential religious institutions, as well as their opportunities for 
garnering extra income. 
Mitsugi left no evidence at all that he found it acceptable for members 
of these socio-economic strata to live comfortably while poorer people 
died during famines. On the contrary, he wrote a great deal to indicate 
the contrary: that all the people would be saved, and at considerable 
official cost, if necessary. Hence, he made those cost of living · 
calculations, and attempted to apply the results. These were ideas and 
convictions he formulated out of an interest in numbers and assiduous 
study of some of the most revered texts of the cultural sphere he 
·inhabited. In the far-off place where he lived, texts conveying the 
wisdom of the ancient sage kings did not need to be naturalized, or 
translated, or pronounced in the original language. Mitusgi applied them 
just as he read them, and developed his innovative, practical and fair-
minded ideas. Neither the politics of Tsugaru, nor those of the distant 
centre, could accommodate those ideas to the point of acting upon them -
as Mitsugi himself did. 
Like ephemeral summer insects flitting across the water's surface, 
Mitsugi and his Horeki reforms were swallowed up by the turtles of 
centralized, bakufu political power and its economic ramifications. And, 
like the carp whose movement in the castle moat is almost imoerceotible. 
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patterns of climatic change and the Tsugaru region's waxing and waning 
interconnectivity with the Japanese state to the south, or peoples and 
polities to the north and west determine now, as they did then, the 
degree to which human intervention can alter the fate of the region's 
inhabitants. 
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Appendix One: The twelve Tsugaru daimyos. 
~ 'h. 16 20 23 41 Sources: sugaru s. 1 jiten, paqes - , - , 
Name and family Life span ,Ageat death/retirement Period in office 
connection Years as Location of grave Age at succession 
daimyo 
1. Tsugaru Tamenobu 1549 - 1607 58 1590 - 1607 
$ill£~{~ 17 41 
b. Oura Tamenobu 
2. Tsugaru Nobuhira 1585 - 1631 46 1607 - 1631 
$ill!f~tt 24 22 
Tamenobu's son 
3. Tsugaru Nobuyoshi 1619 - 1655 36 1631- 1655 
$ill£{~~ 24 12 
Nobuhira's son 
4. Tsugaru Nobumasa 1645 - 1710 65 1656 - 1710 
$ill£{~~ 54 11 
Nobuyoshi's son, and 
brother of first 
Kuroishi daimyo. 
5. Tsugaru Nobuhisa 1668 - 1746 78/63 1710 - 1731 
$ill£{~1!/ 21 42 
Nobumasa's son 
6. Tsugaru Nobuaki 1718 - 1744 26 1731 - 1744 
$ill£{~~ 13 13 
Nobuhisa's grandson 
7. Tsugaru Nobuyasu 1738 - 1784 46 1744 - 1784 
$ill£{~$ 40 6 
Nobuaki's son 
8. Tsugaru Nobuharu 1761 - 1791 30 1784 - 1791 
$ill£{~~ 7 23 
Nobuyasu's son 
9. Tsugaru Yasuchika 1762 - 1833 73/63 1791- 1825 
$ill£$~ 35 29 
6th Kuroishi daimyo 
10. Tsugaru Nobuyuki 1799 - 1862 63/40 1825 - 1839 
$ill!{~ )llJ{ 14 26 
Yasuchika's son 
11. Tsugaru Yukitsugu 1799 - 1865 66/60 1839 - 1859 
$ijl£Ji!Ji* 20 40 
9th Kuroishi daimyo. Third son of 
Matsudaira Nobuaki. 
12. Tsugaru Tsuguakiral 1841 - 1930 Became governor 1859 - 1869 
$ill!*BB of Hirosaki at 28. 18 
4th son of Hosokawa Saigo Died aqed 79. 
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Glossary 
Literary and military arts. 
Warrior, or samurai. 
An investiture, or fief, which took the form of 
either fuch1: or kuramai, both of which were 
commonly called chigyo. 
Land apportioned to a retainer by the daimyo or 
shogun as his investiture. 
A retainer allotted chigyochiby daimyo or bakufu. 
Official intendant, representing the administrative 
authority of either the shogunate or the domain 
Name given to peoples of northern Japan, 
particularly the Ainu. 
Name given to peoples in northern Japan (including 
the Ainu) or the island of Hokkaido. 
An allowance, measured by the number of adults it 
could support for one year. 
Bannermen, or liege vassals, of the shogun with 
fiefs of less than 10 ,000 koku. 
Policy of separating the occupations of the bushi 
and farming populations. 
Barnyard grass, or deccan grass. A course type of 
millet. 
Independent, landowning farmers. 
Salary paid to a retainer. 
Ration coupon for obtaining goods assigned to the 
household. 
292 
itabi t.&~* Small Buddhist stone stele inscribed with Sanskrit 
text. 
jikata chigyo :t:-t!rn *tl:ff Rural holdings allotted as fiefs to higher or middle 
level retainers, called chigyotori(see entry above), 
who managed the land and held rights to directly 
extract taxes and labour services. 
jinsei 1=J§fl: Benevolent rule. 
jitsudaka/ ~IWJ Actual size of a daimyo's holdings expressed in 
uchidaka/ rkJ rWJ terms of productivity in rice, measured in koku of 
kusadaka :&trWJ rice. 
cf. omotedaka or hodaka 
kabunakama ~ft?r~i Association or guild of merchants dealing with the 
same product or manufacture. 
kamon/ *F~ Daimyo and bushihouseholds descended from 
shinpan ttm Tokugawa Ieyasu. 
kanjo bugyo !JJJt$1t Financial magistrate. Post held by Nyui Mitsugi. 
karo *~ Elder in domain administration. 
kemi ~Jl Inspection of rice crop to determine appropriate 
tax assessment. 
kochigyo r*tl1t Small fief granted to retainers or farmers who 
lived on newly-developed farmland. 
kuni 00 Country, often used to refer to a larger domain. 
kokueki 00~ Interest, or profit of a domain, directed at self-
sufficiency. 
kome kitte *-SO~ Rice promissory note. 
koribugyo !15$1T District magistrate. 
kura irichi iii.AW! Land under domain's direct administrative control, 
from which tax and other obligations were 
extracted. 
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kuramai/ liG*l-WJ* Investiture whose holders were paid a stipend 
kirimai chigyo *111-T from the domain treasury, which might retain some 
association with a landed fief. 
kuramai/ liG*, WJ* (lit. treasury rice) Samurai stipend, commonly paid 
kirimai in rice. 
kuramaitori liG*I& Retainers who received stipends as rice from the 
domain granary, and were not normally as high-
ranking as chigyotor1: 
kuroshio ~~ The warm current flowing northwards up the 
Pacific coast and also into the Japan Sea. 
kyoyo *1154 Allowance, ration, or grant. 
machibugyo fHT$1t Town magistrate. 
motoshi :JG~ General overseer. Post held by Nyai Mitsugi. 
nago ~-=f Status held by rural labouring families attached to 
landowning households, and not eligible to hold 
village posts. 
nengu ff.Jt The agricultural tax, assessed in equivalent rice 
value and paid to the relevant overlord in rice, 
other grains and commodities, or money. 
ojoya ::k!±~ Major village headman, who had administrative 
responsibility for a group of villages 
omotedaka, * rWJ , rt: iWi Putative wealth of a domain, and the formal 
hodaka investiture of its daimyo, designating his status in 
relation to the shogun. Measured in koku of rice. 
oyashio tt~ The cold current flowing past the Kurile Islands. 
sankin kotai £ib~f1\; ~ :X System of compulsory residence in Edo and 
attendance on the shogun during alternate years, 
imposed on daimyos. 
shono !j'\~ Small-scale landowning cultivators. 
shoya !±~ Village head man. 
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shugenja {~~~ Mountain ascetic. 
tenbatsu :;Rfij Punishment from heaven. 
tozama ~* Category of daimyos outside the Tokugawa lineage 
and not involved in bakufu administration. 
unsoyaku ~*~ Office of distribution. 
yamase rJJ~ Cold wind blowing from the northern polar region 
over Tohoku during the summer. 
yamabushi rJJ{R: Itinerant priest, usually associated with a mountain 
temple. 
yon in fflA Steward, or manager. 
zeni ~ Copper coin. 
, I 
1 
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